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ABSTRACT 
The Making of Liberal Intellectuals in Post-Tiananmen China 
Junpeng Li 
 
Intellectual elites have been the collective agents responsible for many democratic transitions worldwide 
since the early twentieth century. Intellectuals, however, have also been blamed for the evils in modern 
times. Instead of engaging in abstract debates about who the intellectuals are and what they do, this 
project studies intellectuals and their ideas within historical contexts. More specifically, it examines the 
social forces behind the evolving political attitudes of Chinese intellectuals from the late 1970s to the 
present. Chinese politics has received an enormous amount of attention from social scientists, but 
intellectuals have been much less explored systematically in social sciences, despite their significant role 
in China’s political life. Chinese intellectuals have been more fully investigated in the humanities, but 
existing research either treats different “school of thought” as given, or gives insufficient attention to the 
division among the intellectuals. It should also be noted that many studies explicitly take sides by 
engaging in polemics. To date, little work has thoroughly addressed the diversity and evolution, let alone 
origins, of political ideas in post-Mao China. As a result, scholars unfamiliar with Chinese politics are often 
confused about the labels in the Chinese intelligentsia, such as the association of nationalism with the 
Left and human rights with the Right. More important, without considering how the ideas took shape, we 
would not adequately understand the political trajectory of communist China, where elite politics and local 
policies have been profoundly shaped by intellectual debates. 
This dissertation takes a relational approach to the intellectual debates in contemporary China by 
analyzing the formation of political ideas and crystallization of intellectual positions. It asks two questions: 
who are the Chinese liberals, and how were their distinctive bundles of political views formed? Drawing 
on 67 semi-structured interviews with Chinese intellectual elites across the ideological spectrum, as well 
as detailed historical and textual analyses, this dissertation examines the social forces that have shaped 
the political attitudes of liberal intellectuals in contemporary China. It argues against the prevailing 
attempts to define Chinese liberalism as a social category with a coherent ideology comparable to its 
Western counterpart; rather, as a community of discourse that contains a number of competing and 
contradictory discourses, it is embedded in China’s social reality as an authoritarian regime governed by 
a communist party, and contingent on China’s history straddling the Maoist and post-Mao eras. Rather 
than a monolithic or tight-knit group, Chinese liberals are comprised of an array of social actors, including 
scholars, journalists, lawyers, activists, and house church leaders. They are liberal not because of what 
they are for, but because of what they are against; more specifically, Chinese liberals are united by an 
anti-authoritarian mentality, which is a historical product of the Cultural Revolution from 1966 to 1976 and 
the Tiananmen Square protests of 1989. 
In addition to biographical factors, the views of Chinese liberals have been shaped by structural 
factors represented by the neoliberal reforms and the rise and growth of the intellectual field since the 
1990s, as well as interactive factors manifested by the polar opposition between the liberals and the New 
Leftists. On the one hand, as state-driven capitalism unleashed China’s economic potential, China was 
well on its way to becoming a major player in the international community toward the end of the 1990s; on 
the other hand, the fusion of the free market and political power led to rampant corruption and social 
injustice. How to make sense of China’s crony capitalism became an important dividing line between the 
New Left and liberalism. As the intellectual debates were increasingly cast as part of global cultural 
production, how to appropriate Western thinkers and concepts became a site of contestation. While the 
dramatic expansion of higher education led to the growth of the intellectual field with its own logic and 
rules, in which both liberals and New Left intellectuals were struggling for symbolic power, the penetration 
of the political field remained, not only in terms of visible incentives and punishments, but also in terms of 
its subtle influence on the manner of problem construction and debate. Through combative interactions, 
the liberals and the New Leftists have defined themselves by reference to each other. In the process of 
binary opposition, the views of both sides have moved further and further apart with little overlap. 
This dissertation contributes to political sociology and the sociology of knowledge in three ways. 
First, departing from the conventional approach that takes political orientations for granted, it takes a 
relational approach by analyzing the dynamic processes of ideological formation and polarization. Second, 
it traces the process of ideological alignment and differentiation on three levels: structural, interactive, and 
biographical. Third, while it has been observed that intellectual elites have been the collective agents 
responsible for many democratic transitions worldwide since the early twentieth century, the internal 
division of the intellectuals has received much less attention. My work addresses this issue by analyzing 
how the Chinese intelligentsia has structuralized into binary opposition since the Tiananmen Square 
protests. In particular, I treat political ideas as historical contingencies, rather than fixed properties, that 
are internally shaped by “fractal distinctions.”
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of a few individuals, such as Larry H. P. Lang, Chinese personal names are written with surname 
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First in the world to assume its worries; last to enjoy its pleasures. 
—Fan Zhongyan (1046) 
 
 
On December 9, 2008, an open letter signed by 303 Chinese intellectuals, many of whom 
prominent figures, appeared on the Internet and quickly spread in China’s intellectual circles. The letter 
began with the following paragraph: 
 
A hundred years have passed since the writing of China’s first constitution. 2008 also 
marks the sixtieth anniversary of the promulgation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
the thirtieth anniversary of the appearance of the Democracy Wall in Beijing, and the tenth of 
China’s signing of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. … The Chinese 
people, who have endured human rights disasters and uncountable struggles across these 
same years, now include many who see clearly that freedom, equality, and human rights are 
universal values of humankind and that democracy and constitutional government are the 
fundamental framework for protecting these values.1 
 
The letter, commonly called “Charter 08,” proceeded to declare six universal values—freedom, 
human rights, equality, republicanism, democracy, and constitutional rule—and made 19 demands in 
regard to political and economic reforms. Despite its rather low-key tone and message, the Charter was 
perceived by the Chines Communist Party (CCP) as a collective challenge to its communist rule and 
provoked its harsh responses. 
More than a year later, in March 2010, Wang Binbin, a literature professor at Nanjing University, 
publicly accused Wang Hui, a highly-regarded professor, also of literature, at Tsinghua University of 
plagiarism. The news caught national and international attention. As a large number of world-class 
scholars spoke for or against Wang Hui—including more than 80 renowned foreign scholar, such as 
Frederic Jameson, Gayatri Spivak, Michael Hardt, Andrew Ross, and Slavoj Žižek, who came to Wang 
                                                          




Hui’s defense, despite their lack of proficiency in Chinese2—the controversy quickly escalated into a high-
profile confrontation between Wang Hui’s accusers and supporters. 
What did these two events have in common? After all, the first one was, or turned out to be, a 
highly sensitive political event that, at least for those in political power, defied the communist rule, 
whereas the second appeared to be a controversy with minimal relevance to those outside the Ivory 
Tower. Those familiar China know, however, that they were both significant events with far-reaching 
implications in the contemporary Chinese intelligentsia.3 One the one hand, it is helpful to understand the 
occurrence of these two events in the context of the intense contestation and confrontation between 
liberalism and the left, which have become such a prominent theme in China’s cultural life that almost 
every noted intellectual has been at least loosely attached to one camp or the other. A closer look at the 
two events reveals a striking partisan pattern. There was much overlapping between the Charter’s 
signatories and Wang Hui’s accusers, who were in general identified as liberals,4 while the leftists were 
universally missing from the list of the Charter’s signatories and almost all came to Wang Hui’s defense. 
On the other hand, these two events both cut across the spheres of the political, the intellectual, and the 
academic. In contemporary China—indeed throughout the Chinese history—intellectual contestations 
have rarely been confined to the intellectual or academic circles. The intellectual field and the political 
field have never been mutually exclusive blocs, but rather have shaped and been shaped by China’s 
political trajectory in many ways. In other words, to make sense of the dynamics in the intellectual field, 
one has to situate it in China’s political context; and a discussion of Chinese politics would be incomplete 
without addressing China’s complex intellectual scene. This study hopes to shed some light in this regard. 
This study provides a relational account of intellectuals, in particular the liberal intellectuals, in 
contemporary Chinese. As the title suggests, it considers Chinese liberalism a social formation contingent 
on China’s unique history, underpinned by concrete social nexus, and embedded in changing political 
                                                          
2 The list of the foreign scholars and their open letter, in both Chinese and English, can be found in: 
http://book.ifeng.com/culture/whrd/detail_2010_07/09/1744186_0.shtml (retrieved May 26, 2016). 
 
3 Instead of highlighting historical specificity (Berlin 2013; Kimball 1994), I adopt a rather loose definition of 
intelligentsia here and use the term as a collective designation of intellectuals. A similar usage can be found in 
Mannheim (1956). 
 
4 Interestingly, Wang Binbin, Wang Hui’s original accuser, had not been previously identified as a liberal. Indeed, he 
was among the first to be classified into the camp of the New Left in the 1990s. 
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contexts.5 What does it mean to be a liberal in communist China? How did the liberal intellectuals come to 
their liberal beliefs and their existence as a social formation? These are the questions the following study 
pursues. To put it simply, my answer to the first question is that being liberal means being anti-
authoritarian, explicitly or implicitly, in today’s China, despite the difference in the degree and the internal 
variation. Put another way, rather than a coherent political ideology or philosophical school, Chinese 
liberalism is a jumbled, vague, and heterogeneous set of ideas and attitudes unified by a shared critique 
of the existing communist rule. The second question is more puzzling, as the split between the New Left 
and liberalism took place in the mid-1990s, and both the New Left and liberalism descended from the 
reformist-oriented New Enlightenment movement of the 1980s. 
My answer to the second question is threefold. First, the interplay of two structural factors—the 
neoliberal reforms that were put in place in 1992 and the growth of the intellectual field in the 1990s—
transformed the relationship between the intellectuals and the party-state. On the one hand, as state-
driven capitalism unleashed China’s economic potential, China was well on its way to becoming a major 
player in the international community toward the end of the 1990s; on the other hand, the fusion of the 
free market and political power led to rampant corruption and social injustice. How to make sense of 
China’s crony capitalism became an important initial dividing line between the New Left and liberalism. As 
the intellectual debates were increasingly cast as part of global cultural production, how to appropriate 
Western thinkers and concepts became a site of contestation. While the dramatic expansion of higher 
education led to the growth of the intellectual field with its own logic and rules, in which both liberal and 
New Left intellectuals were struggling for symbolic power, the penetration of the political field remained, 
not only in terms of visible incentives and punishments, but also in terms of its subtle influence on the 
manner of problem construction and debate. Through a historical narrative of the transformation of the 
Chinese intelligentsia, the changing relationship between intellectuals and the party-state, and the 
contentious issues, Chapter 2 delineates the structural complexity and historical evolution of China’s post-
Mao intelligentsia. Second, the shared life trajectory in a communist regime played a significant role. 
More specifically, the traumatic experiences during the Cultural Revolution from 1966 to 1976 and the 
Tiananmen Square protests of 1989 profoundly changed how those intellectuals view the ruling 
                                                          
5 I borrow the term “social formation” from Louis Althusser (2005), but use it in a more general and sociological sense 
without the Marxist connotation. 
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communist party. This is the subject of Chapter 3. Third, through combative interactions, the liberals and 
the New Leftists defined themselves by reference to each other. In the process of binary opposition, the 
views of both sides moved further and further apart with little overlap. While the theme runs through the 
entire study, it is discussed more explicitly in Chapter 4. 
 
Liberal Intellectuals in Post-Tiananmen China 
 
Chinese history has been one of intellectual engagement, considering the fact that intellectuals 
have been a major social and political force for centuries. Throughout history, Chinese intellectuals have 
been characterized by a “worrying mentality” (youhuan yishi) (Link 1992:249–55), as intellectuals have 
traditionally taken the world as their own responsibility. This kind of worrying mentality has been such an 
integrated part of Chinese political culture that even those having lived overseas as non-Chinese citizens 
for decades still pay close attention to China’s political dynamics. This has much to do with China’s 
turbulent modern history of foreign invasion and nation-building. As a result, generation after generation, 
Chinese intellectuals have tried to find remedies for China’s social ills and paths of its national 
rejuvenation. Such sweeping questions as “whither China” have occupied many of China’s brightest 
minds. This in part explains why such theoretical fields as political philosophy enjoyed readership far 
beyond the narrow academic circles, as the educated public believed that they would offer long-term 
solutions for China’s political predicament. Furthermore, unlike advanced industrial societies where 
educated elites seldom use the label “intellectual” to describe themselves—let alone an emotional bond—
this worry mentality is accompanied by a strong sense of self-identity, and even class consciousness, in 
China. During my interviews, many of my interviewees repeatedly referred to themselves as “intellectuals” 
(zhishifenzi) and talked about their responsibility as if they were members of a distinct social class. 6 One 
interviewee even mentioned that he would be willing to scarify his life if it would bring democracy to China. 
Such a worrying mentality became particularly prominent in twentieth-century China, with the May 
Fourth Movement of 1919 and the Tiananmen Square protests of 1989 as the two signature events. The 
May Fourth Movement, along with the broader New Culture Movement, took its inspiration from the 
                                                          
6 Only one interviewee refused to call himself an “intellectual,” on the ground that he was a high school dropout. 
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European Enlightenment. After nearly three decades of Mao’s rule, China witnessed a new wave of 
enlightenment in the 1980s. A central characteristic of the Chinese intelligentsia in the 1980s was the 
relative homogeneity of its attitudes. On the spirit of “reevaluating all values,” Chinese intellectuals were 
eager to catch up with the West by learning Western ideas and reforming China’s economic and political 
systems. Modernization through reform was the consensus. Despite the lack of a specific blueprint, a 
combination of market economy, liberal democracy, and individualism found in the United States was 
perceived by many intellectuals as an ideal model to imitate. 
The rolling tanks in Tiananmen Square on June 4, 1989 dramatically changed China’s intellectual 
landscape. Terms such as “conservative” (baoshoupai) and “reformer” (gaigepai) lost most of their 
relevance in the 1990s. More significantly, as an intellectual field was taking shape, a partisan line 
emerged and began to dominate the intellectual life. Increasingly, Chinese intellectuals bifurcated into two 
camps: liberals and New Leftists. With the facilitation of the Internet, those debates often reached huge 
audiences. With China’s rise on the global stage, both sides have offered their own interpretations and 
undergone further internal transformations. 
Two clarifications are in order here. First, who are the intellectuals? I will not try to provide a 
universal definition of the intellectual, for such an effort would raise more questions than it could answer. 
Rather, it is more analytically fruitful to stop treating intellectuals as a clearly delineated and objectively 
existing group, and instead see intellectuals as a problematic (Li 2010; Li Junpeng 2011). More 
specifically, we should investigate the action of defining itself. As Pierre Bourdieu (1988:256–70) 
suggests, defining the intellectual is a matter of wielding symbolic power—who counts as an intellectual is 
itself a site of struggle within cultural fields. Thus what needs explanation is the struggle itself—the 
definition is only its outcome. In this study, I look at how China’s leftists and liberals define each other with 
labels and theories that originated in the West. In addition, as Karl Mannheim (1952a) reminds us, “every 
historical, ideological, sociological piece of knowledge … is clearly rooted in and carried by the desire for 
power and recognition of particular social groups who want to make their interpretation of the world the 
universal one” (pp. 196–97). Instead of treating intellectuals and their claims for granted, I examine the 
process and implications in which Chinese intellectuals fight for universality of their knowledge. 
Nevertheless, any study should state its object of study, and I should make it clear what kind of people 
6 
 
this study looks at. I take intellectuals as those who publicly engage in political discussions, especially the 
discourse of “whither China.” As a result, the population of this study is both larger and smaller than the 
popular definitions of intellectuals. Take the liberal intellectuals, for example. This study covers individuals 
from a variety of professional backgrounds, including scholars, writers, journalists, lawyers, and activists. 
As Chapter 3 indicates, they are lumped together because they have constituted the liberal discourse in 
today’s China. This means, however, that I focus on the intellectual exchanges with political implications. 
As a consequence, on the one hand, I do not maintain the distinction between intellectuals, scholars, and 
activists, as long as they publicly comment on politics; on the other hand, I restrain myself from discussing 
the critics, no matter how influential they are, who only comment on social issues without touching on 
political issues in a significant way. What is more, I focus on the intellectual elites, namely those 
occupying central positions and with high name recognition in the intellectual field. This choice is based 
on the premise that those individuals have exerted much greater influence on China’s political 
development than their less well-known peers. Throughout the twentieth century and up to this day, 
intellectual debates have never been solely about struggling for cultural domination in China; in case after 
case, intellectual discussions dressed in academic robes have in one way or another spilled out to the 
political sphere—not to mention that there has never been a clear-cut boundary between the intellectual 
political fields. 
Second, what does “post-Tiananmen” mean? As previously mentioned, the year 1989 was not 
only a watershed moment in global history as it marked the end of the Cold War, but also a turning point 
in Chinese history because of the large-scale student uprising in Tiananmen Square, both the 
geographical center of the nation’s capital and the symbolic center of China’s political life. The bloodshed 
led to the political purge of the reformist political and intellectual leaders, and abruptly ended the vibrant 
intellectual discussions. Furthermore, it foreshadowed the later division and fragmentation of the 
intelligentsia. As a consequence of a set of complicated reasons, which will be discussed in detail in the 
following chapters, when the intellectual discussions rekindled in the mid-1990s, the “enlightenment 
consensus” broke down, and the left-right division became increasingly prominent. Therefore, 
“Tiananmen” does not merely indicate a dividing pause in time or a political event, but rather signifies 




Methods and Data 
 
The main methods employed in this study are interviews and historical analysis, with the addition 
of biographical research and participatory observation. 
From 2010 to 2013, in a total of more than a year’s fieldwork in China, Beijing for the most part, I 
conducted 67 in-depth interviews, including 56 liberals and 10 leftists—both New Leftists and Maoists 
(Appendix A).7 To establish the samples, I consulted several lists. In 2004, Nanfangrenwu zhoukan 
(Southern People Weekly), an influential Chinese magazine, first presented its list of 50 most influential 
Chinese public intellectuals.8 Since then, some other media outlets have released their annual lists of 100 
most influential intellectuals. It should be noted that all these lists heavily lean toward the liberals, as most 
of these media outlets take a more or less liberal stance. Nevertheless, for the purpose of identifying 
liberal intellectuals, these lists are valuable and were the basis of my initial samples. In addition, based on 
my knowledge of Chinese intellectuals, I added some interviewees who were not included in these lists. I 
also interviewed 10 leftists as a comparison base. As the number of intellectual elites associated with the 
left is much smaller than the number of liberals, the pool of candidates for interview was much smaller 
and easier to establish. Generally speaking, the two samples constitute one of the largest and 
representative samples of contemporary Chinese intellectuals. While I began with the published lists and 
my reading, during my interviews, I asked each of the intellectuals to describe his or her political 
orientation and whether he or she accepted to be associated with the designator “liberal” or “leftist.” While 
many interviewees insisted on clarifications and qualifications, only one interviewee categorically refused 
the label “liberal.” Therefore, in this study, the categories of liberals and leftists are both widely-accepted 
ideological designators and self-identities. 
While I had a script for interviews and asked all the questions in the script, the interviews were 
mostly conducted in a semi-structured manner. The interviews were held as casual conversations, often 
in tea houses, restaurants, living rooms, or studies. Most interviews lasted between three and four hours, 
                                                          
7 Despite the popular perception, Cui Weiping refused to be identified as a liberal, so I count her as a special case by 
excluding her from my sample of liberals. 
 
8 http://business.sohu.com/s2004/zhishifenzi50.shtml (retrieved May 29, 2016). 
8 
 
with the shortest ones lasting approximately one hour. As a result of the semi-structured nature and 
causal settings, there were many very long interviews, with the longest lasting eight hours, from 6 p.m. to 
2 a.m. 
A bulk of the research is a historical narrative of intellectuals in post-Mao China, often done in a 
chronical manner. In this sense, I engage in a reconstruction of intellectual history in contemporary China. 
It should be noted that while this study uses popular labels such as “Left” and “liberal,” it does not employ 
such terms as analytical shortcuts, let alone moral affirmation or accusation. My purpose is to explicate 
the social processes behind the ideological labels. I should also add that although I have tried to avoid 
taking sides or making moral judgments, it would not be difficult for the reader to discern my own 
ideological leaning, as an entirely value-free analysis is impossible in a study of this nature. I am 
confident, however, that my own political orientation has not changed any empirical statement or 
interpretative conclusion in any substantive way. 
As C. Wright Mills (1959) argues, life stories are core elements of an active sociological 
imagination. Through the experiences of individuals, periods, cohorts and events are organized and 
linked together into the complex mesh of social interaction and social structure. Therefore, biographies 
enable us to see aspects that cannot be attributed to structural factors. I extract biographical information 
from two sources. First, much of the interviews involve life history data. As the intellectuals recalled the 
formation of their political views, they necessarily reflected on their life trajectories, especially turning 
points. Second, as the intellectuals all well-known figures, their life experiences are readily available in 
various studies and the Internet. I have collected as much such data as possible. 
Finally, during my field trips, I attended a number of small gatherings in the intellectual circles. 
Many of those gatherings were done in the form of dinner parties at restaurants, a typical way of making 
friends in Chinese culture. In this process, I got to know many intellectuals very well. Such occasions can 
be seen as ones of participatory observation, and they provide valuable supplementary information in 





The Contested Intellectual Field in Post-Mao China 
 
 
[The] intellectual field as an autonomous system or claiming to be so … is the 
result of a historical process of autonomization and internal differentiation … . 





In Chaos of Disciplines, Andrew Abbott (2001) observes a phenomenon prevalent in social and 
cultural systems: fractal distinctions. In other words, social structures in larger scales tend to reproduce 
themselves or be reproduced in smaller scales. This structural pattern of self-similarity also characterizes 
the intelligentsia in post-Mao China. As is the case in many different social and political contexts (Bobbio 
1996), intellectuals in post-Mao China have been habitually viewed through a left/right prism, and the 
distinction has taken a life of its own and shaped subsequent intellectual debates and perceptions of the 
general public. More important, what makes a Chinese intellectual “left” or “right”/ “liberal” is not the 






Figure 2.1 Intellectuals in 1976–1989 
 
 



























Figure 2.3 Intellectuals since 2003 
 
Before the CCP took over mainland China in 1949, it was designated as a left-wing party because 
of its association and popularity among the disadvantaged peasants and workers. Accordingly, the ruling 
Kuomintang (Chinese Nationalist Party) was perceived as a right-wing party representing the status quo. 
The left/right distinction became ambiguous in 1957, when many intellectuals were purged as “rightists” 
(youpai) simply for criticizing the CCP at the invitation of Mao. More than 550,000 people were 
persecuted during the Anti-Rightist Campaign (Zhu Zheng 2013a, 2013b), the overwhelming majority of 
whom were supporters of the CCP in 1949. They supported the CCP’s vision that 10 to 15 years earlier 
had been called “left,” including that of free speech, a free press, and fairness. In Maoist China, “left” 
designated the orthodox followers of Mao and his policies, and these people were later called “radicals.”9 
After the death of Mao and the end of the Cultural Revolution in 1976, the CCP, under the leadership of 
Deng Xiaoping, abandoned the orthodox Maoist revolutionary ideology, which was now perceived as 
“conservative.” As the CCP was still a left-wing party nominally and “right-wing” or “liberal” ideology was 
reserved for the capitalist class, those holdovers of Mao’s last years was also disparaged as “ultraleftists” 
(jizuopai). Therefore, “conservatives” and “ultraleftists” became synonymous terms (Link 2013:250), and 
radicals in Maoist China would be conservatives in post-Mao China. 
A central characteristic of the post-Mao intelligentsia was the relative homogeneity of its attitudes 
and values. On the spirit of “reevaluating all values,” introducing Western culture and comparing it with its 
Chinese counterpart became the pursuit of many intellectuals (Xu 2000). Although the party-state still had 
                                                          








































tight control over many aspects of the society, intellectuals occupied a privileged stratum and enjoyed a 
level of freedom not seen since the Anti-Rightist Campaign of 1957, despite the fact that they were not in 
a better position materially than the other strata. Not only were many sensitive political issues discussed, 
but also the influence of those debates reached far beyond intellectual circles (Goldman 2002:501). To a 
large degree, almost all intellectuals were reformers in the sense that they all were all pleased by the end 
of Maoism and wanted both economic and political reforms, although they did not have a clear vision for 
the reforms.10 There were a small number of conservatives who appeared to be loyal to Mao’s 
revolutionary vision, but they were party officials and did not enjoy popular support. Moreover, as Deng 
was trying to weaken the power of the conservatives with the party, reformers had the upper hand with 
the CCP. As many intellectuals who were purged by Mao were now reinstated by Deng and his fellow 
reformers to the political system, they became “establishment intellectuals” (Hamrin and Cheek 1986). 
There were also nonestablishment intellectuals. Some of them were not allowed into the social and 
political establishment because of their involvement in various democratic movements, but they 
maintained ties and often worked closely with the establishment intellectuals. As the intellectuals gained a 
relative degree of autonomy, a younger generation of nonestablishment emerged in the mid-1980s. They 
had neither direct connection with the political establishment nor involvement in political activities, but 
played a critical role in introducing Western thought and pushing forward the influential “culture craze” 
(wenhua re). Together, the establishment and nonestablishment intellectuals sought to introduce Western 
ideas and bring about political change. 
The rolling tanks in Tiananmen Square on June 4, 1989 profoundly changed the Chinese 
intelligentsia. There was no longer a reformist consensus. In the second half of the 1990s, the former 
reformers split into liberals and New Leftists, and the polemics between these two “camps” dominated the 
intellectual scene of this period. In addition, on the one hand, a number of former reformers were arrested 
or forced into exile because of their active role in June Fourth, and many of them later became dissidents 
with the explicit goal of overthrowing the CCP; on the other hand, the second half of the 1990s witnessed 
the surge of nationalism, both inside and outside intellectual circles. 
                                                          
10 Even He Xin, an intellectual who has now been widely viewed as a conservative, was a supporter of Deng’s reform 
program and opposed to class struggle and the theory of dictatorship of the proletariat. 
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The Chinese intelligentsia since 2003 and up to this day has been one of differentiation and 
fragmentation. On the liberal side, the radical vision has fallen out of favor and been replaced by the 
mentality of “farewell to revolution.” The CCP has been successful in minimizing the influence of the 
dissidents and radical liberals by Internet censorship and by forbidding those in exile to return to China. 
With the exception of a few, those active in June Fourth have lost much of their influence. At the other 
end of the intellectual spectrum, the Internet facilitated the resurgence of Maoism. Marginal within the 
intellectual circles, Maoism and nationalism enjoyed a high degree of popular support. Most notable of all 
has been the rise of new types of conservatism. On the one hand, a growing number of intellectuals have 
become disillusioned with both orthodox Marxism and liberalism, and turned to the ancient wisdom of 
Confucianism. They have not only tried to bring Confucianism into the intellectual debate by promoting a 
political Confucianism, but also advocated to make Confucianism a state religion. On the other hand, 
some elite intellectuals have become political conservatives by openly defending the rule of the CCP and 
asserting the superiority of the “China model.” 
As fragmented as it appears, the contemporary Chinese intelligentsia is divided by a general 
ideological line which categorizes an intellectual as either a leftist or a liberal (rightist). As I argue in 
Chapter 3, this line in no way indicates ideological homogeneity, but rather a reflection of an intellectual’s 
general attitude toward the authoritarian rule of the CCP and its totalitarian past—in general, the farther 
one’s position deviates from authoritarianism in general and Maoism in specific, the farther one is toward 
the “right” or the liberal side. The only exception to this rule is the distinction between political liberals and 
economic liberals. Economic liberals are to the right of liberal liberals not because they are more critical of 
the communist rule—quite the contrary—but because laissez-faire economics is universally viewed as a 
“right-wing” ideology and China is no exception. It is almost by definition that intellectuals tend to 
differentiate themselves with one another, and the line of demarcation between the left and the 
right/liberal is relative rather than clear-cut. However, intellectuals are, above all, social actors, and as 
social actors they connect to and align with some other intellectuals. When we take a closer look, we find 
that Chinese intellectuals on the left and on the right have different patterns of connections and 
alignments, and it all boils down to one single dimension: how one views the CCP. On a more general 
note, Abbotts’s account of fractal distinctions is purely internalist or discursive. In other words, there are 
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no actors in his account—knowledge itself generates distinctions and divisions. I take a different 
approach by looking at the occupiers of the positions, not positions per se. However, it is not my intention 
to reject the internalist view. Rather, I seek to show how social factors and discursive interactions have 
influenced each other, and have in turn both contributed to the bifurcation of the political views of Chinese 
intellectuals. 
 
Under the Banner of Reform: 1976–1989 
 
It is worth noting at the outset that there was not an intellectual field in post-Mao China11 until the 
mid-1990s, at least not a relatively autonomous cultural arena in which the production and consumption 
of cultural goods were independent of those in economic, political, and other fields as described by Pierre 
Bourdieu (1969). The intellectual debates during this period were deeply political nature in nature and 
were often drawn into political strife of the highest level, intentionally or unintentionally. Therefore, a 
narrative of intellectuals in post-Mao China cannot be separated from a narrative of power struggles 
within the CCP. 
While some commentators, many of whom self-identified liberals themselves, speak of “liberals” 
and “liberal thought” in the late 1970s and the 1980s (Bao Zunxin [2004] 2008; Hu Ping 1991), the word 
“liberalism” or “liberal” was not used in much of this period, except for a small number of introductory 
essays and books on liberal ideas in the West (Chen Kuide 1988; Gan Yang 1989a, 1989b). No Chinese 
intellectuals called themselves or their peers “liberals.” The reason is simple: one of the major announced 
enemies of the CCP throughout the 1980s was “bourgeois liberalization” (zichanjieji ziyouhua), a term 
coined by Liu Shaoqi, China’s then-president, in 1959.12 In addition, because books and articles 
containing liberal ideas were regarded as “poisonous weeds” and were therefore strictly prohibited in 
Maoist China, most Chinese, including the intellectuals, did not have a sufficient grasp of liberalism as a 
political philosophy or worldview, and still equated it with the lack of discipline in the 1980s. The more 
                                                          
11 Indeed, the intellectual field had been largely absent since the establishment of the PRC in 1949, and had been 
extinguished since the Anti-Rightist Campaign in 1957. 
 
12 Although less frequently, the term is used by the CCP as an accusation against its perceived ideological enemies. 




popular terms were “reformers” and “conservatives,” and it was between these two camps that a general 
ideological line was drawn from 1976 to 1989. 
It should be noted that the words gaigepai and baoshoupai suggest struggle within the party 
establishment, as pai indicates a certain rank and alignment within the party apparatus. Indeed, the 
intellectual debate in the late 1970s and throughout 1980s was mainly one within the party and between 
the reformist and conservative camps. Among the nonestablishment intellectuals, almost everyone was 
glad to see the end of Maoism and the launch of the reform program. In this sense, aside from an 
extremely small number of outliers, all nonestablishment intellectuals were reformers or reform-minded. It 
is not an exaggeration to say that the word “reform” was the buzzword of the 1980s (Fang Lizhi 
2016:209–25). 
 
The Combat between the Reformers and the Whateverists: 1976–1979 
 
In September 1976, Mao’s death left China with a bitterly divided leadership. Three factions were 
coveting the paramount leadership: the radicals represented by the Gang of Four, including Mao’s widow 
Jiang Qing, who were ardent supporters of Mao’s revolutionary policies, the beneficiaries represented by 
Hua Guofeng, Mao’s designated successor, and the survivors represented by Deng Xiaoping and Ye 
Jianying, who were senior revolutionary cadres with wide support and considerable influence despite 
being removed of former power by Mao. Instead of collaborating with the beneficiaries who were 
equipped with formal power but short of informal influence, the Gang of Four perceived Hua as weak and 
chose to attack him, which pushed the latter to turn to the survivors for support (MacFarquhar 1991:358–
67).13 In October, Hua and Ye, among others, seized the Gang of Four and their principal associates. The 
military coup ended the Cultural Revolution. 
In the next year, with the back of the other survivors, Deng was reinstated in spite of Hua’s 
reluctance. Now that Hua and Deng were de facto rivals for the ultimate power, they each tried to 
increase political space by claiming ideological legitimacy. It was against this backdrop that the first wave 
of intellectual debates emerged. In the first years after the Cultural Revolution, the intellectuals can be 
                                                          
13 The best general narrative of the factional struggle in the years immediately following Mao’s death and throughout 
the 1980s and the early 1990s is Baum (1994). See also Goldman (1994). 
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loosely categorized into four groups: fanshipai (whateverists), huanyuanpai (nostalgists), gaigepai 
(reformers), and jijin minzhupai (radical democrats).14 They all denounced the Gang of Four, and most of 
them used Marxism to justify their ideas. The whateverists believed that Mao did nothing wrong, Maoism 
was the embodiment of Marxism, and the Cultural Revolution was hijacked by the Gang of Four and Lin 
Biao. The nostalgists maintained that the 1950s was the golden age and Mao made mistakes during the 
Cultural Revolution, and that the key was to go back to Mao’s initial policies. The reformers argued 
against dogmatic understanding of Marxism and pushed for both economic and political reforms. Aside 
from the three types of intellectuals who were all within the establishment of the CCP and argued on the 
platform of Marxism, there also emerged nonestablishment intellectuals who were arguing for the 
adoption of Western-style democracy. They were in many aspects thinking outside the box of Marxism 
and were later called “radical democrats” (Su Shaozhi 1996:25–26). At least for the first three groups, 
what the intellectuals pursued was not cultural legitimacy. As the cultural arena was dominated by the 
legitimizing authority in the political field, the intellectuals aligned with the party apparatus and with one 
another to achieve political goals. 
As Mao’s official successor, Hua sought to consolidate his power by recourse to ideological 
orthodoxy. To justify the military coup that eliminated the rivalry of the Gang of Four, he claimed that the 
latter were not “ultraleftists” but rather “ultrarightists” (Party History Research Centre of the Central 
Committee of the Chinese Communist Party 1991:379), praised the Cultural Revolution as a great 
exemplification of Mao’s theory, and hinted the possibility of relaunching a Cultural Revolution (Chen Yan 
2006:16–17). In February 1977, with the help of theorists Li Xin and Zheng Bijian, Hua proclaimed the 
infamous “two-whatevers” (liangge fanshi): “We will resolutely uphold whatever policy decisions Chairman 
Mao made, and unswervingly follow whatever instructions Chairman Mao gave.” The whateverists had an 
initial upper hand. 
Facing the challenge of opposing Hua without opposing the heritage of Mao, Deng decided to 
align himself with the reformers and engage an ideological debate. In April 1977, Deng wrote a letter to 
the CCP Central Committee. While pledging loyalty to Hua’s leadership, Deng (1977) artfully challenged 
Hua’s “two-whatevers” doctrine by insisting that “we must forever apply accurate and complete Mao 
                                                          
14 Baum (1994:9–12) provided a more detailed typology and analysis of the factional alignments. 
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Zedong Thought to guide our whole Party, whole military, and people of the whole country.”15 Three 
months later, Deng entrenched himself by emphasizing that it was necessary to treat Mao’s writings “as 
an integral system instead of just citing a few specific words or sentences” in his address to the party 
(cited in Baum 1994:46). In this address and two other speeches in the following months, Deng explicitly 
claimed that the essence of Mao’s thought was “seeking truth from facts” (shishi qiushi) (Shen Baoxiang 
2004), an ancient phrase that was shrined by Mao himself. It proved to be a powerful theoretical weapon 
that quickly disabled the “whateverists.” The nostalgists, represented by Hu Qiaomu and Deng Liqun, 
chose to side with the reformers and support Deng’s theory of “seeking truth from facts.” 
In March 1977, Hu Yaobang, Deng’s close associate, was appointed Deputy President of the 
Party School of the CCP Central Committee, a key component of the party’s ideological apparatus. Hu 
immediately launched a magazine, Lilun dongtai (Theoretical Trends). The inaugural issue that was 
published in July contained only one article by Wu Jiang. As a direct rebuttal of Hua’s May article that 
called for the “continuous revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat”16 and identified the primary 
object of the dictatorship as the rightists, Wu’s article insisted that the “continuous revolution” included 
“the revolution of productivity” and that the object of the dictatorship should include both the rightists and 
the leftists (Ma Licheng 2008:3). This article was fiercely attacked by the whateverists. 
However, Deng’s reformist stance commanded wide support from the intellectuals, who were 
thoroughly tired of the revolutionary fervor and eager to see genuine improvement of their personal lives. 
Deng was keenly aware of the situation. As he did not have the ideological orthodoxy enjoyed by Hua, he 
had to align with other forces. Deng decided to work with the long-suppressed intellectuals to undermine 
Hua’s ideological legitimacy. Beginning in early 1977, the reformists (many associated with the Party 
School of the CCP Central Committee) wrote a great number of articles that called for reevaluating the 
Cultural Revolution and the authenticity of Marxism, many of which were published in Renmin ribao 
(People’s Daily) and Guangming ribao (Guangming Daily), two mouthpieces of the CCP (Li Honglin 
2010:298–99; Ma Licheng and Ling Zhijun 1998:50–51; Su Shaozhi 1996:34–38). 
                                                          
15 Italics mine. For the sake of accuracy, I have slightly revised the translation based on the original Chinese text. 
 
16 For Mao’s idea of continuous revolution, see Dittmer (1987). 
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In May 1978, Theoretical Trends and the Guangming Daily published a 7,000-word article “Shijian 
shi jianyan zhenli de weiyi biaozhun” (Practice is the Sole Criterion of Truth). Drafted by Hu Fuming, a 
philosophy professor at Nanjing University, this article underwent extensive revisions by intellectuals at 
the Party School of the CCP Central Committee and editors at the Guangming Daily, and was approved 
by Hu Yaobang (Li Honglin 2010:299–300; Ma Licheng and Ling Zhijun 1998:52–54). It was immediately 
reprinted in the People’s Daily, Jiefangjun bao (People’s Liberation Army Daily), and numerous other 
important outlets. By emphasizing the supremacy of practice,17 this article greatly undermined the 
ideological authority of Hua and the whateverists. From May 1978 to June 1981, the reformers initiated a 
nationwide discussion on the criterion of truth, and many establishment intellectuals at the Party School of 
the CCP Central Committee, the Research Office of the State Council, the Chinese Academy of Social 
Sciences (CASS), and the People’s Daily joined the debate, which has come to be called a thought 
liberation movement (sixiang jiefang yundong) (Li Honglin 2010:302–303). The debate had a far-reaching 
impact on the intellectual and political landscapes in post-Mao China. Facing almost completely one-
sided reformist public opinion,18 provincial civil and military leaders openly supported Deng and the 
“practice” theory, and Hua lost the ideological, and therefore political, battle. In late 1978, during the CCP 
Central Committee work conference in November and the 3rd Plenary Session of the 11th Central 
Committee of CCP, the “two whatevers” policy was condemned as a wrong and “ultraleftist line,” and the 
whateverists were sharply criticized19 (Baum 1994:62–65; Su Shaozhi 1996:40). Deng’s platform of 
economic reform was adopted by the CCP and Hua’s power was greatly undermined. A year later, Hua 
lost all of his formal power and Deng became China’s new paramount leader. 
In early 1979, the reformist establishment intellectuals came to the front stage and attended a 
ten-week party conference on theoretical work. This influential conference provided a forum for the 
reformers to rebuild ideological legitimacy for Deng and his reformist-oriented line.20 The “practice” theory 
                                                          
17 Therefore, the reformers of this period, including Deng himself, were later called shijianpai (practice faction, or 
pragmatists). 
 
18 Some nostalgists, such as Hu Qiaomu, felt political pressure and revoked their support for the debate (Su Shaozhi 
1996:40). 
 
19 Hua himself was implicitly criticized. 
 




became the new ideological orthodox. Some of the most notable reformist intellectuals were Wang 
Ruoshui, Li Honglin, Su Shaozhi, Yan Jiaqi, Hu Jiwei, and Zhou Yang. The major issues discussed 
included the appraisal of the Cultural Revolution, Mao and Maoism, the relationship between the party 
leaders and the party as well as the people, the necessity of abolishing lifelong tenure for leading posts, 
the nature of transition to socialism, and the importance of democracy and the rule of law (Chen Yan 
2006:28–34; Li Honglin 2010:316–23; Pantsov with Levine 2015:354; Su Shaozhi 1996:79–117), many of 
which would even be considered sensitive in today’s China. This appeared to be the “honeymoon” period 
of the intellectual elites in terms of their relationship with the political elites. At this point in history, China 
seemed to be “coming alive” (Garside 1981, cited in Cheek 2015:223). 
 
Nonestablishment Intellectuals and the Democracy Wall Movement: 1978–1979 
 
It would be a mistake to view the thought liberation movement merely as one of establishment 
reformist intellectuals. Another reformist force was the nonestablishment intellectuals, most notably the 
democratic activists associated with the Democracy Wall movement21 of late 1978 to early 1979.22 These 
activists mostly came from the younger generation who had neither official affiliations nor access to the 
official media. Their activities were largely spontaneous, but their demand for political reform echoed 
Deng’s reformist strategy, and Deng took advantage of this. 
In September 1978, the first issue of the relaunched magazine Zhongguo qingnian (China Youth), 
the official magazine of the Communist Youth League that was discontinued during the Cultural 
Revolution, published an editorial, written by Li Honglin and approved by Hu Yaobang, which called for 
overcoming the blind faith in Mao, along with poems from the 1976 Tiananmen Incident. The issue was 
immediately banned by Wang Dongxing, Hua’s whateverist ally. The ban spurred widespread anger. With 
the approval of Hu Yaobang, the magazine boldly posted the whole issue, page by page, on a long brick 
wall on Xidan Street, the center of Beijing. It took no time for the wall to attract much more posters and 
become a place for young people to make democracy-advocating speeches and connect to one another. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
 
21 It has also been called “Beijing Spring.” 
 
22 The democracy movement can be traced back to the Cultural Revolution.  See Brodsgaard (1981). 
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The subject of the posters and speeches quickly changed from the Cultural Revolution to Mao and 
eventually to democracy and human rights (Hu Jiwei [2004] 2012:338–40). Many activists also published 
influential underground magazines, such as Beijing zhi chun (Beijing Spring) edited by Wang Juntao and 
Chen Ziming, Tansuo (Explorations) edited by Wei Jingsheng, and Siwu luntan (April Fifth Forum) edited 
by Xu Wenli and Liu Qing. From 1978 to 1981, there emerged more than 50 underground magazines in 
Beijing alone and 127 magazines nationwide. The most widely-distributed Beijing Spring had a circulation 
of 10,000 at its height (Chen Yan 2006:45, 48). At this stage, the democracy activists were strong 
supporters of Deng and his intellectual associates within the CCP establishment (Chen Yan 2006:39–63; 
Li Honglin 2010:304–311). 
It is worth noting that while the nonestablishment intellectuals had a wide range of backgrounds 
and opinions, most of them stayed within the Marxist framework and vocabularies simply for the reason 
that they knew no other ways of organizing their thoughts, and many criticized what they viewed as the 
biggest ill: the CCP cadres becoming something like a bourgeois dictatorship. What differentiated them 
from the Red Guards was the solution they offered: democracy. The best-known nonestablishment 
intellectual was Wei Jingsheng. A twenty-eight-year-old electrician at the Beijing Zoo, Wei (1997:199–212) 
posted his long essay “Diwuge xiandaihua: Minzhu” (The Fifth Modernization: Democracy) on the Xidan 
wall on December 5. Aside from the four modernizations enacted by Deng, including industry, agriculture, 
science and technology, and national defense, declared Wei, China needed the fifth modernization—
democracy! 
While the boundary between establishment and nonestablishment intellectuals were quite clear 
during this period, they echoed each other and had a close relationship. Some nonestablishment 
intellectuals, such as Chen Ziming, Wang Juntao, and Liu Qing, had personal connections with the 
establishment intellectuals. Many establishment intellectuals were vocal supporters of the 
nonestablishment intellectuals. Yan Jiaqi, for example, distributed the magazine Beijing zhi chun to the 
attendees of the 1979 party conference on theoretical work. Many attendees of the party conference on 
theoretical work visited the Xidan Democracy Wall several times with interest (Pantsov with Levine 
2015:341). Wang Ruoshui, Yu Guangyuan, and official media outlets such as China Youth and Zhongguo 
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qingnianbao (China Youth Daily) all worked with the nonestablishment intellectuals in various ways (Chen 
Yan 2006:52–53). 
 
The Breakup of the Coalition between the Nonestablishment Intellectuals and the Political Elite: 
1979–1981 
 
As previously stated, the nonestablishment intellectuals initially criticized the 
ultraleftists/conservatives and supported Deng, and Deng needed the nonestablishment intellectuals to 
make public opinion for his reformist line in order to seize political power from Hua and his conservative 
allies, so they formed a de facto strategic coalition. Indeed, some of the early posters explicitly praised 
Deng (Chen Yan 2006:41), and Deng approved of and even implicitly encouraged the Democracy Wall 
movement. In November 1989, when receiving the representatives of the Japanese Socialist Party, Deng 
said that “wall posters are guaranteed by the Constitution” and assured that “we have no intention of 
suppressing them or denying the right of the masses to express their views by pasting up wall posters” 
(cited in Dittmer 1981:232). He expressed similar views in the next few days when meeting with American 
and French visitors (Chen Yan 2006:42–43). 
However, the Democracy Wall movement quickly spread to other large cities and spun into the 
most fundamental political issue—the legitimacy of the CCP.  Beginning on November 11, large 
gatherings and heated debates took place every evening in People’s Square in Shanghai. Big-character 
posters with slogans such as “The root of all evils is the dictatorship of the proletariat” and “Resolutely 
and thoroughly criticize the CCP” began to appear. One gathering attracted as many as 150 thousand 
participants. In Beijing, two days after Deng’s permissive speech, more than 30,000 people participated in 
an open forum on democracy (Ch’i 1991:27–29). Moreover, different activist groups began to ally and 
coordinate with one another. For example, seven groups formed a joint initiative in January 1979 (Chen 
Yan 2006:41–42). These all sent alarming signals to Deng. 
What is more, Deng transited from a challenger to a paramount leader during this period, and this 
affected how he viewed the democracy movement. When openly approving of the posters, Deng was 
trying to edge out Hua and the whateverists. After Deng had a decisive victory in the 3rd Plenary Session 
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of the 11th CCP Central Committee in late December 1978, his attitude toward the movement became 
ambivalent. As Deng became the paramount leader, the target of the movement began to shift to him. In 
early March 1979, Deng severed his alliance with the nonestablishment intellectuals by accusing the 
democracy movement for “crossing the boundary.” Two weeks later, the Beijing municipal government 
issued an order prohibiting all big-character posters and underground publications, and arrested Wei 
Jinsheng. Seven months later, Wei was convicted of “counterrevolutionary” activities and sentenced to 15 
years’ imprisonment. In the next one and a half years, Deng arrested and sentenced a large number of 
nonestablishment intellectuals. In April 1981, by ordering to arrest Xu Wenli and Fu Shenqi, Deng put the 
Democracy Wall movement to an end. The more radical nonestablishment intellectuals, who used to have 
high hopes for Deng, had now mostly been disillusioned with the political elite and morphed into 
dissidents, while the best-known ones, such as Wei Jingsheng, spent most of their time in prison in the 
1980s. The more moderate ones, such as Chen Ziming and Wang Juntao, continued to be key players in 
the Chinese intelligentsia in the 1980s. Some others no longer participated in intellectual debates and 
political activities after witnessing Deng’s harsh suppression of the democracy movement. As Deng’s 
economic reforms were under way, the actual lives of average people greatly improved, and Deng was 
therefore viewed by majority of the Chinese favorably in most of the 1980s. In the meantime, Deng’s 
political officer Hu Yaobang and economic officer Zhao Ziyang commanded strong support from the 
establishment intellectuals, and in particular since Hu rehabilitated virtually all intellectuals purged by Mao. 
As a consequence, after the Democracy Wall movement, the establishment intellectuals continued their 
coalition with the political elite, and parted company with the nonestablishment intellectuals, at least 
formally. 
  
The Battle between the Conservatives and the Reformers: 1981–1989 
 
After the fall of Hua, the whateverists fell into disfavor. Most of them were demoted or 
marginalized,23 and did not exist as a collective intellectual or political force. Some nostalgists, however, 
                                                          
23 The notable exceptions are Zheng Bijian and Hu Sheng. Zheng Bijian became Hu Yaobang’s secretary, and in the 
1990s was promoted to be Deputy President of the Party School of the CCP Central Committee and noted as the 
brain behind China’s “peaceful rise” policy. Hu Sheng became the president of CASS and later Vice Chairman of 
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evolved into conservatives. Since the majority of the intellectuals, whether establishment or 
nonestablishment, were at least reform-minded, the conservatives were mainly political elites instead of 
intellectual elites.24 However, the battle between the conservatives and the reformers was a vital theme of 
the Chinese intelligentsia in the 1980s, and was responsible for the Tiananmen Square protests of 1989 
and their outcome. 
While the most powerful conservative were Chen Yun and Li Xiannian, Deng Liqun, head of the 
CCP’s Publicity Department,25 had a more visible presence in the intellectual scene. Demoted during the 
Cultural Revolution, Deng Liqun was a nostalgist Deng Xiaoping’s important ally from 1976 to 1979. 
Critical of Mao’s continuous revolution theory and rural collectivization, Deng Liqun was ideologically 
conservative. More important, Deng Liqun had been enmeshed in a rivalry with the reformer Hu Yaobang 
for the political favor of Deng Xiaoping. As Deng Xiaoping chose Hu to be his second-in-command, in 
order to create opportunities to compete with Hu, Deng Liqun began to position himself as a leader of the 
conservative faction. Both critical of the Cultural Revolution, the conservatives wanted to bring back the 
“correct road of socialism,” whereas the reformers, such as Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang, were 
pragmatists and much less interested in ideological campaigns. 
While Deng Xiaoping initially positioned himself as a reformer, we cannot ignore the political 
calculation behind such a position. Once Deng was enthroned and completely overcame the whateverists, 
his reformist position became ambivalent by showing distaste for democratization and liberalization that 
were out of his control. The conservatives, Hu Qiaomu and Deng Liqun, reportedly succeeded in 
convincing Deng of the excess of liberalization and the need to tighten ideological control. In early 1979, 
after initially making approving comments on democracy during the ten-week party conference on 
theoretical work, Deng compared the democratic movement inside and outside the party with the “right 
opportunist threat” of 1957, and remarked, “We must defend the great banner of Chairman Mao, and no 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, and in his final years became a vocal reformer. 
 
24 This classification obviously depends on the definition of the intellectual. For example, Deng Liqun could be viewed 
as an intellectual if a high-level CCP official who was known as formulating theories in the service of political struggle 
is included in such a category. 
 
25 Formerly translated as “Propaganda Department.” 
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one should blacken it in any way whatsoever. … The main thing now is stability.” (cited in Pantsov with 
Levine 2015:354–55) 
In March 1979, Deng Xiaoping (1979) delivered a deeply conservative speech drafted by Hu 
Qiaomu, in which Deng laid out “four cardinal principles” that were beyond discussion: the socialist road, 
the dictatorship of the proletariat, the leadership of the CCP, and Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong 
Thought.  “[T]he dictatorship of the proletariat means socialist democracy for the people, democracy 
enjoyed by the workers, peasants, intellectuals and other working people, the broadest democracy that 
has ever existed in history,” declared Deng. “It is still necessary to exercise dictatorship over all these 
anti-socialist elements, and socialist democracy is impossible without it.” 
From 1981 to 1988, the conservatives launched three major ideological campaigns against 
“bourgeois liberalization.” The first campaign was the criticism of Bai Hua’s screenplay Kulian (Unrequited 
Love), which the unscreened film Taiyang he ren (Sun and Man) adopted.26 The screenplay told a story of 
a patriot artist who gave up comfortable life in the West and returned to China to join the socialist 
construction, only to have his life ruined during the Cultural Revolution. “You love your country,” asked the 
artist’s daughter, “but does your country love you?” (Baum 1994:126–30; Goldman 1994:88–112; Li 
Honglin 2010:378–83; Spence 1992:277–92; Yang Jisheng 2004:248–56) With the approval of Deng, the 
conservatives and their media outlets, such as the People’s Liberation Army Daily, sharply criticized the 
screenplay and sought to expand the campaign to other intellectual arenas in 1981, but met with 
resistance from the reformers, such as Hu Jiwei, the chief officer and chief editor of the People’s Daily, 
and Zhou Yang, the deputy director of the CCP’s Publicity Department. With Hu Yaobang’s deflection, the 
campaign was cut short after a few months (Vogel 2011:557–59). 
The second campaign was one against “spiritual pollution” from 1983 to 1984. In March 1983, 
speaking at a symposium in commemoration of the centenary of Karl Marx’s death, literary theorist Zhou 
Yang, deputy director of the CCP’s Publicity Department who was a loyal Maoist during the Cultural 
Revolution but became sympathetic to the reformist cause in his later years, presented a paper that 
affirmed the phenomenon and relevance of alienation (yihua) under socialism, and argued that humanism 
                                                          
26 For Bai Hua’s life and the “Bai Hua Incident,” see Kraus (1986). 
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(rendaozhuyi) that was viewed as revisionist in Maoist China should be recognized as part of Marxism.27 
The paper was published in the People’s Daily a few days later and immediately caused huge 
controversy. Zhou was openly criticized by Hu Qiaomu,28 Deng Liqun, and the other conservative 
intellectuals. In a few months, the criticisms of the theories of “humanism” and “alienation” escalated into 
a full-blown Anti-Spiritual Pollution Campaign that affected fields such as literature, philosophy, art, and 
even economic policies. Not only did Hu Jiwei and Wang Ruoshui, the editor-in-chief and deputy editor-in-
chief of the People’s Daily, lose their posts, the reformist forces within the People’s Daily, the CCP’s 
Publicity Department, and the Party School of the CCP Central Committee were almost all purged (Baum 
1994:156–61; Chen Yan 2006:76–94; Goldman 1994:113–32; Li Honglin 2010:412–30; Su Shaozhi 
1996:143–61; Vogel 2011:563–68; Yang Jisheng 2004:256–85). 
The most politically disruptive ideological campaign was the 1987 campaign 
against “bourgeois liberalization.” While Deng’s reform program had been broadened and living 
conditions had substantially improved for most people, from 1985 to 1986, the growing threat of inflation 
and the revelation of official corruption led to large-scale demonstrations on college campus in Hefei, 
Beijing, and Shanghai. The student demonstrators positioned themselves as demonstrators, rather than 
opponents, and believed that the roots of corruption and inflation lied in the slow pace of political reforms. 
The conservatives took advantage of the demonstrations, blamed the reformist leaders for the political 
disruptions, and mounted an ideological counterattack against the reformist camp.  Three prominent 
reformist intellectuals within the establishment—Fang Lizhi, Liu Binyan, and Wang Ruowang—were 
expelled from the CCP. Zhu Houze, the reformist head of the CCP Publicity Department, was removed 
from his position. Most significant of all was the purge of Hu Yaobang, the CCP’s general secretary and 
towering reformist figure (Baum 1994:189–211; Goldman 1994:204–37; Li Honglin 2010:431–70; Rosen 
1988; Su Shaozhi 1996:163–229; Vogel 2011:576–87; Yang Jisheng 2004:297–367). By 1988, the 
coalition between the political elite and the intellectual elite had been severely severed.29 
                                                          
27 The actual drafters of the paper were Wang Yuanhua, Wang Ruoshui, and Gu Xiang. Zhou polished the final draft 
(Wu Min 2015). 
 
28 According to Li Honglin (2010:416), what offended Hu Qiaomu was not Zhou’s paper itself, but the fact that Zhou 
decided to give the keynote speech himself instead of the more senior Hu. 
 
29 After 1987, the only major institutional base for the reformist intellectuals within the political establishment was the 
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What was really on Deng Xiaoping’s mind during all these campaigns? We may never know for 
sure. While Deng did not have the absolute power enjoyed by Mao Zedong and had to share his power 
with Chen Yun, the conservative party patriarch, throughout the 1980s, he never had real challenger to 
his rule within the party. It seems to be fair to say that as a victim of Maoist power struggles, Deng was 
initially fond of political liberalization. However, once he became a paramount leader himself, the ultimate 
goal for him became preserving his authority and the one-party rule, and he became increasingly 
sensitive to any ideological challenge. Deng was keenly aware that his major political legacy was the 
program of economic reforms, and therefore relied on the reformers, Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang, to 
execute his economic policies. But as numerous insider accounts have revealed, Deng also knew that 
political liberalization would ultimately bring down the communist regime, and therefore installed the 
conservatives, Hu Qiaomu and Deng Liqun, to the party’s ideological apparatus. While Deng never gave 
up the idea, or at least rhetoric, of political reforms, his definition of political reforms had nothing to do with 
the division of power or opposition parties, but instead was confined to good governance and “intra-party 
democracy.”30 The idealistic college students who were surrounding the Goddess of Democracy in 
Tiananmen Square in June 1989 did not know this. When the demands of the students were deemed 
“impudent,” Deng crushed the mass protests with brutal force (Calhoun 1994; Zhao 2001).31 While the 
coalition was mostly severed at least a year ago, the emotional bond between the intellectuals and the 
political establishment broke up completely and has never been formed again. 
 
A Growing Space for Nonestablishment Intellectuals, 1982–1988 
 
While an intellectual field did not exist in the 1980s, there was a growing space for 
nonestablishment intellectuals in this period, with the major exception of the Tiananmen crackdown of 
1989. With respect to personal income, the nonestablishment intellectuals were far from well-off. However, 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
CCP’s Office of Political Reform, which was headed by Bao Tong, Zhao Ziyang’s secretary. See Chen Yizi(2013), 
Keyser (2003), and Wu Wei (2013). 
 
30 For an insightful yet succinct discussion of this point, see historian Yu Ying-shih’s preface to Chen Yan (2006). See 
also Nathan (1997) and Ruan Ming (2009). 
 
31 For a collection of key translated documents surrounding the protests—many written by reformist intellectuals—see 
Ogden et al. (1992). 
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with the exception of dissidents, many of them enjoyed a relatively privileged status and pursued 
relatively free intellectual endeavors. Issues such as democracy and the rule of law were frequently 
discussed in the intellectual circles, and relatively open discourse on politics and culture took place in 
mainstream media outlets (Goldman 2002:501). 
A notable phenomenon was the emergence of a new breed of nonestablishment intellectuals, 
represented by Chen Ziming and Wang Juntao. They were not establishment intellectuals who worked 
within the political establishment and advise the political leaders, but neither did they directly challenge 
the communist rule as political dissidents. Active participants of the Democracy Wall movement and the 
1980 Beijing local elections, Chen and Wang were both punished for their political activities with the 
assignment of a less-than-ideal job when graduating from the University of Science and Technology of 
China and Peking University, with an MA and a BA, respectively. In the mid-1980s, Chen decided to jump 
out of official patronage and set up a company and two correspondence schools with his wife and friends. 
The two schools had a total enrollment of more than 230,000 in 1986. With the considerable profits, Chen 
founded a think tank. Within a few months, it sponsored a series of high-profile academic conferences on 
the subject of political reform. The think tank had its own journal, Zhengzhi yu xingzheng yanjiu (Studies 
in Political and Administrative Sciences) that was more widely circulated than any state-sponsored journal 
of the same subjects. After it was forced to close, Chen and Wang established another think tank with an 
even larger size, which included four branches: economics, sociology, psychology, and political science. 
In 1988, Chen and Wang took over Jingjixue zhoubao (Economic Weekly), which in a few months 
became a leading reformist newspaper. They even established their own publishing company and public 
opinion polling, and their seminars regularly attracted hundreds of attendees ranging from esteemed 
scholars to college students, as well as party officials and business people (Chen Ziming 2009, 2010; 
Goldman 2002:516–20). The independent, moderate, and constructive force represented by Chen and 
Wang was an important voice in the Chinese intelligentsia of the 1980s. 
After the thought liberation movement, which was mainly one of establishment intellectuals, there 
witnessed a second intellectual movement, the culture craze, which was largely dominated by young and 
nonestablishment intellectuals.32 Deprived of the opportunity of higher education, the Cultural Revolution 
                                                          
32 For a detailed discussion of the culture craze, see Chen Fong-ching and Jin Guantao (1997). 
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generation was particularly drawn into grandiose and abstract concepts, such as “culture,” “civilization,” 
“value,” “dignity,” “freedom,” and “humanity.” The Chinese edition of the German philosopher Ernst 
Cassirer’s abstruse An Essay on Man sold 240,000 copies in a year. It immediate brought great fame to 
Gan Yang, the young translator and helped him to launch his own well-known book series before long. 
According to Gan Yang (2006:188–89), the book became a best-seller not because of its content, but 
solely because of the word “man” in its title. Indeed, the culture craze was so sweeping in the 1980s, 
among not only intellectuals but also all walks of urban life, that it can be described as the zeitgeist of the 
1980s. It began as a genre of literature that surfaced in the late 1970s—scar literature (shanghen 
wenxue). After the death of Mao, a number of writers implicitly expressed their anger at and 
disillusionment with the Cultural Revolution by portraying the sufferings of party cadres and intellectuals 
during this period. Instead of telling the turbulent decade through the drama of class struggle and political 
campaigns, the writers highlighted the ups and downs of individual lives and their ironic twists. By the 
mid-1980s, a new generation of intellectuals, who received their higher education in the late 1970s and 
early 1980s, sought to free themselves from the intellectual establishment, both intellectually and 
institutionally, and they used the catchword “culture” to challenge the older generation whose theoretical 
toolkit was nothing but Marxism, despite its reformist leaning.33 Echoing the May Fourth intellectuals in 
the early 20th century, the new generation believed that there was something fundamentally wrong with 
contemporary Chinese culture, and attributed China’s social ill to its “backward” culture. Some argued for 
returning to traditional Chinese (meaning pre-Communist) culture, while more advocated cultural 
cosmopolitanism and embraced Western culture. Reformist in their political orientation, these young 
intellectuals also tactically used “culture” to circumvent the punishment from the conservative political elite. 
Beginning in 1984, many academic conferences and seminars were held on the subject of culture, a 
number of elite universities established research centers on culture, academic societies more or less 
outside the intellectual and political establishment mushroomed, and relevant books and articles flooded 
bookstores, journals, and the mass media (Chen Kuide 1991:39–42). 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
 
33 At least some of them intentionally used “Marxist humanism” to push for political reform. As Chen Yan (2006:89) 
put it, “returning to ‘orthodox Marxism’ in actuality became a most powerful weapon against the status quo.” 
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Against the backdrop of the culture craze, three intellectual groups came to the fore: the editorial 
board of the book series Zouxiang weilai (Toward the Future) that was established in 1982, the editorial 
board of the book series Wenhua: Zhongguo yu shijie (Culture: China and the World) that was 
established in 1986, and Zhongguo wenhua shuyuan (Academy of Chinese Culture) that was established 
in 1984. The first two groups appeared to be opposite poles ostensibly as the former represented 
scientism whereas the latter represented culturalism, but they were both part of the broader cultural 
discussion. Although the two groups had official sponsors on paper, they were de facto independent 
academic communities, and gave many young, otherwise unknown, intellectuals and scholars 
unconnected to the establishment opportunities to publish and gain fame. The three intellectual groups 
fundamentally influenced the worldview of a new generation of intellectuals. 
Headed by Jin Guantao and Bao Zunxin and with members all under the age of 50, mostly 
associated with the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS), Toward the Future published from 1984 to 
1988 a total of 74 books, including both original contributions and translated volumes. The first 12 
publications included Jin Guantao’s book on “scientific discovery” of the ultra-stable system of Chinese 
society that led to the cycles of decay and reconstitution throughout its 2000 years of history, Liu 
Qingfen’s book on the reason modern science did not arise in China, Douglas Hofstadter’s popular 
science classic Gödel, Escher, Bach, and Donella Meadows et al.’s The Limits to Growth. The notable 
books published subsequently included Alex Inkeles and David Smith’s Becoming Modern, Julian 
Simon’s The Ultimate Resource, Edward Wilson’s Sociobiology, Sigmund Freud’s selected essays, Max 
Weber’s The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, János Kornai’s Growth, Shortage, and 
Efficiency, Kenneth Arrow’s Social Choice and Individual Values, and Joseph Levenson’s Liang Ch’i-
Ch’ao and the Mind of Modern China. All of the books sold extraordinarily well. All volumes combined, the 
circulation of the book series was estimated to be as high as eight million. Some books sold more than 
one million copies, and tens of thousands of copies sold out within months (Chen Fong-ching and Jin 
Guantao 1997:124; Jin Guantao 2010:209; Yang Zhongxue 2011). It was a common scene to see 
readers queuing up outside a bookstore at midnight in order to buy a copy in the morning (Liu Dong 2014). 
Different from the overarching scientific tone of Toward the Future, Culture: China and the World 
is a book series representing the pillar of culturalism. The editorial board consisted of intellectuals mostly 
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in their 30s and freshly out of graduate school.34 Launched in 1986 and headed by Gan Yang, a young 
philosopher at CASS who graduated from Peking University with a master’s degree a year ago, the series 
introduced more than 100 Western classics, mostly in the humanities, but also a few in social sciences, 
including the works of Friedrich Nietzsche, Martin Heidegger, Ludwig Wittgenstein, Jean-Paul Sartre, 
Albert Camus, Walter Benjamin, Richard Rorty, Carl Gustav Jung, Jean Piaget, Erich Fromm, Abraham 
Maslow, Karl Popper, Max Weber, Daniel Bell, and Samuel Huntington.35 As all these books were banned 
during the Cultural Revolution, and as the younger generation was eager to learn the Western culture and 
integrate China into the global community, they achieved miraculous success in the 1980s. They not only 
helped the editorial board members, authors, and translators to quickly establish themselves within the 
intellectual circles, but sell exceedingly well. Even obscure philosophical treatises, such as Heidegger’s 
Time and Being and Sartre’s Being and Nothingness, sold between 50,000 and 150,000 copies within a 
year (Cheek 2015:242). During this period, many college students and intellectuals were interested in any 
Western classic, and did not care about, or were even unaware of, the specific academic discipline or 
ideological orientation. In general, the editorial board was interested in abstract subject of culture, rather 
than specific political activities. “Politics was a superficial problem [to me], and China’s fundamental 
problem was cultural rebuilding,” recalled Liang Zhiping (2010:334), a legal scholar who was a member of 
the editorial board. 
In 1984, with the support of prominent scholars such as Tang Yijie, Liang Shuming, Feng Youlan, 
Ji Xianlin, and Zhang Dainian, six young lecturers at Peking University established the Academy of 
Chinese Culture, an unofficial academic organization.36 With its approach to culture, the academy tried to 
negotiate between modernization and tradition. To modernize China, this group of intellectuals insisted, 
we must first study and modernize Chinese culture. Departing from the first two groups, the academy 
focused on training and academic exchanges. From 1985 to 1986, the academy hosted four high-profile 
                                                          
34 Most of the members of the editorial board were associated with Peking University or CASS. As post-Mao China 
had not granted doctoral degrees in the fields of humanities and social sciences until 1983, most of the editorial 
members had only a master’s degree. 
 
35 The fact that China was not a member of the Berne Convention in the 1980s and most of the translations were 
therefore published without authorization from the copyright owners undoubtedly contributed to the impressive size 
and efficiency of the book series. 
 
36 Like the editorial board of Toward the Future, the academy had an official sponsor, but the state had no direct 
involvement in its activities. 
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seminars on traditional Chinese culture, comparative cultural studies, science and culture, and culture 
and the future. These were the first large unofficial seminars after the founding of the PRC. Taught by 
scholars such as Liang Shuming and Li Zehou, these seminars attracted more than 3,000 students from 
all over the country and received much media attention. In 1987, the academy launched a two-year 
distance education program on comparative cultural studies, which consisted of 15 courses. The program 
was taught by more than 50 well-known scholars, some of them from overseas, and enrolled 12,754 
students. Some teaching sessions were recorded and played on the China Central Television (CCTV) 
and became national sensations. In addition, the academy organized many international academic 
conferences and invited a number of distinctive foreign scholars to visit and teach in China. 
The national obsession with culture and the accompanying growth of public space upset the 
conservative political elite, who called off the movement during the anti-bourgeois liberalization campaign 
of 1987. However, Heshang (River Elegy), a six-part documentary, revived the culture craze and brought 
it to a peak in 1988. The documentary asked an overarching question that was as broad as most 
intellectual inquiries in the 1980s: why did modern China, unlike the West and japan, fail to become an 
industrial society? River Elegy attributed China’s social and economic ills to its culture. It radically 
criticized the Yellow River civilization (meaning Chinese culture). In terms of the economy, farming and 
devotion to the land, symbolized by the Yellow River, had led to centuries of peasant economy that 
hampered the development of commerce and transportation. In terms of the society, self-imposed 
isolation, symbolized by the Great Wall, had led to an inward-looking China that was cut off from the 
outside world. To break free of the vicious cycle that had haunted China for thousands of years, the 
Chinese people must embraced the “blue-water, maritime civilization.” In other words, modernization had 
to come from the outside, and China must wholeheartedly adopt the Western culture. Viewed by more 
than 200 million people (Barmé and Jaivin 1992:140, cited in Cheek 2015:243), River Elegy was the most 
significant cultural event in 1988, and was aired three times on CCTV. It spurred heated national 
discussions and prompted immense controversy. Praised by many reformist intellectual and political elites, 
it became the subject of fierce attacks from the conservatives. After the Tiananmen Square protests of 
1989, River Elegy was banned and denounced as an “anti-revolutionary blueprint” by the CCP.37 
                                                          
37 For translations of the script, see Su Xiaokang and Wang Luxiang (1991). 
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In a nutshell, under the banner of reform, the Chinese intelligentsia was characterized by an 
“enlightenment consensus.” In many ways similar to the “May Fourth Enlightenment” in the early twentieth 
century in which Chinese intellectuals were united by their opposition to the Confucian tradition and 
embrace of science and democracy (Schwarcz 1986), intellectuals were universally against Maoism and 
fond of modernization, including “cultural modernization” (Wu 2011:363–64). The intellectuals did “not 
necessarily agree with each other about the actual content of [the] ultimate truth, but they all [assumed] 
that there [was] an ultimate truth out there that [would] enable people to discover the answer to restoring 
China as a great civilization” (Wu 2011:363). As Deng’s program of reform and opening up seemed to be 
making headway, and as the program seemed to benefit the majority of the Chinese, the differences in 
the social blueprints envisioned by the intellectuals were concealed by the discourse of reform. One can 
even say that there were not blueprints, as the intellectuals made clear what they were against, but did 
not elaborate or even know what they were for. While open advocates for “wholesale Westernization,” 
such as Fang Lizhi (1990) and Liu Xiaobo (Jin Zhong 1988), belonged to the minority, most intellectual 
viewed the West, and in particular the United States, favorably and believed that China could and should 
adopt Western-style democracy, despite the official discourse of the West as enemy. 
 
Controlled Autonomy: The Rise of the Intellectual Field in the 1990s 
 
The crackdown in Tiananmen Square on June 4, 1989 had a profound impact on the Chinese 
intelligentsia. The reformist political elites were purged. Zhao Ziyang, the party secretary, was removed 
from his position and placed under house arrest for the next 15 years until his death. The establishment 
intellectuals were completely cut off from the establishment, both political and intellectual. The names of 
the most prominent reformist intellectuals became taboos. A large number of intellectuals were jailed and 
sentenced with various prison terms. After their releasement, many continued their intellectual pursuit and 
now found themselves to be dissidents. As their writings were not allowed to be openly published and 
discussed, their influence quickly dwindled. A number of reformist intellectuals were forced into exile and 
have since been forbidden to reenter to their homeland. A small number of them, such as Fang Lizhi, 
gradually reduced political and intellectual engagements. Major intellectual players, such as Yan Jiaqi, Su 
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Shaozhi, Liu Binyan, and Wang Ruowang, became leaders of overseas political opposition, but quickly 
lost their influence among the general public in China.38 Among the nonestablishment intellectuals, the 
most political engaged ones, represented by Wei Jingsheng and Wang Juntao,39 continued their political 
activities overseas with the aim of overthrowing the CCP, and changed their position from reformers to 
radical liberals. The culture craze was halted abruptly. All of the aforementioned book series were 
immediately discontinued. Although some of them were relaunched a couple of years later, they no longer 
had the same influence. Some of the editorial members, such as Gan Yang and Liu Xiaofeng, went go to 
study overseas and reemerged as intellectual leaders a few years later. Some others, such as Xu Youyu, 
became more politically engaged in the second half of the 1990s. Still some others, such as Su Guoxun 
and Chen Jiayin, became accomplished scholars but have never again played a key role in the 
intelligentsia. 
The more significant change was the social environment. After more than two years of political 
and economic gloom, when the conservatives were taking offense on both economic and economic fronts, 
the ailing Deng Xiaoping realized that his legacy of reform and opening-up was on the verge of complete 
demolition, and therefore decidedly relaunched economic reform by taking an inspection tour of south 
China. Not only did the CCP quickly restore its political legitimacy by shifting its basis to economic 
performance, but also China has since embarked on a fast track of economic growth while remaining tight 
one-party rule. The hybrid of state-driven capitalism and political authoritarianism transformed China’s 
intellectual life in almost every way in the mid-1990s. Most important of all was the emergence of an 
intellectual field. 
In the 1980s, the political sphere and the social sphere were closely entwined, and penetrated 
each other. Therefore, there was hardly any “pure” academic pursuit, and intellectuals seldom wrote for 
the audience of other intellectuals, but rather often reached the general educated public. In other words, 
there was not a clear-cut boundary between intellectuals and scholars. While the intellectual players 
                                                          
38 As China has become a major international economic and political player, the political opposition in exile has lost 
much of its momentum since the mid-1990s, with the only exception of Falun Gong. The internal division and strife 
within the opposition was another significant factor. 
 
39 Wei Jingsheng was released after 18 year’s imprisonment. Wang Juntao was arrested in 1990 and released in 
1994. They have both lived in exile in the United States. For depictions of the intellectuals and former student leaders 
in exile, see Buruma (2001:3–121) and He (2014). 
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associated with the culture craze, and in particular the editorial board of Culture: China and the World, 
displayed nascent elements of the intellectual field, the overwhelming majority of the intellectual 
discussions were subsumed into a broader political discourse, or intentionally served political purposes. 
The intellectual discussions mostly operated within the party apparatus, such as the CCP’s Publicity 
Department and the Party School of the CCP Central Committee, rather than universities or the civil 
society. The intellectual debates revolved around party lines—in other words, the rift between reformers 
and conservatives—and were undertaken in the language of Marxism or Maoism. The main polemics 
centered on issues such as Marxist humanism and the criterion of truth. The major intellectual battlefield 
was official venues, such as the People’s Daily and Theoretical Trends.   
The mid-1990s witnessed the emergence of a nascent intellectual field. The distinction between 
scholars and intellectuals became increasingly marked.40 On the one hand, many with university posts 
now saw knowledge production as their ultimate pursuit and no longer interested in public discussions. 
Instead of speaking to the public or to the political elite, they retreated to the ivory tower and preoccupied 
themselves with publishing papers in their narrow fields of study. Some others, such as many economists, 
became technocrats with the duty of advising the state. On the other hand, while less interested in playing 
the academic games, with the disintegration of the institutional and emotional bond with the political elite 
in 1989, the intellectuals were no longer able to directly influence political processes, and they in turn 
began to speak to each other. The intellectual discourse began to be detached from elite politics and 
move “out of the state orbit” (Fewsmith 2011:521). In short, an intellectual field with its own logic, rule, 
and award took shape. While still not immune of the influence of the political field,41 the intellectual field 
became increasingly differentiated and independent from other fields, a pattern that can be called 
“controlled autonomy.” When we talk about the distinctive laws of China’s intellectual field, it is important 
to bear in mind that the laws were often made by the political authorities. 
How did this transformation happen? In my view, the intellectual field emerged as a consequence 
of four structural changes: the integration of China into the international order, the penetration of the 
                                                          
40 As intellectuals and scholars are both social roles, there is a certain degree of overlap. In other words, a person 
can be an intellectual by engaging in certain activities and a scholar in other areas. 
 
41 Even in present-day China, the intellectual field is still penetrated by the political field in various ways. Therefore, 
the autonomy of the intellectual field can only be treated as a matter of degree. On this point, see Ringer (1990). 
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Internet, the rise of the journalistic field, and the expansion and bureaucratization of higher education. 
First, China in the 1990s was much more integrated into the global system. In the 1980s, the Chinese 
intelligentsia was largely a closed system with limited exchange with the outside world. As a consequence 
of their interrupted education during the Cultural Revolution, most intellectuals were handicapped by 
insufficient skills in foreign languages, which limited their intellectual horizon. In the mid-1990s, the 
Chinese intellectuals were already keenly aware of the global intellectual community and wanted to be 
part of it. From neo-Marxism to postmodernism, from the Frankfurt School to rational choice theory, the 
Chinese were no longer strangers to the intellectual frontiers. As Figure 2.4 shows, from 1991 to 2000, 
the size of Chinese students overseas increased more than tenfold from 2,900 to 38,989.42 In the second 
half of the 1990s, many prominent figures in the intellectual field have experiences of studying abroad, 
and a number of people joined the intellectual debates from abroad, including Hong Kong and Taiwan. A 
















                                                          




Figure 2.4 Chinese Students Overseas, 1991–2000 
 
 
Sources: Zhongguo tongji nianjian (China Statistical Yearbook), various years, 
edited by the National Bureau of Statistics of the PRC. China: Zhongguo tongji 
chubanshe. 
 
Second, the facilitative role of the Internet should not be underestimated. China built the first 
cable connection to the World Wide Web in 1994. In the next few years, the Internet blossomed from an 
obscure tool for the technologically savvy to a fixture of mainstream life. From July 1998 to July 2002, the 
Internet users exploded from approximately one million to 46 million (Figure 2.5). The Internet publicized 
and spread the intellectual debates that would have otherwise been confined to a small circle. It also 
provided a key platform for numerous otherwise unknown people to join the intellectual debates. While 
the major space of intellectual debate was the official media in the 1980s, by the end of the 1990s the 
Internet had become one of the main battlefields of ideas. Particularly noteworthy was the emergence of 
a number of influential website devoted to public discussions, such as Sixiang de jingjie (The Realm of 
Ideas), Shiji Zhongguo (Century China), Wenhua Zhongguo (Cultural China), Sixiang pinglun (Critical 



















(Century Salon), Xianzheng lunheng (Constitutional Forum), and Kaidi (KD).43 Most of these websites 
were forced to close down in the early 2000s, but they were instrumental in forging a dynamic 
transnational Chinese cultural sphere (Yang 2003) that still shapes today’s Chinese intelligentsia, not to 
mention that the Internet has continued to be the most free-wheeling media space in China despite the 
CCP’s censorship (Shirk 2011b:15; see also Yang 2009 and Zheng 2008). 
 
Figure 2.5 Internet Users (July 1998–July 2002) 
 
Source: Based on Figure 1-5, Zhongguo hulianwangluo xinxi zhongxin (China 
Internet Information Center), Zhongguo hulianwangluo fazhan zhuangkuang tongji 
baogao (2002/7) (Report on the Development of the Internet in China, July 2002), p. 30. 
 
Third, with the rise of the journalistic field concurrently with the intellectual field in the second half 
of the 1990s, the intellectuals, and in particular the liberal intellectuals, had an important channel to 
express their views. The effort by the CCP to relax its tight grip on the media began in 1979 when it 
allowed for media advertisement (Shirk 2011b:1), but the full-fledged commercialization of the mass 
media did not take off until the mid-1990s. In the 1980s, the People’s Daily and CCTV were almost the 
only sources of media information for the general public. At the end of the 1990s, a number of commercial 
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media outlets, including commercial newspapers and commercial TV channels, were fighting with the 
party media for market shares, and a journalistic field had begun to pick up steam.44 The traditional party 
media outlets were endowed with political capital that was associated with its official status, but in the 
1990s, political capital was greatly devaluated in the journalistic field. With its lively reporting, the 
commercial media enjoyed a wider readership and higher circulations,45 and therefore possessed a 
higher volume of economic capital.46 According to a survey conducted in the early 2000s, even in Beijing, 
the national capital with a large proportion of government employees, only 36 percent of readers read 
party newspapers, whereas the rest read only semiofficial or commercial newspapers (cited in Stockmann 
2011:187). What is more, because of the more down-to-earth style of the commercial media, people were 
more inclined to trust its reporting than that of the party media. By contrast, the party media lost not only 
much readership, but also public trust. As a consequence, in addition to economic capital, the commercial 
media also owned a greater amount of cultural capital. As Bourdieu (2005:33) points out, the journalistic 
field exhibits “a high degree of heteronomy” and therefore is “a very weakly autonomous field.” On the 
one hand, the journalistic field was penetrated deeply by both the economic field and the politic field, and 
therefore tended to lose certain degree of autonomy in relationship to the economic and political 
systems.47 Indeed, almost all of the commercial media outlets belonged to media groups that were 
sponsored and ultimately controlled by the state, despite their commercialized operations. The media’s 
tendency toward “McDonaldization” was also obvious. On the other hand, the journalistic field greatly 
vitalized the intellectual field. On certain occasions, some commercial media outlets have even crossed 
over to political advocacy (Shirk 2011b:11).48 
                                                          
44 For media commercialization in China, see Shirk (2011a), Stockmann (2013), Zhao (1998), and Zhao (2008). 
 
45 Some commercial newspapers claimed a circulation of more than a million. The data on circulations are not reliable 
as they tended to be grossly exaggerated, but the popularity of the commercial media in comparison to the party 
media was beyond doubt. 
 
46 While his later thinking incorporates other forms of capital (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992:114–15), Bourdieu 
(1984:128–29, see also Bourdieu 1998) tends to focus on economic capital and cultural capital, which operate as two 
hierarchized poles crosing over in a social space. In an authoritarian society, political capital plays a significant role. 
For the role of political capital in post-socialist societies, see Eyal (2003) and Eyal, Szelényi, and Townsley (1998). 
 
47 On the penetration of market forces into the journalistic field, see also Habermas (1989). 
 
48 Other than a few left-leaning newspapers and websites, such as Huanqiu shibao (Global Times), Wuyouzhixiang 
(Utopia), and Guanchazhe (The Observer), most commercial media outlets are liberal-leaning. 
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Fourth, the expansion and bureaucratization of higher education transformed the relationship 
between intellectuals and the state. While China has played an increasingly important role in the global 
order, its system of higher education has undergone a significant expansion since the mid-1990s. In 10 
years, the enrollment for higher education increased from 2,044,000 in 1991 to 5,561,000 in 2000, with 
the attendance rate increasing from 3.5 percent to 12.5 percent (Figure 2.6 and Figure 2.7). Accordingly, 
different from the 1980s when intellectual activities were organized within the framework of elite politics 
and editorial boards of book series, a much greater number of intellectuals were incorporated into 
university (and various state-sponsored research institutions, particularly CASS) life. More important, the 
state began a national effort to build world-class universities. In 1995, China launched Project 211, which 
hierarchized Chinese universities and promoted a select group of universities. From 1996 to 2002, the 
state appropriated approximately 2.2 billion US dollar to the project (Li Lixun 2004:17). In 1998, an evener 
larger initiative, Project 985, was launched to allocate large amounts of funding to a small number of elite 
universities. For example, in phase three only, China’s top two universities, Peking University and 
Tsinghua University, each received four billion RMB of state funding, an amount equivalent to more than 
600 million US dollar (Guo Ying 2014). Prompted by state-driven capitalism, the logic of neoliberalism 
began to penetrate the ivory tower. The elite university began to imitate the tenure-track system popular 
in the West, and academic performance began to be quantified by one’s number of publications in top 
journals in his or her field of expertise. Chinese scholars began to be obsessed with the Science Citation 
Index (SCI), the Social Science Citation Index (SSCI), and the Arts and Humanities Citation Index 
(A&HCI), and the Chinese Social Science Citation Index (CSSCI). Almost all universities had a list of top 
journals with different tiers. In order to receive promotion, one must have a good record of publishing in 
those journals. As most scholars write and publish in Chinese, and the recognized journals are all 
sponsored by the state and therefore do not publish articles that may come across as politically sensitive, 
this has effectively domesticated the political engagement of Chinese scholars. Another trick is research 
funding. With relatively low base salaries, research funding from the state has become a major source of 
income. As the selection procedures, and even topics, are controlled by the state, Chinese scholars have 
been largely coopted into the system with little space for political engagement. The combination of the 
carrot and the stick has profoundly shaped the intellectual field from both inside and outside. It was in this 
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context that the first major division of the Chinese intelligentsia erupted in the mid-1990s, which I turn to 
in the next section. 
 
Figure 2.6 Enrollments for Higher Education, 1991–2000 
 
 
Sources: Zhongguo tongji nianjian (China Statistical Yearbook), various years, 
































Figure 2.7 Gross Attendance Rate for Higher Education of the 18–22 Age Group, 1991–2000 
 
 
Sources: Zhongguo tongji nianjian (China Statistical Yearbook), various years, 
edited by the National Bureau of Statistics of the PRC. China: Zhongguo tongji 
chubanshe. 
 
The Eclipse of the Enlightenment: 1990–1997 
 
In the 1990s, Chinese intellectuals were confused and at loss. After more than two years of 
economic stagnation, political setbacks, and social retardation following the Tiananmen tragedy,49 Deng 
boarded a special train and embarked his now famous “southern tour” in early 1992. In late January, 
Deng arrived in Shenzhen, a city known as the “bridgehead” of China’s reforms, and pushed for bolder 
reforms. In his speeches, Deng criticized the conservatives who cast doubt on his program of reform and 
opening-up, and put an end to the debate on whether the “surname” of the reform was “C”—capitalism—
or “S”—socialism. The 14th Party Congress later that year formally defined the mission of the reform as 
developing a “socialist market economy.” However, political reforms were notably dropped from the 
agenda. In the next few years, China saw unprecedented marketization, decentralization, and 
                                                          















privatization. Moreover, with the absence of political liberalization and the CCP’s monopoly of political 
power, rent-seeking and corruption became even much rampant than the 1980s as a large number of 
well-connected government officials and businessmen amassed huge fortunes through a systematic 
seizure of state assets. On the one hand, the rich and the powerful took advantage of each other in the 
process of selling state enterprises, often at exceedingly low process, to individuals, many with political 
connections. On the other hand, the working class, who was supposed to reign supreme in a socialist 
society and with “iron rice bowls” (tie fanwan) of guaranteed lifetime employment, was sacrificed on the 
altar of marketization. From 1998 to 2000, 20.3 million workers were laid off from state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs) (Guang 2009:30). As economic rationality was spreading its logic into virtually all spheres of 
social life and the free market sounding the horn of victory, the communist party retained firm 
authoritarian control and the prospects for democracy seemed dim. The CCP not only survived the 
“liberating” forces of the market, but also benefited and even consciously promoted free-market capitalism. 
Confronted with neoliberalism with Chinese characteristics (Harvey 2005:120–51), the intellectuals were 
ill-prepared and did not know how to make sense of it. 
At the same time, as China was increasingly integrated into the global order, including the global 
academic community, specialization and professionalization turned to be an unstoppable force. On the 
one hand, unlike the 1980s, most intellectual activities now operated within the contexts of universities 
and were separated from one another by disciplinary barriers. Accordingly, academic standards began to 
replace intellectual influence. On the other hands, in the early and mid-1990s, a number of young 
scholars who went to study overseas in the 1980s received their degrees and began to join the 
intellectual discussions, whether based in China or from overseas. Many in the humanities, these 
scholars brought with them intellectual fads and theoretical frontiers that were distant from the daily life on 
the surface, but as a form of cultural capital, the Western theories often became powerful tools in the 
intellectual debates. Indeed, not long after the Tiananmen tragedy, a number of intellectuals began to 
take a second look at the “culture craze” and even the whole intelligentsia of the 1980s. They criticized 
the 1980s “as a time suffused with bombast and overblown rhetoric” and argued that intellectuals should 
keep a distance “from contemporary debates to concentrate instead on the pursuit of specialized 
scholastic research” (Xu Jilin 2000:181). The task of Chinese intellectuals, they insisted, was to rebuild 
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scholarly standards and an academic community insulated from external interference. In the early 1990s, 
a number of academic journals were launched, most notable among them Zhongguo shehui kexue jikan 
(Chinese Social Sciences Quarterly) and Xueren (The Scholar), as well as Zhongguo shuping (China 
Book Review), a journal devoted to serious review essays. The Chinese Social Sciences Quarterly was 
the first journal to introduce a double blind peer-review procedure that was regularly practiced in the West. 
These journals were mostly published in the form of book series as a result of the CCP’s tight control over 
periodicals. Without official affiliations, they were run by the intellectuals themselves. However, a number 
of intellectuals were critical of the specialization and professionalization of intellectual activities, and 
lamented the “fading out of thinkers and thriving of scholars” (sixiangjia danchu, xuawenjia tuxian) (Li 
Zehou 1994).50 First in The Scholar, and later in Ershiyi shiji (Twenty-First Century) and China Book 
Review, many intellectuals participated the discussion on academic standards in specific and 
specialization in general, and this was one of the first intellectual debates in post-Tiananmen China. More 
important, combined with the aforementioned social and economic change, these structural changes set 
the tone for the intellectual rifts throughout the 1990s. 
 
Farewell to Revolution: 1990–1995 
 
The bloodshed in Tiananmen Square prompted many intellectuals to critically examine the 
historical trajectory of China’s twentieth century. In 1912, with the abdication of the child Qing emperor 
Puyi and the establishment of the Republic of China, the “sleeping lion” of China appeared to be 
awakened.51 The May Fourth Movement of 1919 further promised to bring “Mr. Science” and “Mr. 
Democracy” to China. By the end of the twentieth century, however, the Chinese suddenly realized that 
not only was the democratic hope in the 1980s an illusion, but also the entire twentieth century was 
running in circles—the Chinese went a long way from the Xinhai Revolution of 1911 and the communist 
revolution of 1949 to the Cultural Revolution of 1966–1976 and to the Tiananmen tragedy of 1989, but 
                                                          
50 The letter by Li Zehou described the phenomenon without judgement, but this stamen quickly found resonance 
within the intellectual circles. 
 
51 In recent years, some liberal intellectuals have even claimed that the establishment of the Republic of China was a 
mistake. See, for example, Gao Quanxi (2011). 
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eventually seemed to come back to where they were a century ago. Some intellectuals traced the root of 
China’s turbulent history to radicalism.52 In October 1990, Ershiyi shiji (Twentieth-First Century), a 
Chinese-language journal intended to be the forum of intellectual discussions for the entire Chinese 
academic community, was launched in Hong Kong. It quickly established itself as a key medium for 
Chinese intellectuals. While the journal was not allowed to be officially circulated in the mainland, it 
nevertheless gained much publicity and circulation through various unofficial channels. Throughout the 
1990s, many notable intellectual exchanges first erupted in the journal. In the second volume that was 
published in December that year, Yu Ying-shih (1990), a distinguished history professor at Princeton 
University, published a short essay based on his speech in Hong Kong in 1988. The essay blamed 
Chinese intellectuals for their radical visions that inspired waves of revolution in the twentieth century. 
The revolutions, Yu deplored, destroyed all the traditional social structures and replaced them with 
totalitarian political arrangements. In April 1992, the journal published a rejoinder by Jiang Yihua (1992), a 
history professor at Fudan University in Shanghai, with a response by Yu (1992). Jiang came to a 
conclusion diametrically opposed to that of Yu: there had been too much conservatism and too little 
radicalism in modern China. The dissension, however, seemed to have more to do with different 
definitions of conservatism and radicalism. Conservatism and radicalism were political ideologies to Yu, 
whereas Jiang spoke of conservatism and radicalism as social and arrangements. Accordingly, while both 
blamed Maoism and the Cultural Revolution, Yu regarded them as manifestations of radicalism whereas 
Jiang took them to represent conservatism. A number of intellectuals joined the discussion in Twenty-First 
Century, which lasted a few years. Yu was not alone. In the 1990s, Deng Xiaoping’s slogan “development 
is an inescapable necessity” (fazhan shi ying daoli) was widely accepted by not only average citizens, but 
also intellectuals. Even the supposedly subversive concept of “civil society” was fused with a conservative 
undertone, as it was understood to be a plea for patience and waiting for the growth of a new middle 
class to pave the road for democracy (Wang 2003:16–17). 
Another background was the different trajectories and outcomes of the former Soviet bloc and 
China. With the perceived economic and political chaos in Eastern Europe, particularly Russia, and 
                                                          
52 The scholarly criticism of the radicalism of the May Fourth intellectuals started much earlier in the overseas 
Chinese community (see, for example, Lin Yü-sheng [1979]), but systematic reflections in the mainland did not begin 
until the early 1990s. 
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surprising economic growth and social stability of China, many Chinese intellectuals proclaimed the death 
of the “big bang” radical reform and the magic of the gradual reform of the latter (Fan Gang 1996; Zhang 
Yu 1997). All of a sudden, terms such as “gradualism” and “institutional innovations” reached their 
apogee. 
The most forceful and influential conservative argument came from Le Zehou, a philosopher, and 
Liu Zaifu, a literary critic. Both influential reformist figures in the 1980s and supporters of the 1989 
Tiananmen protests, they were forced to leave China and relocate to the United States. From 1992 to 
1994, Li and Liu had a series of casual, yet intellectual, dialogues, which were published in 1995 in Hong 
Kong as a book Gaobie geming (Farewell to Revolution) (Li Zehou and Liu Zaifu 2011). As wide-ranging 
as the topics were, as the straightforward title suggests, the book was essentially an anti-political 
manifesto. Li and Liu defined revolution as “radical actions that overthrow the existing institutions and 
existing authorities by means of drastic methods such as mass violence” (Liu Zaifu 2011:28). They 
equated revolution with irrationality and destruction, criticized the students for refusing to compromise 
with the government in 1989, attributed China’s turbulent twentieth history to revolutionary thinking and 
actions, emphasized that economic development should come before political liberation, and rescinded 
the intellectual’s leading role in social change. “What China needs is construction,” summarized Liu Zaifu 
(2011:27), “rather than destruction.” 
In line with the distaste for revolution and radicalism, Zhu Xueqin, a Shanghai historian who was 
recognized as one of the most prominent liberal voices in the 1990s, published Daode lixiangguo de 
fumie (The Collapse of the Moral Republic) in 1994. Ostensibly a study of Jean-Jacques Rousseau and 
the French Revolution, the book drew parallels between the revolutionary political cultures of France and 
China and claimed that “the French-style political culture has been infused into the political blood and 
political character of the Chinese” (Zhu Xueqin 1994:1). In Zhu’s view, the disaster of Mao’s Cultural 
Revolution, like Maximilien Robespierre’s French Revolution, was a result of moral utopianism. Critically 
acclaimed, the book prompted many intellectuals to rethink the relationship between reform and 
revolution. In the 1990s, the anti-revolution sentiment was so pronounced that Liu Xiaobo, a liberal known 
for his radicalism in the 1980s, wrote an article in 1994, calling for a desanctification of the word 
“revolution” and an end to revolution. He described the 1989 protests as “a grand spectacle of blind 
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righteousness” and wished that the blood of the students would pave the way for “lasting reform” (Liu 
Xiaobo 1994:323). 
It is worth noting that the “conservatism” at issue here is different from that in the 1980s and the 
2000s. Unlike the 1980s when the conservatives and reformers defined each other, the conservative tide 
in the 1990s was largely a reactive movement within the liberal camp. Conservatism at this time was 
defined against the radical liberals who wanted a revolution-style quick regime change. In addition, with 
the popularization of Western conservative thinkers, such as Edmund Burke, Chinese intellectuals 
increasingly cast the word “conservatism” in a positive light. While bidding farewell to revolution, the 
intellectuals still hoped for the democratization of China. While blaming the radicalization of the student 
protests of 1989, the intellectuals still qualitatively saw the authoritarian regime as the evil of all evils. 
Different from the conservative turn in the 2000s that was characterized by the rise of New Confucianism, 
“conservatism” was really about strategic and discursive moderation in the 1990s. The conservative 
movement generated heated debates that have lasted even to this day.53 It is safe to say, however, that 
gradual reform has come to be the received wisdom, and most intellectuals have repudiated the idea of 
radical revolution since the 1990s.54 
 
Humanism versus Postmodernism: 1993–1995 
 
The CCP lost much of its moral authority after the 1989 Tiananmen massacre, but showed 
extraordinary level of resilience thereafter by channeling people’s energies toward acquiring wealth. 
Deng’s 1992 “southern tour” led China to a neoliberal path as economic pursuits superseded political 
rights and became the overarching theme of people’s daily lives. In the early 1990s, with the state 
loosening its grip on the economy, tens of thousands of Chinese left their hometowns to better off their 
lives in coastal cities. With the emergence of private enterprises, a large number of citizens chose to 
leave the official system to “jump into the sea” (xiahai) of the private sector. By the mid-1990s, 
consumerism had engulfed the entire urban society to a degree of “900 million doing business out of 
                                                          
53 See, for example, Li Shitao (2000) and Ma Guochuan (2011). 
 
54 For a notable exception, see Teng Biao and Wang Tiancheng (2015). 
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1,000 million Chinese” (shiyi renmin jiuyi shang). With the emergence of nouveaux riches (baofahu), 
“getting rich” became a national obsession. 
The tide of commercialization reached nearly every coder of the society, and reshaped the 
relationship between intellectuals and the state in a fundamental way. The intellectuals were not rich in 
the 1980s, but at least they were not poor compared with most other social groups, let alone their 
command of social respect. Furthermore, as they worked closely with the political elite, they often 
“legislated” about public opinions and relished their role as cultural heroes. By the mid-1990s, the 
intellectuals not only lost political and cultural influence, but also were greatly marginalized both socially 
and economically. Socially, with the rise of popular culture, abstract and sweeping intellectual discussions 
no longer occupied a central position of the nation’s cultural life. As the intellectuals began to speak to 
each other with different views, their role became something akin to “interpreters” with diminished impact 
on the increasingly materialistic and cynical society (Bauman 1987). Economically, with the opening and 
expansion of the private sector, the intellectuals suddenly found themselves to be the economically 
disadvantaged. In 1992, the average annual salary of those in the educational sector ranked 10th out of 
12 social groups. On average, an assistant professor earned RMB 140 per month, whereas a public 
restroom cleaner on Chang’an Avenue in Beijing earned RMB 200 (Chen Yan 2006:161). Following the 
motto, “To be rich is glorious,” many intellectuals abandoned their intellectual pursuits and threw 
themselves into business. In Tianjin, a major city in north China, approximately 1,500 professors and 
researchers “jumped into the sea” in 1992 alone. In Shanghai, from January to September 1992, 200 
professors left the academe and established more than 500 enterprises. Scientists founded high-tech 
companies, economists started consulting companies, and English professors opened language schools 
(Chen Yan 2006:160).55 As mass culture dominated the cultural life, the scene of readers swamping into 
bookstores to purchase books by Sartre and Heidegger became a distant memory. 
In the early 1990s, Wang Shuo, a Beijing-based novelist who publicly challenged “high” literature 
and tailored the mass market, became the most famous Chinese writer.56 Similar to the Beat Generation 
in post-war America in their rebellion against the cultural establishment, Wang Shuo was fundamentally 
                                                          
55 For an interesting story of three professors who abandoned their academic careers to become business owners, 
see Liu (2001). 
 
56 The most widely read foreign writer during this period was the Czech novelist, Milan Kundera. 
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different in his explicit rejection of spiritual quest and celebration of materialism. Wang Shuo’s flamboyant 
and hooligan (pizi) works were a miniature of the post-Tiananmen generation who were disillusioned with 
politics and turned to nihilism and hedonism. To the surprise of many intellectuals, in early 1993, Wang 
Meng, a veteran writer and former Minister of Culture who lost his job because of the 1989 Tiananmen 
protests, published an essay, “Duobi chonggao” (Shunning the Sublime), in support of Wang Shuo’s 
rejection of idealism and embrace of cynicism. 
This perceived kowtowing to consumerism quickly provoked criticisms from those wanting to 
defend the critical role of the intellectual in society. In early 1993, Wang Xiaoming, a literature professor 
at East China Normal University, hosted a small discussion with four of his graduate students on the crisis 
of “humanist spirit.” The transcript of the discussion was published in the June issue of Shanghai wenxue 
(Shanghai Literature) and generated intense interest in the intellectual circles (Wang Xiaoming et al. 
1993). In 1994, Dushu (Reading), the premier intellectual magazine in China, offered a special section 
devoted to the discussion of humanist spirit, and published high-profile dialogues six issues in a row 
(Zhang Rulun et al. 1994; Gao Ruiquan et al. 1994; Xu Jilin et al. 1994; Wu Xuan et al. 1994; Zhang 
Rulun et al. 1994; Ge Jiayuan and Luo Houli 1994). The discussants were mostly young or middle-age 
humanist intellectuals in Shanghai and Nanjing, including Zhang Rulun, Wang Xiaoming, Zhu Xueqin, 
Chen Sihe, Xu Jilin, and Wang Mingming. A national discussion quickly ensued from 1994 to 1995 (Wang 
Xiaoming 1996).57 
In a sense, the marginalization of the intellectuals, at least in terms of their social role, was an 
inevitable consequence of the deepening of the market-oriented reform. Ironically, the intellectuals who 
advocated a reduced role of ideology lost their leading social role in the process of depoliticization. Once 
what they were fighting for became a reality (at least partially), they were puzzled as to what their enemy 
really was. 
In addition, likely a result of the repressive political environment, the debate was overwhelmingly 
skewed toward the merit or evil of the capital, rather than political authoritarianism. In other words, both 
the accusers and defenders of commercial culture left out China’s political and historical contexts, and 
viewed the humanist spirit as opposed to the market economy without the consideration of the 
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institutional environment and human rights. As a consequence, the “humanist spirit,” itself never clearly 
defined, became an empty slogan without the “human.” In a political environment that had not completely 
recovered from the bloodshed, the intellectuals turned their critical gaze on consumerism, a target that 
easily became the scapegoat of the perceived social ill. The different attitudes toward the market 
economy foreshadowed the division between the New Leftists and the liberals a couple of years later. 
 
Enlightenment versus Postmodernity: 1993–1997 
 
Postmodernism was one of the many trendy Western theories introduced to China during the 
culture craze of the 1980s.58 In the fall of 1985, Fredric Jameson, a distinguished postmodern literary 
critic, gave a four-month seminar at Peking University and attracted a number of the brightest young 
minds.59 While China was still in the mood of enlightenment and modernity, many young intellectuals 
realized that the heyday of various theories associated with modernism and modernity was long gone. 
However, throughout the second half of the 1980s, the discussion of postmodernism remained one of 
pure intellectual curiosity, and the Chinese reality did not enter the horizon of the postmodern discourse. 
In the early 1990s, when consumerism appeared to be transforming Chinese society at a stunning pace, 
and when Chinese intellectuals, some of whom studied at top American universities at the height of the 
culture craze and later received their PhDs, began to apply postmodern theories to their own society 
adeptly, postmodernism suddenly entered the center of the intellectual debate. 
 In 1993, Liu Kang, an assistant professor of comparative literature at the Pennsylvania State 
University with a PhD from the University of Wisconsin, published an English article in Modern China. A 
self-claimed neo-Marxist, Liu accused the Western sinology, and in particular the study of modern 
Chinese literature, for its intrinsic Cold War mentality and Eurocentrism. More specifically, while criticizing 
modern Chinese literature for its permeation of politics and therefore lack of aesthetic value, the Western 
                                                          
58 I lump together postmodernism, postcolonialism, poststructuralism, post-Marxism, and other relevant theoretical 
positions under the umbrella term “postmodernism,” simply for the reason that most intellectuals discussed in this 
section only spoke of postmodernism or post-ism in a loose sense and did not make a distinction, as evidenced by 
the newly coined term houxue (post-ism) (Zhao Yiheng 1995a). There is no denying that the degree of heterogeneity 
among the above theoretical orientations can be extraordinary. For example, Chinese neo-Marxists often disagreed 
with the other postmodernists. 
 
59 The lectures were later translated and published. See Jameson (1987). 
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scholars themselves were accused of being full of ideological bias, as evidenced by their praise of anti-
communist literature while bashing left-leaning and Marxist works for political purposes. Since literature 
could never escape politics, Liu argued, it was false and “political” to dismiss left-wing literature as being 
politics overwhelming aesthetics (Liu Kang 1993a). As the anonymous reviewers could not reach 
consensus as to whether to publish it, the editors solicited Perry Link, a noted sinologist to guest edit a 
symposium, joined by responses from Michael Duke and Zhang Longxi. The responses from Duke and 
Zhang, as well as Link’s (1993) introduction, were all critical. Link doubted the usefulness of Western neo-
Marxists for sinology because they “[a]dmired state socialism without [ever] having lived under it.” Duke 
(1993) insisted to separate aesthetics from politics, and stuck to the conclusion that modern Chinese 
literature had been contaminated by politics. Similarly, Zhang (1993a:79, 90) maintained that “the 
aesthetic experience of reading” Chinese texts and “the experience of real life in China” would not deny 
that literary works in the service of politics had produced “little more than political propaganda of the 
dullest kind,” and accused Liu for treating contemporary Western theory “as an absolute value” and 
wrongly applying First World theories to Third World experience. 
The first round of debate was conducted in English and confined to the academic world. A few 
months later, Liu Kang reiterated his position, along with responses to Link, Duke, and Zhang, in Twenty-
First Century, this time in Chinese. This article initiated prolonged debates between Liu and Zhang. 
Among the most controversial was Liu’s justification of Mao Zedong’s politicization of aesthetics by 
resorting to Western postmodernism. For example, since Foucault’s theory of the complicity of power and 
knowledge convincingly showed the fundamental flaws of Western liberalism, and since Mao’s thought 
might very likely influenced Foucault’s conception, Mao was correct in viewing literature as a matter of 
power struggle and political strategy (Liu Kang 1993:14). In a much more sarcastic tone than his English-
language rejoinder, Zhang Longxi (1993b:141) ridiculed Liu’s justification of Mao’s politicization of 
aesthetics, “Since big-name Western theoretical master Foucault was inspired by Mao, how can we not 
bow in worship before Mao’s truth with three cheers of hallelujah? Since we were lucky to live in Mao’s 
China and therefore closer to Mao’s truth compared with the Westerners, does not what we say make 
more sense when talking about issues such as politics, ideology, and Marxism and Leninism? Are those 
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harping on the Third World experience and the disasters of totalitarian politics not one-track minded Rip 
van Winkle and flies in the ointment?” 
If the debate had so far remained confined in terms of participants and issues, a parallel debate, 
which first broke out a year earlier and was later fused by the polemics between Liu and Zhang, involved 
more people and issues. In 1992, the journal Wenyi yanjiu (Literature and Art Studies) hosted a 
conference on postmodernism. One of the main themes out of the conference was the release of Third 
World “hidden history” (qian lishi). On the conference, Wang Yuechuan (1992, cited in Xu Ben 1995:18), 
a literature professor at Peking University, pointed out that a key task for contemporary scholars was to 
“place the historical experience of Third World culture in the ebbs and flows of the power discourse of the 
entire world culture and render the ‘hidden history’ visible.” The clash of the discourses between First 
World and Third World, Wang continued, could produce only two possible results: either “the hidden 
history takes itself to confront the dominant discourse, relocates itself in the world that is manipulated by 
the hegemony spatially and temporally, and therefore wins itself a seat in the mainstream,” or the hidden 
history “becomes kathoey-like cultural spectacle to be viewed by others, or even for the purpose of 
mirroring and corroborating the ideology of ‘Western culture-centralism,’ echoes the myth of ‘Orientalism’ 
by digging family graves, publicizing national humiliation, and fabricating exotic materials.” In Zai 
bianyuanchu zhuisuo (The Pursuit on the Margins), Zhang Yiwu (1993), a young literature professor at 
Peking University, called for “indigenous” cultural critiques, and applied postcolonial theory to the 
collective memory of the Chinese. According to Zhang, in today’s China, the main suppression of the 
“memory of the people” came from the West, for Western ideology had penetrated into the “unconscious” 
of the Chinese and colonized Chinese culture. In line with Liu Kang’s (1993a, 1993b) earlier thesis, Zhang 
(1995:131) viewed Chinese politics, and in particular the CCP’s political authoritarianism, as a cultural 
commodity in the global chain of capitalist production. In addition, Zhang fused nationalism with 
postmodernism by proposing resisting modernity and enlightenment with “Chineseness” (Zhonghuaxing), 
which sought to reposition China back at the center of the world (Zhang Fa, Zhang Yiwu, and Wang 
Yichuan 1994). Along with Chen Xiaoming, Zhang Yiwu quickly rose to be the most prominent 
postmodernist in China. As Xu Jilin (1995:136) observed, “In the first half of 1994, whenever you browse 
the table of contents of an intellectual journal with certain influence, you will find the works of Chen 
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Xiaoming and Zhang Yiwu, which argue for the ‘postmodern’, the ‘postcolonial,’ the ‘postallegorical,’ ‘post-
New Era’ … .” 
The arguments of Chen Xiaoming and Zhang Yiwu caused great controversy. Xu Ben (1995:22), 
an English professor at Saint Mary’s College of California, wrote that “in comparison with the domestic 
and official authority that still commands the capacity and means of directly controlling and manipulating 
the ‘memory of the people’ of China, it seems that the Western discourse ought not be the main target of 
confrontation for cultural critiques pertaining to the ‘memory of the people’.” Furthermore, in blaming the 
West instead of China’s political authority, argued Xu (1995:27; see also Zhang Longxi 1999), Zhang 
Yiwu indeed “chose low-risk or riskless target of criticism.” Xu (1996:82) even accused Chinese 
postmodernists for “being cultural interpreters of official nationalism and authoritarian rule.” Zhao Yiheng 
(1995a, 1995b), a professor of comparative literature at the School of Oriental and African Studies, 
University of London, blamed the Chinese postmodernist, and in particular Zhang Yiwu, Chen Xiaoming, 
and Liu Kang, for using “radical” Western postmodern theory to defend China’s cultural and political 
status quo and therefore giving rise to the neoconservatism.60 In the same vein, Zhang Longxi (1996:19, 
22) equated Chinese postmodernists with neoconservatives, and taunted them for blindly accepting 
stylistic Western discourses and dropping names, such as Homi Bhabha, Jean Baudrillard, Gayatri 
Spivak, Antonio Gramsci, and Jacques Lacan, while claiming to represent China’s national interest 
against Western hegemony. Postmodernism that “radically criticizes Western traditions” might “provide 
convenient rationale for Chinese intellectuals to give up their responsibility to criticize their own culture 
and turn to a nationalistic position,” observed Zhang Longxi (1996:19).61 All in all, the critics were 
concerned with the political implications of Chinese postmodernism: “[Apart] from Western postmodern 
and postcolonial theories that are recognized by the ‘post-ist’ critics, is it that all things with Western 
origins are incompatible with China’s unique situation and therefore cannot be enjoyed by the Chinese? 
Human rights, democracy, and freedom are certainly values originating from the West, but cars, airplanes, 
electric light, and telephones were also invented in the West. Why does the ‘post-ism’ not oppose to the 
latter list and replace it with Third World China’s indigenous inventions such as wooden walking horses?” 
                                                          
60 Zhao coined the term houxue in this article. 
 
61 For similar argument, see Lei Yi (1995a) and Xu (2001). 
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(Zhang Longxi 1996:24) Guo Jian (1996), a literature professor at the University of Wisconsin-Whitewater, 
faulted Chinese postmodernists and their Western predecessors, including Fredric Jameson and Michel 
Foucault, for disregarding and even “commodifying” the atrocity of the Cultural Revolution, and 
questioned the appropriation of postmodernizing China’s human rights condition. In response, Zhang 
Yiwu (1996:123) criticized Zhang Longxi for falling into “the mainstream ideology of the Western white 
middle class.” In his view, the critics of Chinese postmodernism erred in their prioritizing politics and 
values—seeing their polemical opponents as political enemies and modernity as a universal value (Zhang 
Yiwu 1996:125–26).62 
 
The Collapse of the Enlightenment Consensus: 1995–2000 
 
As intense as the debate surrounding postmodernism was, because of the esoteric nature of the 
terms and topics, it was largely one among literary scholars. It was the next debate—the one between 
liberals and the New Left—that truly rocked and permanently changed the Chinese intelligentsia. It is 
worth noting that there was a large degree of connection and overlap between those two debates, and 
many of the postmodernist and their critics were later perceived as New Leftists and liberals respectively, 
but as the debate reached a much larger stage with much more profound political implications, the main 
participants changed. More important, as the labels “New Left” (xinzuopai) and “liberalism” (ziyouzhuyi) 
have come to be widely used and taken on lives of their own, despite resistance on both sides, almost all 
the subsequent discourses and debates haven proceeded more or less through the prism of the left-
liberal division. 
 
The Emergence of the New Left 
 
Institutional Innovation and Reasonable Elements: While the liberals viewed themselves, and 
were widely perceived, as the successors of the reformers of the 1980s, a closer look tells us that the 
New Leftists had their origins in the reformist intellectuals as well. The most notable case was Gan Yang, 
                                                          
62 Many of the essays in the debate are reprinted in Wang Hui and Yu Guoliang (1998). 
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the editor of Culture: China and the World. Never explicitly politically-engaged in the 1980s, it was 
nevertheless not difficult to discern his pro-reform position. From the mid-1980s to the end of the 1980s, 
Gan Yang (1989b) consistently lamented that China’s failure in the twentieth century was a result of the 
intellectuals’ overemphasis on social responsibility and national interest at the expense of individual 
freedom. “If today’s Chinese intellectuals are still unwilling to hold high the banner of ‘liberty comes first’, 
then China will have no luck to welcome the twenty-first century,” asserted Gan Yang (1986). He claimed 
that what China needed was a “thorough … cultural modernization” (Gan Yang [1986] 2006:25) and 
“taking great pains to reintroduce the basic values in modern Western culture, and in particular freedom, 
democracy, and rule of law, that have been crudely rejected and excluded” (Gan Yang [1989] 2006:108). 
Gan even radically wrote that “the most forceful means of carrying forward and promoting tradition is 
rather that of ‘anti-tradition’” (Gan Yang 1987:2). As a consequence he was seen as an advocate of 
wholehearted Westernization (quanpan xihua). In another 1989 essay, Gan Yang (1989a) introduced the 
life and thought of Isaiah Berlin, a leading liberal thinker, for the first time to China. Gan Yang left China to 
pursue a PhD at the Committee on Social Thought at the University of Chicago in 1989, but remained 
active in China’s intellectual scene in the next few years. Studying with conservative thinkers Edward 
Shils and Allan Bloom, Gan became increasingly conservative and anti-liberal.63 In 1993, Gan Yang 
published an essay in Twenty-First Century, praising China’s rural industrialization—“leaving the land but 
not the village, entering the factory but not the city” (litu bu lixiang, jinchang bu jincheng)—as a unique 
model of development that achieved industrialization without destroying rural communities.64 As it differed 
from Western modernity in which “the economic and social spheres are separated as a result of the 
separation of the labor force and means of production,” the Chinese mode provided a viable alternative to 
Western modernity and constituted a “great contribution to human civilization” (Gan Yang 1993:5). 
A year later, Cui Zhiyuan, an assistant professor of political science at the Massachusetts 
Institute of technology, simultaneously published two influential articles in the August issue of Twenty-
First Century. Leaving China in 1987, Cui studied with prominent analytical Marxists, Adam Przeworski 
and Jon Elster, at the University of Chicago. After a brief introduction of neoevolutionism, analytical 
                                                          
63 How much commonality there is between Gan’s conservatism and the conservatism of Shils and Bloom is surely a 
matter worth looking into. 
 
64 The article was based on Gan’s presentation at a Harvard conference a year earlier. 
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Marxism, and critical legal studies, the first article moved on to use these theories to distill the “reasonable 
elements” and “institutional innovations” of Chinese politics and economy. For example, the thriving of the 
township and village enterprises showed that the Great Leap Forward had its merits, and exemplified 
flexible post-Fordism; and China’s opposition-less village elections demonstrated advantages in 
comparison with the multi-party system in the West (Cui Zhiyuan 1994b). The other paper, coauthored 
with the Harvard legal scholar Roberto Unger, used the turbulence during Russia’s transition to illustrate 
the flaws of neoliberalism, criticized Chinese intellectuals for institutional fetishism, and stated that the 
institutional innovations could lead China to an alternative route to Western capitalism (Unger and Cui 
Zhiyuan 1994).65 A month earlier, the Beijing qingnianbao (Beijing Youth Daily) published a short version 
of Cui’s first article, along with an editorial. In the editorial, authored by Yang Ping ([1994] 1996), the label 
xin zuoyi (New Left)66 for the first time was used to describe a Chinese intellectual: “There is now New 
Left in China.” A Taiwan-based magazine immediately picked up with an essay entitled “A Flood of New 
Leftist Thought in Mainland China” (cited in Liu Qingfeng 2001:51). However, the sobriquet did not 
immediately become popular until the debates proceeded and intensified in 1996. 
The articles by Gan and Cui, and in particular Cui’s articles, immediately offended a number of 
intellectuals, and sparked off a round of animated debate. While in many respects the debate was initially 
a continuation of the previous one surrounding postmodernism, it spanned out of the literature circle to 
include intellectuals from different academic backgrounds. “For a period, whenever we intellectuals got 
together, we would talk about this,” recalled a liberal intellectual during interview. In the three responses 
published in the October and December issues of Twenty-First Century, Ji Weidong (1994), Deng 
Zhenglai (1994), and Wang Dingding (1994a) all criticized Cui for utopian thinking and for mechanically 
applying Western theories to China. Ji Weidong (1994:8), a law professor at Kobe University in Japan, 
also pointed out that throughout history the Chinese had never respected rules: “By switching our 
attention to the outside world, we can broaden our imaginative horizons in institutional learning and 
                                                          
65 The article is a translation of an English-language article that was later published in the November-December issue 
of the New Left Review of the same year. 
 
66 Xin zuoyi literally means “new left wing,” whereas xin zuopai, a term used more widely later, can be translated 
literally as “new left faction.” While some intellectuals prefer to be called or refer to others as xin zuoyi because they 
do not like the connotation of “faction”(Xu Jilin et al. 2001:199), I do not see them as substantially different and 
therefore refer to both as “New Left” or “New Leftists.” 
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innovation. Even if the institutional learning results in a little ‘institutional fetishism,’ what harm can there 
be?!” In a follow-up essay, Cui Zhiyuan (1995c) used the collective economy (jiti jingji) of Nanjie Village, 
the reportedly last Maoist village in China, as an example to illustrate the “reasonable elements” of 
Maoism and the institutional innovation that went beyond the dualism of socialism and capitalism. In 
general, the tones of both sides were friendly, as the critics approved the general direction of institutional 
innovation whereas Cui (1995c:134) was “pleased with the responses from the academy and the media.” 
The tone of the debate became much bitter in late 1995. In a gathering in the fall of 1995, a few 
intellectuals, including Liu Dong, Qin Hui, Lei Yi, Wang Hui, and Huang Ping, the last two of whom later 
became representatives of the New Left, discussed what they saw as “absurd” views of Cui and Gan, with 
whom they acquainted in the 1980s. At that time, they did not refer to Cui, Gan, or themselves as a New 
Leftist or liberal, but were angry that Cui and Gan “used Western left-wing theories to interpret the 
Cultural Revolution, … Mao Zedong, and the people’s communes (renmin gongshe).” They “completely 
disregarded the facts, and only derived theory from theory, and text from text,” said a liberal who 
participated in the initial debates. At that gathering, Liu, Lei, and Qin decided to each write an essay to 
criticize Cui and Gan. 
Liu’s and Lei’s articles appeared in the December issue of Twenty-First Century, along with the 
responses from Cui and Gan. Liu’s (2001) article, entitled “Beware of Designer Pidgin Scholarship,” 
asserted that only Chinese with living experience in China could have “the kind of in-depth cultural 
awareness that can only be achieved through total immersion” and therefore “an adequate measure of 
genuine empathy for the Chinese cultural environment” (99). Liu identified a “novelty-seeking” tendency in 
Western academia, manifested by “all kinds of intellectual fashions and fads” (99), and cautioned against 
scholars “‘[cutting] the feet’ of their data to ‘fit the shoes’ of their theoretical frameworks” (100) or dropping 
names “simply for theatrical effect” (102). Lei Yi (1995b) echoed Liu’s criticism of designer pidgin 
scholarship (yangjingbang), and criticized those studying overseas for their uncritical adherence to 
Western Marxism and forgetting the atrocity of the Cultural Revolution and Maoism. 
The attacks did not work well, as they were framed by Cui and Gan as an issue of “right to speak,” 
for Liu seemed to indicate that only those living in China—and therefore had “an adequate measure of 
genuine empathy”—could speak for China. Cui Zhiyuan (1995b) accused Liu for promoting 
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“epistemological privilege.” Asking who the “we” was when studying China, Gan Yang (1995) rebuked Liu 
for resorting to the language of a “party hack” instead of a scholar. Even Zhang Longxi (1996), who 
supported Liu’s criticism of designer pidgin scholarship itself, faulted Liu for drawing a line between those 
based in China and overseas. One of the key allies of Liu and Lei, acknowledged during interview, 
“Because of Liu’s unwise tactic, we lost that battle.” 
However, this was only the beginning of a much more intensive and prolonged debate. In 
February 1996, Twenty-First Century featured a special issue on Chinese New Left and postmodernism. 
In his article, Qin Hui, a well-known historian at Tsinghua University who wrote under the pseudonym 
“Bian Wu,”67 fiercely attacked Cui Zhiyuan (Bian Wu 1996a). This time, Qin picked up the label “New Left,” 
but used it in a satirical vein by describing Cui as a “New Leftist with Chinese characteristics.” In particular, 
Qin launched a scathing attack on Cui’s ambivalence toward Maoism: “Western Marxists and neo-
Marxists in the academic circles in Europe and America … are still largely democratic socialists. They 
criticize capitalism, but would never think that a Gulag-like Soviet society is better that the West; they 
criticize Khrushchev, but would in no way say that Stalin was better than Khrushchev … . Once the Left 
was rejuvenated in China, … we now see some ‘New Left’ theories with ‘Chinese characteristics.’ … [The] 
‘New Leftists’ are teaching us to learn not from Eastern Europe, not from the West, and not even from the 
Asian ‘tigers’, but exclusively from … Mao Zedong! … If we follow the advocate to find ‘reasonable 
elements,’ do you think it would be difficult to find many ‘reasonable elements’ in Nazism or some even 
worse systems?” (Bian Wu 1996a:4–5)68 
 
State Capacity: At the same time, another influential debate also first burst out in Twenty-First 
Century, and it produced another important New Leftist, Wang Shaoguang, who also owns a doctoral 
degree from an elite American university. With a dissertation on the Cultural Revolution, Wang received a 
PhD in political science from Cornell University in 1990 and subsequently taught at Yale University. In an 
article wrote before the collapse of the Soviet Union, Wang Shaoguang (1991) distinguished between 
regime type and state capacity, and advocated a democratic regime with strong state capacity. In 1991, 
                                                          
67 Qin Hui later publicly revealed his identity. 
 




Wang visited Russia with a delegation of Yale faculty members. The economic struggle and social 
turbulence of Russia had a deep impact on him. Once a democrat, he had since become increasingly 
critical of democracy. At Yale, Wang met Hu Angang, a researcher at CAS and visiting scholar at Yale 
from 1991 to 1992. In 1993, Wang and Hu authored Zhongguo guojia nengli baogao (State Capacity of 
China). In February 1994, Wang and Hu published an article, “The Decline in the Extractive Capacity of 
the Chinese Government and Its Consequences,” which was essentially a précis of their coauthored book. 
In this article, Wang and Hu sounded the alarm for China’s fiscal starvation: China’s economic reforms, 
and in particular regional decentralization, had led to the steady decline of state capacity measured by the 
fiscal revenues of the central government. If this process was not reversed by transferring a greater share 
of fiscal revenues from provincial governments and state enterprises back to the central government, a 
weak central government would mean increasing income inequality and social unrest, and even a 
Yugoslav-style disintegration. To avoid the disaster, Wang and Hu urged, the central government must 
strengthen its authority. Wang and Hu’s report received attention from the Chinese government, and 
facilitated its tax-sharing (fenshuizhi) reforms of 1994, which largely overhauled China’s fiscal and 
taxation regime and enabled the central government to regain its control over the economy. For the first 
time in post-Tiananmen China, intellectuals with no personal connections with the political establishment 
were able to influence national policies. 
 In the same issue of Twenty-First Century, Wang and Hu’s argument was challenged by Yang 
Dali (1994), an assistant professor of political science at the University of Chicago, Rao Yuqing and Xiao 
Geng (1994), both professors at the University of Hong Kong, and, notably, Cui Zhiyuan (1994a). The 
main controversy revolved around the definition and measurement of state capacity. Later, more 
intellectuals joined the debate in other media outlets (Li Qiang 1998; Wang Dingding 1994b; Zhang 
Shuguang 1995). While many attempted to criticize Wang and Hu’s thesis from a social science 
perspective by attacking their definition and operationalization, it is quite obvious that many intellectuals 
who were wary of the power of the authoritarian regime disliked the policy implications of Wang and Hu’s 
report. As Zhang Boshu (2015:123–25) put it: 
 
“No one denies that a modern state needs ‘governing capacity.’ … But what is 
real ‘governing capacity’? … Is it ‘mobilizing the nation’s resources to address major 
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problems’? … [But] what if [the direction] is wrong? The two-party system or multi-party 
system in democratic states may be bothered by low-efficiency, but there are no big or 
fatal mistakes at stake. A ‘mistake’ by Mao Zedong brought ten years of national suffering 
while nobody could do anything about it. Was it high ‘governing capacity’ or low 
‘governing capacity’? … “State capacity” is not the only factor—there must be a proper 
institutional framework, as well as a solid legitimacy base and a value base … .” 
 
Attack on Modernity: While Yang Ping’s 1994 editorial only referred Cui Zhiyuan as a New Leftist, 
by early 1996 “New Left” had become a collective label. In January that year, Mingbao yuekan (Mingpao 
Monthly), a Hong Kong-based magazine, published a special issue on the emergence of the Chinese 
New Left, and identified Cui Zhiyuan, Gan Yang, and Wang Shaoguang as the most prominent 
representatives (cited in Bian Wu 1996b:128; see also Wang 2003:28). The signal event that caught the 
attention from the entire intelligentsia was the publication of Wang Hui’s ([1997] 2008) long essay “The 
State of Contemporary Chinese Thought and the Question of Modernity” in 1997. A researcher at the 
Institute of Literature of CASS and coeditor of Reading, Wang was a participant of the Tiananmen 
protests. Like most other intellectuals, Wang believed that enlightenment and modernity would ultimately 
bring prosperity and democracy to China. However, his position changed after the 1989 crackdown, and 
particularly after his immersion in academic frontiers during his visit to Harvard and the University of 
California-Los Angeles in the early 1990s. 
Wang’s essay was the first systematic critique of modernity as an ideological orientation in post-
Tiananmen China. The main thesis can be summarized as follows. Since 1989, China had been 
increasingly integrated into the global system of production of consumption. Neoliberalism as a global 
force had permeated every aspect of Chinese society, and therefore must be the point of departure of any 
serious analysis of contemporary China. The main intellectual discourse in the 1980s was modernity, 
especially the binaries of China/West and tradition/modernity. However, by the mid-1990s, the 
enlightenment project, represented by the neoliberal reform, had not only failed to give rise to a “good 
society,” but also revealed the intrinsic and unresolvable contradictions of the market society. As the logic 
of capitalism had run through all aspects of social life, the political operation was also tightly linked to the 
capital; therefore it was no longer sufficient to view China as an authoritarian regime. To be specific, since 
the mid-1980s, the neoliberal reform, which placed efficiency above all else, had not only created 
economic inequality, but also impeded political democracy. By embracing enlightenment and modernity, 
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the reformist intellectuals indeed provided ideological legitimacy for Chinese neoliberalism. Because of 
their unwillingness to criticize neoliberalism, the reformist intellectuals had lost their critical edge, and the 
Enlightenment as an ideology of modernization had become a conservative defender of capitalism. This 
article received wide-spread attention, and established Wang’s role as a leading New Left intellectual in 
China. In 2000, Gan Yang identified Wang Shaoguang, Cui Zhiyuan, Wang Hui, and himself as the 
leading Chinese New Leftists. Since then, the names of the “big four” have widely been tied together, 
despite their internal differences. Moreover, while they had previously voiced disagreements with one 
another (Cui Zhiyuan 1994a; Gang Yang 2001; Wang Hui 2003), or approval of some liberals, they have 
since argued along the New Left/liberal line and become allies, both ideologically and socially.69 
 
The New Left Discourse 
 
By the end of 1990s, “New Left” had been widely used as an ideological label. In addition to the 
“big four,” there emerged a cluster of well-known New Left intellectuals, such as literary critics Chen 
Yangu, Han Yuhai, Kuang Xinnian, Liu Kang, and Zhang Xudong, economists Zuo Dapei, Yang Fan, and 
Han Deqiang, and playwrights Huang Jisu and Zhang Guangtian, whether they approached the label 
willingly or reluctantly. In 2003, an anthology devoted to the New Left and their critics was published 
(Gong Yang 2003). Aside from institutional innovation, reasonable elements, sate capacity, and the 
critique of modernity, the New Left in the 1990s resorted to three other general rhetorical appeals: justice, 
democracy, and revolution. 
 
Justice and equality: On the one hand, it would be factually wrong to claim that only the New Left 
appropriated the notion of justice. Despite the attack from the New Left that the liberals were indifferent to 
social and economic justice, some of the most influential discussions of justice came from the liberals, 
and in particular from Qin Hui and He Qinglian. On the other hand, as a result of the heterogeneity of 
                                                          
69 For example, 2011, Chongqing University established the Institute for Advanced Studies in the Humanities and 
Social Sciences, with Zhang Xudong as its director. The academic committee was comprised of scholars most of 
whom associated with the New Left, including Cui Zhiyuan, Wang Shaoguang, and Gan Yang. The New Leftists have 
frequently attended conferences organized or attended by other New Leftists, but have almost never interacted with 
the liberals, and vice versa. During my interview, while insisting on the internal differences, a prominent New Leftist 
was unwilling to reveal the differences. 
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Chinese liberalism, and in particular the dominance of free-market ideology and popularization of 
libertarian ideas in the 1990s, the justice discourse was to a certain degree pushed aside and 
marginalized within liberalism.70 As a consequence, justice became much more frequently associated 
with the New Left. 
Wang Shaoguang (1994) was among the first to question the CCP’s guiding principle of 
prioritizing efficiency and called on a public discussion on the issue of justice in China’s economic reforms. 
In a theoretical discussion of the relationship between efficiency and equity, Wang Shaoguang cited 
Rawls’s theory to illustrate that those on the bottom of society should not suffer during economic reforms. 
Wang then went further by claiming that human dignity as a value is above private property rights and 
free exchanges. He listed five principles in dealing with equity and efficiency: poverty-alleviation, fair 
equality of opportunity, due consideration to equity and efficiency, political democracy, and economic 
democracy. Writing at a time when the liberals had not entirely owned the label “liberal,” Cui Zhiyuan 
(1997c) also took inspiration from Rawls, and in particular his idea of the veil of ignorance. He claimed 
that Rawls was a Rousseauian liberal rather than a Lockean liberal, and insisted that property rights were 
not a precondition, but rather an object, of social contracts. Wang Hui ([1997] 2008) criticized the 
outrageous social and economic injustice in the course of China’s market-oriented reforms, and in 
particular the rising rural-urban disparities and the corruption in the process of privatizing state assets. 
In light of China’s increasing income inequality, both Wang Shaoguang and Cui Zhiyuan (1995c) 
emphasized the urgency of economic democracy. Theoretically, economic democracy intended to apply 
the principle of popular sovereignty to the economic sphere. Practically, economic democracy advocated 
the employment of capital by labor and a strong role of the state in income redistribution (Cui Zhiyuan 
1997b; Wang Shaoguang 1994:31–32). Cui (1996a) famously claimed that the Anshan iron and steel 
complex in Maoist China exhibited the feature of co-decision making, and therefore economic democracy, 
by the participation of productive labor and workers in the management of the factory. The concern of 
economic inequality was so deeply-ingrained that a New Leftist made the following comments during 
interview, “If the humans are willing to change, there are already a variety of pills and genes. Can’t we 
change the human nature [to make us all equal]? Of course we can. … I think we can change our human 
                                                          
70 For example, economist Wang Dingding (1995), an admirer of Hayek, argued that efficiency was an indispensable 
tool to achieve social justice. 
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nature. Why can’t we change it to make the society more equal?” In Wang Hui’s ([2001] 2008:126) view, 
by advocating the constitutional protection of private properties, Chinese liberals were by nature 
attempting to legalize the unjust wealth distribution. 
The concern over justice also led to the New Left’s critical stance toward globalization. Wang Hui 
emphasized that the entire economic, social, and economic activities in post-Tiananmen China should be 
understood through the prism of global capital flow and penetration of capital into the society (Wang Hui 
[1997] 2008), and even regarded the 1989 Tiananmen protests, which were commonly viewed as a pro-
democracy movement, as part of the global anti-capitalist movement (Wang Hui [2001] 2008). In the 
1990s, when China was negotiating its entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO), both the liberals 
and the official media praised the entry as a major step in China’s assimilation into the global community 
and emergence as a global power. The New Leftists, however, were almost uniformly critical of the WTO 
accession, at least the terms and procedures. In particular, influenced by Immanuel Wallerstein’s world-
systems theory, they were concerned that the WTO accession would forcibly bring China into the global 
center-periphery system in which the hegemonic center exploited the powerless periphery (Cui Zhiyuan 
[1993] 1997; Wang Hui [2001] 2008:146–49). Economist Han Deqiang (2000) was the most vocal 
opponent of China’s WTO entry, predicting that it would lead to a wave of bankruptcy of China’s 
enterprises and collapse of the rural economy. In his view, the WTO entry was a result of the collision 
between the rich Chinese and cross-national corporations (and the accompanying neoliberalism). 
Similarly, Yang Fan (2000) warned that because of the lack of social safety net, WTO accession would 
exacerbate China’s problems of economic inequality and unemployment. 
 
Democracy: In the 1990s, democracy as a rhetoric was popular among both New Left and liberal 
intellectuals. In general, however, their conceptualizations of democracy were different. While the liberals 
were more interested in representative democracies (Zhu Xueqin 1998), the New Left favored direct 
democracies.71 
In an article that discussed Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Cui Zhiyuan (1995a) regarded the 
association of Rousseau with totalitarianism as an example of the bias of Western ideology. In 
                                                          
71 For an analysis of various understandings of democracy, see Gao Quanxi (2010). 
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demonstrating that Rousseau’s idea of the general will gave rise to modern democratic theory, Cui 
argued that an authentic liberal must take into account of the general will. Gan Yang also embraced the 
idea of popular sovereignty. In the immediate aftermath of the 1989 crackdown, many in the overseas 
Chinese community believed that China’s future lied in federalism. Gan Yang (1996) refuted this view, 
insisting that the foundation of modern politics should be the individual citizen instead of local power. In 
other words, popular sovereignty precluded the option of a government within a government, and a mass 
democracy would be a good way to restrict the power of local governments. Therefore, the central 
authority should be based on the authorization of all citizens, which entailed a mass democracy based on 
direct elections.72 
In a 1997 article in Twenty-First Century, Gan Yang (2001) harshly criticized the liberals for their 
view on democracy.73 In Gan’s view, Chinese liberalism in the 1990s had degraded into ultra-
conservatism that rejected democracy in the name of liberty. To reverse this trend, Gan (2001:83–84) 
proposed, “We must reject the exclusion of democracy in the name of liberalism, reject the repudiation of 
the French Revolution in favor of the English Revolution, reject the disavowal of Rousseau and the 
endorsement of Burke, and reject, especially, the negation of modernity (in the form of the European 
Enlightenment and the Chinese May Fourth Movement) under the pretext of resorting to Chinese 
tradition.”74 Citing Tocqueville’s expansion of the concept of democracy from the political sphere to the 
spheres of society and culture, Isaiah Berlin’s approval of the French Revolution, and Benjamin 
Constant’s distinction of liberties of ancients and moderns, Gan Yang maintained that negative liberty and 
positive liberty were not incompatible and that political liberty should not leave out direct democracies.75 
As Gan Yang (1997) saw it, the biggest obstacle to China’s emergence was the increasing feeble central 
authority relative to local power. Borrowing Max Weber’s concept of “political nation,” Gan maintained that 
China must become a mature political nation by overcoming the prevailing “political philistinism.” To that 
end, the widest possible political participation—that is, a mass democracy—would be able to include all 
                                                          
72 A revised English translation can be found in Gan Yang (2003). 
 
73 The article was later translated into English and included in an anthology edited by Zhang Xudong in 2001. 
 
74 The contrast between Gan Yang’s defense of and Wang Hui’s attack on the Enlightenment is indeed obvious. 
 
75 As many commentators have noticed, the frequent transmutation or logical contradictions of Gan Yang’s views is 
striking. For example, in an essay published in 1991, Gan wrote highly of Edmund Burke and called on the Chinese 
to “cast aside democracy and science, and lay the foundation for freedom and order” (Gan Yang 1991). 
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citizens in national politics, forge a uniform national identity, solve the problem of central-local divide, and 
ultimately help China to become a great and modern political nation. Wang Hui ([1997] 2008:73–74) also 
criticized the liberals’ confinement of democracy to the rule of law and rejection of mass political 
participation, and insisted that direct democracies should play a great role in China’s social, political, and 
economic life. Furthermore, Wang Hui ([1997] 2008:86–87) insisted that democracy should enter the 
cultural arena, and hoped that cultural democracy would resist the influence of cross-national capital. 
 
Revolution: In 2000, a stage play Che Guevara became a cultural sensation in Beijing and a few 
other major cities. With “a stylized form close to the street skits of the years of struggle against the 
Guomindang76” (Wang Hui [2000] 2003:85), the play was full of revolutionary rhetoric and communist 
vocabularies. It relentlessly condemned the United States and called for a return to Maoist proletarian 
revolutionary values. It had been performed nearly 100 times by 2012 and reminded us that the 
revolutionary ideal and the nostalgia for China’s revolutionary past had never been quenched. It was a 
common scene when the audience echoed the actors’ lines and shouted “Down with capitalism!” and 
“Eradicate private ownership!” (Yang Jisheng 2004:556–57) “Our purpose was not to portray Che 
Guevara per se,” the playwright Huang Jisu said, “but to highlight his reflection on the important perennial 
questions—how to see this society, and how to view human equality and inequality” (Wu Qi 2012).77 
While many liberals were wary of anything pertaining to revolution, it occupied a central position in the 
New Left discourse in the 1990s. In the influential anthology, Sichao (Currents of Thought), out of the 13 
articles written by New Left intellectuals, many expressed nostalgia for Mao’s communist revolution and 
Cultural Revolution (Gong Yang 2003). 
An ardent critic of Western modernity, Wang Hui ([1997] 2008:74) lamented that Chinese 
intellectuals had only paid attention to the individualism in the writings of Nietzsche and Sartre while 
ignoring their criticisms of modernity. In particular, in embracing neoliberalism and forbidding open 
discussions of the Cultural Revolution and Mao’s revolutionary legacy, Wang Hui ([2001] 2008:123) 
argued, the CCP and the liberals had formed a de facto alliance of hegemonic ideology that led to 
                                                          
76 Guomindang is the pinyin transliteration of Kuomintang, or the Chinese Nationalist Party. 
 
77 For a detailed analysis of the stage play, see Conceison (2004:177–90). 
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collective amnesia of China’s revolutionary past.78 Wang Hui (2003:110) pointed out, “How to achieve a 
new understanding of Chinese revolution, of the legacy of socialism, and of the achievements as well as 
the tragedies of this legacy are major questions urgently in need of address from Chinese intellectuals, 
but to which they have so far been unable to respond. This is because the ideology of neoliberalism and 
its legitimization were built on the total repudiation and moral condemnation of this legacy.” While 
acknowledging the violence and tragedy brought Mao’s revolution, Wang Hui (2003:111) considered 
Chinese revolution unfinished business, refused to discard the legacy of equality of Chinese revolution, 
and wanted to “consider the possibilities and historical conditions for a free society enabled by democracy 
and equality via scrutiny of the actual conditions that gave rise to the revolution.” 
While Wang Hui in general approached the revolution on an abstract level, Cui Zhiyuan (1997a) 
wrote a series of influential articles in the 1990s aiming to retain and develop the “reasonable elements” 
of Maoism. More specifically, he argued that Mao’s thought should be part of the blueprint for twenty-first 
century China, and many practices in Maoist China were pioneering social experiments in mass 
democracies and economic democracy that should be brought back to contemporary China. In 1996, Cui 
Zhiyuan (1996b) caused great controversy by making the following statement: “Today, we should 
institutionalize what Mao Zedong said ‘launching a Cultural Revolution every seven or eight years’ as 
regular national direct elections. On in this way is the nature of the people’s democratic dictatorship or the 
dictatorship of the proletariat carried out.” In an essay that discussed Antonio Gramsci in the context of 
Chinese revolution, Chen Yangu (1995), a literary critic at CASS, indicated that Chinese socialist 
revolution should not confine itself to the seizure of regime and the transformation of the ownership of 
means of production; instead, it should also aim at cultural hegemony by competing with Western cultural 
imperialism with the socialist culture. 
 
The Rise of the Liberal Discourse 
 
Whether the reformist intellectuals and pro-democracy activists in the 1980s, or even such 
prominent figures in the Republic era as Hu Shi and earlier Liang Qichao for that matter, were “real” 
                                                          
78 Wang Hui ([2006] 2009) later called the evaporation of revolution from the CCP’s official discourse “depoliticized 
politics” or the “politics of depoliticization” (quzhengzhihua de zhengzhi). 
66 
 
liberals is a matter of frequent debate. As I argue in Chapter 3, this question has no “correct” answer as it 
all depends on the definitions of “liberalism” and “liberals.” Let it suffice at this point to say that not until 
the second half of the 1990s, with the emergence of the debate between the New Leftists and the liberals, 
did a large number of Chinese intellectuals begin to call themselves, and be identified as, liberals. 
However, the rise of the liberal discourse was a much more complex social phenomenon than the 
intellectual debate alone, and contemporary Chinese liberalism has been an extraordinarily broad 
ideological spectrum. This section identifies several important strands that eventually converged into the 
liberal discourse. 
 
Pro-democracy activism: In a way, the Tiananmen crackdown evoked a series of unofficial 
political campaigns in the 1990s. On the one hand, a number of former political prisoners, many of whom 
Democracy Wall activists, continued their political resistance. Most of them were released in the early 
1990s ahead of schedule as China was bidding for the 2000 Summer Olympics (Goldman 2005:83), but 
refused to compromise and stay silent. On the other hand, the massacre propelled some people to 
become dissidents and political activists. 
Two campaigns stood out as the most significant. The first was the public call for the CCP to 
make appropriate reparations. The most prominent grassroots campaign was the Tiananmen Mothers 
movement. Initiated by a group of parents, relatives, and friends of victims of the CCP’s military action on 
June 3 and June 4, 1989, the movement consistently called for a public investigation into the military 
assault on the civilians, an apology from the CCP for its atrocities, appropriate punishment for those 
involved in killing and making decisions, and reparations for the victims and their families. The campaign 
was led by Ding Zilin, a retired philosophy professor whose teenage son was shot and killed by the CCP 
troops. Consisting of more than 100 individuals whose loved ones were killed during the protests, the 
campaign became a focus of international attention. Despite the hostility from the CCP and routine 
harassment from the law enforcement,79 including the CCP’s Internet censorship, the campaign was 
influential, and its call for reparative justice was an important component of the liberal discourse of the 
1990s—and to this day. 
                                                          
79 The leaders, including Ding Zilin and her husband (died in 2015), have been under house arrest and surveillance 
for more than 20 years with occasional arrests. 
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The second noteworthy campaign aimed at establishing an opposition party. In the second half of 
the 1990s, the political climate underwent subtle changes. Deng Xiaoping was incapacitated by early 
1996 and died in February 1997. With the aging and consequently waning influence of the other party 
elders, the party leader Jiang Zemin was able to consolidate his power. With the economy in best shape 
since 1989 and a boost in national pride by the transfer of sovereignty over Hong Kong from the British, 
there appeared a short period of political relaxation. In October 1997, China signed the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). A year later, China signed the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. As China was further integrating itself into the international 
community, pro-democracy activists were encouraged with the hope of rekindling the flames of 
democracy and freedom. In December 1997, Xu Wenli, a major Democracy Wall activist who was 
released on parole in 1993 after 12 years of imprisonment, and Qin Yongmin, another veteran activist 
who spent eight years in prison in the 1980s, released “An Open Letter to Fellow Factory Workers” (Gao 
quanguo gongren tongbao shu), calling for workers nationwide to echo China’s signing of the ICESCR 
and establish independent workers’ unions. This broke a near 10-year oppressive silence of citizen 
activism. Xu also took advantage of the newly emerging Internet and set up an electronic Democracy 
Wall, which heralded China’s online citizen activism in the twenty-first century  (Qian Liqun 2012b:294). In 
June 1998, US President Bill Clinton visited China, which was the first presidential visit from the United 
States since the Tiananmen crackdown. Perceiving this as a great political opportunity, many pro-
democracy activists began to establish the China Democracy Party. They applied for registration in 
Zhejiang Province without avail. At the same time, they established numerous local planning committees, 
elected Xu Wenli to represent the political dissidents, and asked for Xu’s meeting with Clinton. In July, 
Wang Youcai and other Zhejiang activists were arrested, but were later released under domestic and 
international pressure. Many activists misjudged the situation, and thought that the CCP was about to lift 
the ban on opposition parties. In November, Xu Wenli and some other activists announced the 
establishment of the Beijing and Tianjin branch of the China Democracy Party and a plan for a national 
congress of the party. The campaign was quickly suppressed and its leaders harshly punished. In 
addition, the tactics were questioned by some of its own members. However, without a doubt, the 
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opposition party campaign was an important page in China’s contemporary history.80 Many of its 
participants have continued their activism in China and overseas. 
 
Marxist humanists: As previously discussed, the reformist political and intellectuals elites were 
purged or sidelined after 1989. After the crackdown, both the institutional and emotional bonds of those 
elites with the CCP were broken. This pushed them further toward liberal ideas, or freed them from the 
consideration of “political correctness.” In addition, some prominent party elders began to critically reflect 
on the Chinese revolution and the communist ideal and openly expressed views at odds with official 
dogma. As these intellectuals belonged to the older generations and therefore had limited exposure to 
liberal theories, their theoretical inspirations were largely confined to various versions of Marxism. 
However, under the surface of Marxist languages lay the discontentment of the authoritarian rule and 
support for political democracy and individual freedom. 
Hu Sheng, a major whateverist who became the president of CASS and Vice Chairman of 
Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference in the 1980s, underwent considerable soul-searching 
in his later years. While acknowledging the achievements in Mao’s China, he criticized Mao’s leftist 
politics and the CCP’s tradition of political persecution, and praised Deng Xiaoping for saving China. In 
particular, in an article published in 1999, Hu criticized Mao for degrading into populism, defined as 
skipping the stage of capitalism and directing China to jump from a peasant economy to socialism. 
Capitalism, as Hu saw it, was an inevitable stage in human development (Hu Sheng 1999). 
Zhu Houze, former head of the Publicity Department of the CCP, was already a prominent liberal 
high-ranking party official in the 1980s. Known for his libel propaganda policy of “generous, tolerant, 
relaxed” (kuanrong, kuanhou, kuansong), Zhu was dismissed from his post in 1987 during the anti-
bourgeois liberalization campaign. In 1989, as chairman of the All-China Federation of Trade Unions, he 
called on to “establish a new political order of democracy alongside a new economic order of market” 
(cited in Zhang Boshu 2013:6). The Tiananmen crackdown prompted Zhu to part company with the CCP. 
He had since surrounded himself with liberal intellectuals of various backgrounds, attended numerous 
                                                          
80 See Wright (2004) for a detailed case study of the opposition party campaign. 
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unofficial conferences on political reforms, and written a series of articles in support of democracy (Zhu 
Houze 2013). 
A more outspoken party elder was Li Rui, Mao’s secretary in the 1950s and the executive deputy 
head of the CCP’s Organization Department in the early 1980s. In 1994, Li Rui published a memoir of the 
Lushan Conference of 1959, which saw Mao’s political purge of the Defense Minister Peng Dehuai, and 
was critical of Mao’s dictatorship and utopian vision. After the publication of the book, Li began to openly 
criticize Mao and the CCP. More important, by repeatedly and openly calling for constitutional political 
reform, Li became the most prominent liberal party elder. 
Most notable of all, however, was Li Shenzhi’s transformation into a liberal. Former foreign policy 
adviser to Premier Zhou Enlai and Vice President of CASS, Li firmly opposed to the 1989 crackdown and 
was forced to retire the following year as a consequence. In the 1990s, Li Shenzhi (2005) became one of 
the most vocal supporters of liberalism, and wrote a series of essays advocating the revival of the 
enlightenment ideal of the May Fourth Movement. In 1998, in a preface for a book that honored 
the centennial year of Peking University, Li (1998:5) proclaimed that “liberalism is the best and most 
universal value.” As short as this preface was, because of Li’s political status and social influence, it 
encouraged many intellectuals to openly call themselves “liberals,” and was widely credited for its 
important role in the “flowering of liberalism” (Goldman 2005:128–60) in the late 1990s. 
Li’s most influential political writing came a year later. In 1999, when the CCP was celebrating 50 
years of communism in China, Li ([1999] 2005) wrote an essay, “Fifty Years of Storms and Vagaries.” In a 
deeply personal tone, Li vividly recalled his experience during the founding ceremony of the People’s 
Republic in 1949, and in particular his state of euphoria in Tiananmen Square, believing that China was 
on its way to freedom, equality, and “the incomparably wonderful communism.” However, in just a few 
years, Li was purged as a “rightist,” and the country underwent 40 years of turbulence, ending with the 
1989 Tiananmen massacre. Ten years later, when China seemed to be emerging as a global economic 
power house, the collective memory of the tragic past had been erased, and there was still no sign of 





“Ten years have elapsed since 1989, and Jiang Zemin has taken over the reins 
of power for 10 full years … [and] there is no longer any force that could challenge 
him. … Taking the initiative for a directed democratization would be the best thing for 
China and for the Communist Party. … Since in 1992 Deng Xiaoping could violate the 
four cardinal principles introduced by himself by saying that ‘capitalism can operate a 
market economy, so too can socialism’ and thus made a fresh start for Chinese economy, 
why can’t you open up a new opportunity for Chinese politics by saying ‘capitalism can 
practice parliamentary democracy, so too can socialism’?” 
 
In no time was the essay widely circulated and warmly received within the liberal intellectual 
circles. It has been widely regarded as one of the most influential political tracts in post-Mao China. Li 
was even seen by many intellectuals as the “spiritual leader” (Ren Bumei 2003) and “chief spokesperson” 
(Ding Xueliang [2003] 2013) of China’s liberal intellectual movement. 
 
Free-market economics: In the immediate aftermath of the Tiananmen uprising, the conservative 
forces appeared to be on the rise. The conservative party elders launched attacks not only on political 
reformers, but also on the market-oriented economic reforms. For two years, Chinese economy was in a 
state of stagnation. More important, the program of reform and opening-up, Deng’s greatest political 
legacy, was challenged within the party. Deng’s 1992 southern inspection tour put the debate to rest. In 
the next few years, China began to encourage the growth of private enterprises and attract foreign direct 
investments. This political tactic inadvertently created an opportunity for free-market economics. As the 
“market” discourse became a state-sanctioned amulet for the economists, and as the rhetoric of free-
market appeared much less ideologically subversive than that of democracy, liberty, or human rights, 
free-market economics achieved a near hegemonic status in the Chinese intelligentsia. During this period, 
economics became one of the most prominent fields of study. Economists frequently appeared in the 
media, travelled a great deal to give lectures, and were much materially better-off than their colleagues in 
the other disciplines. Economics and business became the most attractive and sought-after majors in 
college. Free-market economists, such as Milton Friedman of the Chicago School and James M. 
Buchanan of the Public Choice School, were widely seen as intellectual heroes. 
The most remarkable intellectual phenomenon during this period was the rise of new institutional 
economics. While the relatively low requirement of mathematics certainly played a role as most 
economists trained in the 1980s and the first half of 1990s were not equipped with mathematical 
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techniques, Chinese economists found the motto “Getting institutions right” especially appealing. 
Economist Ronald Coase was first introduced into China in the 1980s with Chinese translations of his 
classic papers, “The Nature of the Firm” and “The Problem of Social Cost.” In the 1990s, his anthology 
became a best-seller in China and influenced a generation of economists. As Sheng Hong (2013), an 
economist and one of the earliest translators of Coase’s work, put it, “China’s post-1978 reform has been 
by nature a process of institutional change, which surely needs a theoretical explanation. When proposing 
programs of institutional change, Chinese economists were naturally looking for institutional theories. 
After a period of searching, they found new institutional economics, which was founded by Coase. … The 
essence is the acknowledgment and protection of property rights … .” When Coase won the Nobel Prize 
in Economics in 1991, some thrilled Chinese economists held a party in celebration and collectively wrote 
a congratulatory letter to Coase. In the 1990s, new institutional economics was the most popular and 
respected school of thought in economics, and arguably among all social sciences. Almost all major 
works of Ronald Coase, Douglass North, Oliver Williamson, Almen Alchian, Harold Demsetz, Elinor 
Ostrom, and Steven N. S. Cheung81 were translated into Chinese and attracted the brightest minds in 
China. The Unirule Institute of Economics, China’s most influential nongovernmental economic policy 
think tank, built itself almost entirely on new institutional economics. In short, new institutional economics 
was instrumental in spreading the idea of property rights. By the end of the 1990s, the importance of 
market competition and property rights was widely acknowledged in the liberal intellectual circles. 
 
Various liberal theories: As a political philosophy, liberalism already had a solid ground in the 
1980s, and the names of classic liberal thinkers were not unknown to Chinese intellectuals. However, it 
was not until the 1990s when the academic field quickly grew and expanded that various liberal theories 
reached beyond the ivory tower and entered the intellectual and public discourses. In the 1990s, classical 
liberal thinkers, such as John Locke, and modern liberal theorists, such as John Rawls, were all widely 
read and admired. As Liu Junning (1998:1) claimed, “the coming of age of liberalism [was] the most 
significant development in the transition of the Chinese intelligentsia from the 1980s to 1990s.” 
                                                          
81 A Hong Kong-born economist who was a student of Armen Alchian and close friend of Ronald Coase. 
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The most influential version of liberalism in the 1990s, however, was a particular version—
libertarianism—and the “star of all stars” was F. A. Hayek. While liberalism as an intellectual tradition may 
be lacking in China, for many Chinese intellectuals who went through the Cultural Revolution and the 
Tiananmen crackdown, these was a natural aversion to collectivism and yearning for individualism, and 
they were eager to learn and embrace Western theories that may be even considered extreme in the 
West. It was against this backdrop that a “Hayek craze” was sweeping the entire intelligentsia in China in 
the 1990s. During this period, Hayek’s major works, including The Road to Serfdom,82 The Constitution of 
Liberty, and The Fatal Conceit, were all translated into Chinese with readership across disciplines.83 
While the culture craze of the 1980s was almost impossible to replicate, Hayek’s books were still easily 
best-sellers. The first print of The Road to Serfdom sold nearly 40,000 copies (Chen Yan 2006:271). 
Some of Hayek’s translators, such as Deng Zhenglai and Qiu Feng, became intellectual stars. Aside from 
Hayek, Ludwig von Mises and Karl Popper each had a cult-like following. The Hayek Association of China 
was founded in 2005 and has since held its annual conferences, with selected conference papers 
published in book form every year. Indeed, in the 1990s, regardless of the discipline, an intellectual who 
did not quote Hayek in his or her writing would appear out of place. An economist, who was among the 
earliest to introduce Hayek into China, gave the following explanation for the popularity of Hayek in China: 
 
Many political scientists and economists are interested in Hayek because of the 
context of China’s authoritarianism. Hayek is more appealing in China than in the West, 
for the Western society has largely achieved freedom—there is only a matter of more or 
less. In addition, there are mechanisms of self-correction in the Western society, such as 
elections, the protection of basic rights, and bills of human rights. Such mechanisms don’t 
exist in China. Since the establishment of the PRC, we have emphasized that collective 
interests are above individual rights. As a consequence, the individuals have been 
atomized … and their rights are susceptible to violations … . We have reached a 
conclusion: if Europe was on the road to serfdom, then China is on an even faster track 
to serfdom. So what? It means that liberty as defined by Hayek is very important. 
 
With the flooding of various liberal theories into China, liberalism as a political philosophy became 
a prominent field of study. With the only exception of economics, political philosophy attracted more 
                                                          
82 The first Chinese translation of The Road to Serfdom was published in 1962 as a restricted publication, and 
therefore had limited circulations. 
 
83 The translations of many of these books received financial support from the Friedrich Naumann Foundation for 
Freedom, which is related to the Liberal Democratic Party of Germany. 
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intellectual attention than any other academic field in the humanities and social sciences. Regardless of 
one’s intellectual or disciplinary background, almost everyone in the intellectual field more or less read (or 
at least read about) and talked about Hayek, Mises, Locke, Rousseau, Burke, Rawls, and Nozick.84 
In the liberal camp, two intellectuals were instrumental in bringing liberalism to the fore of 
intellectual inquiry. Liu Junning, a young political theorist at CASS85 who self-identified as a conservative 
liberal, emerged in the 1990s as a leading intellectual. In the 1990s, he wrote a large number of popular 
essays introducing Western libertarian and conservative political theories (Liu Junning 1998c). In an 
influential essay, Liu Junning (1998b) quoted a classic and romantic statement of British Whig statesman 
William Pitt the Elder, “The poorest man may, in his cottage, bid defiance to all the forces of the Crown. It 
may be frail, its roof may shake; the wind may blow through it; the storms may enter; the rain may enter; 
but the King of England may not enter; all his forces dare not cross the threshold of the ruined tenement.” 
In a sweeping and accessible fashion, Liu helped to popularize the idea of private property rights, and 
many younger-generation intellectuals and college students first came to the idea of individual liberty 
through reading Liu’s essays.86 
In another essay, Liu appropriated Ayn Rand’s views to attack China’s cultural tradition of placing 
collective priorities ahead of individual freedom of choice, and advocated a Tocquevillian “enlightened 
self-interest” as a middle ground between collectivism and individualism in their extreme form.87 Liu (cited 
in Goldman 2005:150) borrowed the Western notion of “no taxation without representation”: “The 
protection of property demands that each citizen participate, discuss, and supervise government in a 
systematic way because the maintenance of government is based on taking the citizens’ wealth and the 
citizens have the right to ask how the wealth is spent.” Liu’s (cited in Goldman 2005:150) version of 
liberalism also extended to national politics by calling for competitive elections at all levels: “[In] a society 
based on appointed and unlimited government, power is unrestricted and people’s rights are unprotected; 
the people or rule of law have no influence. … [By contrast, a society based on competitive elections 
                                                          
84 For a succinct discussion of the preeminence of political philosophy in the Chinese intelligentsia, see Liu Qin 
(2008). 
 
85 Liu was forced out of CASS in 2000 for his political views. 
 
86 A number of younger-generation intellectuals mentioned the influence of Liu Junning’s essays on their political 
views during interviews. 
 
87 It is indeed interesting to note the appropriation of Tocqueville from both the liberal and New Left camps. 
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produces limited government in which] the highest level of power and every level of power is checked, 
restrained, and supervised and all levels are open to free competitive elections and are responsible to the 
electorate.” Furthermore, in an introductory textbook on conservatism, Liu Junning (1998a) laid out the 
ideas of Edmund Burke and argued for the compatibility between conservatism and libertarianism. 
In 1995, Liu cofounded Res Publica (Gonggong luncong), a journal published in the form of book 
series.88 The journal quickly became a major forum for the discussion of liberal ideas. The seven issues 
published from 1995 to 2003 were themed “The Logic of the Market and the Idea of the State,” “Public 
Order in a Market Society,” “Economic Democracy versus Economic Freedom,” “Liberty versus 
Community,” “Direct Democracy versus Indirect Democracy,” “Liberalism and the Contemporary World,” 
and “Constitutionalism and the Modern State,” respectively. With the average sales volume exceeding 20 
thousand copies (Chen Yan 2006:271) and a wide circulation on college campuses, the journal 
enlightened a generation of young Chinese. The ideas introduced in the journal were no longer those of 
Sartre, Nietzsche, or Heidegger that were popular in the 1980s, but rather were mainly liberal thinkers 
based in the English-speaking world, such as Hayek, Popper, Berlin, and Rawls.89 
At the end of 1998, Zhu Xueqin (2003:105) proclaimed that liberalism as a theoretical discourse 
had come to light in China, and offered the following widely circulated definition of Chinese liberalism: 
 
Philosophically it stands for empiricism, in contrast to transcendentalism. Its 
historical ideas are based on a fallibilistic evolutionary theory, and reject any kind of 
historical determinism. Its concepts of evolution involve gradual improvement and 
progress, and a refusal of the voluntarism that is characteristic of radicalism. Its economic 
theory requires a market system, and rejection of a planned economy. Its political theory 
requires a representative democracy, a constitutional government and a legal system, 
proof not only against an individual tyranny or an oligarchy, but also against a mass 
dictatorship in the name of the ‘general will’ exercised by a majority. Its ethical code 
requires the protection of differing values and includes the belief that no individual must 
be sacrificed as a means to any abstract end. 
 
While its accuracy has been disputed, the definition did depict the hybrid nature of Chinese 
liberalism as an academic or theoretical discourse. In other words, in the second half of the 1990s, 
Chinese liberals in academic circles exhibited elements of neoliberalism—pursuit of economic rationality, 
                                                          
88 Because stringent official regulations made the licensing of new periodicals difficult, many journals had been 
published in the form of book series. 
 
89 See Zhi Shui (2000) for a brief discussion of Res Publica. 
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conservatism—repulsion for direct democracies and inclination for gradualism, classical liberalism—
emphasis on individual rights, and libertarianism—upholding liberty as an ultimate value. 
 
Social justice: A major criticism from Chinese New Left of the liberals was their deaf ears to social 
justice. However, this criticism only applies to a small number of market fundamentalists and dogmatic 
libertarians. With respect to social justice, the real difference between the New Leftists and the liberals 
lied in the view on the roots of social injustice. For the New Leftists, social injustice and economic 
inequality were results of China’s neoliberal reforms, or China’s increasing integration into global 
capitalism. While the New Leftists did blame China’s communist leaders for colluding with multinational 
corporations for enforcing neoliberalism and suppressing anti-neoliberal voices, the criticisms were often 
casual remarks in passing, and the ultimate target was almost always the intangible “global capitalism.” 
While some die-hard market fundamentalists did embrace capitalism without any reservation, most 
liberals simply felt that the notion of neoliberalism was out of place in a communist China. They viewed 
authoritarianism (or communism) as the evil of all evils. In terms of social injustice, the New Leftists and 
the liberals both saw the same phenomenon, and in particular crony capitalism. However, unlike the New 
Leftists, the liberals blamed the ruling communist party. For the various social problems that emerged in 
the process of market transition, unlike the New Leftists who faulted the market itself, the liberals 
considered them a result of distorted capitalism, and believed that more market, rather than less market, 
which meant less political authoritarianism, was the way to go. 
The most sustained criticisms of social injustice came from Qin Hui and He Qinglian. Qin was one 
of the first intellectuals to expose the danger of China’s neoliberal reforms. In the early 1990s, he wrote a 
series of influential articles that attempted to affirm the supremacy of justice (Qin Hui 1998b). Qin Hui 
([1994] 1998b) refused to choose between equity and efficiency, and instead regarded justice as a more 
fundamental value that was above both equity and efficiency. As he argued, the symptom of China’s 
social problems was not inequality, but rather injustice. Qin acknowledged the prevalence of corruption in 
China’s economic transition, but unlike the New Leftists who attributed the injustice to market competition, 
he blamed China’s “pre-market” system. In other words, instead of seeing economic inequality and social 
injustice as results of the market economy, Qin blamed the lack of “real” free competition. Qin Hui (1998a) 
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harshly criticized the intimate connection between power and wealth, and refused to see it as a necessary 
“primitive accumulation.” Qin was also the first intellectual to openly criticize the share-holding reform and 
stock frenzy of 1992. As he pointed, without a just process, the so-called market reform would only create 
opportunities for those in power, as those in charge of state assets might well steal from what they were 
supposed to guard (Wang 2003:24). 
While Qin Hui’s criticism might have been the most sophisticated theoretically, it was the 
journalist, He Qinglian, who made social justice to the dinner tables of many Chinese. In 1997, He 
published Zhongguo de xianjing (China’s Pitfalls) in Hong Kong. A year later, after repeated rejections 
and some abridgements as a result of its sensitive nature, the book was published in the mainland under 
the title Xiandaihua de xianjing (Pitfalls of Modernization). In this book, He exposed the astonishing and 
ugly truth behind the glorified picture of modernization, including increasing inequality led by distributive 
injustice, the illegal seizure of state assets, “land enclosures,”  environmental degradation, and collapsing 
moral order. The book became an instant best-seller and caused a national sensation. 
 
Anti-totalitarianism: In the second half of the 1990s, as the market-oriented reforms progressed, 
private publishers began to play an important role in spreading the liberal ideas. While on paper all 
publishers were owned and controlled by the state, a new phenomenon emerged: buying and selling 
book license numbers (shuhao). Although the book license numbers were all allocated to state-owned 
publishers, a number of private publishers figured out a way to evade the stringent official regulations by 
purchasing book license numbers directly from state-owned publishers. While the books were published 
by the latter on paper, the real players behind the books were private publishers.90 With the relative 
relaxation of political control from 1997 to 1998, the publishing industry saw an unpreceded flooding of 
books that were liberal in orientation. With successful marketing that would be impossible from state-
owned publishers, many of the books achieved commercial success. 
A young intellectual star during this period was Yu Jie, a master’s student in the Department of 
Chinese Language and Literature at Peking University. In 1998, Yu published Huo yu bing (Fire and Ice), 
a collection of trenchant essays permeated with an anti-totalitarian spirit. For example, Yu Jie ([1998] 
                                                          
90 See Xu Xiao (2001) for an in-depth account of private publishers in the second half of the 1990s. 
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2014:26) quoted American politician Daniel Moynihan and wrote, “If a country’s newspapers are filled with 
good news, then the country is likely to have its jails filled with good people.” The book is comprised of 
numerous short and pithy statements about totalitarianism. Yu ([1998] 2014:47) commented, “Lu Xun said 
that totalitarianism led to cold ridicule. But I say: I would be willing to clap for a totalitarian rule that allows 
for cold ridicule. In fact, totalitarianism only allows for warm carols … .” The book was followed in the 
same year by Tiewu zhong de nahan (A Call to Arms from the Iron Room), and in the next year by Shuo, 
haishi bushuo (To Speak, or Not to Speak), Gan’ga shidai (Age of Awkwardness), and Wenming de 
chuangtong (Scars of Civilization), all best-sellers. 
In January 2000, Yu Jie made it to the headline of national news by publicly condemning Yu 
Qiuyu, an eminent writer who was a member for a working team employed by the Gang of Four during 
the Cultural Revolution. In an article entitled “Yu Qiuyu, Why Don’t You Repent?”, Yu Jie (2000) lashed 
out Yu Qiuyu for remaining silent about his disgraceful past while rising to fame by commenting on the 
history of other people. Yu Jie insisted that he was not targeting Yu Qiuyu himself, but rather intended to 
showcase the loss of soul of Chinese intellectuals: “If all Chinese refuse to repent, China’s freedom and 
justice will exist in only the ‘past’ and ‘future.’ If we all, like Mr. Yu Qiuyu, lose our memory of suffering, 
our memory of sin, our memory of responsibility, the happy and harmonious life that we all long for will 
never be a guarantee.” The article stirred a spirited debate nationwide about history, memory, and 
confession. Some commentators even compared Yu Jie to Lu Xun, the most distinguished Chinese writer 
in the twentieth century and hailed by many as “China’s conscience.” 
In addition, in the late 1990s, as the Internet revolution was under way, many pro-democracy 
activists and dissidents had a platform to express their views. For example, Liu Xiaobo, a noted 
intellectual who was imprisoned for 20 months as a “black hand” behind the 1989 uprising, became an 
active writer in the cyberspace. He not only organized numerous petitions on the Internet, but also wrote 
a large number of essays commenting on a variety of social and political issues. Another accused 
Tiananmen “black hand,” Chen Ziming, also wrote a great number of online commentaries. When Chen 
published his collected works in Hong Kong in 2010, the number of volumes was as great as 12. Liberal 
intellectuals like Yu Jie, Liu Xiaobo, and Chen Ziming did not have formal training in liberal theory, but 
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their down-to-earth analysis of Chinese society and vocal criticisms of totalitarianism made them 
important liberal voices in the late 1990s. 
Finally, Václav Havel, former political dissident in Czechoslovakia and first president of the Czech 
Republic, became an important source of inspiration for the liberal intellectuals. While Havel’s writings 
have been officially banned even to this day, translations of his political writings, and in particular his most 
famous essay “The Power of the Powerless,” circulated widely in the Chinese intelligentsia in the late 
1990s. Havel’s thesis that those without formal political power and deprived of political freedoms in a 
totalitarian regime could exert a particular form of power by “living in truth” proved to be resounding and 
encouraging for many liberal intellectuals. 
Cui Weiping (2011), a literary critic who was instrumental in bringing Havel’s works to China, 
described how she discovered Havel: 
 
My encounter with Eastern Europe was entirely a result of my personal spiritual 
confusion and incompetence, which began at the end of the 1980s.91 It lasted quite a few 
years and caused a lot of pain. It was a huge crisis for me at that time. My previous way 
of speaking suddenly stopped working as I didn’t know how to express my experience. 
What I said in public and what I thought in private were disjointed back then. This means 
that on the one hand, the world in front of you came tumbling down … . On the other 
hand, … [I] had not established my inner order. I was in a depressing state of complete 
aphasia … . 
… One day, completely by coincidence, I pulled out a book from my bookshelf—
a red-cover Havel anthology from a Canadian friend … . As I was reading it, I felt that 
never had there been such a person that was so close to my life experience. 
I remember it was almost noon. My daughter came back from school before long. 
I continued reading it after I prepared lunch for her and waited for her to go back to 
school. … I found the outlet for my long-suppressed feelings. … I [began to] immerse 
myself in [translating Havel]. … Once I began [reading and translating ] Havel, I 
immediately realized his extraordinary value, and in particular his value for Chinese 
reality. … When my friends called me and asked me what I was doing, I said I was 
“making a spiritual nuclear bomb”! 
 
For many liberal intellectuals who were neither whole-hearted free-market neoliberals nor political 
dissidents who sought to intentionally confront the communist party, the peaceful “anti-politics” favored by 
Havel provided a viable “third-way.” As Li Shenzhi (cited in Barmé 2001:228) commented: 
 
[Havel’s] politics of antipolitics was originally premised on an opposition to the 
forming of political parties, and an opposition even to efforts to formulate a political 
                                                          
91 Cui was clearly alluding to the Tiananmen Square protests of 1989. 
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agenda. What he did advocate was that every person should rely on their conscience and 
speak the truth; that each and every person should engage in practical actions. His was a 
philosophy of action … a belief that “we should all act in the way we think most 
appropriate, to take responsibility for ourselves.” 
 
As the popularity of Havel gained momentum, the value of Milan Kundera, the Czech writer who 
was immensely popular a few years ago, began to be questioned. Li Shenzhi ([1998] 2005:159–60) 
maintained that Havel’s call for action, and in particular every person undertaking his or her own 
responsibility by being truthful, was exactly what post-totalitarian China needed. Xu Youyu ([1998] 1999) 
argued that compared with Kundera’s dismissal of protests and petitions, Havel’s insistence of moral 
responsibility was more valuable in directing China’s citizen activism; more specifically, Havel offered an 
viable alternative to both totalitarianism and Kundera’s cynicism. Yu Jie launched the fiercest attack on 
Kundera, viewing his characters’ disengagement with society and Chinese intellectuals’ collective silence 
on the history, and in particular the Cultural Revolution, as sharing the same cynicism. By contrast, Yu 
argued, Havel was an emblem of social conscience, or even a “sage,” and therefore should be emulated 
by Chinese intellectuals. Yu’s article received many criticisms for its extreme view, but it is no 
exaggeration to say that Havel was an inspirational figure for a large number of Chinese liberals. 
 
In search of history: As it was still a taboo to publicly commenting on sensitive political issues, 
many liberal intellectuals came up with a strategy to express their views without crossing the boundary: 
using the past to allude to the present (jiegu yujin). While on the surface narrating the past, these 
intellectuals indeed intended to criticize the current government and envision a better future. 
In the second half of the 1990s, “rediscovering history” became a theme of much intellectual 
inquiry. There emerged three branches of “popular history.” The first was the upsurge in the interest in the 
Republic era of the early twentieth century, which has lasted to this day. All of a sudden, Hu Shi, an 
influential liberal philosopher in the first half of the twentieth century who fell into disrepute for his anti-
communist stance and involvement with the Nationalist government, became a cultural hero. The 
intellectuals praised Hu’s understanding of liberalism, tolerance of his opponents, and refusal to work with 
the CCP. They argued that there was a potential for a liberal and democratic China in the early twentieth 
century, and lamented the missed opportunities. In addition, the liberal thoughts of Kang Youwei, Liang 
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Qichao, Wang Guowei, Cai Yuanpei, and Chu Anping all attracted intense interest. Even Chen Duxiu, 
China’s earliest revolutionary Marxist and cofounder of the CCP who later fell out with Mao and was 
expelled from the party, was being reevaluated and praised for his democratic view and criticism of 
Stalinism. Another notable development was the rising interest in the National Southwestern Associated 
University (Xinan lianda), a temporarily merged university during the Second Sino-Japanese War from 
1937 to 1945. Paying tribute to the earlier independently-minded intellectual leaders and painting a rosy 
picture of the university as a safe haven for academic freedom and scholarly excellence despite the 
flames of war, the liberals effectively set off by contrast the loss of intellectual autonomy and vulgarization 
of cultural life under the communist rule. 
The second trend was the rediscovery of the “inconvenient” history of the CCP. For example, 
some historians “rediscovered” the fact that the CCP was involved in the production and trade of opium in 
the Yan’an era to sustain itself financially. Mao’s words of appreciation to several Japanese delegations 
for Japan’s invasion of China as it created a stupendous opportunity for the survival and growth of the 
CCP when the Nationalists were occupied with the war were also widely circulated on the Internet. During 
this period, taking advantage of the relatively relaxed political environment, a large number of books were 
published that attempted to uncover the “historical truth” beneath the official propaganda. In 1999, 
historian Xiao Shu92 (1999b) published Liu Wencai zhenxiang (The Truth about Liu Wencai), revealing 
that many of the so-called atrocities of the famous archetypal “villain landlord,” Liu Wencai, were nothing 
but fabricated official propaganda. Another book by Xiao Shu (1999a), Lishi de xiansheng (Harbingers of 
History), collected many editorials, comments, and speeches by the CCP leaders before they won the 
civil war against the Nationalists. The speeches were all about democracy and constitutionalism. To give 
a few examples, Mao said that what China needed most was democracy based on free elections; and Liu 
Shaoqi, a high-level CCP leader, said that the CCP did not intend to impose a one-party rule. The book 
was nothing short of a bombshell as it exposed the hypocrisy of the CCP with its own words. 
The last thread of history was that of the Cultural Revolution and Maoist China in general. In 1995, 
a book about the later life of Chen Yinke, became a national best-seller. Chen Yinke was a distinguished 
                                                          
92 Xiao Shu was before long forced out of the academia and became a journalist because of the two books mentioned 
here. In 2011, he was forced to end his career in journalism because of his liberal views and active participation in 
pro-democracy activities. He lived in the United States in exile from 2014 to 2015. 
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historian who decided to stay in the mainland when he had the opportunity to relocate to Taiwan with the 
Nationalists. Chen managed to retain his integrity after the Community Party took over. In 1953, when 
invited to head the Institute of Ancient Chinese History of CAS, he put forth two demands: (1) the entire 
institute would not hold Marxism and Leninism as its official ideology and would not be forced to study 
Marxism and Leninism; and (2) Mao or Liu Shaoqi would issue such a written statement. The demands 
were not met, and Chen declined the job offer as a result. In addition, he more than once declined 
visitations of high-level CCP officials. When the Cultural Revolution was unfolded, Chen was brutally 
persecuted and died in 1969 (Lu Jiandong 1995). Chen’s experience touched numerous Chinese 
intellectuals. His expression “thoughts of freedom, spirits of independence” (duli zhi jingshen, ziyou zhi 
sixiang) became a maxim of a generation of Chinese liberals. 
The late 1990s also saw a surge in books on the Cultural Revolution. Liberal intellectuals, such 
as Xu Youyu and Zhu Xueqin, wrote a series of essays that documented their personal experiences 
during that period. Including Xu Youyu, some intellectuals also called for those participated in political 
persecution during the Cultural Revolution to repent, and intended to launch a nationwide campaign of 
reflection. The purpose was to restore historical truth and preserve collective memory. In addition, the 
dissidents who were buried in the official history were rediscovered and celebrated, notably Yu Luoke and 
Lin Zhao. In 1970, publicly condemned as a “counter-revolutionary” and “subversive,” the 27-year-old 
Beijing factory worker, Yu Luoke, was executed in front of 100 thousand spectators for opposing the 
“bloodline theory” (xuetong lun), an official ideology that prescribed legitimate and superior social status 
to the revolutionary families. The theory was vividly summarized by the popular slogan: “A hero’s son is a 
real man, whereas a reactionary’s son is a rotten egg.” In his article “On Family Background,” written at 
the age of 24, Yu presented a point-by-point refutation of the theory, and in particular its violence of 
democratic principles and human rights. In 1999, Xu Xiao, Ding Dong, and Xu Youyu edited a collection 
of Yu’s writings. A year later, Yu’s younger brother published Yu’s memoir (Yu Luowen 2000). Many 
liberal intellectuals paid tribute to Yu, and regarded him as a pioneer defender of human rights in red 
China. Another dissident who received widespread attention was Lin Zhao, a young political prisoner who 
was tortured and executed during the Cultural Revolution for her fearless criticism of Mao’s dictatorship 
and advocate for individual freedom. In the late 1990s, many intellectuals worked to bring Lin’s story back 
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to light. In 2000, a book entitled In Search of Lin Zhao was published (Xu Juemin 2000). Books on Yu 
Luoke and Lin Zhao were quickly banned by the CCP, but since the early 2000s, the attention and 
admiration received from China’s liberal community saw only increase. 
 
Rediscovering liberalism: A discursive strategy employed by the liberals was to position 
themselves as inheritors of the “founding fathers” of Chinese liberalism, such as Yan Fu, Liang Qichao, 
and Hu Shi, and the heirs of the May Fourth spirits of democracy and enlightenment. The liberals, 
however, had difficulty wrapping up the storyline for the Maoist era, as liberalism appeared to be nearly 
eradicated during this period. The publication of Gu Zhun wenji (The Collected Works of Gu Zhun) in 
1994 and Gu Zhun riji (The Diaries of Gu Zhun) in 1997 became two important events in the history of 
Chinese liberalism. Little known before the 1990s, Gu Zhun first propounded a theory of “socialist market 
economy” in 1956 when he was an economist at CAS. Gu was condemned as a “rightist” in 1957 and 
was harshly persecuted when the Cultural Revolution broke out in 1966. However, he continued his 
theoretical work with an impressive oeuvre on democratic theories and institutions. In his preface to The 
Diaries of Gu Zhun, Li Shenzhi ([1997] 2005:289) made it clear that by giving up his illusion with 
totalitarianism and criticizing dictatorship, Gu had effectively completed his transition to a liberal. With Gu 
Zhun, the liberals could now claim that the torch of liberalism never died out in China, as the Chinese 
never stopped pursuing liberty and rebelling against totalitarianism. 
In 1998, Peking University was celebrating its centennial year. As the university had been China’s 
premier university and played a significant role in China’s cultural history, the celebration was on the 
media spotlight for an entire year. In May, Beida chuantong yu jindai Zhongguo (The Tradition of Peking 
University and Modern China), an anthology edited by Liu Junning (1998b), came out with immediate and 
resounding applause. The book collected the writings of many liberal intellectuals associated with Peking 
University in the last 100 years on the themes of freedom, democracy, human rights, and individualism. It 
even included essays from Chen Duxiu and Li Dazhao, the cofounders of the CCP, in which they both 
commented on liberal values in an affirmative light. In contradiction with the official definition of the 
tradition of Peking University (Beida chuantong) as patriotism, the book argued that the real Beida 
chuantong was liberalism. In his preface, Li Shenzhi (1998) wrote in support by affirming that liberalism 
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was the best universal value and therefore ought to be celebrated. The book, once again, was quickly 
banned. However, its significance cannot be underestimated for it was arguably the first time Chinese 
liberals self-consciously and self-confidently carried the banner of “liberalism.” After the publication of the 
book, many intellectuals began to call themselves “liberals” with pride. 
It is clear that by the end of the 1990s, the liberals and the New Leftists had evolved into two 
distinct ideological camps, each with its own set of loose principles, rhetoric, and representative 
intellectuals. While intellectuals in each camp disagreed on many specific issues, the clash between 
these two camps hid the differences and effectively united each camp. On the liberal side, a liberal 
commented during interview, “We are not just a coalition—we have been even closer than a coalition. Our 
differences have not displayed at this stage. Only when you ask about the origins of my thought and what 
[intellectual positions and thinkers] I identify the most can you see the differences among us.” The same 
conclusion can be safely applied to the New Leftists, as they no longer targeted each other, and only saw 
the liberals as their adversaries. Since the mid-1990s, the New Left and liberal intellectuals have 
embarked on different intellectual and ideological paths. Each camp did not merely unite in discourse. 
Indeed, while many of the intellectuals befriended each other and even worked together in the 1980s—for 
example, Gan Yang and Xu Youyu were major players in the Culture: China and the World book series—
they largely stopped seeing each other and began to solely socialize with the like-minded in life. The 
“enlightenment consensus” that united them against the conservative political elite in the 1980s had 
collapsed by the end of the 1990s. 
 
United in Fragmentation: 2000–2008 
 
Since the advent of the twenty-first century, the New Leftists and the liberals have essentially 
stopped directly engaging with each other. The intelligentsia, however, underwent further transformations 
in the 2000s that were no less profound than those in the 1990s. This section identifies the 
transformations in each side of the ideological spectrum. On the left side, the New Left dropped its 
democratic rhetoric; Maoism returned to the cultural scene; the New Left, political conservatism, and 
cultural conservatism began to converge; and nationalism became a dominant theme. On the liberal side, 
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free-market libertarianism no longer wielded hegemony within the liberal discourse; different strands of 
liberalism began to emerge; liberalism as an intellectual movement began to converge with the various 
civil rights movements; and cultural conservatism began to challenge the traditional pro-West view and 
sought to excavate liberal elements from China’s cultural tradition. On the other hand, under the surface 
of fragmentation, the attitude toward the authoritarian regime became the defining distinction between the 
Left and the liberals. As fragmented as it appeared, each side was united, and indeed defined, by its 
opposition to the other side. 
 
From Criticizing Neoliberalism to Embracing Authoritarianism: Transformation of the Left 
 
The Evaporation of democracy: In comparison with the 1990s, a subtle, but noticeable change, 
for the New Leftist was their attitude toward democracy. As previously stated, despite their disapproval of 
representative democracies, the New Leftists were almost universally advocates of direct democracies. In 
the 2000s, democracy, at least as commonly understood, was quietly dropped from the New Left 
discourse. 
In 2000, Wang Shaoguang left Yale to teach at the Chinese University of Hong Kong while 
holding a chaired professorship at Tsinghua University in Beijing, and began to increase his presence in 
the Chinese intelligentsia. In the next few years, he launched a series of attacks on democracy based on 
competitive elections. In 2008, Wang published Minzhu sijiang (Four Lectures on Democracy), which was 
based on the lectures he gave at Tsinghua University in the previous year.93 The book began by taking 
issue with Yu Keping’s widely circulated 2006 essay “Democracy is a Good Thing.” Deputy Director of the 
Compilation and Translation Bureau of the CCP’s Central Committee, Yu was a prominent advocate for 
democracy in the 2000s. While his language was often elusively simple,94 which was typical for a high-
level party official, Yu’s comments were influential and in general welcomed by the liberals because of his 
                                                          
93 The book was part of the relaunched Culture: China and the World series, edited by Gan Yang. The relaunched 
series now included works of intellectuals associated with the New Left, such as Wang Hui, Zhang Xudong, Jiang 
Shigong, and Lü Xinyu, and none identified as liberal. It can be seen as a miniature of the divisiveness of the 
intelligentsia. 
 




political status.95 Wang’s opening statement was that democracy as we knew it was not a good thing. The 
first chapter was essentially a brief history of political thought on democracy in the West. Wang wrote that 
for most of the time in Western history, democracy was seen as a bad idea, not a good idea, by eminent 
thinkers from Plato, Aristotle to Thucydides and Cicero. Yu then went on to argue that representative 
democracies that had been widely adopted in modern Western societies were not “real democracies,” 
and used the examples of the United Kingdom, France, and the United States to show that the so-called 
democratic institutions for a long time effectively excluded certain groups. Therefore, the prefixes of 
“liberal” and “constitutional” favored by the liberals as a precaution against the tyranny of the majority 
were detrimental to the spirit of democracy. But what about direct democracies? Remarkably, Wang 
made a quite dramatic break from his stance in the 1990s by saying that even direct democracies could 
not change the “aristocratic” and “oligarchical” nature of elections, and election-based democracies 
deceptively replaced “government by the people” with “government by the consent of the people.” Wang 
claimed, in the end, that “a real democracy” not based on elections was a good thing, and recommended 
demarchy (sortation or allotment) and deliberative democracies as viable alternatives. Such a theoretical 
discussion was a common practice in the Western academy, but in China, Wang’s essentially anti-
democratic statements had profound political ramifications. 
Two broader contexts are worth noting here. First, many intellectuals on the left were not 
impressed with the result of political liberalization in Central and Eastern Europe, and developed serious 
doubt about elections, with respect to both their ultimate desirability in political life and their compatibility 
with Chinese political culture. Second, as democratization began to speed up across the strait in Taiwan, 
the New Leftists found the accompanying chaos and disorder, such as increasing protest activism and 
political polarization led by the two-party system, repellent. At the same time, Taiwan’s extraordinary 
economic growth in the 1980s appeared to have slowed to a great extent in the 1990s and 2000s as it 
was liberalizing politically. Taiwan held its second ever direct presidential election in 2000 and ended 
more than a half century of the rule of the Nationalist Party, but the election also highlighted the societal 
division between the supporters of the two major political parties. In the 1990s and 2000s, the scenes of 
brawling of Taiwanese legislators during parliamentary sessions were frequently broadcast on television 
                                                          
95 Yu was widely rumored to be part of the inner circle of theorists of Hu Jintao, China’s President. 
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in China. Political scientist Pan Wei graduated with a PhD from the University of California-Berkeley in 
1996 and began to teach at Peking University in the same year. He was highly critical of the democratic 
transitions in Taiwan, “As democratization was taking off in Taiwan, it began to fall into chaos. There were 
protests and demonstrations every day, and its economy began to stall. Those of us who experienced the 
Cultural Revolution felt that Taiwan was undergoing another Cultural Revolution. The Taiwanese 
themselves felt that it was democracy, but … we were saner than them.” Separating the rule of law from 
democracy, Pan Wei (2003, 2006) began to criticize the latter, or “democratic fetishism” as he called it, 
and to advocate the former. 
Gan Yang, who was a major advocate of direct democracies, similarly used the case of Taiwan to 
oppose election-based democracies. In an interview in 2006, when asked what China should learn from 
the democratic practices in Taiwan, Gan Yang ([2006] 2012:484) replied, “Nothing. Honestly, the lesson 
of democracy in Taiwan is we don’t want such a democracy. … Such a low-quality democracy … is 
indeed a bad politics in the package of democracy, and has been a common practice in recent years from 
Eastern Europe to Latin America … . The essence of such a low-quality democracy is politicians 
producing hatred and deepening social rifts, with the help of mass media, for the sake of votes … .” Kang 
Xiaoguang, a noted policy expert at CAS,96 put it most bluntly, “Democratization is a choice that will wreck 
China and bring calamity to its people.” (Sun Chuanwei ([2004] 2011) 
 
The Return of Maoism: As a pragmatist political leader, Deng Xiaoping knew from the beginning 
when he arose to power in the late 1970s that a Khrushchevian denunciation of Mao Zedong and Maoism 
would ultimately bring down the communist rule and his regime. Therefore, after passing a resolution with 
the conclusion that Mao’s “merits are primary and … errors secondary,”97 Deng forbad any open, 
unofficial discussion of Maoism, despite his strained relationship with Mao. China under Deng, and in 
particular its state capitalism after 1992, had in effect contradicted Mao’s “continuous revolution” theory in 
every major way. Jiang Zemin, Deng’s successor, essentially continued Deng’s neoliberal policies. 
However, instrumental in creating a space for state capitalism, the suppression of ideological discussion 
                                                          
96 Kang is currently a professor of public administration at the Renmin University of China. 
 
97 http://en.people.cn/dengxp/vol2/text/b1420.html (retrieved April 12, 2016). 
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inadvertently left a lurking peril of political legitimacy for the future. While there was a nationwide “red 
song fever” in 1993, it was more of a triumph of postmodern deconstructionism and commercial culture 
rather than a nostalgia for revolution. In the 1990s, Maoism was a weapon for the conservative political 
elites to reinsert themselves back to political power. For example, led by Deng Liqun, the conservative 
party elders wrote a number of “ten thousand character manifestos” (wanyanshu) questioning the socialist 
nature of Deng Xiaoping’s reforms and arguing for a new wave of class struggles (Ma Licheng 2012:35–
65), despite Deng Xiaoping’s (and Jiang Zemin’s) invariant response of “no arguing.” Mao was certainly 
still popular among certain social groups, and in particular rural population and laid-off urban workers, but 
the sentiment had not transformed into an intellectual and social force. 
Three factors contributed the resurface of Maoism. First, it extended and transformed from elite 
politics to a social movement. The person behind the Maoist rhetoric in the 1990s was Deng Liqun, who 
mainly used Maoism as a political weapon against the reformists and liberals within the party. Therefore, 
while criticizing specific policies, such as Jiang Zemin’s “Three Representatives” and his decision to admit 
capitalists into the Communist Party, Deng Liqun never explicitly attacked Deng Xiaoping himself or 
repudiated Deng Xiaoping’s reform program as a whole. After Deng Liqun’s last “ten thousand character 
manifestos” in 2003, a more radical group of party elders, such as Ma Bin, former Vice Minister of 
Metallurgical Industry, and Li Chengrui, former Commissioner of the National Bureau of Statistics, took 
over and targeted Deng Xiaoping himself. They insisted that Mao was wise in purging Deng Xiaoping, as 
the subsequent history proved that Deng Xiaoping, in initiating the reform and opening up program, 
intended to “restore capitalism” (Zhu Xueqin 2009:31–32). These party elders were less politically 
ambitious and more ideologically conservative. They were willing to go beyond the party establishment to 
seek social support. As Maoism changed from elite politics to mass participation, it received much more 
media attention and therefore commanded more social support. Second, with the popularization of the 
Internet, many of the Maoist voices found ways to reach the wider society. All of a sudden, the Maoists 
realized that they were not alone. Two websites, the Utopia98 and Mao Zedong Flag99, became China’s 
most active and prominent communities of Maoists. Aside from a large number of online articles and 
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discussions, the Utopia operated its own bookstore that was devoted to Marxist and Maoist books, and 
held regular seminars that often attracted a large number of attendees. By the late 2000s, the Utopia had 
become one of the most influential voices in the Chinese intelligentsia. Third, as the liberal discourse was 
widely perceived to be politically sensitive, while the New Left discourse had difficulty reaching the wider 
society because of its notorious obscurity and elusiveness—the old times of national obsession with 
Edward Said, Antonio Gramsci, or Immanuel Wallerstein had long gone—the Maoist discourse became 
the only safe and easy channel through which those unsatisfied with China’s neoliberal reforms could 
express their discontent. 
While the New Leftists, many of whom prestigious scholars with a PhD from an elite American 
university, refused to conflate themselves with the Maoists who had emerged as an important current of 
thought called “Old Left” (laozuopai) or “Maoist Left” (Mao zuo), their discourse now looked strikingly 
similar to that of the Old Left. It is true that the New Left and the Old Left never completely identified with 
one another, as the Old Left appeared too coarse, or even vulgar, to the New Left, and the New Left too 
esoteric, or even elitist, to the Old Left, but it is not difficult to identify the commonalities between Wang 
Hui’s criticisms of China’s “depoliticized politics” and the Old Left’s attack on the Communist Party’s 
“capitalist restoration” and suppression of ideological discussions, or, for that matter, Cui Zhiyuan’s praise 
of the “reasonable elements” of the Cultural Revolution and the Old Left’s accusation of Deng Xiaoping of 
betraying Mao. Indeed, the major cofounders of the Utopia, including Han Deqiang and Yang Fan, were 
widely seen as members of the New Left a couple of years ago; the major figures of the New Left and 
their articles were all prominently featured on the website of the Utopia; and Wang Hui and Cui Zhiyuan 
had both gave talks at the Utopia’s seminars. More important, as both the New Left and the Old Left saw 
the liberals as their major opponents, and vice versa, the boundary between the Old and New Left 
became increasingly blurred. In other words, to a large degree, the New Leftists transformed from anti-
capitalists radicals to Maoist political conservatives in the new century. 
 
Mao with a Confucian cap: Since the founding of the CCP, Chinese communists had been 
cultural radicals as far as their attitude toward traditional Chinese culture is concerned. Anti-traditionalism 
reached its peak during the Cultural Revolution when Mao launched an anti-Confucian campaign in late 
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1973, which lasted until his death in September 1976 (Gregor and Chang 1979). In 1973, Mao indicated 
that he was in favor of Qin Shi Huang, China’s first emperor noted for his ruthlessness, and opposed to 
Confucius. Even after the Cultural Revolution, Confucianism was still a target of denunciation as 
Confucius was attacked as an inspiration of the Gang of Four. However, Marxism-Leninism and Maoism 
as an official ideology greatly eroded in post-Mao China (Misra 1998). After the Tiananmen massacre, as 
the CCP was facing a legitimacy crisis, it began to rebrand itself as a tradition-friendly party and sought 
legitimacy from the long-vilified Confucianism. Since 1993, the CCP had actively promoted Confucianism 
as a cultural tradition and national learning (guoxue) as an intellectual pursuit (Lei Yi 2014). Beginning in 
2004, China launched its program of Confucian Institutes as part of its “soft power” initiative. By the end 
of 2015, China had established 500 Confucius Institutes in 125 countries.100 And by the late 2000s, 
Confucianism appeared to be fully compatible with Marxism and well integrated within the CCP’s party 
apparatus. A national survey found that 40.9 percent of China’s active cultural traditionalists were 
members of the CCP (Kang Xiaoguang 2009). 
Against this backdrop, political conservatism and cultural conservatism converged on the left side 
as a number of intellectuals began to justify the authoritarian rule in the name of national interests and 
cultural tradition. Kang Xiaoguang (2004), for example, acknowledged that the communist rule since the 
death of Mao had lacked a solid ideological base, and therefore the CCP was in urgent need of a new 
and effective theory of legitimacy. Liberal democracy as a theory of legitimacy had “bankrupted,” Kang 
argued, thus a realistic point of departure had to be political authoritarianism. To seek political legitimacy, 
the CCP must stop looking for Western resources and fix its attention on China’s cultural tradition. 
Confucianism, with its advocate of “kingly way of politics” (wangdao zhengzhi), should be the ideological 
basis of China’s communist rule. In other words, the CCP should learn to rule by virtue, rather than by 
power. On the side of the citizen, since the ruler had more merits than the ruled as a result of political 
meritocracy and he wholeheartedly wanted the good of his subjects, the ruled must obey the ruler. As 
Kang argued, because such a Confucian theory of “benevolent government” did not operate on how the 
ruler gained its power, but only on how he wielded his power, it effectively preempted the need for 
elections and reliance on administrative record. A Confucian benevolent government, therefore, would be 
                                                          
100 http://www.hanban.org/confuciousinstitutes/node_10961.htm (retrieved April 12, 2016). For a critique of the 
Confucius Institute, see Sahlins (2015). 
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an ideal option for China’s communist rulers. Furthermore, to radically replace Marxism with 
Confucianism, Kang (2006) suggested, two things must be done. First, the CCP must replace Marxism 
with the doctrines of Confucius and Mencius as its guiding principles, and require all party members to 
study the Four Books and Five Classics, the Chinese classic Confucian texts. Second, in order to 
“Confucianize” (ruhua) the society, the CCP should establish Confucianism as the state religion and bring 
Confucian teachings to the national education system. 
Whether it was for the liberals, the New Leftists, or the Old Leftists, it had been traditionally held 
that there was a disruption, or even opposition, between Mao’s China and post-Mao China. The hidden 
implication was the contrast between the former’s revolutionary turbulence and the latter’s economic 
growth. However, as a continuation of the New Left’s effort to identify reasonable elements in Maoism 
and revive Mao’s revolutionary legacy, some intellectuals began to emphasize the continuity of the first 30 
years (1949–1978) and the second 30 years (1979–2008) of communist China. Inspired by sociologist 
Daniel Bell’s famous self-identification as “a socialist in economics, a liberal in politics, and a conservative 
in culture,” Gan Yang ([2005] 2012, [2007] 2012) maintained that the most useful values for today’s China 
were, by order of importance, socialism, conservatism, and liberalism. It is worth noting, however, that 
Gan Yang’s ([2007] 2012) understanding of these three terms was quite different from that of Bell. By 
socialism, he appeared to mean Mao’s socialist practice; by conservatism, he referred to Confucianism; 
and by liberalism, he confined it to market economy. In terms of China’s socialist legacy, Gan rejected the 
binary of the first 30 years’ disaster and the second 30 years’ success, and insisted that Mao’s “creative 
destruction” laid a solid foundation for Deng’s reforms.101 Like Kang Xiaoguang, Gan Yang ([2005] 2012) 
offered a Machiavellian piece of advice to the communist rulers in the service of China’s “soft power”: 
juxtaposing three political traditions—the reform tradition of market economy, the Maoist tradition of 
equality, and the Confucian tradition of authority and self-cultivation—and regarding them as a 
continuation of Chinese civilization. In the end, Gan (2007, [2007] 2012) proposed, China should pursue 
the political goal of a “Confucian socialist republic” that would be strong enough to compete with Western 
                                                          
101 Such a view has been well received by China’s power center. For example, Xi Jinping (2013a), China’s current top 
leader, indicated that the first 30 years and the second 30 years were both periods of socialist construction under the 
leadership of the CCP and neither period ought to be used against the other. 
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capitalism. In his comments, Wang Hui ([2005] 2007) endorsed Gan’s effort as one of restoring cultural 
confidence and consciously looking for “subjectivity” (zhutixing). 
 
The convergence between the New Left and nationalism: In general, nationalism was considered 
a right-wing ideology in the West. In China, however, nationalism has been associated with the left. It 
should be noted that the New Left and nationalism were largely two separate ideological movements in 
the 1990s. With the notable exception of Liu Kang, who coauthored a popular nationalist book, 
Yaomohua Zhongguo de beihou (Behind the Demonization of China) (Li Xiguang, Liu Kang, et al. 1996), 
when the hyper-nationalist and anti-West book, Zhongguo keyi shuo bu (China Can Say No) (Song Qiang, 
Zhang Zangzang, Qiao Bian, et al. 1996) swept China with a record sales number of more than 3 million 
copies, New Leftists, such as Wang Hui ([1997] 2008:95), were critical of its overly populist stance, or at 
least remained silent. Nevertheless, generally speaking, there is no denying that from the beginning, the 
liberals had been cosmopolitan, and even disdainful of nationalism and populism, whereas the New 
Leftists had been more or less nationalistic and anti-West. Indeed, from Wang Shaoguang’s study of state 
capacity to Gan Yang’s view of China as a political nation, the ideological connection between the New 
Left and nationalism was quite obvious. 
Two historical events in the 1990s were worth noting. The first event was Beijing’s failed bid for 
the 2000 Olympics. As an early favorite, Beijing lost the bid to Sydney in the final round. This generated 
nationwide outrage and nationalistic sentiment in China. Because of the frequent criticisms of China’s 
human rights record from the American government, and in particular the adoption of a resolution against 
Beijing hosting the Olympics from the United States House of Representatives, many Chinese believed 
that the loss was a result of international conspiracy, and in particular the political intervention from the 
United States (Haugen 2008:147). As China was eager to come back to the world stage after the 1989 
crackdown, the Olympic bidding was far more than a political or cultural event, but a symbol of national 
pride. For many people, the loss of the bid was perceived as a huge setback, or even a national 
humiliation. In a sense, this marked the beginning of the anti-West popular nationalism in contemporary 
China. The second event was the United States’ bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade during the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) blitz of Yugoslavia in 1999. While US President Bill Clinton 
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promptly apologized and stated that the bombing was accidental, many Chinese saw it as intentional. In 
the following days, large, and often violent, demonstrations erupted at consular offices of the United 
States and other NATO countries in Beijing. The protesters were mainly comprised of university students, 
and the protests were indeed tolerated, and even facilitated and encouraged, by the Chinese government. 
However, anti-West, and in particular anti-American, nationalism has since gained legitimacy in the 
intelligentsia. Before the Belgrade bombing, as the NATO’s bombing was under way, liberal intellectual 
Zhu Xueqin published an essay that harshly criticized populism and nationalism as major impediments for 
the modernization of China. Several days later, as the nationalist voice was augmented, Zhu’s article and 
other cosmopolitan views lost a great deal of credit and became targets of vehement condemnations on 
the Internet (Wang 2003:34–35). 
The nationalist rhetoric reached another peak in the 2000s, which also surrounded a sporting 
event—the Beijing 2008 Summer Olympics. This time, nationalism as an ideology or current of thought 
swept the entire left side of the ideological spectrum. The choice of China as the host country was once 
against criticized by some foreign politicians and activists based on the concern over its human rights 
record. What is more, during the months of global torch relay prior to the games, wide-scale protests and 
demonstrations erupted, and many of the protesters were pro-Tibet activists. Back in China, these 
protests were reported and perceived to be a hostile reaction from the West as the Chinese were opening 
their welcoming arms, and provoked intense nationalist sentiment. Anti-West protests burst out and swiftly 
spread to all the major cities. At this point, many intellectuals on the left came out and condemned the 
West’s bias against China. In other words, nationalism became a defining feature of various leftists. 
Against this background, in 2009, Zhongguo bu gaoxing (Unhappy China), a book of ultra-nationalism, 
was published. While not as sensational as China Can Say No, a book published 13 years ago with a 
similar theme and tone, it still garnered much attention, both in China and worldwide, and the five authors 
became spokespersons of Chinese nationalism. In a militant tone, the book provoked: 
 
With respect to the question of whether Tibet has been an integral part 
of China since ancient times—whether since the Yuan dynasty, Qing dynasty, or 1959—
the Westerners insist that it is 1959. As I replied to some Western journalists regarding 
the Tibet issue, speaking of facts, there is no dispute that [Tibet has been an integral part 
of China since] the Qing dynasty; but I can also tell you Westerners plainly: Even if it’s 
1959, so what? If you’re a man, come over and let’s fight. Stop this eternal chatter! … 
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Come and seize [Tibet] if you’re a man. … On the issue of Tibet, the Chinese don’t think 
that Westerners are in the position to judge. What the Chinese did in April 2008 [in 
protesting] was never begging Westerners to accept the view of the Chinese or accept 
the Chinese, but rather expressing their discontent, and even wrath, to Westerners … 
(Wang Xiaodong 2009b:41–42) 
 
Furthermore, the book called for China to “conditionally break” with the West (Song Qiang 2009), 
and stated that China’s long-term goals should be “first to eliminate violence and maintain goodness in 
the world, and second to manage more resources than it does now in order to benefit all people in the 
world” (Wang Xiaodong 2009a:98). 
While the New Leftists were still unwilling to associate themselves with the ultranationalists in the 
2000s, their nationalist stance was no less striking. In an interview in 2008, when asked about the 
significance of the worldwide anti-West protests by the Chinese on April 19, Gan Yang ([2008] 2012:188–
90) gave an exuberant reply: 
 
The large-scale assemblies on April 19 when the Chinese all over the world held 
Five-star Red Flags aloft in Europe and the United States were a significant turning point 
in world history. The April 19 protests showcased a new generation of self-improving, 
self-reliant, self-confident, and free Chinese in front of the world. The marches during 
which they were holding national flags aloft were completely spontaneously and 
voluntarily organized. Their voice that soared across the world came completely freely 
from the deepest bottom of their hearts. The April 19 marches, whose participants mainly 
came from the 1980s generation, was a culmination of the pride of 5,000 thousand years 
of civilization, the resolution of 100 years of resisting imperialist powers, the strength of 
60 years of nation-building with motivation, self-improvement and self-reliance, and the 
confidence and free spirit of 30 years of reform and opening up. 
… 
The April 19 marches marked the end of the long era of Western politicians and 
media self-regarding as moral judges in the world. People in non-Western countries were 
no longer tolerant of the Western politicians and media who made irresponsible remarks, 
manipulated the truth, and demonized non-Westerners at their will. 
The fact that this “new cosmopolitanism” was started and promoted by the 
Chinese is not surprising, for China is the strongest and most independent non-Western 
country. The roaring of the Chinese worldwide on April 19 told CNN102 and the other 
media: WE DO NOT TRUST your coverage! 
 
It is not difficult to discern that for the New Left, nationalism was equivalent to state nationalism. 
In other words, the “nation” was referring to the state. Indeed, when the New Left talked about China’s 
problem of nationalities, they were speaking on behalf of the rather vague Chinese nation, or the Han 
                                                          
102 CNN (Cable News Network) became a main target during the anti-West protests for its perceived anti-Chinese 
coverage of recent events. 
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majority, instead of the ethnic minorities. For example, Wang Hui (2011:225–27) famously called the 2008 
anti-West protests a “politics of dignity.” However, while briefly and elusively pointing out that “the logic of 
the politics of dignity and equality should be extended to all social relationships in Chinese society, 
including ethnic relations” (Wang Hui 2011:226), he mainly used the thesis to justify the anti-West 
marches. When the patriotic youth perceived bias from the Western media and protested, it was praised 
as a politics of dignity and a reflection of “a world perspective” and “internationalism” (Wang Hui 
2011:226), as opposed to the “parochial nationalism” (Wang Hui 2011:225) deeply ingrained in the 
Western society and uttered by CNN: “The overseas student movement expressed with great clarity its 
rejection of the forces of international hegemony and separatism, thereby allowing the entire world to hear 
the voice of Chinese society.” (Wang Hui 2011:226) 
The following paragraph, bewilderingly missing from the English edition,103 illustrated what Wang 
Hui (2010:182–83) meant by the “politics of dignity”: 
 
In 1993, under the interventions from the American government and some other 
Western governments, China did not win the right to host the 2000 Olympics. Fifteen 
years later, when China was actively bidding for the Olympics, many political powers 
once again sought to humiliate China in various means and ways. … The insulting 
comments from CNN exemplified a hierarchical worldview, … . What the politicians in 
[those hegemonic powers] are used to talking about is retaining the “leadership” and 
“superiority” of their own countries, rather than recognition that is based on equality … . 
 
Wang Hui (2011:224) spoke rather elusively of the need to “establish a new basis for a politics of 
equality by thoroughly reconsidering our developmental logic, creating a more tolerant public arena and 
allowing the voices of ordinary people fuller expression in that space,” but never confronted the political 
reality in Tibet. When he talked about the “politics of dignity,” he was referring to the dignity of the 
Chinese in front of Westerners, rather than the dignity of Tibetans under the communist rule. Were the 
protests of the Tibetans against the Chinese government also a politics of dignity? Wang did not seem to 
think so—at least he did not address the question. Rather, he blamed the West for the political 
disturbance in Tibet: 
 
                                                          
103 It is worth noting that Wang Hui’s original Chinese texts have often been modified in their English-language 
translations, which on some occasions can lead to a more or less different interpretation. 
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In fact, a variety of people are supporting “Tibet independence,” and aside from 
those critiquing Chinese politics from the viewpoint of democracy and human rights, there 
are three matters worthy of particular note from a historical perspective. First is that 
Western knowledge of Tibet is deeply rooted in an orientalist mind-set, … . Relatively 
speaking, this factor has been particularly influential on Europeans. Second is the 
manipulation of public opinion by a specific political force and the organization of a 
political operation, something particularly relevant to the United States. Third, sympathy 
for Tibet contains an admixture of concern, fear, aversion, and rejection of China, as well 
as toward its rapid economic rise and, specifically, toward its radically different political 
system. On this last point, aside from a substantial number of Third-World countries, the 
entire world has been affected (Wang Hui 2011:137–38). 
  
In short, instead of viewing the “Tibet question,” or rather the international community’s concern 
of the political and social situation in Tibet, as one of human rights, Wang Hui considered it a product of 
the “phantasm” of Westerners’ orientalism and realpolitik. By the late 2000s, most New Leftists had 
indeed evolved into full-fledged nationalists. 
 
Carl Schmitt with red armband: The German legal and political theorist Carl Schmitt never visited 
China in his lifetime; neither did Mao pay a visit to Germany. There is not any evidence that Schmitt’s 
writing was influence by Mao Zedong’s revolutionary theory, or vice versa, despite Mao’s theory of 
guerrilla war was featured rather prominently in Schmitt’s (2007b:54–61) slim treatise, Theory of the 
Partisan. However, in the 2000s and up to the present, Carl Schmitt, the right-wing legal and political 
theorist, and Mao, the radical political leader, have found a striking commonality in China: they have been 
both admired by the New Left.104 Since the early 2000s, Carl Schmitt has been the most talked-about and 
translated political theorist in China, with the only possible exception of Leo Strauss, another conservative 
political theorist to be addressed below.105 In 2002, Liu Xiaofeng edited Schmitt yu zhengzhi faxue (Carl 
Schmitt and Political Jurisprudence), an anthology of translated commentaries on Schmitt, and initiated a 
wave of “Schmitt craze” that has not faded even to this day. There has even emerged a school of political 
constitutionalism that builds on Schmitt’s constitutional theory (Liu Xiaofeng 2015). The first book-length 
translation of Schmitt’s work was The Concept of the Political, published in 2003. In approximately 10 
years, almost all the major works by, and even on, Schmitt had Chinese translations. The “cult of Carl 
                                                          
104 There have been some studies on the compatibility of Schmitt’s and Mao’s thoughts. See, for example, Yang 
Shigang (2007) and Zheng (2016). 
 




Schmitt” (Xu Ben 2006), and for that matter, the “cult of Leo Strauss,” in contemporary China have 
attracted wide attention (Lilla 2010; Wang 2012). In China, as a journalist put it, “no one will take you 
seriously if you have nothing to say about [Schmitt and Strauss] and their ideas” (cited in Lilla 2010). By 
the end of the 2000s, Hayek, who was the most admired thinker in China merely 10 years ago, had 
almost completely fallen out of fashion, and free-market proponents and libertarians were no longer in the 
intellectual mainstream, but rather widely seen as naïve and even radical. 
The intellectual relationship between Schmitt and Strauss is a complicated one. While Strauss 
criticized Schmitt for not being antiliberal enough (cited in Holmes 1993:60), it is more appropriate to see 
Strauss as a “friendly critic of American liberal democracy” (Deutsch 2010; see also Howse 1998), and 
therefore to distinguish Strauss from Schmitt’s antiliberal tradition. Strauss clearly was critical of liberalism, 
and in particular its cultural pluralism and moral relativism, as was manifested in twentieth-century 
America, but unlike Schmitt, he was never a full-fledged statist. While Strauss rarely commented on real-
life politics, his most eminent students, such as Allan Bloom and Thomas Pangle, can all be seen as 
supporters of liberal democracy and anti-authoritarians. The intense interest in Leo Strauss among 
Chinese intellectuals would require a long research paper. I will therefore confine myself to the discussion 
to Schmitt in the following paragraphs, and make only two observations regarding Strauss here. First, 
there are two types of Strauss admirers in China: antiliberals—or New Leftists for that matter —who read 
Schmitt and Strauss as in line with each other and despise liberalism as impulsively shallow, and 
classicists who respect Strauss’s work in classical philosophy and view his esoteric writing as a sign of 
intellectual depth. Second, there is a certain degree of overlap between these two orientations, and those 
who admire Schmitt tend to admire Strauss, and vice versa. For example, Liu Xiaofeng and some other 
New Leftists have been known for their obsession with esotericism, or weiyan dayi, a Chinese expression 
literally translated as subtle words with profound meanings. Liu Xiaofeng has also been a prominent 
classist in China. In addition, Gan Yang has been a major advocate of liberal arts education since the 
mid-2000s, and has presided China’s most radical “Great Books” program—albeit its focus on Chinese 
classics instead of Western ones—at a major university, Sun Yat-sen University, since 2009. 
Carl Schmitt was surely a brilliant and important political thinker, and his intellectual influence has 
seen a steady revival worldwide since the 1990s. What is more, left-wing philosophers and political 
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theorists in the West have played a significant role in the rising fame of Schmitt (Agamben 2005; Mouffe 
1999).106 No less striking is the popularity of Schmitt’s work in today’s Russia (Krastev, Leonard, and 
Wilson 2009:1; Xu Fenglin 2010). As the two major exponents of Schmitt’s thought, Gan Yang and Liu 
Xiaofeng (2006) insisted that they introduced Western thoughts merely for the sake of their academic 
value, rather than practical concerns. It is also reasonable to assume that introducing Schmitt was a 
move of academic adventure or strategy, not only because Schmitt was previously little known to the 
Chinese audience, but also because his writings appear to be more sophisticated, or even esoteric, than 
many advocates of human rights and democracy. However, in China, the political, intellectual, and 
academic fields have never been mutually exclusive. After all, a political thought does not suddenly 
become popular out of a social vacuum. Why Carl Schmitt, not, say, Wilhelm von Humboldt, another 
German political thinker who was a liberal? The common denominator of Carl Schmitt, Mao, and the 
Chinese New Left, I argue, is statism, the canonization of a powerful political leader.107 
A key to understanding Schmitt is the concept of sovereignty, an enduring theme throughout his 
academic career. In the famous opening line of Political Theology, Schmitt ([1985] 2005:5) wrote, 
“Sovereign is he who decides on the exceptional case.” The word “on” (über in the German text) is 
notoriously ambiguous, but it is this ambiguity in which the essence of sovereignty lies: the sovereign 
decides both what constitutes an exception and what constitutes an appropriate decision in response to 
that exception ([1985] 2005:29–35). As Tracy Strong (2011:34) argued, “the one without the other makes 
no sense at all.” Schmitt ([1985] 2005:5) made it clear the notion of sovereignty laid the foundation of his 
general theory of the state. The sovereign was, by nature, the making of “a genuine decision” (Schmitt 
[1985] 2005:3). Therefore, an “exception” cannot be defined in legal terms, which means that the 
definitions of the political situation and the appropriate measures are completely in the hands of the 
sovereign. Schmitt (2008:45) made a crucial distinction between the political and the state, “[Today] one 
can no longer define the political from the state; what we take to be the state must, on the contrary, be 
                                                          
106 Some critical thinkers associated with the Frankfurt School, including Max Horkheimer, Theodor Adorno, and 
Walter Benjamin, were also influenced by Schmitt (Kennedy 1987). Noting that the leftist journal, Telos, devoted an 
entire issue (72, Summer 1987) to Schmitt’s work, Stephen Holmes (1993:37) emphasized that the editor’s 
introduction urged the left to learn “from,” and not “about,” Schmitt. 
 




defined and understood from the political.” The essence of the state, to Schmitt, was a community of 
people, which by definition entailed an exclusion, or even opposition. In other words, the state necessarily 
defined itself against those not belonging to the community. It was from this premise that Schmitt 
(2007a:26) derived his classic assertion, “The specific political distinction to which political actions and 
motives can be reduced is that between friend and enemy.” Not surprisingly, based on this claim, Schmitt 
rejected parliamentary democracy and liberal cosmopolitanism as being naive. It should also be noted 
that Schmitt was not merely talking about political opposition—taking the form of us against the other, 
politics was to him a matter of life or death and therefore the foe to be confronted was a mortal enemy. 
By now the strong authoritarian flavor of Schmitt’s political thought should be quite clear—indeed 
it sounds strikingly similar to Mao’s theory of people’s democratic dictatorship (renmin minzhu 
zhuanzheng).108 For the Chinese New Left, the appeal of Schmitt did not mainly rest on the depth or 
correctness of his theory, but rather on its theoretical and practical implications. During the last days of 
the Weimar Republic, Schmitt witnessed the feebleness, and eventual breakdown, of its parliamentary 
democracy in the face of the meteoric rise of the Nazis, which would in turn change the constitution itself 
(Mehring 2014:97–251). Furthermore, as the public good-pursuing Parliament was taken over by de facto 
interest groups with their own short-term goals and “behind closed doors” politics, the supposedly neutral 
state, which was beyond any specific social interest, became completely enmeshed with, or even 
abducted by, society. The way out, for Schmitt, was an all-embracing and powerful ruler, the sovereign, 
whose executive power was unhampered by constraints of legality. That was why Schmitt saw Hitler as a 
God-sent figure, although he found Hitler repulsive as a person (Strong 2011:42). 
Ideas have consequences. The thought of Schmitt, an antiliberal democrat, was appropriated by 
the Chinese New Left to give rationales for the authoritarian rule of the CCP. In a review of Schmitt’s The 
Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy, which was widely read and praise by the New Leftists, Zhang Xudong 
(2005), a postmodernist and student of Fredric Jameson’s,109 wrote that “Schmitt indeed had a deeper 
grasp of the essence of democracy than liberals, for he did not see democracy as a set of … procedures, 
                                                          
108 For a succinct discussion of the theoretical connection between Schmitt’s thought and Marxism, see Thornhill 
(2010:30–32). 
 
109 Schmitt’s warm reception among postmodernists is not unique to China. Jürgen Habermas (1986) noted a similar 
phenomenon in the English- and French-speaking worlds in the 1980s. 
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such as general elections, anonymous votes, or parliamentary debates, but rather looked for a solid 
theoretical basis for the modern civil state.” More specifically, the foundation of state power should be 
political will, not procedural democracy. Here, Schmitt had a specific understanding of political will, which 
was highly praised by Zhang Xudong: “Western-style democracy in history and reality has always been 
characterized by ‘homogeneity’ and ‘exclusivity.’ To establish real and meaningful democratic rights for 
the people, there is a need to simultaneously, or before all else, exclude various social elements that do 
not belong to the people—through the ages, slaves, savages, heretics, traitors, the ‘Red Bandits,’ the 
‘four sinister elements,’ ‘illegal immigrants,’ and ‘terrorists’ have helped to establish the boundary and 
essence of ‘civilization,’ ‘democracy’ or ’people’s democracy’.” In the end, Zhang agreed with Schmitt that 
the essence of democracy was power instead of “universal equal rights,” and concluded that what China 
could learn from Schmitt was to establish the power wielded by the homogeneous few who enjoyed 
“substantive equality” as the general will. Liu Xiaofeng regarded Schmitt as “the most important political 
thinker who was admired by both the New Left and the New Right” (Liu Xiaofeng 2002a:8), and placed 
the significance of his thought in the context of “the coalition of the New Left and neoconservatism against 
neoliberalism” (Liu Xiaofeng 2002a:2). Although it is hard to see how China was similar to Weimar 
Germany in constitutional crisis, Liu (2002a:14) nevertheless supported Schmitt’s assertion that a political 
leader should have the power to disregard the rule of law and guard his ultimate political goals, and the 
enemies en route should be the subject of dictatorship. Like Schmitt, Liu saw the world as full of danger 
and conflicts, and placed his hope for civil order in dictatorship. On many different occasions, Liu ([2013] 
2015) called Mao Zedong the “Father of the Nation” (guofu)110 because he defended the sovereignty of 
China and launching the Cultural Revolution—one of the most significant historical events in the world 
because it exemplified the principle of popular sovereignty. The essence of the Cultural Revolution, to him, 
was equality. Liu argued that the biggest obstacle to China’s development during the last 100 years had 
been the liberal ideas of the Enlightenment, for the key to modern politics should be a real king (wangzhe), 
or strong leader (dangangzhe), such as Mao. In this sense, Liu (2005, 2010, [2013] 2015) claimed that 
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the liberals were the real despots and Mao a real liberal.111 In an eccentric way, Schmitt and Mao fit each 
other strikingly well in China. 
 
Out of Ivory Tower: Transformation of Liberalism 
 
Economic liberalism versus political liberalism: Because of its infusion with the official neoliberal 
ideology, free-market economics played a key role in the rise of liberalism in the 1990s. Many widely-
sought economists commented on social issues from the perspective of economic efficiency and were 
instrumental in opening up the discursive space for the larger liberalism. As the political liberals also 
emphasized the importance of property rights and market competition, they saw the economists as a 
close ally. Indeed, as the economists enjoyed official sanction and social popularity, they were engaged in 
the design of economic policies and the spread of laissez-faire ideas and were largely indifferent to the 
intellectual debates. Therefore, somewhat ironically, it was the political liberals who were debating the 
New Left on behalf of the free-market ideology in the second half of the 1990s. However, as the crisis of 
social injustice became increasingly salient in the late 1990s, the silence of the economists to this issue 
led to their fall from the crown. While sharing almost all beliefs with the political liberals, such as 
democracy, the rule of law, and human rights, the economists naively believed that they could “trick” out 
political liberty from marketization (Yao Zhongqiu 2011:20). When market economy had become a 
societal consensus, the continuation of the free-market rhetoric without addressing social injustice in 
concrete language led to the distance of some political liberals from the economic liberals. 
Indeed, the blow to public trust in free-market economics came as early as the mid-1990s, when 
some economists proposed the theory of “justifiable corruption”—corruption was a “second best” choice 
of resource allocation as it “activated” inactive public resources by rendering them private. The 
prevalence of corruption made the cost of preventing or punishing it exceeded the loss cause by the 
corruption itself, so the anti-corruption measures should be modest. Some economist also viewed 
corruption as an informal institutional arrangement, which would follow by formal institutional change. In 
other words, corruption was a type of “road toll” en route to a market economy (Wan He 2000). In a 
                                                          




nutshell, they hoped that China would “corrupt into” political liberty.112 As these views contradicted 
common-sense wisdom, they incurred harsh criticisms. However, it was not until the late 1990s that 
economists as a group became the target of criticism, and it was at this point that the disagreements 
between political liberals and economic liberals began to surface. 
In 1997, journalist He Qinglian published China’s Pitfalls in Hong Kong. A year later, a censored 
version, Pitfalls of Modernization, appeared in the mainland. Documenting the complication between 
power and wealth behind the courses of employee shareholding (gufenhua), allocation of state-owned 
land, loss of state assets, primitive accumulation of capital, and reorganization of rural society, He, a self-
claimed liberal, criticized Chinese economists for defending the official corruption in the names of free 
market and necessary original sin. The economists must change their indifference to morality and return 
to its tradition of classical political economy by speaking out against social injustice, urged He. First 
published in Hong Kong, it nevertheless attracted attention from the intellectual circles, not to mention 
that many of its chapters were originally published as journal articles, most of which appearing in Twenty-
First Century, with wide readership. Immediately a national best-seller, the publication of the book in the 
mainland in 1998 became a national cultural event. While it was not the first exposure of hidden social 
injustice behind the state-sanctioned economic reforms—Qin Hui published a series of articles with 
similar claims in 1993 to 1994—He’s book was much more influential than the others. 
Widely discussed in the intellectual circles and popular media, the book initially met with silent 
dismissal from the economists. As economics was hailed as king of all social sciences, many economists 
simply refused to engage with, or even read, He’s popular and equation-free book. Without mentioning 
He’s name, the first response came from Fan Gang, one of the best-known economists. In an essay in 
the intellectual magazine, Reading, Fan Gang claimed that economists should have moral standards as 
citizens, but talking about morality as economists would be equivalent to “loafing around.” Fan’s central 
thesis that morality was out of the boundary of economics as a field of inquiry was indeed modest, but the 
title of his essay—“‘Amoral’ Economics”—and the concluding statement—“Economists are precisely 
‘amoral.’ Follow your own road, and let the people talk.”—offended many people and sparked a great deal 
of controversy. 
                                                          
112 Such a theory was not new. Indeed, some Western economists had something similar to say about corruption in 
South Asia (Wan He 2000). 
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In November 1998, Zhang Shuguang, another free-market economist, gave a series of lectures in 
the United States. Annoyed by the repeated questions from his American audiences about He’s book, 
Zhang wrote a long review essay of He’s book for Reading.113 In his view, the book raised a series of 
important social issues, but lacked a theoretical framework and empirical falsifiability. Zhang dismissed 
the book as a mass-market book filled with “emotional dramatizations,” instead of a serious academic 
book. Moreover, as an admirer of Hayek, Zhang ridiculed He for regarding Hayek as a defender of social 
justice, insisting that it was Hayek’s view that social justice was a “road to serfdom.” As Zhang accused 
He for mobilizing the masses against serious academic investigations, He (2000) rebutted by saying that 
it was the free-market economists who controlled public opinion and official discourse. 
In late 2000, economist Wu Jinglian openly warned that Chinese stock market had been 
manipulated by bankers, and compared Chinese stock market to a casino. At the same time, the Chinese 
government began to tighten its regulation over the stock market. In early 2001, Chinese stocks tumbled 
for four consecutive days. In February, five economists—Li Yining, Dong Fureng, Xiao Zhuoji, Wu Xiaoqiu, 
and Han Zhiguo—held a press conference, warning that Wu’s remarks might destroy China’s budding 
stock market. Notably, Wu, Li, Dong, and Xiao were all prestigious free-market economists. This was the 
first time that disagreements among free-market economists were broadcast to the public. 
The biggest blow to the free-market economists came in 2004. In a series of high-profile essays 
and speeches, Larry H. P. Lang, a Taiwan-born and Hong Kong-based economist, launched blistering 
attacks against the ongoing property rights reform of China’s SOEs, in particular the loss of state assets 
in the course of state-led privatization, and called for heavier state regulations. Lang was especially 
critical of the existing practice of management buyout (MBO) as it became an easy way for managers of 
SOEs to annex state assets. He criticized the managers of some of the largest SOEs by name, and 
accused them of pocketing state assets by manipulating financial statements and the process of MBO. 
Lang’s remarks triggered nationwide discussions over the SOE reforms. Worried that the privatization of 
SOEs would be halted or even reversed, many free-market economists, notably Zhang Weiying and Zhou 
Qiren, came out and accused Lang for political opportunism and exaggerating the scale of state asset 
embezzlement. Zhang Weiying (2004) insisted that only by privatization would managers have incentives 
                                                          
113 The review essay was published in two pieces in Reading, in the October issue of 1999 and the March issue of 
2000, respectively. A slightly different version appeared on the Internet earlier. 
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to take care of the assets, and the biggest threat to Chinese economy was not the loss of state assets, 
but rather the encroachment of private assets by the state.114 After the debate, Lang was regarded as a 
prominent New Leftist. On the liberal side, while many political liberals still supported Zhang and Zhou, 
many others joined Lang and saw the state-led privatization as unjust. Moreover, the political liberals 
began to feel uncomfortable with the overly neoliberal tone of the free-market economists. More broadly, 
in part because of Lang’s impressive academic background115 and detail data, he commended huge 
popular support, which was described as “Lang cyclone.” Lang’s remarks appeared to have influenced 
state policy, as Gu Chujun, a business tycoon and one of Lang’s main targets, was convicted of state 
asset misappropriation before long. In addition, in the subsequent years, state policy began to lean 
toward the SOEs instead of private enterprises. After the debate, the free-market economists were widely 
perceived as spokespersons of “bigwigs” and therefore lost a great deal of public trust. 
In the second half of the 2000s, aside from Zhang Weiying, Mao Yushi was the economist who 
aroused most controversy. A prestigious economist who had applied cost-benefit analysis to a number of 
social issues, which won him the 2012 Milton Friedman Prize for Advancing Liberty from the Cato Institute, 
a well-known libertarian think tank in the United States. In 2007, Mao wrote that his motto was “speaking 
on behalf of the rich and working on behalf of the poor,” for it took courage to speak against the grain and 
popular will on behalf of the justifiable rights of the rich. In 2007, commenting on the perennial problem of 
railway ticket shortage during the Spring Festival travel season, Mao wrote that the best way for the 
government was to increase the prices of the tickets. In 2008, Mao noted that only 10–20 percent of 
Chinese college students were from poor families, therefore the low tuitions were akin to a free ride for 
most people. Accordingly, the best policy would be to raise the tuitions and help the poor students in the 
form of scholarships and loans. In 2009, Mao argued that affordable housing projects created rent-
seeking opportunities for those with connections with political authorities and therefore should be halted, 
or alternatively, affordable public houses should be built without private bathrooms in order to eliminate 
the incentive for corruption. These remarks are not without merit from a purely economic point of view. 
However, appearing on popular media with simplified titles such as “Mao Yushi Favors College Tuition 
                                                          
114 The remarks from both sides are collected in Cao Jianshan (2005). 
 
115 With a PhD in finance from the Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania and an impressive record of 
English publications, Lang was a chaired professor at the Chinese University of Hong Kong. 
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Increase” only served to outrage innumerable people. As a consequence, Mao Yushi in particular and 
free-market economists in general were seen out of touch by many Chinese. Toward the end of the 
2000s, economists were no longer widely regarded as part of the intellectual vanguard. 
 
A Variety of Liberalisms: A notable phenomenon in the intelligentsia of the 2000s was the 
proliferation of different “branches” of liberalism. If in the end of the 1990s many intellectuals began to 
proudly call themselves liberals, by the end of the 2000s many liberals had wanted to add an adjective 
before the label “liberal.” In the center of the liberal discourse were Locke-inspired classical liberalism, 
Hayek-inspired libertarianism, Rawls-spired modern liberalism, and Friedman-spired free-market 
economics, but four other strands—new authoritarianism, democratic socialism, constitutional socialism, 
and cultural conservatism—also had strong liberal flavors and should be seen as integral components of 
Chinese liberalism of the 2000s. I leave cultural conservatism for the next section, and discuss the three 
other currents of thought here. 
New authoritarianism (xinquanweizhuyi) had its origin in the brief intellectual debate in the late 
1980s. As previously discussed, post-Mao China has been characterized by a combination of economic 
marketization and political authoritarianism. In the mid-1980s, the reformist political leaders, Hu Yaobang 
and Zhao Ziyang, intended to make breakthroughs in the political arena. In addition, the exceptional 
economic growth and political stability of the Four Asian Tigers—Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, 
and Taiwan—in the 1980s appeared to suggest that economic liberation and political democratization did 
not have to come hand in hand. Accordingly, the relationship between economic development and 
political liberation provoked heated debates in the intellectual circles and in turn influenced the political 
elite. In the mid-1980s, political scientist Samuel Huntington visited Beijing. As the Chinese were 
unfamiliar with his thought, his thoughts on political institutionalization and political authority were briefly 
introduced in the CCP’s internally-circulated newsletters. Quite inadvertently, Huntington became the 
spiritual leader of China’s new authoritarians. What is more, his thought caught the attention of the 
political leaders, including Zhao Ziyang (Yan Jiaqi 1992:315). Even Deng Xiaoping, when heard about 
new authoritarianism from Zhao, said, “This is exactly my view” (Wu Jiaxiang 2001:17–18, [2008] 
2011:67). In 1988, Huntington’s Political Order in Changing Societies was translated into Chinese and 
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immediately became the “Bible” for Chinese new authoritarians.116 Huntington’s emphasis on the 
importance of political order and authoritative leadership for developing countries was particularly 
influential. His assertion that “men may … have order without liberty, but they cannot have liberty without 
order” (Huntington 1967:7–8) was much quoted in the intellectual circles. There emerged five major 
proponents of new authoritarianism: He Xin, Xiao Gongqin, Wu Jiaxiang, Zhang Binjiu, and Wang Huning. 
It should be noted, however, that He Xin was a noted exception as he regarded political authoritarianism 
as an end. Reformist in orientation, the majority of the new authoritarians saw political authoritarianism as 
a means—they simply believed that democratization should be realized in an orderly fashion and under 
the leadership of the CCP; in addition, they held the view that a period of political repression was 
necessary for China’s economic development and eventual realization of political liberty. For example, 
Wu Jiaxiang (1989:35) wrote metaphorically about the relationship among democracy, liberty, and 
autocracy, “Before democracy and liberty got ‘married,’ there is a period of ‘flirting’ between autocracy 
and liberty. If democracy is the eventual life partner of liberty, then autocracy is the premarital ‘lover’ of 
liberty.”117 
The debate surrounding new authoritarianism was abruptly interrupted by the Tiananmen 
crackdown. The 1990s was a period of dormancy for the new authoritarians. He Xin lost much of his 
credibility in the intelligentsia for siding with the CCP in 1989. Wu Jiaxiang was jailed for his involvement 
in 1989 and lost much of his platform of speech. Zhang Bingjiu lost his job at Peking University for his 
involvement in 1989 and was no longer active in the intelligentsia. Wang Huning entered the political 
system and became a senior adviser for President Jiang Zemin. Xiao Gongqin was the only remaining 
major new authoritarian in the intelligentsia, but his voice was drowned out in the debate between the 
New Leftists and the liberals. 
In the 2000s, Xiao Gongqin and Wu Jiaxiang reemerged as important voices in the intelligentsia. 
Wu Jiaxiang became an active political commentator on the Internet. He gradually realized that political 
                                                          
116 Political Order in Changing Societies indeed had three Chinese editions in the 1980s. The first translation, by Li 
Shengping et al., was published by Huaxia chubanshe (Huaxia Publishing House) in 1988. The other two 
translations, by Wang Guanhua et al. and Zhang Daiyun et al. respectively, were published by Shenghuo dushu 
xinzhi sanlianshudian (SDX Joint Publishing Company) and Shanghai yiwen chubanshe (Shanghai Translation 
Publishing House), both in 1989. This attests to the popularity of the book. 
 
117 For reviews of the debate surrounding new authoritarianism, see Liu Jun and Li Lin (1989) and Lu Yi (2009). 
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authoritarianism might slip into autocracy, or even dictatorship. To solve the dilemma, Wu Jiaxiang (2001, 
2004, [2008] 2011) proposed a three-stage theory of China’s political development. The first stage was 
characterized by economic marketization and political authoritarianism; the second stage was the vertical 
decentralization of political power—more specifically, regional autonomy in the form of federalization; and 
finally, the horizontal decentralization of political power, meaning the division of powers into a legislature, 
an executive, and a judiciary. With the moderation of the liberals in the late 1990s and early 2000s, the 
differences between the liberals and the new authoritarians became trivial. During this period, Xiao 
Gongqin began to call himself a moderate liberal and focus his critique on the New Left and nationalism. 
At the same time, increasingly under the influence of cultural conservatism, Xiao also self-identified as a 
new conservative (xinbaoshouzhuyizhe). Xiao acknowledged that freedom and democracy were his 
ultimate pursuits, but respected the legitimacy of the communist regime for the sake of political order. To 
reconcile the tension between democratization and the one-party rule, Xiao Gongqin (2008) proposed a 
course of trial and error democratization under the leadership of the CCP. 
In Maoist China, democratic socialism (minzhu shehuizhuyi), or socialist democracy (shehui 
minzhuzhuyi), was denounced as revisionist (Ma Licheng 2012:82–83).118 In the 1980s, with the 
relaxation of ideological control, democratic socialism emerged as an important inspiration for many 
reformist intellectuals whose only philosophical training was Marxism. Eminent establishment intellectuals, 
such as Wang Ruoshui and Li Honglin, tried to find democratic elements in Marx’s own writings to push 
for political reform. In the 1990s, reformist party elders, such as Li Rui, Hu Sheng, Zhu Houze, and Gao 
Shangquan, all made remarks that bore resemblance to democratic socialism. Yanhuang chunqiu (China 
through the Ages), an intellectual magazine supported by reformist party elders, had been a major 
platform for democratic socialist thought.119 In 2007, 86-year-old Xie Tao, a veteran CCP member and 
former Vice President of the prestigious Renmin University of China, published an article, “The 
Democratic Socialist Model and the Future of China.” Xie viewed the history of the second half of the 
twentieth century as a triumph of democratic socialism, which transformed both socialism and capitalism. 
Democratic socialism was the real orthodox Marxism, Xie argued, as the later Marx and Engels were both 
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used interchangeably in China in most cases. 
 
119 For an anthology of key texts on democratic socialism in China, see Cao Tianyu (2008). 
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democratic socialists and originated the concept of a peaceful and gradual transition to socialism; the 
radical and violent eradication of capitalist means of production practiced in Soviet Union and China was 
a characteristic of Leninism, rather than Marxism. Xie’s real intention, after all, was to push for 
democratization: “The democratic socialist model is composed of democratic constitutionalism, mixed 
private ownership, socialist market economy, and welfare policies. The core of democratic socialism is 
democracy. Without the protection of democracy, the other three components will all mutate and 
deteriorate.” “The reform of political system can no longer be postponed,” Xie made an appeal to the CCP 
leadership at the end of his article. Written by a senior party elder with a Marxist language, this article 
occupied the center of attention of the intelligentsia almost in the entire year of 2007, and was one of the 
most influential political texts in the 2000s. Its reception was quite polarized. Considering Xie a valuable 
ally, the liberals almost universally praised this article, although most of them did not believe in 
democratic socialism. While the New Leftists largely remained silent, the Maoists were furious and 
organized 10 conferences to criticize Xie, accusing him of “opposing the ‘four cardinal principles’,” 
“distorting Marxism,” and “intending to overthrow the CCP” (Ma Licheng 2012:107–108). 
In 2006, economist Hu Xingdou coined the term “constitutional socialism” (xianzheng 
shehuizhuyi), which was later adopted by legal scholars Jiang Ping and Guo Daohui, political scientist 
Gao Fang, and political theorist Hua Bingxiao. Hu argued that China’s political reform should begin with 
the rule of law, and leave democracy for a later stage. He defined constitutionalism as the restriction of 
government power by checks and balances (Hu Xingdou 2006). He very broadly and vaguely defined 
socialism as social justice. In Hu’s view, the best strategy to promote political reform in today’s China was 
to supervise and force the government to observe its own constitution. Hu advocated a “controllable 
democratization” led by the CCP, which could take the form of campaign speeches or deliberative 
democracy, but not in the form of large-scale direct democracies or protest activism. A more elaborate 
theoretical treatment of constitutional socialism came from Hua Bingxiao (2010), a political theorist based 
at Northwest University in Xi’an, who proposed a six-step democratization process led by the communist 
party: (1) rule of law and democratization within the CCP, (2) judicial independence and other legal 
reforms, (3) legislative professionalization, (4) the strengthening of supervisory and consultative functions 
of various levels of Political Consultative Conferences, (5) the withdrawal of state from SOEs, and (6) the 
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election of the President by members of the National People’s Congress (NPC). Different from Hu 
Xingdou and the democratic socialists, Hua did not support a multi-party political system. In 2008, led by 
Hu Xingdou, 12 intellectuals issued an open letter to the NPC, calling for the adoption of constitutional 
socialism and proposing to build a monument or museum in honor of 30 years of reform and opening up 
(Radio Free Asia 2008). 
 
The rise of cultural conservatism: As was the case for the left, Chinese liberalism also saw a 
conservative turn in the 2000s. The crucial distinction, however, was that the leftists infused cultural 
conservatism with political conservatism, and used it to justify the political status quo, whereas 
conservatism was confined to the cultural and social arena on the liberal side. For some liberals, the turn 
to China’s cultural tradition was simply intended to refute the popular view that the Western political 
model of liberal democracy was unsuited to China— throughout history the Chinese have placed 
emphasis on social harmony and been blind to individual liberty. For example, Liu Junning (2011) claimed 
that “what we now call Western-style liberalism has featured in China's own culture for millennia”—many 
classical thinkers, such as Daoist philosopher Laozi, and Confucian philosophers Mencius and Huang 
Zongxi, wrote about the obligations of a ruler to a country's citizens and expressed the view of limited 
government. In 2007, Liu Junning called for the launch of a Renaissance in China aiming at “finding 
universal values from classical culture” and transforming social values through a cultural movement. 
More notable and controversial than any other event during this period was the rise of New 
Confucianism on the liberal side. Of particular significance was political Confucianism advocated by Jiang 
Qing. A legal scholar by training, Jiang was influenced by the culture craze in the 1980s. Back then he 
drew inspiration from Buddhism and Christianity, and was liberal in orientation. In the late 1980s, Jiang 
began to be interested in Confucianism and became a devout Confucian in the 1990s. However, Jiang 
was still interested in Western conservative political thoughts and Christian thoughts during this period, 
and was the translator of several Western classic texts, including a collection of Edmund Burke’s political 
essays. In 1995, Jiang Qing published Gongyangxue yinlun (Introduction to the Gongyang Commentary 
on the Spring and Autumn Annals), which elucidate his initial thought on political Confucianism. Jiang 
criticized the older-generation New Confucians, who were active in Taiwan and Hong Kong in the second 
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half of the twentieth century, for overemphasizing self-development, or inner sageliness (neisheng), in the 
Confucian tradition and downplaying its political dimension, or outer kingliness (waiwang). Even though 
some of the older-generation New Confucians, and in particular Mou Zongsan, advocated new outer 
kingliness, Jiang commented, they blindly accepted Western liberal democracy as a political framework, 
which was contradictory to the teaching of Confucius and only served to make China a “colony” of 
Western culture. Jiang emphasized the political element of Confucianism—the kingly way—which should 
be separated from self-development. In 1996, Jiang founded the Yangming Academy (Yangming jingshe), 
an institution devoted to Confucian teaching, in Xiuwen, Guizhou, in which Confucian philosopher Wang 
Yangming had a “sudden enlightenment” 500 years ago. 
In 2003, Jiang Qing published Zhengzhi ruxue (Political Confucianism), which marked his 
application of Confucianism to contemporary Chinese society and politics and radical break with Western 
liberalism. Political Confucianism, Jiang maintained, had been an integral part of Confucianism from the 
beginning, and should serve as the blueprint for the reconstruction of Chinese politics and society. Jiang 
opposed to the rule of law, and instead advocated the rule by ritual (lizhi)—the ultimate goal was to 
replace all laws with moral teaching. Furthermore, he supported the blend of politics and religion by 
reestablishing Confucianism as a state religion. Jiang was highly critical of democracy—the sovereignty 
of the people often led to amoral and short-sighted decisions—and believed that the kingly way, in which 
the ruler ordered the society and pacified the world in the interest of the people, was a far superior 
institutional arrangement. In addition, in a democratic regime, political legitimacy was based on the 
sovereignty of the people, but there was indeed more than one source of legitimacy. Moreover, the 
sovereignty of the people might not always lead to moral and farsighted decisions. 
Jiang Qing (2013a, 2013b, 2013c) supported constitutionalism, albeit a distinct Confucian 
constitutionalism, or the Confucian Way of the Humane Authority. Here Jiang designed an institutional 
framework in great detail. The Confucian constitutional structure had three main parts: the Academy to 
supervise the state, the tricameral parliament, and symbolic monarch republicanism. Jiang identified three 
types of legitimacy: the legitimacy of heaven (tiandao)—a transcendent moral and political authority, the 
legitimacy of earth (didao)—a ruling authority that descended from history and culture, and the legitimacy 
of the human (rendao)—the general will of the people. Accordingly, the tricameral legislature included a 
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House of Ru (Tongruyuan, or “House of Exemplary Persons”) that represented sacred legitimacy, a 
House of the Nation (Guotiyuan) that represented historical and cultural legitimacy, and a House of the 
People (Shuminyuan) that represented popular legitimacy (Jiang Qing 2011, 2013c; Jiang Qing and Bell 
2012). 
Immensely controversial, Jiang’s thought was also profoundly influential. He was recognized by 
both the left and the right as the most important Confucian intellectual in the 21st century, and “almost 
single-handedly succeeded in enriching debates about China’s political future” (Bell 2013:1). What is 
more, Jiang’s influence reached far beyond the intellectual world. For example, both China and Taiwan 
emerged a massive “child classics reading movement” in the 2000s (Billioud and Thoraval 2015:41–69), 
and Jiang was the most important spiritual leader and vocal supporter. In 2004, the authoritative Higher 
Education Press published a 12-volume elementary textbooks, Zhonghua wenhua jingdian jichu jiaoyu 
songben (The Fundamental Texts of Chinese Culture Classics for Reciting), which included 19 Confucian 
classics. Edited by Jiang Qing, these had been the first classics-reciting textbooks for children since 1912 
when classics-reciting was removed from the national elementary school curriculum. 
On the surface, Jiang’s idea was similar to that of “leftist Confucians,” such as Kang Xiaoguang. It 
is also true that Jiang directed most of criticisms against Western liberal democracy and seldom directly 
criticized the political status quo in China. It should not be forgotten, however, that Jiang was trying to 
make his voice heard in a communist country and therefore had to master the art of “writing between the 
lines.” It would indeed be a mistake to conflate Jiang and Kang. For such New Confucians as Jiang Qing, 
Qiu Feng, and Chen Ming, they were equally critical of the communist rule in China, if not more so. On 
this point, they were similar to the older-generation New Confucians in Taiwan and Hong Kong, who 
viewed communism as responsible for China’s moral decay and political predicament. Therefore, their 
cultural conservatism did not lead to political conservatism. A well-known New Confucian put it succinctly 
during interview, “Exactly because I’m culturally conservative, I’m not politically conservative.” On the 
contrary, those endorsing Confucianism on the left, such as Kang Xiaoguang and Gan Yang, more or less 
regarded Confucianism as a pragmatic tool to bolster regime legitimacy and buttress the status quo, and 




From intellectual movement to civil rights movements: To a large degree, liberalism was an 
intellectual movement in the 1990s. The major intellectual players were university professors, either in 
China or abroad. Most of the hotly-debated issues were theoretical and abstract ones, such as the 
relationship between democracy and liberty, the distinction between direct democracies and 
parliamentary democracies, and the importance of private property rights.120 When the polemics moved to 
policy issues, the exchanges were often complicated by academic jargon. While the intellectual field was 
gaining autonomy from the political field in the second half of the 1990s, it was still entangled with the 
academic field. In other words, the intellectuals were the scholars. The situation changed dramatically in 
the 2000s. With the mushrooming of the civil rights movements and the emergence of rights 
consciousness, Chinese liberalism found its social basis. The intellectuals and the activists echoed each 
other, and transformed the intelligentsia. Under state capitalism, the 1990s saw the emergence of new 
social strata. As a continuation of the reshaping of society, different social strata began to fight for their 
own interests. In this sense, Chinese intellectuals became “organic intellectuals,” who were attached to 
various social groups and spoke on their behalf (Gramsci 2000:301–311). There were a variety of civil 
rights movements, such as the collective resistance in the countryside, the environmental movement, the 
feminist movement, and the LGBT movement, which all contributed to the popularization of liberal ideas. I 
focus on four intertwined movements here: the rights defense movement, online activism, non-
governmental organizations (NGOs), and the house church movement. 
The most significant fusion between liberal ideas and citizen activism was the rights defense 
movement. To a large degree, China’s political trajectory was a product of elite politics in the 1980s and 
the 1990s. With the gradual exhaustion of convenient agendas of reform, China’s politics was 
increasingly shaped by social forces in the 2000s. Most remarkably, the notion of rights, which was still 
foreign to many Chinese 10 years ago, became part of the popular discourse and was used by different 
activists to make social progress. While the concept of “rule of law” was enshrined in the constitution, it 
was often conflated with the “rule by law”—the use of law by the state to justify its action and facilitate 
social control—in the official discourse. A direct response to this ambivalence, the rights defense 
movement had two types of collective actors: protestors and lawyers. By government measures, there 
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were 9,700 collective incidents (quntixing shijian)—including protests, riots, demonstrations, marches, 
group complaints, and so on—nationwide in 1993. The number increased by 10 times in the next decade 
and reached 87,000 in 2005 (cited in O’Brien and Stern 2008:12). The majority of the incidents were 
direct consequences of infringement of rights—such as forced eviction, relocation and demolition, the 
suffering of laid-off factory workers as a result of privatization, and public health scandals—and often 
used the constitution as a weapon. Even rural residents, the least educated social group, “worked” human 
rights and official rhetoric to their own advantage (O’Brien and Li 2006). Concomitantly and often 
voluntarily, a number of lawyers and legal activists began to defend the interests of the vulnerable groups, 
mostly against government agencies. In this process a number of human rights lawyers rose to 
prominence, such as Xu Zhiyong, Teng Biao, and Pu Zhiqiang. In 2003, while still doctoral students in 
legal studies at Peking University, Xu Zhiyong and Teng Biao, along with fellow student Yu Jiang, 
delivered an open letter to the NPC, demanding a constitutional review of the notorious custody and 
repatriation system. The letter played a significant role in the abolition of the system a month later. In the 
same year, Xu, Teng, Yu, and Zhang Xingshui established the Sunshine Constitutionalism Institute 
(Yangguang xiandao shehui kexue yanjiu zhongxin), an NGO that was renamed “Open Constitution 
Initiative” (Gongmeng) in 2005. With the mission of promoting rule of law and social justice, the Open 
Constitution Initiative was involved in many human rights lawsuits and launched some high-profile right-
defense activities. 
China’s Internet revolution transformed popular expression in the 2000s by giving rise to a new 
form of contention—online activism. The Internet played a key role in both assembling activists at one site 
and coordinating contentious events in different sites (Tilly and Tarrow 2015:16), but in the context of 
China, the most significant form of online activism was “connective action,” a personalized, digitally 
mediated politics (Bennett and Segerberg 2013). Because of the authoritarian nature of the regime, 
contentious activism had been highly risky and often ineffective. Most average people had avoided overly 
political action, or even expression. The Internet greatly reduced the cost of collective action by 
transforming high-risk political contention into low-risk popular expression, such as mocking the 
communist leaders through Internet memes. Moreover, by rendering politics everyday common problems, 
the Internet often transformed local contentious episodes into national political events through the 
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process of upward scale shift (Tilly and Tarrow 2015:125–27); in other words, online activism was 
characterized by scaling up through personalization. The iconic cases of Internet activism in the 2000s 
included the Sun Zhigang case in 2003, the BMW incident in 2004, the “black kiln” case in 2007, and the 
Deng Yujiao incident in 2009 (Yang 2015:3; see also Chen Po-chi and Hung Chin-fu 2012:216). These 
online protests did not target the ruling authority per se, but it was through the everyday online interaction 
that the rights consciousness became deeply-ingrained and the authority of the Communist Party 
gradually dissolved. Despite the heavy censorship, through blogs, online bulletin-board forums, and later 
microblogs (Weibo), the Internet served as a liberated and liberating space by weakening the agenda-
setting capacity of the state, and became a constitutive part of the emergent civil society.121 
The first registered NGO in communist China, an environmental group called “Friends of Nature” 
(Ziran zhi you), appeared in Beijing in 1994. Despite the unfriendly, often hostile, political environment, 
NGOs became important players in China’s civil rights movement in the 2000s. In 2001, there were 
approximately 200,000 registered NGOs. The number more than doubled by 2008 (Howell 2012:284).122 
The most influential NGOs worked in the areas of the environment, education, disabilities, children, public 
health, rural development, community, and migrant workers (Shieh and Amanda Brown-Inz 2013:13–15). 
By confining themselves to specific policies, the NGOs managed to gain legitimacy despite the state’s 
unease, and gave liberalism solid ground in China. For example, the Aizhixing Institute of Health 
Education (Aizhixing yanjiusuo), an AIDS-awareness group, worked hard to defend the rights of people 
living with HIV and probe the truth behind the blood-selling scandal—which led to the world’s highest 
concentration of HIV infection rates—in Henan Province; the think tank Transition Institute (Chuanzhixing 
shehui jingji yanjiusuo) focused on economic and social policies, such as tax policies, industry regulation, 
and civic participation, and was active in calling for the state to reduce its excessive presence in the 
economic and social spheres; and the China Rural Libraries (Liren xiangcun tushuguan) opened 22 
                                                          
121 A detailed, optimistic study on this theme is Yang (2009). For more cautious studies, see MacKinnon [2011] 2012 
and Zheng (2008). 
 
122 There were a large number of unregistered NGOs. The number of unregistered NGOs was estimated to be 
approximately 300,000 in 2005 (Shieh and Amanda Brown-Inz 2013:7). There were also massive numbers of 
government organized nongovernmental organizations (GONGO), mass organizations (qunzhong zuzhi), and student 




libraries across the country, with the mission of providing children and teenagers in underprivileged areas 
with free access to books—books that were free of official propaganda. 
A discussion of civil rights movement in contemporary China cannot leave out the house church 
movement. In general, China’s Christians were not interested in direct confrontation with the political 
authorities, but their spiritual pursuit posed a challenge to the symbolic order of the authoritarian regime. 
What is more, as unregistered Protestant assemblies operating independent from state, the house 
churches by definition defy the state’s effort to bring all religious activities under its control. From the 
1990s to the 2000s, the house church movement underwent several important transformations. First, the 
church goers were no longer mainly comprised of peasants, but included increasing numbers of 
intellectuals, business persons, and other middle class people. Some of the influential house church 
pastors were themselves important liberal thinkers. Second, no longer an underground operation, the 
movement had attracted much public attention beginning in the late 1990s. Third, the house churches 
became increasingly socially engaged by providing a series of social services. In a sense, they were the 
best organized NGOs in China. Fourth, as a direct response to state repression, the house churches 
launched their own rights defense campaigns, and even joined the larger and secular rights defense 
movement (Kao Chen-Yang 2013; Li Fan2011:187–226). Fifth, the house church movement spanned into 
the boundary of an intellectual movement as more and more Christian intellectuals elaborated liberal 
ideas, such as the protection of individual freedom, human rights, and democracy, through the prism of 
Christianity. With an estimated 30 million to 60 million regular churchgoers (Spegele 2011), the house 
churches were a considerable contribution to the rise of liberal consciousness in the 2000s. 
As a decisive feature of the intelligentsia of the 2000s, with the exception of online activism—
each of the aforementioned movements had its own prominent intellectuals who spoke for its interest—Xu 
Zhiyong, Teng Biao, and Pu Zhiqiang for the rights defense movement, Guo Yushan and Wan Yanhai for 
the NGO movement, and Yu Jie, Wang Yi, and Ren Bumei for the house church movement. Because of 
its diffused and personalized nature, the online activism did not have its own “intellectual leaders,” but as 
the liberal intellectuals frequently spoke against the power on the Internet—which in turn defined their 
status as intellectuals—they were in a sense all online activists themselves. The 2000s can therefore be 
seen as an era of organic intellectuals. 
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China’s liberal intellectual movement climaxed at the end of 2008. On December 9, an open letter 
signed by 303 liberal intellectuals was published online and quickly spread in and beyond the intellectual 
circles.123 Commonly referred as Charter 08 and taking its inspiration from Czechoslovakia’s Charter 77, 
this letter immediately received international attention. Although the Chinese government took great 
efforts to contain its spread and curb its influence, more than 11,200 people inside and outside of China 
had signed the Charter by April 2010. The Charter declared six universal values—freedom, human rights, 
equality, republicanism, democracy, constitutional rule—and made 19 demands with respect to political 
liberation, economic reform, urban-rural disparities, and environmental protection. Liu Xiaobo, one of the 
main brains behind the Charter, was arrested two days before its official release. Charged with “inciting 
subversion of state power,” Liu was sentenced to 11 years' imprisonment a year later. Liu won the Nobel 
Peace Prize in 2010 for his role in the nonviolent struggle for human rights. 
 
Same Bed, Different Dreams: 2009 to the Present 
 
The year 2008 was one of at once Charter 08 and the Beijing Olympics. As a manifesto for 
political reform, Charter 08 united Chinese intellectuals on the liberal side, but also initiated a wave of 
severe state repression that has lasted to this day. On the left side, the 2008 Beijing Olympics, along with 
the National Day military parade in 2009 and the Shanghai World Expo in 2010, brought about a tide of 
state nationalism that was unprecedented in post-Mao China; accordingly, statism became the unifying 
theme for the intellectual discourse on the left. In November 2012, Xi Jinping took the reins of both the 
Communist Party and the state. With political power unseen since Deng Xiaoping, Xi has since led China 
on a path of hard authoritarianism (Shambaugh 2016:2). At the same time, intellectuals on the left have 
celebrated state power and expounded the merits of political authoritarianism. Combining nationalism and 
authoritarianism, Xi has exercised various new forms of control over the intelligentsia. In an age of 
“Chinese Dream” (Zhongguo meng), as propagated by Xi,124 many intellectuals have dreamed of a strong 
                                                          
123 For the English translation, see “China’s Charter 08,” translated by Perry Link, New York Review of Books 56 
(January 15, 2009). (http://www.nybooks.com/articles/22210). 
 
124 Zhonguo meng has been widely translated as “China Dream” by foreign scholars and reporters, but the Chinese 
state has recently adopted the translation of “Chinese Dream,” in an effort to downplay its nationalist and statistics 
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and prosperous China, but their dreams are starkly different. The leftists are projecting a powerful 
authoritarian state that will soon replace the United States to be the world leader, whereas the liberals are 
hope that a liberal democratic China will not be a distant dream. 
 
The China Model: The New Left’s Celebration of Authoritarianism 
 
As Lu Xun put it, a ruler wants intellectuals to do four things for him: consent—support and 
embrace his “great insights” and “wise decisions,” interpret—theoretically elaborate the scientific and 
moral nature of these insights and decisions, and even their great historical significance; third, propagate 
his thoughts; and fourth, act out for his political theater (cited in Qian Liqun 2012:316). Amid the 
worldwide financial crisis from 2007 to 2008, China still remained its vibrant economic growth, and even 
acted as one of the major economic forces that pulled the world out of the economic mud. At this point, 
the rise of China appeared to be more real than ever. The New Leftists, who emerged in the 1990s as 
critics of Chinese neoliberalism, had now lost most of their critical edge, or more accurately, directed their 
critical fixations solely on Western hegemony. They voluntarily began to act as the consenters, 
interpreters, and propagators of China’s authoritarianism. A New Leftist said during interview, “When the 
West was falling into economic crisis, we reached our climax. This told me clearly that China has its own 
advantages. This highlighted a question I had asked before: why did China succeed? For 100 years we 
had studied why China failed and searched for all sorts of reasons: language, culture, national character, 
economy, science, and so on. All of a sudden we changed. At least a small portion of people like me 
began to ponder why China succeeded.” “Why are you [liberals] still calling for constitutionalism?” said 
him, “Rule by man has worked perfectly for China!” The same New Lefts who claimed that market-
oriented economy and Western-style democracy did not fit China were now saying that China’s state-
controlled economy and one-party rule were systematically superior. 
In 2004, American journalist Joshua Cooper Ramo published a pamphlet, The Beijing Consensus, 
which criticized the neoliberal Washington Consensus, and regarded the Beijing Consensus as a viable 
alternative. Ramo did not describe the policy details of the Beijing Consensus—he mainly praised Deng 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
implications by emphasizing that it is a dream of all Chinese people. See Lu Yao and Ge Jiangtao (2015). 
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Xiaoping’s pragmatic approach of “crossing the river by groping for stones” (mozhe shitou guohe) as 
more flexible than the rigidly defined Washington Consensus. In other words, the Beijing Consensus was 
a negatively and loosely defined concept (Ding Xueliang 2011:5). In addition, viewing China’s economic 
growth as a refutation of privatization and free trade, Ramo proposed the Beijing Consensus as an 
economic concept and did not address the political aspects of the communist regime. The slim pamphlet 
did not attract much attention from the international academic community, but was warmly received by the 
New Leftists in Beijing. While the New Leftists had questioned the Western-style market economy and 
liberal democracy as the desired models for China since the 1990s, they now felt that there was really no 
need to search for a model at all—the authoritarian rule practiced in Beijing now was exactly what they 
wanted. 
Recall that Jiang Qing, a New Confucian scholar, criticized Western-style democracy for solely 
building on the legitimacy of the human—popular sovereignty—while ignoring the legitimacy of heaven 
and the legitimacy of earth. In a review essay, Wang Shaoguang (2012c) insisted that Western liberal 
democracy did not even have the legitimacy of the human—let alone the other two types of legitimacy—
because numerous popular polls found that a large proportion of citizens in the West did not trust their 
governments. Wang (2012c:24) asked, “If a large number of citizens do not have much confidence in their 
governments, how much ‘legitimacy of popular will’ does such a political system have?” In line with his 
previous comments on democracy, Wang wrote that the problem of Western liberal democracy was its 
lack of real democracy. What about China? While bashing Western democracy, Jiang was not a fan of 
communism either, hence his premise (and conclusion) that today’s China faced a serious crisis in 
legitimacy. Jiang was wrong, wrote Wang (2012c:21–22), for “scholars familiar with this area have almost 
reached a consensus: the level of legitimacy of China’s political system is quite high.”125 Wang only briefly 
mentioned studies with contradictory conclusions, and attributed the small number of previous studies 
consistent with his conclusion on China’s legitimacy in academic journals to the bias of journal reviewers 
in the West.126 Why did the Communist Party enjoy such a high level of legitimacy? Wang coined a term 
“Chinese socialist democracy” (Zhonghua shehuizhuyi minzhu). As he saw it, “socialist” corresponded to 
                                                          
125 Wang cited studies by Bruce Gilley, Heike Holbig, as well as the volume How East Asians View Democracy (edited 
by Chu, Diamond, Nathan, and Shin, 2008). I believe that Wang’s interpretation of these studies is questionable. 
 
126 The only example Wang gave was an unpublished article by Shi Tianjian. 
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the legitimacy of heaven, for socialism provided a transcendent authority; “Chinese” represented the 
legitimacy of earth, for the communist rule descended from Chinese history and culture; and “democracy” 
represented the legitimacy of the human, for the Communist Party enjoyed a high level of popular support. 
In short, China’s current political system commanded legitimacy from all three sources, and there was a 
“real utopia” that Western progressive intellectuals, such as Eric Olin Wright, had been pursuing over the 
100-plus years. 
In his 2008 book, Four Lectures on Democracy, Wang took pain to argue for the inferiority of 
Western-style democracy. In the 2010s, he effectively became a spokesperson for a Chinese-style 
democracy. Wang (2014b) made a distinction between a representative democracy (daiyixing minzhu) 
and a representational democracy (daibiaoxing minzhu). Chinese people, Wang claimed, not only 
enjoyed democracy, but also enjoyed a better type of democracy—representational democracy. To be 
more specific, China’s representational democracy addressed four key questions: (1) represented who: 
the people, namely, the “laboring masses” and “all patriots who supported socialism and the unification of 
the country—the Chinese communist revolution for the first time in human history brought hundreds of 
millions of average people; (2) who represented: all who wielded political power, including both elected 
representatives and officials with real power; (3) represented what: “objective” needs across the entire 
society, such as employment, health care, and housing, rather than “arbitrary” or “ever-changing” needs 
that were only shared by the well-off upper- and middle-classes, such as tax-reduction, freedom of 
expression, and gay marriage; and (4) how to represent: the mass line as developed by Mao Zedong, 
which covered all people, instead of voters only as characterized by Western-style democracy. As Wang 
(2013b) wrote, the reason that representational democracy was superior to “hypocritical” representative 
democracy was that it addressed the essence, rather than form, of democracy, which was also why the 
communist rule was widely supported by the Chinese people. 
The CCP did not merely pride itself in the issues of legitimacy and democracy, Wang (2014a) 
maintained, but had also made strides in governance and social development. Wang made his name for 
warning China’s crisis of state capacity in the 1990s, but praised the party-state system for successfully 
solving the problem. Moreover, different from many people’s perception, China had already become a 
welfare state with the fruit of economic development shared by all citizens. In Wang’s view, these all 
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exhibited the advantages of China’s unique party-state system. In the social sphere, Wang criticized the 
concept of civil society as a “vulgar neoliberal myth” fabricated by Chinese liberals and Western hostile 
forces to attack Chinese government. As Wang (2013a) recommended, the Chinese people should 
pursue “people’s society” (renmin shehui)127—a political community constituted by the “laboring 
masses.”128 
Different from Wang Shaoguang, the Berkeley-trained political scientist Pan Wei (2010b) viewed 
China’s emergence as a “cultural renaissance”; and different from Ramo, Pan took a “wholesale” 
approach by affirming the entire economic, political, and social system in today’s China. In 2006, the 
Center for Chinese and Global Affairs at Peking University, directed by Pan, launched a large project on 
the China model. With the help of Wang, the Center sponsored a number of conferences, culminating in a 
large conference on Sixty Years of People’s Republic and the China model at the end of 2008. The 
anthology out of the conference was published in 2009, which signaled the birth of, in Pan’s (2010a:6) 
words, the China School—the study of China as the world’s only “civilization-state.” The foundation of the 
China model, Pan ([2009] 2010:25) explained, was the continuity of Chinese civilization, which was a 
product of “China’s 100 years of struggle, 3,000 years of dynasty, and 5,000 years of civilization, and also 
[included] the foreign civilizations that [had] been assimilated as an integral part of Chinese civilization.” 
Pan ([2009] 2010) divided the China model into three subsidiary models: state and non-state 
economies (guo min jingji), people-based politics (minben zhengzhi), and harmonious society (sheji tizhi). 
In terms of the economy, Chinese economy was characterized by the coexistence of the state and non-
state economies, and consisted of four pillars: state-controlled means of production—the land and other 
natural resources; state-owned financial institutions, large enterprises, and service institutions; a free 
labor market that was based on family business and community business; and free commodity and 
capital markets that were based on business and community business. In terms of politics, Chinese 
politics built on the democratic concept of people-orientation, a meritocratic official-promotion mechanism, 
an “advanced, selfless, and united ruling group,” and effective mechanisms of government division of 
labor, checks and balances, and error-correction. In terms of the society, Chinese society was organically 
                                                          
127 Hu Angang (2013), Wang’s close colleague, had a strikingly similar argument in the same year. 
 
128 Wang (2011b) also argued that Western concepts such as polity (or form of government), despotism, 
totalitarianism, and authoritarianism were all misleading ideological labels. 
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held up by four pillars: families as the basic units of society, community- and work unit- based social 
networks, overlapping and flexible social networks and administrative networks, and family ethics that 
penetrated social organizations. In Pan’s ([2009] 2012:22) view, when China succeeded, it was because 
of the above Chinese system; when China met with setbacks, it was because of its deviance from the 
system. While Pan (2010a:17) did not claim that the China model was superior to Western democracy, he 
refused to specify any drawback of the model either; indeed, many of the often-mentioned lurking perils, 
such as the lack of judicial independence and the lack of checks and balances, were elements of the 
successful China model. For Pan (2010a:6), the China model was so profound and worked so well that 
many Western observers’ attribution of China’s rise to “authoritarianism plus market” was nothing but a 
“cheap shot.” 
 
The Chongqing Model: The Brief Ascension of Maoism, 2008–2012 
 
After a brief Mao craze in the early 1990s, Mao Zedong was back in the news from 2008 to 2012. 
This time, the Maoist revival was far more than a collective nostalgia for the “red culture,” as it entered 
into the secret world of elite politics. As a revealing case, it also showed the profound level of mutual 
penetration between the intellectual field and the political field. 
In October 2007, Bo Xilai, the charismatic “princeling” was transferred from the post of Minister of 
Commerce to the head of the large western metropolis of Chongqing, one of the five national central 
cities. An ambitious and capable leader, Bo had been widely known as a candidate for China’s highest 
political position, along with Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang, since 2002. Therefore, the appointment in 
Chongqing was a relative setback in Bo’s political career. To take the final plunge in the battle for political 
power, Bo cast himself as Mao’s heir. Beginning in 2008, Bo launched a series of Mao-style political 
activities. For example, he required all city cadres, at every level, to visit the countryside and “eat, live, 
and labor with the peasant masses” for at least seven days, and 30 days for newly hired or promoted 
cadres, every year in order to nurture relationships with them and lift them out of poverty (Lynch 
2015:108–109). Government offices, factories, and universities across the city put up statues of Mao, 
which quickly spread elsewhere in the country (Lam 2015:67). 
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Economically, by actively seeking foreign investment, expanding SOEs, promoting aggressive 
household registration (hukou) system reform, implementing large-scale public works programs and 
subsidized housing projects for the poor, Bo was greeted with wide popular support. The most 
controversial aspects of Bo’s platform were the campaigns of “singing red songs” (changhong) and 
“striking the black mafia” (dahei). Culturally, Bo launched a massive “red culture” movement, demanding 
all city officials and ordinary residents to sing revolutionary songs in the name of “lifting their spirits,” and 
all local radio and TV stations to broadcast, even exclusively so, revolution-themed programs. Socially, 
Bo initiated a sweeping and often extrajudicial campaign against corruption and organized crime, which 
led to the arrest of more than 5,700 people, including lawyers and Bo’s political opponents, as well as 
forced labor of approximately 1,000 people, dozens of executions, the seizure of more than $11 billion in 
illicit funds from 2009 to 2011 (Richburg 2012; Spegele 2012), and significantly increased the security 
and police presence in the city. Despite its popular support, the anticrime campaign was criticized by 
many legal experts for the arbitrary detainments, hasty trials, alleged tortures, and aggressive 
confiscation of properties, as well as abuse of power and violation of the rule of law. 
Despite the social percussions, both Bo himself and the party leaders denied the existence of a 
model.129 In addition, the fact that Hu Jintao, China’s highest leader, did not even visit Chongqing once 
suggested a hidden tension between Bo and the power center.130 Moreover, Bo’s gestures in Chongqing 
appeared to be more of opportunistic, and therefore ritualistic, moves than wholehearted embrace of 
Maoism, for he did not resort to class struggles, and his previous policies in Liaoning Province were quite 
liberal and starkly different from those in Chongqing.131 However, many New Left intellectuals were 
enthralled by the Chongqing model, and perceived it as an once-in-a-lifetime opportunity to put their leftist 
ideology into practice and even transform their cultural capital into political capital.132 In early 2011, Su 
                                                          
129 See, for example, “Bo Xilai, women congmei tiguo ‘Chongqing moshi’” (Bo Xilai: We Have Never Talked about a 
Chongqing Model), retrieved May 1, 2016 (http://politics.people.com.cn/GB/16854690.html); “Zhang Dejiang: Wo 
renwei genben jiu bucunzai Chongqing moshi (Zhang Dejiang: I Don’t Think There is a Chongqing Model at All), 
retrieved May 1, 2016 (http://news.sohu.com/20121108/n357068476.shtml). 
 
130 Bo’s major backer in the power center was Zhou Yongkang, then China’s security chief and a member of the 
party’s Politburo Standing Committee, who later fell from grace after the conviction of a series of corruption charges. 
 
131 The facts that Bo had a secret villa in France and sent his two sons both to study in elite private schools in the 
United States and the United Kingdom cast further doubt on the sincerity of his Maoist gestures. 
 
132 I have not surveyed the reactions from scholars/intellectuals more closely associated with the political 
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Wei, Yang Fan, and Liu Shiwen published a book, straightforwardly titled Chongqing moshi (The 
Chongqing Model), in an attempt to provide a systematic and laudatory account of Bo’s initiatives. Wang 
Shaoguang (2011a, 2012a) summarized the Chongqing experience as “Chinese Socialism 3.0,” 
regarding Bo’s Chongqing as exemplifying Mao’s mass line and as a new stage in the CCP’s pursuit of a 
new developmental path different from free-market capitalism. Even after the Wang Lijun incident,133 
Wang Shaoguang (2012b) insisted that “there is no reason for him to change [his assessment of 
Chongqing].” With respect to Bo’s campaign of “striking the black mafia,” while acknowledging its 
drawbacks, Wang argued for its continuation because of its popular support. Wen Tiejun, then dean of 
the School of Agricultural Economics and Rural Development at the Renmin University of China, was a 
core member of a writing team for a laudatory book, Chongqing xinshi (New Developments in 
Chongqing).134 He passionately endorsed Bo’s Chongqing initiatives as “a historic leap from the ‘old 
governance of GDP’ to the ‘new governance of peoplehood,’… and pioneering explorations that are full of 
wisdom … and provide new light, new imagination, and new thinking for human civilization of the new 
century” (Hu Shuntao 2011). 
The most systematic interpretation of the Chongqing model came from Cui Zhiyuan, who even 
took a leave of absence from Tsinghua University to serve as Assistant Direct of the State 
Asset Management Committee of the Chongqing government, at the invitation of Bo and Chongqing 
mayor Huang Qifan, from 2010 to 2011. As a city official, Cui’s job was to “publish articles about 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
establishment, but should note that they nearly universally endorsed the Chongqing model. For example, in June 
2011, Chen Kuiyuan, then Vice Chairperson of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference and President 
of CASS, along with CASS’s Executive Vice President Wang Weiguang, led more than 40 senior scholars from CASS 
and elite universities to attend a conference in Chongqing, in celebration of its achievements. Apart from the book by 
the writing team of the People’s University of China, Li Shenming, Vice President of CASS, led a CASS team to 
publish a book in 2011 that praised Bo’s Chongqing. The party secretary and president of Peking University also 
brought their team to Chongqing to establish an official partnership with the Chongqing government. 
 
133 In February 2012,after falling out with Bo and feeling imminent threat, Wang Lijun, Vice Mayor of Chongqing and 
former police chief of the city, abruptly sought asylum at the United States Consulate and revealed Bo’s secrets, 
including a murder case and its cover-up. Wang was also rumored to have revealed Bo’s secret plan to replace Xi to 
become China’s top leader. In an attempt to cover it up, the Chongqing government announced that Wang was 
receiving “extended period of therapeutic rest” and attempted to arrest him from the consulate. Wang was taken by 
the agents of the Ministry of State Security the next day and later dismissed, convicted, and charged. This directly led 
to the downfall of Bo and Zhou. 
 
134 The writing team was led by Ji Baocheng, then President of the Renmin University of China who was later 
investigated and suspended from the CCP for two years as a result of a corruption probe. It was widely rumored that 
the book was sponsored by the Chongqing government with a funding of RMB 40 million, although I am unable to find 
any official confirmation. However, Jiedu Chongqing (Interpreting Chongqing), the other relevant book written by the 
team that was set to be published in 2012, never saw its light of the day after Bo’s downfall.  
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Chongqing’s experience” to “communicate both internally to government officials, and to the general 
press” (cited in Callahan 2013:85). Cui was less interested in grandeur boasts, but concentrated on 
Chongqing’s specific economic and social policies. In his view, Chongqing’s land exchange market and 
the relevant household registration reform embodied nineteenth-century economist Henry George’s idea 
of the “single tax” on land; Chongqing’s expansion of SOEs exemplified economist James Meade’s ideal 
of liberal socialism—the simultaneous development of public ownership and private business; and Bo’s 
mass line populist policy could be interpreted in light of communist thinker Antonio Gramsci’s notion of 
cultural hegemony. In short, the Chongqing model showed the “future path” for the Communist Party (Cui 
2011). The celebration of the Chongqing model from the New Left was such a notable intellectual 
phenomenon that a term “scholars who have gone off to Chongqing” (benxiang Chongqing de 
xuezhemen) was widely circulated in the intellectual circles in 2012 (Rong Jian 2012). 
The loudest supporters of the Chongqing model, however, were not the theoretically 
sophisticated New Leftists, but rather the Maoists. Sima Nan and Kong Qingdong were the most well-
known supporters of, and even surrogates for, Bo and the Chongqing model on the Internet. After Bo’s 
ouster, they still defended Bo, and even openly criticized Wen Jiabao, then China’s Premier and a major 
force behind Bo’s downfall, on the microblog. In 2012, Kong acknowledged on the microblog that he 
received more than RMB 1 million from the Chongqing government for the task of “promoting the 
Chongqing model,” and had returned the money after an investigation by state security agencies.135 Sima 
Nan was also rumored to have worked on the instructions of Bo and Wang Lijun with material and political 
returns. Despite Sima’s denial, his close personal connections with Wang was well-documented. For 
some politicians and intellectuals, the Maoist might have been an opportunistic move; for the large 
number of average Mao followers, however, the passion was real, and it was largely Bo’s Maoist agenda 
that brought Mao back into the central stage of China’s political and social life from 2008 to 2012. During 
this period, revolutionary songs and TV programs became a daily cultural routine, and the scene of 
people voluntarily singing “red songs” in parks and other public spaces was seen in every major city. 
Mao’s statues were feverishly put up in many places. The Maoist websites, such as the Utopia and the 
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April Youth136, received unpreceded attention. Popular Maoist gatherings were often reported. There were 
even reports on the cure of infertility and the endurance of cancer by singing “red songs” in state-
sponsored media,137 which vividly conjured up the Mao era. Moreover, many liberals were vehemently 
attacked for perceived anti-Mao remarks. In 2011, Mao Yushi published an essay on Mao Zedong on his 
blog, in which he criticized Mao for launching the Cultural Revolution and seizing power through class 
struggles. “Restore Mao Zedong as human being,” Mao made a quite modest call. Unexpectedly, led by 
the Utopia, the Maoists launched a wave of fierce verbal attacks on Mao Yushi, calling him a “traitor” 
(hanjian) and “running dog” (zougou, or lackey) of the Americans, and castigating him for “viciously 
attacking Mao Zedong, distorting the history of the CCP, intentionally stirring things up and creating 
disturbances.”138 Mao Yushi also received a massive amount of threatening letters and emails. Many 
Maoists even surrounded Mao’s apartment to protest. What is more, the Maoists, including Mao’s 
daughter-in-law, organized a nationwide “Public Prosecution again Mao Yushi” (Quanmin gongsu Mao 
Yushi) campaign.139 All of a sudden, the whole country appeared to be under the risk of a Maoist 
theocracy. 
Bo’s dramatic fall in March 2012 abruptly ended the Maoist crusade in Chongqing. The specter of 
Maoism, however, has continued to haunt the land of China. As a result of the CCP’s reluctance to 
confront Mao’s revolutionary legacy, Maoism has been an abiding element in China’s political and 
intellectual life. “High Maoism” is long gone, but its “aura … has continued to suffuse many aspects of 
thought, expression, and behaviour in contemporary China” (Barmé 2012:29).140 As long as the 
Communist Party continues its ritualistic homage to Mao while forbidding any substantial public 
discussion, Maoism will always be a political time bomb for the party and the nation, and the battle over 
                                                          
136 www.M4.cn. 
 
137 “Chongqing aizheng wanqi huanzhe kao chang hongge tingguo hualiao” (Late-stage Cancer Patient Endures 
Chemotherapy by Singing Red Songs), June 23, 2011, retrieved May 3, 2016 
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139 See, for example: http://www.szhgh.com/s/8/ (retrieved May 3, 2016). 
 
140 On the long-lasting legacy of Mao, see also Barmé (1996), despite its relatively early publication date. 
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Maoism will always be a central theme of China’s ideological and intellectual contestation. Indeed, as the 
next section shows, in just a matter of months, the new national leadership quietly brought Mao back its 
platform. More important, while political campaigns may come in circles, Mao’s legacy has been so 
deeply ingrained in the mentality of both average people and elite intellectuals, and so often infused with 
nationalist fervor, that it may eventually get out of control and bite back the party. I should add that 
despite justifiable criticisms, some New Left thinkers, such as Wang Hui and Cui Zhiyuan, have 
respectfully attempted to salvage Maoism from bombastic ideological rhetoric, but as I will discuss in 
Chapter 4, the political environment made their work rarely impartially evaluated because politics and 
thought have been so tightly and intricately interwoven that it is nearly impossible to distill “authentic 
beliefs” and “serious thoughts” from intellectual tactics and political motivations. 
 
The Chinese Dream: China under Xi Jinping 
 
Despite all the ideological turbulences and setbacks, in the Hu Jintao era from 2002 to 2012, or at 
least from 2002 to 2008, China was nevertheless on a path of political reform, no matter how moderate it 
was. The ideological control was in general tighter in the Hu era than in the Jiang Zemin era, and the 
regime harshly suppressed the liberal intellectuals from 2009 to 2012, but neither Hu nor Premier Wen 
endorsed the Maoist-flavored China model and Chongqing model. In terms of domestic policy, Hu 
appeared to be pragmatic. Guided by the vision of a “harmonious society,” Hu did not seek, and even 
appeared to be averse to, mass campaigns. In terms of foreign policy, the regime took a relatively soft 
approach and was careful not to directly confront other nations. China’s political trajectory, however, 
changed dramatically under its new leader, Xi Jinping. Immediately before and after Xi’s rule, the liberal 
intellectuals had high hopes. Because Xi’s father, a Communist veteran, was perceived to be a moderate 
and reasonable political leader who was rumored to be opposed to the purge of the reformist leader Hu 
Yaobang in 1987 and the crackdown on student demonstrators in 1989, and because Xi himself (and his 
father) was a victim of Mao’s political purge and mass campaigns, including the Cultural Revolution, many 
intellectuals thought that Xi had no taste for a totalitarian or authoritarian rule, and therefore expected him 
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to bring positive changes to China’s political course—some even hoped that he would initiate a full-scale 
political reform, like Mikhail Gorbachev or the Taiwanese leader Chiang Ching-kuo did. 
As of this writing, most liberal intellectuals have been utterly disappointed. They have come to 
realize that they were too hasty to celebrate the fall of Bo Xilai and his “red revival,” as many of Xi’s 
policies may be seen as nothing but repackaging of the Chongqing model. A liberal intellectual said in a 
private conversation, “We thought we were going to get a Chiang Ching-kuo. It turns out that we’ve got a 
Khomeini.” The appropriateness of the comparison aside, it vividly conveys the frustration of many 
intellectuals.141 As Nathan (2016) summarized, Xi “has reinstated many of the most dangerous features of 
Mao’s rule: personal dictatorship, enforced ideological conformity, and arbitrary persecution.” It is beyond 
the scope of this section to go into details of Xi’s rule. It is also difficult to know for sure what has really 
been going on in Zhongnanhai, the center of China’s political power. Therefore, I only make two general 
statements here. First, as a result of the CCP leaders’ reluctance to change the fundamental structure of 
Chinese economy and tendency to defer tough choices, which certainly had much to do with political 
considerations, the stocks for sustained high economic growth have been exhausted and diminishing 
returns began to set in. From 2008 to 2009, amid the global financial crisis, China unveiled an economic 
stimulus program aimed at increasing its domestic demand. While it prevented Chinese economy from 
collapsing, the program led to massive debts on the part of local governments and SOEs,142 as well as 
the looming problem of bad loans on the part of state-owned banks.143 China’s GDP grew 6.9 percent in 
2015, the lowest growth rate in 25 years (Magnier 2016). The growth rate was still impressive compared 
with other countries, but the era of sustained double-digit growth is clearly gone. As the economy slows 
down, the CCP is likely to increasingly build its legitimacy on state nationalism,144 and as aforementioned, 
Confucianism. This means that ideological control will be tighter, as has already been shown, and that Xi 
will be more sensitive and intolerant to ideological challenges than his predecessors. Second, different 
from his predecessors, Jiang and Hu, Xi appears to be a true “believer.” Unlike Jiang and Hu, who mainly 
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ruled as technocrats, Xi is a “princeling,” the son of a powerful party elder. Xi has consistently displayed a 
combined sense of emperor and savior. On the one hand, he feels like he is a king who just inherited an 
empire from the revolutionary founders of the empire—this is his land and he is in control. On the other 
hand, he has an acute sense of crisis. Xi has more than once conveyed a message that the CCP is facing 
an imminent and existential threat from those wanting to end the one-party rule, and as the “chosen one,” 
he must step up and save the party and the communist empire. Li Weidong, a liberal commentator, vividly 
describe the mentality of the princelings in power: “[The] children of the founding elite see themselves as 
the inheritors of an ‘all-under-heaven,’ a vast world that their fathers conquered under Mao’s leadership. 
Their parents came from poor rural villages and rose to rule an empire. The second generation is 
privileged to live in a country that has ‘stood up’ and is globally respected and feared. They do not 
propose to be the generation that “loses the empire.” (cited in Nathan 2016)145 
In a leaked internal speech delivered at the end of 2012, Xi mourned the fall of the Soviet Union, 
attributing its disintegration to the loss of communist convictions. “Finally, all it took was one quiet word 
from Gorbachev to declare the dissolution of the Soviet Communist Party, and a great party was gone,” Xi 
said. “In the end nobody was a real man, nobody came out to resist.” (cited in Buckley 2013) How sincere 
Xi’s apparent reverence for Mao is still a myth—and I doubt it as it has been more rhetorical than action-
oriented—but there seems little doubt by now that Xi is determined to save China’s one-party rule and 
views liberalism as an ideological enemy. On a more substantial note, in terms of domestic policy, Xi 
launched an unprecedented anti-corruption campaign. He has not only expelled the powerful former 
security chief from the party with a sentence of life imprisonment, which broke the unwritten rule of 
criminal immunity for Politburo Standing Committee, but also arrested the top aide to former president Hu, 
and reshuffled the military by prosecuting the two former vice chairmen of the Central Military 
Commission as well as a number of high-ranking generals. The real intention of the anti-corruption 
campaign is still unclear, but Xi wasted no change and consolidated his power by replacing the purged 
officials with those in his inner circle. He has created and chaired a series of supra-ministerial steering 
committees (lingdao xiaozu) to bypass existing institutional structures, thus seizing much administrative 
power that traditionally belonging to the premier and his State Council. In terms of foreign policy, Xi has 
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replaced the traditional strategy of “maintaining a low profile and hiding brightness” (taoguang yanghui) 
that was put forward by Deng Xiaoping and adhered for more than two decades with the new strategic 
direction of “striving for achievement” (fenfa youwei). More concretely, he has taken a much more 
assertive and aggressive stance than his predecessors, which is particularly reflected by China’s quickly 
declining relationship with Japan, its military expansion in the South China Sea, its defiance of America, 
and its high-profile diplomatic initiatives with Asian neighbors. Xi appears to command political power 
unseen since Deng Xiaoping. 
While Xi has not explicitly used the term “China model,” he has vowed to lead China along the 
“Chinese Way” (Zhongguo daolu), which he defined as “socialism with Chinese characteristics” (Xi 
Jinping 2013b). It appears that the party is ready to export the Chinese Way to the world as “China’s 
success represents the success of a new set of values” and “the Chinese Way provides a new model to 
be learned for the world” (Han Qingxiang and Chen Shuguang 2016). In November 2012, shortly after 
assuming office, Xi first referred to the phrase “Chinese dream,” indicating that “the great rejuvenation of 
the Chinese nation” is “the greatest dream of the Chinese nation.”146 Since then, the “Chinese dream” has 
become the quasi-official ideology of the party leadership. While Xi has juxtaposed the neologism with the 
“American dream,”147 his vision is exclusively about the reemergence of China as a super power, and 
there is no place for individual liberty at all. 
Xi’s agenda of national rejuvenation is certainly shared by the statist vision of Chinese 
intellectuals on the left, and many have since come out to offer their interpretations of the elusive 
“Chinese dream.” Li Xiguang, professor of journalism at Tsinghua University, edited a book, Soft Power 
and Chinese Dream, in 2011. After Xi’s 2012 speech, Li substantially updated the book in 2013 by adding 
chapters from New Left thinkers, such as Wang Shaoguang, Pan Wei, Wang Hui, and Zhang Weiwei. 
The new edition eliminated the commendatory references to Bo and his Chongqing model, and turned to 
interpreting Xi’s “Chinese dream” from different angels. For example, Li Xiguang wrote that the essence 
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of the Chinese dream was shared prosperity, which gave the party new legitimacy, and endorsed it as a 
key strategy in building up China’s soft power. Wang Shaoguang appropriated Karl Polanyi’s argument 
for the protection of society to interpret the Chinese dream, praising the new government’s policies as 
efforts to combat neoliberalism. Wang Hui reiterated that China should choose its own path to modernity 
that was different from the combination of free market and liberal democracy, and emphasized that Mao’s 
legacy should not be abandoned. Zhang Weiwei, a political scientist with a PhD from the University of 
Geneva in Switzerland and chair professor of political science at Fudan University, has emerged as one 
of the most vocal interpreters of the Chinese dream. From 2011 to 2014, Zhang published a “China 
trilogy”: Zhongguo zhenhan (The China Wave), Zhongguo chudong (The China Ripple), and Zhongguo 
chaoyue (The China Horizon). Largely a consequence of their lavishly cheerful descriptions of the party 
and fairly comprehensive elaborations of the China model, these books have been on the required 
reading lists of many party and administrative organs and therefore best-sellers—the first two volumes 
have sole more than two million copies in total (Chen Yiming and Yue Mengrong 2014). There have even 
been reports that Xi recommended The China Wave to Robert Zoellick, former president of the World 
Bank (Tatlow 2015). In Zhang’s view, China did not need to learn from the United States any longer 
(Zhang Weiwei and Ma Ya 2013), for the power of capital has overtaken social power and political power, 
whereas “China’s political system makes sure that political, social, and capital power reaches an 
equilibrium that benefits most people” (Chen Yiming and Yue Mengrong 2014). “The Chinese dream is 
more wonderful than the American dream,” asserted Zhang (2014). In 2013, Fudan University, one of 
China’s top universities, established the Center for China Development Model Research, which two years 
later became one of the 25 elite think tanks to be cultivated by the government, with Zhang as its 
founding director. The attendees of the opening ceremony included Wang Shaoguang, Pan Wei, Fang 
Ning, Wang Wen, and Su Changhe, all associated with the New Left. 
 
The Crackdown on Liberals: 2009 to the Present 
 
Behind the façade of a harmonious society, the CCP has been suppressing liberal voices quite 
ruthlessly since early 2009. It should be noted that the large-scale crackdown began during Hu’s reign, 
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but became more intensified, open, and regular after Xi took over. It is difficult to fathom the rationale or 
strategy behind the apparently sudden reverse course on the part of the CCP, and I limit myself to factual 
presentations in this section.148 
The crackdown indeed began at the end of 2008 with the release of Charter 08. Two days before 
its official release, the two main drafters, Liu Xiaobo and Zhang Zuhua, were detained. After a year’s 
detainment, in December 2009, Liu was charged and convicted of “inciting subversion of state power,” 
and was sentenced to 11 years in prison. Liu’s wife has been under secret house arrest since Liu won the 
Nobel Peace Prize in 2010. Zhang has been under tight surveillance and cut off from the outside world. 
Most of the 303 original signatories have been summoned, interrogated, or harassed by police. Domestic 
media has remained silenced on the Charter to this day. 
This wave of crackdown, however, remained largely measured without escalation, despite some 
notable hostile actions from the state, such as the forced closure of the Open Constitution Initiative and 
the detainment of Xu Zhiyong in 2009. The reverse course began in late 2010 and early 2011, with Liu’s 
Nobel award and the Jasmine Revolution. Immediately after the Norwegian Nobel Committee announced 
Liu’s award on October 8, 2010, many liberal intellectuals with close association with Liu were detained 
by the police, including the Tiananmen Mother Ding Zilin and her husband, Jiang Qisheng, Xu Youyu, Cui 
Weiping, Wen Kejian, Yu Jie, Teng Biao, Xu Zhiyong, Zhang Dajun, and Hua Ze. Many more were 
harassed by police and forbidden to attend relevant activities. Yu Jie, Fan Yafeng, and Liu Suli were 
physically assaulted by police. A large number of intellectuals were taken away to “forced travel” for 
weeks when the award ceremony was approaching in December. More than 20 intellectuals, even 
including their spouses and children, and approximately 200 Christians, experienced outbound travel 
restrictions, for the fear that they would attend the ceremony in Norway.149 If the previous repression on 
liberal intellectuals were sporadic and reactive, it became an active and large-scale crackdown on the 
entire liberal intelligentsia. More profoundly, as an unintended consequence, it radicalized the liberal 
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intellectuals as a group by completely pushing them to the side of enemy. As He Guanghu, an authority 
on religious studies at the Renmin University of China, noted during his interview, the large-scale 
crackdown marked the “formal and public break between the intelligentsia and the government.” 
The situation further worsened in early 2011. Inspired by the Tunisian Revolution of 2010, some 
pro-democracy activists, who have remained anonymous to this day, called for regular nationwide public 
assemblies and protests. On February 20, protests broke out in Beijing and some other large cities. The 
protests in Beijing and Shanghai drew large crowds, but most were merely curious bystanders with only a 
handful of active participants (FlorCruz 2011). Because of heavy police surveillance and presence, the 
subsequent calls for action all went unanswered. In short, the so-called Chinese Jasmine Revolution was 
really “much ado about nothing.” The Communist Party, however, reacted rather harshly. At least 54 
people were arrested or detained in less than two months (Wong 2011), including prominent figures such 
as Ai Weiwei, Teng Biao, Ran Yunfei, Feng Zhenghu, and Jiang Tianyong. Hundreds of people were 
summoned by police or subject to reinforced supervision or house arrest. The persecution of house 
churches considerably intensified. For example, the state stepped up its already harsh campaign against 
the well-respected Shouwang Church, which enjoyed a large following from intellectuals and university 
students. To prevent its members from attending the outdoor Easter service,150 the authorities detained 
hundreds of congregants in their homes and took dozens into custody (Jacobs 2011a). The police also 
placed the church leaders under house arrest and blocked he church’s website (Davison 2011; Jacobs 
2011b), and forced hundreds of congregants to sign a disavowal of their spiritual guide (Gauthier 2011). 
More important, the state stepped up its already heavy Internet censorship and surveillance. After the 
crackdown, some prominent liberal intellectuals, such as Yu Jie, Zhang Boshu, Liao Yiwu, and Teng Biao, 
chose to move abroad out of the concern of personal safety.151 Indeed, there has been a significant 
increase in the number of intellectuals seeking refuge in the United States since 2012 (Phillips and 
Pilkington 2016). 
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As harsh and sweeping as the crackdown under Hu was, it was not carried out as a national 
campaign. Since Xi’s succession to China’s leadership at the 18th Congress in November 2012, however, 
the campaign against liberalism, or the civil society more generally, was elevated to the level of national 
policies. To begin with, the number and range of activists detained is likely unprecedented. (1) 
Crackdown on the New Citizenship Movement: The New Citizens Movement, a branch of the broader 
rights defense movement, has launched several high-profile campaigns, such equal rights for education 
and wealth disclosure of government officials. Although it has been careful to focus on specific policy 
issues rather than directly challenging the Communist rule, it alarmed the authorities because of its 
mobilizing capacity. In August 2013, Xu Zhiyong, the major leader of the New Citizens’ Movement, was 
formally arrested after more than three months’ house arrest. Five months later, he was sentenced to four 
years in prison for “gathering crowds to disrupt public order.” Wang Gongquan, a well-known 
businessperson and financial supporter of the movement, was detained in September and formally 
arrested in October. (2) Crackdown on human rights lawyers. From July 2015 to the beginning of 2016, 
the government detained at least 248 rights defense lawyers and legal-aid activists, including respected 
names such as Wang Yu, Wang Quanzhang, and Zhou Shifeng, as well as a Swedish legal-aid activist, 
and formally charged nine of them, mostly with the serious crime of “subverting the state order” (Buckley 
2015b; Ford 2016). This has been the most sweeping campaign against human rights lawyers in Chinese 
history. (3) Crackdown on feminist activists. In 2015, on the eve of International Women’s Day of March 8, 
the authorities detained five feminist activists for their anti-sexual harassment activities, in the name of 
“picking quarrels and creating a disturbance,” in Beijing and Guangzhou (Branigan 2015). In January 
2016, the government forced the Beijing Zhongze Women’s Legal Counselling and Service Center, a 
flagship legal service for women and the first NGO specializing in women’s legal aid, to shut down after 
more than 20 years of operation (Tatlow 2016). (4) Crackdown on labor activists. In December 2015, the 
authorities detained seven labor activists in Guangdong, accusing them of using “advocacy as a cover to 
disturb public order and violate workers’ rights” (Wong 2015). The 71-year-old mother of one of the 
detained activists sued several state media for defamation of her son, but had to drop her lawsuit 
because of intense pressure from the authorities (Lau 2016). (5) Crackdown on house churches. After Xi 
came to power, the eastern province of Zhejiang has mounted a campaign of systematically demolishing 
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Christian churches. From 2014 to 2015, in merely two years, more than 1,500 churches were torn 
down,152 and as many as 2,000 crosses were forcibly removed, or even burnt down in the name of 
removing “illegal structures.”153 There have been reports of church leaders and members physically 
assaulted, killed, or even buried alive (Guyjoco 2016).154 A number of church leaders have been detained; 
some have been convicted of financial crimes and “illegally gathering people to disturb social order”—one 
pastor was sentenced to 14 years in prison as a consequence.155 (6) Crackdown on NGOs. IN merely 
three years, the operational space for NGOs has been much reduced. Aside from the aforementioned 
labor and feminist NGOs, the state has clamped down a number of other NGOs. For example, in July 
2013, the Beijing municipal government shut down the Transition Institute, after many raids, and detained 
many of its leaders and staff members, including Guo Yushan, its president. In 2014, the authorities took 
aim at the China Rural Libraries. While the government began to close down its branch libraries in as 
early as 2011, it intensified its crackdown in 2014 by ordering the closure of its libraries and detainment of 
its staff members in rapid succession. Following the mounting political pressure, the China Rural Libraries 
decided to disband in September. In April 2016, as a major step in Xi’s war on civil society, the NPR 
passed a new law that gave security forces control over foreign NGOs operating in China. The law 
stipulated that all NGOs must register with public security officials, and criminal measures would be taken 
against any individual or group engaging in activities deemed detrimental to “China’s national interests” or 
“ethnic unity” (Phillips 2016).In merely three years, China’s civil society changed from burgeoning to 
dwindling. 
Even more detrimental to the fate of liberalism, and political liberation in general, has been the 
campaign-style tightening of ideological control. In the spring of 2013, the CCP circulated a confidential 
internal document, which has come to be known as Document No. 9, to all party cadres all the way down 
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to the county level. Although the contents of the document have never been officially released and the 
party has never officially acknowledged or denied the existence of such a document, quite a few local 
official websites and newspapers reported the collective study of this document.156 My private 
conversations with some party cadres confirm the existence of such a document. In addition, the entire 
document was leaked on the Internet in August 2013. Moreover, the liberal journalist Gao Yu was 
arrested in 2014, and was convicted of leaking state secrets and sentenced to seven years in prison in 
2015, which were believed to the document (Buckley 2015c). This can serve as an indirect proof of the 
document. The document warned that the party would lose power if it could not eliminate seven 
ideological trends: (1) promoting Western constitutional democracy, which was “an attempt to undermine 
the current leadership and the socialism with Chinese characteristics system of governance”; 
(2)promoting “universal values,” which was an attempt to “weaken the theoretical foundations of the 
Party’s leadership”; (3) promoting civil society, which was an attempt to “dismantle the ruling party’s social 
foundation”; (4) promoting neoliberalism, which was an attempt to “change China’s Basic Economic 
System”; (5) promoting the West’s idea of journalism, which was an attempt to “challenge China’s 
principle that the media and publishing system should be subject to Party discipline”; (6) promoting 
historical nihilism, which was an attempt to “undermine the history of the CCP and of New China”; and (7) 
questioning Reform and Opening and the socialist nature of socialism with Chinese characteristics. These 
views, the document asserted, “exist in great numbers in overseas media and reactionary publications. 
They penetrate China through the Internet and underground channels and they are disseminated on 
domestic Internet forums, blogs, and microblogs. They also appear in public lectures, seminars, university 
classrooms, class discussion forums, civilian study groups, and individual publications.” To combat these 
trends, the document ordered all party cadres to “pay close attention to work in the ideological sphere” by 
strengthening party “leadership in the ideological sphere,” guiding “our party member and leaders to 
distinguish between true and false theories,” unwaveringly adhering “to the principle of the Party’s control 
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of media,” and “conscientiously [strengthening] management of the ideological battlefield.”157 This has 
been the most systematic and concrete crackdown on liberalism in the form of official policy in post-Mao 
China, and the document foreshadowed the subsequent waves of crackdowns on various liberal 
intellectuals. 
Following Document No. 9, university campuses became the major ideological battleground. In 
May 2013, the CCP’s Organization Department and Publicity Department, along with the Ministry of 
Education, issued a joint document, urging party organs of all universities nationwide to “enhance 
ideological and political training for young teachers”158 and set up a veto system on the basis of ideology 
in the evaluation of young faculty members.159 In September 2013, Yuan Guiren, Minister of Education 
who called for educational reform through decentralization not long ago, indicated that students, from 
elementary school students to graduate students, were major objects of ideological work, and his mission 
was to “cultivate hundreds of millions of teenagers as committed heirs of Marxist ideology, and bring the 
theory of socialism with Chinese characteristics and the Chinese Dream to textbooks, classrooms, and 
brains.” Yuan also vowed to step up Internet surveillance on college students, and “take a total control of 
public opinion on the Internet.”160 In January 2015, the General Office of the CCP’s Central Committee 
and the State Council issued a joint directive, directing all universities to intensify their propaganda work. 
The document identified the mission of the university as “the frontier of ideological battle with the tasks of 
studying and promoting Marxism, cultivating and advancing core socialist values, and provide talents and 
intellectual support for the Chinese Dream of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.” It required all 
universities to initiate a round of ideological education focusing on socialism with Chinese characteristics 
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160 “Jiaoyu buzhang: Yishixingtai jiaoyu yao jin yiwan xuesheng tounao” (Minister of Education: Ideological Education 
must Target the Brains of Hundreds of Millions of Students). South China Morning Post, September 16, 2013. 




and the Chinese Dream, step up positive propaganda on the Internet, and enforce ideological loyalty as a 
deciding factor in faculty hiring and promotion.161 Echoing the directive from the power center, Yuan 
required all universities to “never allow statements that attack and slander party leaders and malign 
socialism to be heard in classrooms,” and “never allow teachers to grumble and vent in the classroom, 
passing on their unhealthy emotions to students.” “Strengthen management of the use of original Western 
teaching materials,” Yuan said at a meeting with presidents of some of China’s top universities. “By no 
means allow teaching materials that disseminate Western values in our classrooms.” (Buckley 2015a) 
This wave of ideological campaign, which is still ongoing, is an effort to uproot liberal values from their 
sources. In 2013, at least two outspoken liberal professors, Xia Yeliang and Zhang Xuezhong, were 
dismissed from their posts. In 2015, several well-known liberal professors, including He Weifang, Zhang 
Qianfan, Zhang Ming, and Sun Liping, were called out by name and censured in official media (Li Jiming 
2015; Xu Lan 2015). In 2016, the ideological grip was extended across the board. In January, the Ministry 
of Education ordered schools of all levels to conduct “patriotic education” by means of online media, such 
as Weibo and WeChat, and integrate patriotism into textbooks and exams of schools of all levels.162 
Finally, Xi has ushered in the most rigorous system of censorship the press since the mid-1990s. 
(1) The overall space for liberal intellectuals has been greatly reduced. Since Xi came to power, the blogs 
and Weibo accounts of numerous outspoken liberal intellectuals have been shut down. In August 2013, in 
a mysterious action, the authorities arrest Charles Xue, a Chinese-American businessperson known for 
his outspoken criticisms of the government and 12 million Weibo followers, for alleged prostitute soliciting. 
Eight months later, however, Xue appeared on CCTV with a lengthy confession, renouncing his previous 
Weibo posts and endorsing the government’s control of the Internet. In September 2013, the CCTV 
conducted an unscheduled on-camera interview with Pan Shiyi, Xue’s close friend and another business 
magnate and online opinion leader, who had no choice but to say in front of camera that influential Weibo 
users should be “more disciplined.” These two events were only the beginning of a series actions aimed 
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at intimidating and punishing outspoken online opinion leaders. The latest case was the Ren Zhiqiang 
incident. A retired real estate tycoon, Ren is known for his outspoken criticisms of the CCP on Weibo. In 
February 2016, after some journalists displayed a banner—“CCTV's surname is the Party. We are 
absolutely loyal. Please inspect us.”—when Xi made an inspection tour of the CCTV, Ren posted several 
messages on Weibo, criticizing the media’s blind loyalty to the party. Three days later, Ren became the 
subject of a wave of harsh denunciation from official media, and his Weibo account and other social 
media accounts were all shut down. In May, Ren was placed one-year probation within party.163 (2) The 
party has tightened its control over the media. Since the beginning of 2016, the party has asserted itself 
more aggressively in the already tightly-regulated media. In his February inspection tours to three state 
media outlets in Beijing, Xi required that journalism must serve and reflect absolute loyalty to the party 
(Wong 2016). In March, three articles on the freedom of press were deleted from Caixin.com, China’s 
premier business news organization, in a row by the Cyberspace Administration of China. In a very rare 
move, the website posted two articles, on its Chinese and English-language websites respectively, 
reporting this experience, but these two articles were quickly deleted as well (Forsythe 2016). In the same 
month, an employee of the Xinhua News Agency, China’s official press agency, posted an open letter on 
online, accusing the Internet regulators of employing “tactics reminiscent of Maoist times to silence and 
smear critics” (Buckley 2016). In April, the Economist and Time joined the long list of foreign news 
websites blocked in China, apparently as a result of their recent cover articles critical of Xi (Feng 2016). (3) 
Besides the law on foreign NGOs, in 2015, China passed two new laws—the national security law and 
the counter-terrorism law. The new laws are concerning because of their nearly all-encompassing 
definitions of national security and terrorism. For example, the term “terrorism” is defined as “any 
proposition or activity—that, by means of violence, sabotage or threat, generates social panic, 
undermines public security, infringes on personal and property rights, and menaces government organs 
and international organizations—with the aim to realize certain political and ideological purposes.” 164Not 
only can the laws be easily used against dissidents, pro-democracy activists, and ethnic minorities, but 
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also the flow of information—and even opinions—on the Internet could be construed as undermining state 
security. Therefore, these laws effectively curb the freedom of press. (4) The publishing industry has been 
the subject of increasing censorship. Based on my private conversations with many publishers and 
editors in China, it is almost a consensus that the publishing industry is facing the greatest censorship. 
More than one publisher has told me that he dared not publish books that would have been their normal 
business in the eras of Jiang and Hu. The number of books forced to withdraw from the market after 
release has never been greater. Even more disturbing is the prevalent phenomenon of self-censorship. 
One the one hand, what counts as permissible has never been clearly defined; on the other hand, the 
punishment is often harsh—the dismissal of the publishers and editors has been a common practice. As a 
consequence, most publishers are unwilling to take the risk to “test the water.” A publisher told me that 
she was not going to publish any translated books in the areas of religion and politics, even if the book did 
not address China at all, for “it is so easy for such a book to be seen as sensitive.” In addition, the party 
effort to suppress the freedom of press appears to have reached outside of the mainland. In a serious 
mysterious cases, a number of Hong Kong publishers and booksellers known for publishing and selling 
“forbidden books” went missing in Hong Kong—and in one case in Thailand—only to be found in jails in 
China later. This has greatly intimidated publishers and booksellers in Hong Kong, who are often the last 
hope for many Chinese writers to publish their works, and many have decided to give up publishing or 
selling political books (Jenkins 2016). 
So far, I have done my best to present facts. What is really on Xi’s mind? That is a question that 
everybody concerning about China’s fate wants to know. I do not think that anyone other than Xi himself 
can give a definitive answer. I should add that while there is an unprecedented sense of disillusion among 
the liberal intellectuals, some liberals—and they definitely belong to the minority—still think highly of Xi. 
Many of those intellectuals are associated with new authoritarianism. They emphasize that there is still a 
strong conservative faction within the party—many point to the former president, Jiang, and his allies in 
the CCP’s Central Politburo—hence the need for Xi to consolidate his power first before liberalizing China. 
They also argue that all the harsh crackdowns might have been directed by the conservative faction 
against Xi’s will. These speculations cannot be dismissed—reformist leaders Hu Yaobang and Zhao 
Ziyang failed in the 1980s largely because the conservative factions overpowered them—but these are 
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speculations built on incredibly thin evidence. It goes without saying that such a concentration of power 
has rarely yielded good results throughout history. It also goes against one’s commonsense that a leader 
has to become a dictatorship first in order to become a liberator second. Whatever the truth, I shall 
conclude here that as if history serves as any indicator for the future, the fate of Chinese intellectuals of 
all positions will be deeply shaped by China’s political trajectory, and what the intellectuals think and do 





Liberals without Liberalism 
 
 
[Only] something which has no history can be defined. 
—Friedrich Nietzsche (2007:53) 
 
 
This chapter tackles a puzzle in the study of Chinese intellectuals: who are the liberals? 
Exacting accounts are confusing because they often present very different picture of liberal 
intellectuals. I argue that the confusion stems from an attempt to define the social category of 
Chinese liberals on a substantive level that regards liberalism as a pre-defined ideology imported 
from the West, and that this approach is ultimately misleading because it generalizes on the basis of 
some hypothetical existential condition. I take the opposite approach by identifying the 
commonalities of the self-identified liberals. Based on my sample of 56 self-identified liberals, I argue 
that “liberal” is used to describe the political orientation of a wide array of intellectuals who are 
themselves scholars, social and cultural critics, journalists, human rights lawyers, social activists, 
political activists, and Christian liberals. Moreover, liberalism in post-Tiananmen China is not a 
coherent ideology, but a relational concept that is socially embedded and historically contingent. As 
a community of discourse, Chinese liberalism contains different, and often conflicting, strands of 
thought. Chinese liberalism is more about what they are against, rather than what they are for. What 
the liberals share and what set them apart from the leftists, ultimately, is their anti-authoritarian 
sentiment. Such a sentiment is a result of shared life experiences in communist China, and has been 
solidified by two historical events: the Cultural Revolution and the Tiananmen Square crackdown. 
 
Who are Chinese Liberals? 
 
“Liberalism” is a muddled concept in the intellectual scene of contemporary China. Not only has 
there not been a consensus among the intellectuals, let alone the general public, with respect to what 
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exactly the word means, but also it is often argued that Chinese liberal intellectuals are not “real” liberals 
(Lei Chiyue 1999). Indeed, the problem of authenticity has plagued Chinese liberals and Sinologists for 
more than a century. For example, in his study of liberal thoughts in early twentieth-century China, 
Jerome Grieder (1970:344) insists that a distinction should be made between “liberalism in China” and 
“Chinese liberalism,” with the former meaning a consistent ideology worldwide and the latter a Confucian 
ideal of “superior man” that endured throughout China’s imperial history (see also de Bary 1983). 
Liberalism failed in China in its time, argues Grieder (1970:345), because as a set of values liberalism 
found no soil in wartime China. Yan Fu, Liang Qichao, and Hu Shi, hailed by many as the “fathers of 
Chinese liberalism,” have often been lamented for misunderstanding the inalienable relationship between 
liberalism and individualism and therefore subordinating individual liberty to the needs of national 
salvation and material wealth (Chang 1971; Grieder 1970; Huang 2008; Schwartz 1964); hence Yin 
Haiguang’s ([1966] 2009:275) famous conclusion: “Chinese liberals suffer from inherent weakness and 
postnatal disorders.” 
The matter is even more puzzling in post-Tiananmen China. Edmund Fung (2008–2009:574) 
observes that the Chinese liberals “appear increasingly in a neo-liberal fashion.” By contrast, Gao Quanxi 
(2012:22) suggests that Chinese liberals are sincere leftists through the prism of academic pedigree. Day 
(2013:7–9) views liberals and neoliberals as two distinct intellectual groups in China, with the former 
leaning further toward the stance of market economy. Feng Chongyi (2009:30) argues that contemporary 
Chinese liberals are fundamentally different from right-wing political and intellectual forces in the West as 
they “not only strive for individual freedom and seek to replace the despotism of the Leninist party-state 
with liberal democracy, but also stand at the front line in the fight against social inequality, and champion 
the cause of the working class in the quest for a better life.” Zhidong Hao (2003:410) maintains that 
Chinese liberals “are conservative in that they believe in the market forces, and … are authoritarian in 
that they believe in the strong government fostering the market forces.” Wang Hui ([2001] 2008:144) 
accuses Chinese liberals as politically conservative and economically radical. Ren Jiantao (2001:25) 
emphasizes that the common baseline of contemporary Chinese liberalism “can only be individual liberty 
and rights provided by classical liberalism.” Frenkiel (2015:136) divides Chinese liberals into right-wing 
liberals who are against welfare and New Leftists who advocate social democracy. A young scholar (cited 
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in Wang Yi 2004) offers the boldest statement: “There are no liberals in China, for the real liberals should 
be in prison in China’s reality.” 
There is some truth in each of the above view. For example, many liberals do welcome F. A. 
Hayek in much the same manner as Margaret Thatcher did, and many do urge China to follow the global 
norm of protecting human rights, while some others do criticize the Chinese government for not stepping 
up its role in providing social welfare. However, upon closer look, one cannot help but notice how 
ambiguous and even messy the above definitions are. Not only are many of them contradict one another, 
but also some of the persons who provide definitions are themselves defined by others (and define others) 
in one way or another. 
I argue that the confusion stems from an attempt to define a social category, namely Chinese 
liberals, on a substantive level that regards liberalism as a pre-defined and -elaborated ideology imported 
from the West, and that this approach is ultimately misleading because it generalizes on the basis of 
some hypothetical existential condition. As Mannheim (1952b:188) asserts, the adoption of a concept 
from another social environment changes the meaning and significance of the concept. Indeed, any of the 
above definitions inevitably encounters problems when applying to the majority of Chinese liberals, either 
self-identified or externally designated. If we define Chinese liberalism as neoliberalism, we would not 
understand why Qin Hui, a historian who was among the first to expose the rampant social injustice in 
China in the 1990s, regards himself as a liberal and is widely considered one of the most preeminent 
Chinese liberals,165 and we would be puzzled to learn that Qin draws theoretical inspirations from both 
Robert Nozick and Gunnar Myrdal (Bian Wu 1994; Qin Hui 1998, 2000b, 2003, [1999] 2005). If we refer 
to Chinese liberals as champions of free markets, we would miss the polemics between He Qinglian, a 
well-known liberal, and some free-market economists in the late 1990s and early 2000s. In fact, if we treat 
Chinese liberalism as an ideology, we would not be able to explain why Zhang Boshu, a critical 
philosopher who builds his theory on various forms of Western Marxism, claims to be a liberal and has 
harshly criticized the Chinese New Left. Furthermore, if we see Chinese liberalism through the prism of 
Western ideology, we would not know how to categorize a number of well-known intellectuals who are 
widely viewed as liberals but hold views akin to the New Left in the West, such as the literary critic Qian 
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Liqun, the historian Zhang Ming, the artist Ai Weiwei, the social critic Cui Weiping, and the feminist activist 
Ai Xiaoming, let alone a great proportion of the social activists in China166; we would not understand why 
Kang Xiaoguang, an academic who advocates Confucianization of China, is generally situated on the left 
side of the intellectual spectrum, and Yu Jianrong, a respected scholar who has written extensively on 
China’s human rights abuses in China, is generally considered a liberal; and we would be surprised that 
nationalism is a leftist ideology in China, and that Carl Schmitt and Leo Strauss are welcomed by some 
“leftist” intellectuals but loathed by most “rightist” liberals. 
It is also worth noting that many of the practitioners of defining and judging are themselves self-
claimed or widely-perceived liberals. As Bourdieu (1969; 1988:256–70) illustrates, an intellectual field is a 
site of struggle for symbolic dominance; different actors compete for the right and power to define 
themselves and the others, and the arbitrators are often at the same time the ones to be judged (and vice 
versa). The practice of naming and categorizing—who is a liberal, and who is not—is a means of 
competing for power in the intellectual field of China. Indeed, the label “liberal” itself was a form of 
symbolic capital whose definition and possession were objects of struggle. In the second of the 1990s 
when the division between the liberals and the New Left took shape, both sides tried to own the name of 
“liberal.” Embracing the label of “liberal,” the liberals positioned themselves as defenders of liberty and 
democracy and naming their opponents “New Left,” which is to a large degree a negative term in China 
as it conjures up the image of remnants of Maoist fanatics. Initially rejecting the label of “New Left,” the 
New Leftists drew a parallel between Chinese liberals and Western neoliberals, and insisted that they 
were comrades of American liberal left and were therefore true liberals. The liberals won the battle, and 
the two labels have since been widely used, both inside and outside the intellectual field. 
Since the action of defining liberals and liberalism is a matter of symbolic power, trying to provide 
“objective” definitions can only be a futile pursuit. In order to understand the ostensible contradiction of 
Chinese liberalism, it makes more sense to look at the liberals in the context of post-Tiananmen China 
instead of liberalism as a universal ideology. I argue that liberalism in post-Tiananmen China is not a 
coherent ideology, but a relational concept that is socially embedded and historically contingent. Chinese 
liberalism is a historical phenomenon with specific social context. Rather than defining philosophically 
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that has been largely inspired by New Left ideas, see Day (2013):154–85. 
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what Chinese liberalism is, I provide a sociological analysis of the liberals. I mainly look at the intellectuals 
who self-identified as liberals, although include discussions on those reject the label (or seldom use the 
label) but nevertheless are widely perceived to be liberals inside and outside the intellectual field. 
 
Liberalism as Translingual Practice 
 
In Tranlingual Practice, Lydia Liu (1995) challenges the assumption that the underlying meaning 
of language is universal and commensurate by showing that concepts associated with Western modernity 
were radically reinvented in the works of Chinese writers in the May Fourth Era of the early twentieth 
century. While Liu’s particular empirical facts and interpretations are subject to question,167 the concept of 
translingual practice is nevertheless illuminating and can shed light on the cross-cultural diffusion and 
variation of liberalism. 
According to the Oxford English Dictionary, the word “ism” connotes “[a] form of doctrine, theory, 
or practice having, or claiming to have, a distinctive character or relation.” The definition suggests a 
degree of both uniqueness and coherence. Furthermore, in the English world, -ism as a suffix is often 
used as an ideological marker, indicating a set of ideas or principles.168 Accordingly, liberalism is often 
used as a type of political ideology, juxtaposed with the competing ideologies such as conservatism, 
socialism, and nationalism (Kramnick and Watkins 1979; Vincent 2010). Because liberalism is a basket of 
ideas and ideals that are often of conflicting nature, it is almost impossible to provide a succinct yet 
satisfying definition,169 although we may say that liberalism is a political philosophy or ideology based on 
the premises of liberty and equality. As a noun, when used in a more or less ideological fashion, “liberal” 
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168 Ideology has an intricate conceptual history and has remained an ambiguous and controversial term in the political 
vocabulary of both experts and laypersons (Freeden 1996, 2003; Thompson 1984). Eschewing to pursuing the 
intellectual debate in political theory, I adopt a relatively straightforward definition of ideology: “a set of ideas involving 
visionary and grandiose schemes of social change” (Kramnick and Watkins 1979:2). 
 
169 I have surveyed a large number of books, articles, and encyclopedia and handbook entries on liberalism and 
found it difficult to find a one-sentence definition. Rather, the common approach is to trace the history of liberal ideas 
since John Locke and Adam Smith (Kramnick and Watkins 1979:8–26), to disaggregate liberalism into a subset of 
concepts, such as justice, equality, rights, and democracy (Vincent 2010:23–55), or to compare different versions of 
liberalism, such as classical liberalism versus modern liberalism, and libertarianism versus welfare liberalism (Ryan 
2012). The most helpful short survey that I have found is Freeden’s Liberalism: A Very Short Introduction (2015), 
which identifies five temporal layers of liberalism (13). 
145 
 
in general refers to a liberal-minded person, albeit its ambiguous ideological intensity and high degree of 
contextual variation. 
“Liberalism” and “liberal” are even much more ideologically saturated and politically charged 
terms in contemporary China. The Chinese equivalent of the world “liberal” is a two-character compound 
of zi and you, which means “self, oneself” and “from, since” respectively. Despite its appearance in many 
ancient works, it was used as an undefined combination of words rather than a fixed lexical collocation. 
Ziyou first became a fixed combination in nineteenth-century Japan, and was then transported back to 
China to stand for the Western concepts of freedom and liberty (Nathan 2002:252). In a similar fashion, 
zhuyi was first coined in Japan (although as Chinese characters) as a translation of ism and later brought 
back to China (Wang Binbin 1998:75).170 
Before long, however, liberalism found it difficult to remain solely in the philosophical or 
ideological realm. As China’s turbulent history moved on, the term has been deeply entrenched in the 
national pursuit of wealth and power and often transgressed into the realms of politics and culture. For 
example, in the early twentieth century, the intellectual leader Liang Qichao (1994:61) stated plainly in his 
long and influential essay “Xinmin shuo” (The New Citizen) that what he meant by ziyou was “the freedom 
of the group, not the freedom of the individual.” Indeed, Liang and most other pro-liberty intellectual 
leaders in the early twentieth century regarded ziyou as a tool for national salvation and reconstruction. In 
the face of foreign invasion, political chaos, and dissolving social order, Chinese intellectuals were 
burdened with the task of finding solutions for national crises rather than seeking philosophical purity or 
sophistication; thus, among many other foreign ideas, liberalism was viewed as a potential way to 
strength the state, not necessarily as a theory of restrained power aimed at protecting individual rights. 
Equating liberty with permissiveness and unrestrained behavior, Sun Yat-sen, the founding father and 
first president of the Republic of China, insisted that the Chinese enjoyed too much, not too little, personal 
liberty (Fung 2000:35–36). The communist leaders have not thought highly of liberalism either. In a 
famous essay written in 1937, Mao Zedong associated liberalism with the lack of principles and 
                                                          





disciplines,171 and called on all CCP members to fight against liberalism (Mao Tse-tung 1965). The attack 
on liberalism, at least in the official discourse, has carried on to this day. As recent as March 6, 2013, 
Wang Qishan, head of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection of CCP and member of the 
Politburo Standing Committee, claimed that “liberalism is the soil for act that violates political discipline” 
(Yang Weihan and Zhao Renwei 2013). Two months later, an article on the official website of the CCP 
called on all party members to “take a clear-cut stand against liberalism” (Chen Guorong 2013). 
 
Varieties of Liberals 
 
Most existing accounts of liberalism in contemporary China treat it as a school of thought and 
focus on a handful of elite liberal intellectuals, such as Liu Junning, Qin Hui, Xu Youyu, and Zhu Xueqin. 
This would be a fairly accurate picture of the second half of the 1990s, as Chinese liberalism indeed 
began as an intellectual movement back then. However, this narrow depiction is misleading as liberalism 
has progressed beyond the academic field and converged with the political, religious, legal, journalistic, 
and artistic fields. Therefore, as a noun, “liberal” is used to describe the political orientation of a wide 
array of intellectuals who are themselves scholars, social and cultural critics, journalists, human rights 
lawyers, social activists, political activists, and Christian liberals.172 Although endowed with different 
expertise and speaking to different audiences, they echo and support each other and represent the most 
prominent liberal voice in contemporary China. 
 
Liberal scholars: A highly diverse group, liberal scholars were vital to the resurface of liberalism in 
China in the second half of the 1990s. Based on their fields of expertise, they can be divided into the 
following categories: (1) Economists: Often called “economic liberals,” the liberal economists have played 
a significant role in China’s market-oriented economic reforms. They in general favor less government 
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172 The classification is surely more or less arbitrary. A scholar, for example, can be a social critic or a social activist at 
the same time, as exemplified by Li Yinhe. In addition, an intellectual may change his role for one reason or another. 
Xiao Shu, for example, changed from a scholar to a journalist, because of a sensitive book he wrote, and later to a 
social and political activist, as a result of his outspoken commentaries in the Southern Weekly. I do not claim any form 




regulation, introducing the market mechanism, reducing the state-owned economy, protecting private 
property rights, and encouraging entrepreneurship. Zhang Weiying and Mao Yushi are the best-known 
liberal economists. (2) Philosophers and political theorists: This is a highly heterogeneous group as it 
includes classical liberals such as Xu Youyu, conservatives such as Liu Junning, libertarians such as 
Wang Jianxun, and modern liberals such as Gu Su. (3) Legal scholars: Prominent legal scholars, such as 
Jiang Ping, He Weifang, Zhang Qianfan, and Xiao Han, have argued for mechanisms that institutionalize 
the protection of human rights, and in particular judicial independence. (4) Historians: Historians such as 
Yuan Weishi, Lei Yi, Zhang Ming, and Wu Si, employ the strategy of “using the past to allude to the 
present” to engage in the liberal discourse, and have established a large influence among the general 
public. 
 
Social and cultural critics: While many social and cultural critics are scholars themselves, their 
social influence comes more from their popular writings and opinions tailoring for the general public than 
those within their academic fields. For example, sociologist Li Yinhe is known as the most outspoken 
defender of LGBT rights in China; legal scholar Yang Zhizhu is a vocal critic of China’s one-child policy; 
political scientist Liu Yu is the author of several bestselling books on democracy and is called a “Goddess 
of Democracy” by many fans; and economist Hu Xingdou has been a spokesperson on behalf of the 
disadvantaged. Many liberal social and critical critics outside the academic circle, such as writer Yu Jie, 
who has been an outspoken critic of the CCP, writer Yu Shicun, who has commented on political and 
cultural issues, and freelancer Li Ziyang, who has worked to spread libertarian ideas. 
 
Journalists: Among all the different social fields, the journalistic field is seen by many as the most 
liberal one, largely as a result of the inherent interest of the journalists in the freedom of the press and 
their personal experience with heavy government monitoring. Nanfang zhoumo (Southern Weekly) and its 
sister publications are the most influential liberal media outlets in China. They have published a large 
number of investigative articles that expose the negative side of the society and commentary pieces by 
liberal intellectuals that contribute to public democratic debate. While the liberal media has been careful to 
refrain from sensitive political reporting, they have frequently offended the CCP and received various 
148 
 
forms of punishment as consequences. Journalists such as Xiao Shu, Zhang Wen, and Guo Yukuan have 
written many influential news reports and commentaries. 
 
Human rights lawyers: The rise of human rights lawyers as a group is a quite recent phenomenon 
in China. In March 2003, Sun Zhigang, a young migrant worker in Guangzhou was detained by local 
police for not having a temporary residence permit and died three days later as a result of physical abuse. 
In May, three doctoral students at Peking University—Yu Jiang, Teng Biao, and Xu Zhiyong—delivered 
an open letter to the NPC demanding a constitutional review of the custody and repatriation system. A 
few days late, five scholars, including legal scholars He Weifang and Shen Kui, submitted a proposal to 
the NPC for a special investigation of Sun’s death and the custody and repatriation system. A month later, 
the system was abolished. Since then, human rights lawyers have been active in various legal cases and 
in pushing constitutional reform. The most famous human rights lawyers are Xu Zhiyong, Teng Biao, and 
Pu Zhiqiang. 
 
Social activists: Concomitant with the emergence of human rights lawyers was the rise of the 
rights defense movement. In 2003, Xu Zhiyong, Teng Biao, Yu Jiang, and Zhang Xingshui founded the 
Open Constitution Initiative, an NGO that aimed to advocate the rule of law and improve human rights 
conditions in China. Before it was declared illegal and shun down by the CCP, the Open Constitution 
Initiative did a great deal of work in provided legal assistance to victims of injustice, spreading the idea of 
human rights, and exposing human rights violations. In 2010, Xu Zhiyong, Wang Gongquan, and Xiao 
Shu launched the Chinese New Citizens’ Movement (Zhongguo xin gongmin yundong) to continue the 
rights defense activities. While Xu and Wang were both arrested in 2013, Xu was sentenced in 2014 to 
four years in prison, and Xiao Shu went in exile overseas from 2013 to 2015, the rights defense 
movement has remained active and adopted a variety of movement tactics, such as citizen meals 
(gongmin jucan) and popular surveillance (weiguan) (Teng Biao 2014). With the facilitation of the Internet, 




Political activists: In general, there is much overlap between the political activists, defined as 
those directing challenging the rule of the CCP, and the so-called dissidents, who vocally oppose the 
official policy of the CCP. The two terms, however, are often defined from different angles and therefore 
have different emphases. For example, dissidents are a broader category than political activists because 
some dissidents, such as Jiao Guobiao and Zhang Boshu, do not directly engage in political activities. In 
addition, whether dissidents like Liu Xiaobo, winner of the 2010 Nobel Peace Prize, are political activists 
is a matter of defining what “activists” and “political” mean. Not surprisingly, most political activists in 
China live in prison, under house arrest or heavy surveillance. Those leading political activists in exile, 
such as Hu Ping, Wang Juntao, and Wang Dan, have directly challenged the communist and played a 
significant role in the past. However, because of the success of the CCP in insulating the majority of the 
Chinese from the writings, speeches, activities, and information of those activists, these liberal political 
activists exert the least influence on the general public, compared with the other categories. 
 
Christian liberals: Since the 2000s, house churches have become an increasingly visible social 
and even political force in China. Operating independently of the CCP-controlled apparatus, these 
unregistered, mostly Protestant, assemblies are a challenge to the CCP’s attempt of ideological control. 
In 2011, Pew Research estimated as many as 35 million unregistered Christians in China (Rauhala 2014). 
The growth of the house church movement has met with vigilance and hostility from the CCP. Since 2011, 
in line with its crackdown on dissidents, the CCP has intensified its suppression of house churches. The 
best-known cases are the 2011 crackdown on the Shouwang Church and the subsequent large-scale 
forced demolition of house churches, which has met fierce resistance from the church members. Against 
the backdrop of the house church movement, a large number of liberal intellectuals, such as Yu Jie, 
Wang Yi, Jiao Guobiao, Fan Yafeng, and Zhang Dajun, have converted to Christianity, and spoken 
publicly against the CCP from a religious perspective.  
 




In Chinese, two terms—ziyouzhuyizhe and ziyoupai—are associated with the noun “liberal.” 
While these terms can be, and in the overwhelming majority of cases are, used interchangeably, there 
are some subtle differences among them. Ziyouzhuyizhe contains the word zhuyi, which conveys a 
stronger ideological flavor that is tinged with consistency, exclusivity, and idealism.173 Ziyoupai conjures 
up the image of small cliques as pai suggests factions. These two terms can be literally translated as 
“individuals who believe in liberalism”174 (or liberalist) and “liberal faction.” For some intellectuals, 
ziyouzhuyizhe conjures up the image of a dogmatic and argumentative ideologue, whereas ziyoupai 
suggests partisan alignments (Gao Xingjian 2001). To avoid the ideological complications, some 
intellectuals prefer the label ziyouzhishifenzi, which by eliminating the morpheme of zhuyi appears to be 
less ideologically fossilized. I do not make a distinction between the terms as it is artificial and superficial 
in most cases. 
During interviews, I asked each self-identified liberal to elaborate his or her understanding of 
liberalism. As it turned out, only a small portion of the liberals define liberalism as an ideology. In other 
words, very few liberals explicitly embrace liberalism as an ism and have a more elaborate enunciation, or 
are willing to elaborate, what their version of liberalism is. In what follows, I report the statements that are 
in line with ideological liberalism and focus on those who have specific ideological labels for themselves. 
 
Conservative liberal: Instrumental in bringing liberalism as a discursive field to the fore of the 
intellectual circle in the 1990s, political theorist Liu Junning is seen by many as the one of the “purist” 
liberals in China for his prolific theoretical writings and his refusal of intellectual compromise (Ma Licheng 
2012:122). A self-described “conservative liberal,” Liu described his ideology as “a political tradition 
descending from the British Whigs along with John Locke, Edmund Burke, Adam Smith, and the 
Federalists.” Noting that his version of liberalism is different from that in today’s America, Liu emphasized, 
“American liberalism is socialism. In America, liberalism means leftism. Pretty much 99 percent of 
American university professors are leftist socialists.” After learning my sociology background, Liu added, 
“The conservative liberalism I’m referring to is absolutely not welcome on American campuses, and is a 
                                                          
173 However, in the early 1900s, zhuyi was used widely and was in general used in a positive way (Wang Fan-san 
2013b). For detailed discussions of ism in modern China, also see Spira 2015; Wang Fan-san 2013a. 
 
174 We can even use the coined term “liberalist” for ziyouzhuyizhe. 
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type of thought hated by your mentors.” Liu identified his stance with American conservatism and the 
ideology of the Republican Party in the United States and the Conservative Party in Britain, while 
acknowledging that he had not personally encountered partisan conflict revolving around issues such as 
abortion rights, gay marriage, and immigration. In addition, Liu identified the thoughts of Michael Novak, 
Harvey Mansfield, Russell Kirk, Robert Nisbet, Milton Friedman, and Alexis de Tocqueville as his 
intellectual wellspring. Liu’s thought also contains elements of libertarianism. In a widely read essay, 
when arguing for the supremacy of individual property rights, Liu (1998a:53) quotes the following 
statement from William Pitt the Elder, “The poorest man may in his cottage bid defiance to all the forces of 
the Crown. It may be frail—its roof may shake—the wind may blow through it—the storm may enter—the 
rain may enter—but the King of England cannot enter—all his force dares not cross the threshold of the 
ruined tenement!” In an introductory volume on conservatism, Liu (2014) makes a sharp distinction 
between conservatism (baoshouzhuyi) as a political ideology and the conservative faction (baoshoupai) 
as a cultural attitude, and takes pain to demonstrate that what conservatism tries to conserve is the 
classical liberal tradition. To him, conservative liberalism is equivalent to libertarianism. 
Yu Jie, a dissident and social critic, also associated his stance directly with American 
conservatism: 
 
I’m a liberal in the Chinese sense, but a conservative in the American sense. … 
Many of my thoughts are close to those of the Republican Party in America. More 
specifically, in terms of economy, I favor free competition; in terms of politics, I’m for big 
society and small government and believe that the less government intervention, the 
better; in terms of society, I like to see the churches and social groups to do more things; 
in terms of ideology, I’m opposed to totalitarianism, especially the ideology of 
communism. My position is pretty much the same as Reaganism and Thatcherism. If 
China democratizes in the future and many social issues come to the fore, a number of 
conservative views will emerge just like today’s America, such as gun rights, death 
penalty, abortion, homosexuality, and drugs. 
 
While legal and political philosopher Gao Quanxi called himself a conservative liberal, his version 
of conservative liberalism is quite different from that of both Liu’s and Yu’s. According to him, 
conservative liberalism was characterized by “a set of fundamental views on politics or constitutionalism 
from the perspectives of nation-building and constitution, and of new understanding of tradition.” Gao 




The commonly understood liberalism is mostly based on an individualistic 
premise, and accords supremacy to individual rights and liberty. But in my view, this is a 
misreading of liberal constitutionalism and liberalism, or at least an incomplete reading. 
Liberalism is surely concerned with individual liberty and individual rights, but the 
individual rights and liberty have their premise—they take as their practical foundation a 
social community. In particular, individual rights and liberty can only be realized after the 
establishment of a democratic constitutional system. Therefore, liberalism is not anti-
social, but is realized in the social; it is a social liberalism. Society-building, and in 
particular the construction of a political society and democratic constitutionalism, is of 
utmost importance for individual rights and individual liberty. Individualism or individual 
supremacy in its pure form is not liberalism. … This type of liberalism, which emphasizes 
society and constitutional rule, belongs to “early modern” liberalism and to the Anglo-
Saxon conservative liberalism, and is different from contemporary Rawlsian or 
Habermasian liberalism. … It not only defends negative individual rights, but also 
highlights civic virtue, positive rights, common interests, rights-based struggles for a just 
society, positive liberty, and citizen participation in defense of this liberty. This version of 
classical liberalism or early modern liberalism neither rejects tradition nor denies history. 
On the contrary, it locates the normativity of the constitution in tradition and history … 
(Gao Quanxi 2014:30). 
 
In another book, Gao (2004) calls for a returning to David Hume and a fusion of a Humean 
conservative liberalism and the Confucian tradition. It seems fair to say that his liberalism is a combination 
of classical liberalism and conservatism. 
Self-identified as a “conservative constitutional liberal,” historian Yao Zhongqiu,175 a renowned 
Hayek scholar and founder of the Chinese Hayek Society who has been more recently associated with 
the renaissance of Confucianism, distinguished his understanding of liberalism from two other versions of 
liberalism: economic liberalism that elevated marketization, and enlightenment liberalism that descended 
from the New Culture Movement in the early twentieth century and favored individual freedom. Yao 
claimed to have found a rich liberal tradition in the Confucian thought that existed in thousands of years of 
China until the Chinese Communist Party took over China. 
 
Classical liberal: “Classical liberalism” is a very popular label among Chinese liberals, but there is 
a high degree of variation with respect to its exact meaning. Economist Sheng Hong, who was among the 
first to introduce new institutional economics to China in the late 1980s and early 1990s, emphasized that 
his classical liberalism was confined to the realm of the economy. According to him, classical liberalism 
                                                          
175 Yao often uses the pseudonym “Qiu Feng” in his popular writings. 
153 
 
cherished economic freedom and believed that liberty should come before democracy; the economic 
sphere belonged to the private sphere and therefore should not be determined by voting. 
Among the first to introduce Mises and Hayek to China in the 1990s, economist Feng Xingyuan 
characterized his position as a combination of libertarianism and ordoliberalism. On the one hand, he 
asserted his pro-market stance and saw privatization as a prerequisite for economic success; on the 
other hand, he stressed the role of the state in establishing and ensuring orderly market competition. 
Feng regarded Hayek as the “beacon of liberalism” and quite harshly criticized Rawls as “a liberal in the 
upper body and a socialist in the lower body.” 
With the hugely popular book Minzhu de xijie (Details of Democracy), Liu Yu, a political scientist 
with a PhD from Columbia University and a professor at Tsinghua University, is a frequently-sought 
interpreter of democracy. To Liu, classical liberalism “emphasized individual rights and liberty, both 
economically and politically.” She noted the different social backgrounds of liberalism in China and 
Western societies, “In the West, the word ‘liberal’ has evolved from the initial classical liberalism into 
modern liberalism, which places more emphasis on collective rights.” “China has not yet crossed the 
threshold of classical liberalism because individual liberty and rights have not been acknowledged and 
recognized,” Liu thought of different forms of liberalism in terms of historical stages, “so I’m ambivalent 
toward the collective rights proposed by modern liberalism.”  
Political philosopher Xu Youyu, a leading voice in the debate with the New Left in the late 1990s, 
accepted the label “classical liberal” with some qualifications. Drawn to the idea of natural rights, Xu 
stressed its differences from libertarianism: 
 
People here often distinguish between liberalism and libertarianism. It is often 
believed that the latter is closer to classical liberalism—I’m not that type. But I’m not a 
left-leaning Rawlsian liberal either. … If you exclude the element of libertarianism, or the 
doctrines of Nozick and Hayek that completely reject the notion of social justice, I’m 
indeed close to classical liberalism. Some understand classical liberalism as 
libertarianism—I totally disagree. Locke declared that people have the right to rebel when 
the government violates the social contract. I admire Locke in this sense. Indeed you can 
say Locke is the father of classical liberalism. … But Locke doesn’t lead to Nozick or 
Hayek.   
 
Modern liberal: While libertarian and classical liberal ideas do meet with acceptance from a 
portion of the self-identified liberals, it would be a mistake to exaggerate their popularity among Chinese 
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intellectuals. Contrasting himself with laissez-faire libertarianism, political philosopher Gu Su identified 
himself with Rawlsian modern liberalism, which is “the liberalism of and since the 20th century.” He 
equated classical liberalism with libertarianism and noted, “Classical liberalism can be traced from Adam 
Smith to Nozick. This set of libertarian doctrines may encounter some problems in today’s complex 
society. The typical case is the financial crisis in the West, which would have been very difficult to handle 
solely with the mechanism of the market. There need to be some measures of public intervention.” Gu 
described his position as “basically in the middle but slightly leaning to the left” because “sometimes an 
emphasis of equality is needed.” 
 
Constitutional liberal: Xianzheng (constitutionalism) was a word that frequently appeared in the 
interviews. Philosopher Zhang Boshu preferred to describe himself as a “constitutional liberal”: 
 
If we talk about liberalism from the perspective of political philosophy, and 
emphasize that the individual rights of citizens precede everything else in today’s 
world … , then you can say I’m a liberal. If we say that liberalism seeks to solve problems 
faced by the human society through constitutional-institutional arrangements, I agree with 
the basic elements and proposals of liberalism on constitutionalism. What makes the 
matter complicated is economic liberalism. With respect to the market economy, I have 
reservations about Hayekian laissez-faire economics … . On economic issues I’m leaning 
toward a mixed system. On the one hand, the market economy is profit-driven, which … 
without doubt increases productivity, … but on the other hand, the market economy … 
generates the problem of negative externalities that is in need of external intervention, 
including government intervention. 
 
In a sense, Zhang’s view was opposite of that of Sheng Hong’s, as Sheng confines liberalism to 
the sphere of economy, whereas Zhang explicitly rejected economic liberalism and called for more 
freedom in the political and social spheres. But it should be noted that what they meant by social and 
political liberalism are quite different: Sheng seemed to conflate democracy and liberalism and reduced 
democracy to the majority rule, while Zhang appeared to center his understanding of liberalism on human 
independence and the rule of law. 
 
Neoliberal: Arguably the best-known advocate for free-market economics and privatization in 
China, Zhang Weiying, former dean of the Guanghua School of Management at Peking University, 
defined his version of liberalism as “firmly advocating privatization, individual freedom, and market 
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competition.” He claimed that “a market economy is the most moral system” and “an individualist society 
is the most responsible society,” and insisted on the supremacy of economic freedom. In his book The 
Logic of the Market, Zhang (2015:xvii, xix) stated, “The market economy is humanity’s greatest creation. It 
provides the best rules of the game for human progress. … The so-called defects of the market are in 
large part the result of market critics’ subjective imagination and the government interventions they cause.” 
In a highly controversial statement in the 1990s, Zhang claimed, “Under public ownership, the residual 
claim of an official may be a Pareto improvement, because it helps to lower the cost of supervision and 
raise the incentives of the official. Corruption of private goods is a second-best choice, if not the best 
choice, for social and economic development.” Economic efficiency appeared to be the ultimate goal for 
Zhang (2015:194), “In transitional China, many corrupt practices have similar efficiency-increasing 
traits. … [If] the government intrudes into the private realm—such as holding monopoly rights to engage 
in commercial activities, financing, and setting private contracts—then exchanging bribes for private rights 
will perhaps increase efficiency, even if it involves rent-seeking and redistribution of the national income. 
Indeed, bribery is a means to redeem those private rights that the government has legally, but irrationally, 
seized.” 
Zhang is not alone. Journalist Zhou Kecheng also prioritized the economic rule and praised its 
simplicity and universality, “The same cellphone falls to the ground once I relax my grasp, in both China 
and America. As long as there is a price regulation, the average folks find it difficult to buy gasoline, in 
both Chin and America.” Li Ziyang, cofounder of the libertarian think tank iPencil Economic Research 
Institute, believed that the Austrian School was the most authentic form of liberalism, “While the Chicago 
School still agrees with some measures of government intervention, the Austrian School, including its 
theories of money and business cycle, is completely against government intervention. Therefore we 
prefer the Austrian School, although Milton Friedman’s Free to Choose and Capitalism and Freedom are 
great.” By subordinating social, political, and cultural spheres to an all-encompassing economic logic, 
these intellectuals exhibited many affinities with the ideology of neoliberalism. 
 
Feminist liberal: Widely seen as the most eminent sexologist in China, sociologist Li Yinhe 
described herself as a “feminist liberal.” As Li put it, “First, my basic orientation is simply freedom and 
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democracy. Second, you can dislike homosexuality, one-night stand, swinging, or sadomasochism, but 
they have their rights to do things that we don’t like.” However, this view was strongly opposed by a self-
identified Straussian conservative liberal, “I’ve found her view deeply repugnant, because the principles of 
modern civil law, that is to say some typical values of liberalism, such as autonomy, contract, and 
freedom, only apply to certain fields, and can’t be transplanted to the other fields, such as marriage and 
family.” 
 
Constitutional socialist: Economist Hu Xingdou described himself as a “constitutional socialist.” As 
he explained it, constitutional socialism “respects both the supremacy of the constitution and the authority 
of the government, and aims at establishing a government that is both limited and powerful, a social 
system in which citizens enjoy individual rights, and a value system that is socialist in content.” In the 
Chinese intelligentsia, constitutional socialism and the related democratic socialism occupy a unique 
niche—while the younger generation in general do not find it attractive, it is particularly appealing to the 
older generation and those within the party system. 
 
Liberalism without Ism 
 
The aforementioned liberals, however, belong to the minority. During interviews, while accepting 
the label of “liberal,” most of the liberals did not, at least not explicitly, treat liberalism as an ism. In other 
words, they refused or were reluctant to be affiliated with the political philosophy known as liberalism. 
When asked what they meant by “liberalism,” they gave a variety of answers. 
 
Freedom: Famous for two books, Qian guize (Hidden Rules) and Xuechou dinglü (The Principle 
of Blood Payment), Wu Si, then Executive Editor of the celebrated reformist magazine, China through the 
Ages, took liberalism simply as the embracement of freedom. “I haven’t seriously studied liberalism, so I 
always feel a little diffident about calling myself a liberal,” Wu began with a caveat. After noting that 
freedom had historically been a product of struggles among different groups, he quite vaguely associated 
liberalism with freedom by a metaphor, “Assuming that the average level of freedom is 10 square meters 
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in Europe and America and nine square meters in China, let’s move toward 10 square meters. If this 
proposition is liberalism, then I favor it. It’s my stand.” When asked to specify freedom, Wu defined 
freedom as “the restriction on violence.” 
Social activist and cofounder of the Transition Institute (Chuanzhixing shehui jingji yanjiusuo), an 
influential public policy think tank, Zhang Dajun made a distinction between liberalism as a belief system 
and Christianity on the one hand, and liberalists and the liberal faction, “Strictly speaking, I’m not a 
ziyouzhuyizhe (liberalist), for I believe in Christianity, but you certainly can call me a ziyouzhuyizhe in a 
broad sense … because I pursue freedom. … I belong to the ziyoupai (liberal faction), and I don’t like to 
call myself a ziyouzhuyizhe.” Different from Wu Si, Zhang identified freedom of religion and conscience as 
the ultimate form of freedom, “I don’t see freedom of speech or other forms of freedom as the most 
important value, because I believe they are all derivatives of freedom of religion and conscience.” 
Guo Yushan, cofounder and director of the Transition Institute, also saw freedom as the essence 
of liberalism, and defined liberalism as the freedom from oppression, “You can elaborate the concept of 
liberalism from perspectives such as negative liberty and positive liberty, but I don’t think it needs to be so 
sophisticated. In my view, liberalism simply means the lack of oppression.” 
 
Tolerance: In the eye of the late dissident Chen Ziming, a veteran democracy activist, liberalism 
was not an ideology or a philosophical doctrine, but an attitude toward the others, especially one’s 
opponents: 
 
My version of liberalism is indeed one that looks least like an ism. It is a very 
open and broad field. Many people can be counted as liberals and it doesn’t have to be 
the Austrian School economists. To me, liberalism means treating various schools of 
thought in an open and equal manner, allowing their views themselves to debate, and 
accepting the ones that win the debate. It’s not that I have to believe something because 
it is held by, say, the Platonic School. 
 
Liberalism, in Chen’s view, meant least insistent with respect to one’s intellectual position. This 
view is indeed in line with that of many Chinese liberals who regarded liberalism as a way of life rather 
than a political orientation.176 
                                                          




Rationality: Economist Dang Guoying put a high premium on rationality and had published two 
books whose titles contain the word “rationality”: The Rationality of Economics and The Rationality of 
Reform. To him, liberalism meant rational thinking, “There would be no factions if we think rationally. 
There would be only one faction—the faction of seeking truth from facts.” It should be noted that Dang 
seemed to have a quite loose definition of rationality—while it did refer to rational choice or calculation in 
some of his statements, on most occasions it simply meant reason or reasonable practice. 
 
Truthfulness: The late legal scholar Cao Siyuan, the drafter of China’s first bankruptcy law, 
divided liberalism into three elements of liberalism, “First, let things be what they are, and seek truth from 
facts. Second, say what you think. Third, honestly discuss and criticize different opinions.” Cao felt 
strongly about not being able to freely express himself in high school, “The most interesting thing about 
philosophy (that was taught) was that it went to the opposite extreme: it required you to have the ‘correct’ 
thought; in other words, it asked you to lie. You didn’t think so, but A was the ‘correct’ thought and B was 
the ‘incorrect’ thought. You were required to say A, but what you really thought was B. What would you do? 
You had to lie. So, the requirement of truth became the requirement of lying.” 
 
Independence: While law professor He Weifang described himself as a classical liberal, his 
interpretation of the term contained very little philosophical rumination. He approached classical liberalism 
from two aspects. First, in the understanding of the law, he was theoretically conservative for not favoring 
economic imperialism that treated legal studies as supplemental to the other fields, such as economics 
and sociology. “In advancing rule of law in China, including the course of legal education, it’s very 
important to sort out the tradition from ancient Rome, including the Anglo-Saxon tradition. What we need 
is make-up lessons.” Second, on social and political issues, he believed that an intellectual should 
undertake an independent and critical role. His classical liberalism encompassed both a traditionalist 
approach to his field of study and a loose understanding of the role of intellectuals. He even expanded the 
concept to life styles, “If one’s state of life is classical liberal, then that’s great.” 
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Human rights activist Yang Zhizhu also defined liberalism as independence. However, he 
understood independence as self-employment: “Independence means not being hired by any 
organization, as exemplified by Spinoza who earned a living by grinding optical lenses.” 
 
Self-fulfillment: Historian Zhi Xiaomin explicitly refused to view liberalism as a “relatively closed 
ism” and adopted a philosophical approach, “Liberalism is open and infinite. The most significant feature 
of liberalism is its recognition that humans are different from one another and each individual is an 
independent entity … . Human beings can only best realize themselves by freely developing in their 
fullest … . What liberalism believes is that each person in the world has his or her value, and one’s most 
significant meaning is to fully realize his or her value.” For Zhi, liberalism was about human flourishing 
through the development individual potential and capacities. 
 
Human rights: Political activist Jiang Qisheng identified human rights as the essence of liberalism, 
“[Liberalism means that] everything revolves around respecting and protecting human rights, and, based 
on which, establishing the life styles and the basic institution—constitutional democracy or multi-party 
democracy, which is employed worldwide.” Jiang seemed to understand human rights as negative rights 
and as rights pertaining to individuals, “The litmus test of modern democracy is whether each individual’s 
human rights are respected and protected, even if he is one who is criticized, … even if one billion vote to 
have him executed  … .” 
 
Modernization: As a catchword among Chinese intellectuals in the 1980s, “modernization” has 
lost much of its former appeal and luster since the 1990s when the academic field began to gain 
increasing autonomy and communicate frequently with the Western academic field. However, some 
intellectuals, and in particular those associated with Chinese liberalism, chose to stick with the concept 
and use it favorably. Historian Yuan Weishi understood liberalism as pro-modernization, “I pursue China’s 
modernization. Not just economic modernization—I hope China will become a modern society, a modern 
country. If you say this is liberalism, then I agree with it and accept it. But more accurately, I belong to the 
faction of modern society (xiandaishehuipai) or the faction of modern nation (xiandaiguojiapai), and I 
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pursue globalization. China should become a modern society, and a modern society or a modern nation 
should swim with the current of globalization.” 
 
Logic: According economist Mao Yushi, winner of the 2012 Milton Friedman Prize from the Cato 
Institute, liberalism meant logic, “For a society to be stable, there must be equality among all peoples. 
This is logic, because if all peoples are unequal and there are an emperor and the masses, then the 
masses all want to be the emperor. How could the society be stable? The only stable situation is when all 
peoples are equal, the consequence of which must be a free society. On the flip side, why are some 
people unfree? Because there are some other people with privileges. If someone else can intervene your 
freedom, you will not have freedom. The foundation of freedom is equality, and the foundation of equality 
is logic … .” 
 
Logical positivism: Citing Émile Durkheim as a major intellectual inspiration, journalist Guo 
Yukuan linked liberalism to logical positivism and highlighted the value of logical consistence and 
coherence, “I’m neither a leftist nor a rightist; I’m a logical positivist. I like what Durkheim says—you need 
to find answers to social facts from social facts, rather than from ideals. … Many liberals like to cite 
Kenneth Burke, Isaiah Berlin, or Václav Havel. I don’t like that way of argument; that’s not an argument. I 
like to talk about what the fact is, how the argument should go, and what problem is to be solved.” 
 
Universal values: Jiao Guobiao, a Christian and former journalism professor who was dismissed 
from Peking University for openly criticizing the CCP, similarly denied that his thought had anything to do 
with isms as his writings were all about specific topics, “However, my arguments have to have bases, 
which do point to liberalism, or universal values.” When pressed about his understanding of universal 
values, Jiao illustrated it this way: 
 
For example, I think monogamy is a universal value. Of course, it has not been 
always the case throughout history, but there is no polygamy or bigamy in the Bible.177 
Between Adam and Eve, it was absolutely monogamy. … I’m just improvisational here, 
but in fact monogamy reflects an equal and transparent relationship. Nobody has said 
                                                          
177 Jiao appeared to have misread the Bible, at least the Old Testament.  
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that transparency is a universal value, but I think it should be. … The so-called 
democracy or constitutionalism, after all, is a means of solving human relationships. 
 
Rights defense movement: Xiao Shu, leader of the New Citizens’ Movement that is part of the 
larger rights defense movement, was engaged in the intellectual debate between the liberals and the New 
Left in the early 2000s. But since then he has actively participated in and led the rights defense 
movement and distanced himself from the intellectual polemics: 
 
In my opinion, since the emergence of the rights defense movement in 2003, the 
reality has already responded to the intellectual debate. The rights defense movement is 
“liberalism in action” … and since then liberalism has found its social foundation in the 
real life … . The liberal rights defense movement has been thriving and in the 
mainstream. … China’s social movements, at least their ideas, are heir to the then 
liberalism. … [The activists] are the embodiment of liberalism in action. … The basic ideal 
of all of the social movements is … liberalism. 
 
Liberalism as Community of Discourse 
 
Most studies on contemporary Chinese intelligentsia have been conducted by intellectual 
historians, political theorists, literature scholars, or journalists (Chen Yan 2006; Davies 2007b; Fewsmith 
2008; Goldman 2005, 2007; Ma Licheng 2012; Moody 2007; Wu 2014; Xu Jilin 2011a; Xu Jilin et al. 2007; 
Zhang 2008).178 Taking a substantivist approach, most of these studies decipher the texts and speeches 
of the liberals, and classify the liberals into different schools of thought (Li 2015; Ma Licheng 2012). Some 
go further by taking a stance and participating in polemics themselves (Ren Jiantao 2004; Zhang Boshu 
2015). What is more, these studies often regard Chinese liberalism as a more or less coherent ideology 
and write of liberals (and the other “camps”) as if they are a monolithic group, and examine Chinese 
liberalism as a system of thought comparable to Western liberal thinkers such as Locke, Mill, Rawls, 
Hayek, and Friedman. These studies have provided a luminous source of light in the intellectual life and 
political thought in contemporary China, and the historical and textual details are most helpful. However, 
as the beginning of this chapter shows, these studies are often misleading in that they do not sufficiently 
capture the complexity, and in particular the heterogeneity, beneath the surface of the intellectual labels. 
Moreover, transposing value-laden concepts, such as liberalism, from the Western context to the Chinese 
                                                          
178 Frenkiel (2015) and Hao (2003) are notable exceptions. 
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context (and vice versa) without critically reflecting on the contextual differences leads to Western-centric 
assumptions (Cohen 1984). While the insistence of the so-called Cambridge School of Intellectual 
History179 that the illocutionary intentions of authors in different historical contexts or communicative 
occasions should be the principal object of intellectual history (Skinner 1969) is likely overstretching, its 
contextualist approach that locates authors and ideas in their historical milieu is illuminating (Pocock 2009; 
Skinner 2002).180 
While giving the existing studies their due credit, I argue that a sound and sufficient 
understanding of contemporary Chinese intelligentsia requires a sociological perspective that pays 
attention to not only the discourses, but also discourse producers. I am not privileging the sociological 
perspective as the only legitimate approach; rather, I believe that contemporary Chinese intelligentsia 
cannot be properly understood without taking account the social dynamic behind the waves of discourses 
on the surface. To be more specific, instead of defining Chinese liberals based on an a priori ideological 
criterion, we are better served to examine in what sense those intellectuals are grouped together,  what 
role have the grouping and the label played, and the social relations behind the political rhetoric. 
On a more theoretical front, a sociological study of Chinese liberals makes a contribution to the 
burgeoning literature on the “new sociology of ideas” (Camic and Gross 2001; McLaughlin 2008), which 
does not take the content of knowledge and ideas for granted, but rather treats it as a key variable to be 
explained.181 Different from those in the humanities who either view ideas and political orientations as 
given (Said 1994) or focus on documenting discourses or interpreting texts (Schwartz 1985), the new 
wave of sociological studies try to link social milieu and group dynamics to knowledge and ideas. While 
sociologists of knowledge, including sociologists of science, have studied the relation between products 
of culture and the their producers, including scientists, intellectuals, and artists (Becker 2008; Mannheim 
                                                          
179 As Bevir (2011) points out, the term can be misleading as those associated with it differ significantly with one 
another. 
 
180 For an opposing approach that distill texts into certain complex “unit-ideas” and perennial debates, see Lovejoy 
(2009), although the contrast between Lovejoy and the Cambridge School tends to be exaggerated (McMahon 
2014:21). While Skinner’s insistence on the primacy of the “intention in utterance” is susceptible to attacks, in a 
sense, the opposing canonical approaches seem to build on a hidden assumption of a “real” intention, that is, 
contributing to perennial inquiries or future debates. 
 
181 Camic and Gross (2001:243–49) lay out five tenets of the new sociology of ideas: the sociology of ideas is an end 
in itself; rejection of the internal/external distinction; contextualism; localism; and struggles for intellectual position and 
the importance of fields. However, as is the case with many agenda-setting theoretical manifestos, the contrast 
between the “old” and “new” sociology of ideas is somewhat augmented. 
163 
 
1936; Merton 1973), not until fairly recently have sociologists explicitly tried to bridge the internal/external 
gap and look at the content of ideas itself (Abbott 2001; Baert 2015; Camic 1992, 1995; Camic, Gross, 
and Lamont 2011; Collins 1998; Farrell 2001; Frickel and Gross 2005; Glaeser 2011; Gross, 2002, 2008; 
Huebner 2014; Kusch 1995; Lamont 1987; Ward 1996).182 While the Cambridge School of Intellectual 
History has done some extraordinary work that situates products of culture within their contexts (Pocock, 
1975; Skinner 1978a, 1978b), sociology’s concern with social relations and social processes provides 
valuable insights into the social nature of knowledge. And while sociologists of knowledge have 
traditionally looked at sociocultural forces external to the content of knowledge, such as class positions 
and the organization of scientific or intellectual community, the new wave of studies maintain that 
“sociocultural processes are as much internal to the content of ideas as they are external” (Camic 
2001:8146). As the intellectual historian Dominick LaCapra (1980) argues, an appeal to the context was 
not particularly illuminating and is even deceptive, as there are a variety of interacting contexts that 
deserve further investigation. LaCapra singles out six contexts: the intentions of the author, the life 
(motivations) of the author, the society in which the author is located, the culture milieu, the corpus of the 
author, and the modes of discourse (structure or analogous concepts). Among these six types of context, 
sociology provides ideal tools for at least three: motivations, society, and culture. 
Charles Tilly (2005:14) identifies three types of general descriptions and explanations of social 
processes: systemic, dispositional, and transactional. Systemic accounts explain events by their location 
within a self-sustaining entity such as a society or an organization; dispositional accounts explain social 
and political occurrences by factors such as motives and emotions, which often operate on the individual 
level; and transactional accounts locate the key of the explanatory chain in interactions among social 
sites. While systemic accounts often have difficulty sorting out causal relationships, transactional 
accounts are particularly adept at locating middle-range explanatory mechanisms (Merton [1949] 1968); 
while Skinner’s quest for illocutionary intentions can be viewed as a special type of dispositional account, 
the transactional accounts can help us explain ideological positions by group patterns of the intellectuals. 
                                                          
182 This line pf research was in part precipitated by the new sociology of science, and in particular a group of British 
sociologists who challenged Mertonian scientific exceptionalism and analyzed the constructionist and situational 
nature of scientific knowledge in the 1970s (Barnes 1974; Bloor 1991). 
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As suggested above, Chinese liberals are not a tight-knit group with a hierarchical structure, a 
distinct set of rules, or a coordinated agenda. Rather, it is a discursive field (Foucault 1972; Wuthnow 
1989) that contains a number of competing and contradictory discourses, with some being philosophical 
or political in nature and some others more culturally oriented. What is more, the internal tension within 
the discursive field is high. Neither is Chinese liberalism a distinct ideology, if by ideology we mean “a set 
of ideas involving visionary and grandiose schemes of social change” (Kramnick and Watkins  1979:2)—
as shown above, most elite liberals in China are unable to put forward a systematic and coherent set of 
political beliefs or an articulate grand vision about china’s political future. I argue that liberalism in post-
Tiananmen China is a loose and multifarious community of discourse, or discursive community. Rather 
than a narrowly demarcated school or group, a community of discourse is a symbolic space in which a 
certain set of related discourses, written or verbal, formal or informal, are produced and disseminated; it is 
comprised of a loose-knit network of individuals who share an active interest and similar self-definitions, 
and who interact through the act of speaking or writing. A community of discourse is a dynamic space that 
premises on social relations, provides social categories, construct group identities, maintains symbolic 
boundaries, and bound by shared meanings.183 
As a community of discourse, Chinese liberalism displays a remarkable degree of heterogeneity. 
As indicated before, in terms of what they do, there are scholars, lawyers, writers, journalists, social and 
political activists, church leaders, and even party officials. Among scholars there are philosophers, 
political scientists, economists, sociologists, legal scholars, and historians. And as described above, 
internal disagreements and even conflicts abound within the liberal circle. The quarrels between 
moderates and radicals, between pragmatists and idealists, and between market fundamentalists and 
social democrats are all familiar to the insiders and observers. However, it would be a mistake to dismiss 
the label “liberalism” all together, as a social boundary can be easily discerned—when the liberals debate 
with one another, they call it “disagreements;” when the liberals debate with those on the left, they call it 
“combat.” When the liberals argue with each other, it is more or less friendly disagreements within the 
same “camp”; when the liberals argue with the left, it is a grudge battle that often transgresses into the 
cut-throat world of politics. As Xu Youyu (2012b: 61–62) noted, “Some people have suggested that we 
                                                          
183 I use the term much less in the normative (Habermas 1990) or linguistic (Swales 1990) sense, but in a sociological 
way (Wuthnow 1989). 
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are political liberals, whereas people like Zhang Weiying are economic liberals, and in order to avoid the 
slander and attack from the New Left, we should make a distinction between these two camps, or expel 
them from the liberal camp. Out of intellectual honesty, I’m not going to adopt such a strategy. While we 
have different emphases, and have disagreements and even oppositions, we all advocate market-
oriented economic reforms … .” Similarly, when asked whether the Chinese intelligentsia was still 
characterized by the division between the liberals and the New Left, Lei Yi said, “Yes, pretty much so. 
Despite the internal differences, these are two fundamentally different camps, … and the labels still make 
a lot of sense.” The alignment is not merely in terms of discourse—it extends to social connections in the 
real life, as commented by a journalist, “I get along with liberals well. Of course some liberals are jerks, 
but most of them are honest and open-minded, and you can have eye contact with them during 
conversations. … I even think that the New Leftists are mentally ill. … If you watch my debate with Wang 
Xiaodong on TV, he wouldn’t even have eye contact with you. … He must have been hiding something.” 
The fundamental division and distrust between the liberals and the left was confirmed by my interviews 
with both liberals and New Leftists. Since the early 2000s, the social distance between the liberals and 
the left has been increasing. While there were occasional public conversations between them or 
conferences attended by both sides in the 1990s, to a large degree, the liberals and the left have since 
regarded each other as enemies and do not even see each other often. A liberal interviewee’s comments 
convey the distance, “The leftists completely defend today’s Communist Party, and some even think that 
the suppression is not enough. You can read Pan Wei’s articles. Sima Nan said that those who dared go 
against the will of the CCP should be consequence. Tell me, how can the two sides get together?” 
 
The Common Denominator 
 
In an essay on Václav Havel, former political dissident in Czechoslovakia and first president of 
the Czech Republic, social critic Cui Weiping asks a profound question: 
 
Within the context of today’s China, supposedly Havel is easier to be identified 
with by those folks who are called “New Left,” considering his critique of modernity and 
the fact that he has never given up his “leftist” spirit. But in reality Havel tends to be 
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identified with by the folks who are called “liberals.” Why is this the case? (Cui [2000] 
2003:239) 
 
After quoting Havel’s passage that expressed his ambivalent attitude toward the term “socialism,” 
Cui went on and wrote: 
 
Can we draw the conclusion based on the above passage that Havel is indeed 
still a “socialist”? Wrong! Then can we draw the conclusion that he is not a socialist? Also 
wrong! Is he a liberal? You must be crazy! So he is not a liberal? Please tell me what you 
mean by “not a liberal”. Okay, he is a “New Leftist”? Where does that term come from! 
When the minimum framework of liberal democracy is not established, when the baseline 
of political equality, economic independence, and freedom of speech that are shared by 
everybody is completely established, the term “New Leftist” misses as much as, or even 
more than, it offers, because such a basic “framework” and “baseline” are shared by 
everybody, including any “leftist,” “rightist,” “moderate leftist,” “moderate rightist,” “mild 
leftist,” “mild rightist,” lunatic artist, dedicated Marxist, scissor grinder, or knife sharpener. 
They certainly need to be built and maintained by everybody. In this sense, the so-called 
“liberal” is not an adequate term either. For example, how can someone who identifies 
with Havel a “liberal”! (This merely indicates that he is not a liberal.) Alas, when can we 
get rid of this one-dimensional thinking! (Cui [2000] 2003:243–44) 
 
Cui then compared the paradox faced by Chinese intellectuals to that faced by Havel: 
 
In Central and Eastern Europe, because of the complex situations and 
paradoxes, all issues that could be raised were inevitably fragile and open to attacks, for 
they were often self-contradictory. … China’s situation is exactly the same. Almost every 
sentence uttered by us is attacked front and rear. After we make an argument, within one 
second a thought will strike us—we need another article that makes an argument 
contradictory to what was just made. (Cui [2000] 2003:244) 
 
To understand Havel’s paradox, Cui suggests, we need to keep in mind that Havel never forgot to 
confine the problem he engaged to his major subjects of critique. This insight helps us make sense of the 
heterogeneity of Chinese liberalism as a community of discourse. Indeed, Cui herself exemplifies the 
complexity of contemporary intelligentsia. A literature professor at the Beijing Film Academy,184 Cui is 
more widely known as a social commentator, human rights activist, and translator of Havel’s “The Power 
of the Powerless.” In 2009, Cui and Xu Youyu collected the Homo Homini Award on behalf of all of the 
signatories of Charter 08 and its major drafter Liu Xiaobo, winner of the 2010 Nobel Peace Prize, from the 
hands of Havel. Because of her political opposition, Cui is perceived by many Chinese as a prominent 
                                                          
184 Cui is now retired. 
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liberal intellectual (Xu Jilin 2002:44). However, during interview, Cui repeatedly rejected the conventional 
label, “I’m not a liberal, because I’m not a big fan of the free market ideal.” 
By contrast, legal scholar Wu Fatian185 has frequently claimed that he is a liberal and that he is 
leaning toward the right in the political spectrum. During interview, Wu pointed out that he was with the 
liberals on a great number of issues, including democracy, freedom, human rights, rule of law, and the 
Cultural Revolution. However, intellectual positioning is not simply a matter of self-positioning—
perceptions of intellectual rivals and the larger society play a crucial role. Both inside and outside the 
intellectual field, Wu is perceived as a leftist and it is difficult to find anyone who identifies him as a liberal. 
The question then becomes: how are we to account for the different experiences of Cui and Wu? 
Put another way, what does it mean to be a liberal in post-Tiananmen China? The answer lies, I argue, 
not in what the liberals are for, but in what they are against. As a negative reference group, the 
authoritarian regime has always been the main reference and target in the mental world of Chinese 
liberals. As an old saying goes, “the enemy of my enemy is my friend,” in the face of the unbending 
authoritarian regime that has not collapsed after the Tiananmen massacre, but rather has grown more 
and more resilient largely because of its sustained economic growth, most intellectuals who are opposed 
to authoritarianism, explicitly or implicitly, have come to identify themselves and those link-minded as 
liberals. Despite the myriad of internal differences (and strife or even conflicts) and the lack of 
organization, Chinese liberals are united by their anti-authoritarian mentality. The reason that Wu is seen 
as a leftist instead of a liberal is simply that his online anti-rumor campaign has only been “selectively 
busting rumors”—only busting anti-CCP rumors but never busting official rumors—and therefore Wu is 
considered by the liberals as an ally of the regime, despite his repeated refusal. 
This reveals the danger of taking liberalism and liberal at their face value and out of their context 
in China. Chinese liberalism is a constellation of less-articulated and ill-defined ideas, and whether a 
person is counted as a liberal is determined not by his or her ideological purity, but by whether his rhetoric 
is considered part of the anti-authoritarian discourse. In the liberal “camp,” there are both neoliberals who 
wholeheartedly embrace capitalism and the free market and social democrats who are worried about 
market tyrannies fueled by unfettered capitalism; there are both admirers of the modern democratic state 
                                                          
185 Wu’s birth name is Wu Danhong but often goes by the pseudonym Wu Fatian in public. 
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who would like to see an American-styled mechanism of separation of powers set up in China and critics 
of Western democracy who believe that a great deal of political wisdom can be drawn from Confucianism; 
there are both universalists who worry about the nationalist fervor in China and nationalists with strong 
anti-American sentiment; and there are both conservatives bidding “farewell to revolution” (Li Zehou and 
Liu Zaifu 2011) and radicals calling for “returning to revolution” (Teng Biao and Wang Tiancheng 2015). 
Despite all these differences, the intellectuals are unified by their shared opposition to the communist 
regime, although the degree varies. In the eyes of the liberals, the problems triggered by modernity and 
capitalism are all minor compared to the evil of authoritarianism. Chinese liberals did not become liberal 
by reading Hayek or Adam Smith, but rather found and appreciate them only after they became liberal—
meaning becoming anti-authoritarian—through breathing in and out of communism every day. Therefore, 
only by understanding Chinese liberals in the context of the authoritarian regime can we understand the 
ostensibly “garbled version of liberalism” (Freeden 2015:111), and only a sociological approach can tell 
us why the liberals read Havel and Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn and the New Leftists read Carl Schmitt and 
Leo Strauss. 
The coalition, or elective affinity, between different lines of ideology is not unique to post-
Tiananmen China. Indeed, the similar pattern can be observed in Central and Eastern Europe prior to the 
Revolution of 1989. For example, the signatories of Charter 77 came from different political ideologies 
and did not all see themselves as dissidents (Bolton 2012); the coalition between the dissidents and the 
technocrats was the key to the capitalist transition of the Czech Republic (Eyal 2000, 2003:59–92); the 
collapse of the Soviet Union was precipitated by Soviet intellectuals who were united by their yearning for 
moral renewal and human dignity (Aron 2012). In communist-ruled countries, it is a common 
phenomenon that intellectuals of different backgrounds and with different political orientations unite 
against the regime (Saxonberg 2013:156–66). 
In communist China, intellectuals belonging to this de facto alliance are widely seen as liberals, 
which in turn affect how they identify themselves. Take Zhang Ming for example. A historian and social 
critic, Zhang’s situation is similar to that of Cui Weiping in that he is widely perceived, against his will, as a 




A journalist once asked me, ‘You have never studied abroad. Why do you like 
liberalism so much?’ I said, “I don’t like liberalism; I like freedom. It is a human instinct to 
like freedom.’ … I don’t see myself as a liberal, because I’m not like Gao Quanxi and the 
others who come from a tradition of liberalism and have studied the theory of liberalism 
itself. I just believe that pursuing freedom and resisting tyranny are human instincts. I’m 
only against tyranny. I don’t agree with the theory of liberalism, or rather I don’t have a 
crush for this theory. I just don’t like oppression. It’s not my purpose to develop a school 
of thought. Because for a historian like me, the fact is right there, tyranny is right there, 
and so many dead people are right there. … I don’t like tyranny, so I can’t say tyranny is 
necessary. But some people can say so. So to me it’s not a matter of positioning, but a 
matter of conscience. In fact, I believe there are many people like me. We don’t want to 
pursue a theory of liberalism or a neoliberal society; we are not interested in those at all. 
But we have instincts. I can’t say that forced evictions and forcing petitioners into mental 
asylums, re-education through labor camps (laojiaosuo), or prisons are good and 
necessary things. I can’t say that and I can’t ignore those things, so I speak out. I’m just 
against those things. … There are no leftists and rightists in the Western sense in China; 
there are only pro-establishment faction and non-establishment faction, only faction with 
conscience and faction without conscience. Only those two factions. I’m not really a 
liberal. I’m just a person who speaks from conscience. … [The reason many see me as a 
liberal is that] what I’m vehemently opposed to is also opposed by the liberals. 
 
As much heterogeneity as Chinese liberalism displays, and as much historical variation as 
liberalism has undergone, anti-authoritarianism as the core of Chinese liberalism has never changed 
since 1989. Indeed, it is the hidden and deep-rooted anti-authoritarian mentality that has effectively united 
the so-called liberals. The self-identified liberals whom I interviewed expressed much disagreement 
concerning a wide range of issues, and many even had pursued heated internal quarrels and angers, but 
one prominent theme had consistently stood out—the rebellion against the CCP, albeit the difference in 
degree. And in the face of the authoritarian regime, everything else does not seem to matter much any 
longer, as explained by Zhang: 
 
Indeed there are many contradictions between me and [many liberals]. Some of 
them, such as Yu Jie, Wang Yi, and Jiao Guobiao, I very much disagree with what they 
say. It’s just that I haven’t argued with them. … I will not criticize the liberals. Why would I 
criticize them? There is no motivation for me to criticize them openly. Relatively speaking, 
what pisses me off more is the government, so I focus on criticizing the government. 
 
An interviewee commented during interview 
 
[The New Left] has undergone two significant transformations. First, they have 
abandoned the essence of the left. The left is supposed to be critical, but they are now in 
total agreement with the China Model. Second, they are trying to connect with history. … 
On the other hand, the liberals are rethinking the issues of nationalism and state-
building … . Over the last three to five years, … the so-called conservatives, liberals, and 
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New Left have changed in terms of their goals and approaches … . But all the changes 
revolve around a core, which is the judgment of the CCP, the dictatorial regime. The 
division in stance and opinion is still clear. China’s New Left still argue based on the 
premise of the CCP, whereas the liberals still question the dictatorial regime itself. 
 
As communities of discourse, liberalism and the New Left have both undergone profound 
transformations since the 1990s; however, the stark difference in attitude toward the CCP and its 
authoritarian rule has not disappeared—indeed, it has only become more pronounced. For the liberals, 
the most important reality of today’s China is the dictatorial politics; but for the leftists, the real evil is 




As Vladimir Gligorov (1991:20) observes, in a country that lacks liberal tradition, “one has to 
experience conflict with socialism to see the natural beauties of liberalism.” In a rapidly changing society, 
significant historical events often persist as points of contemporary reference, generate generational 
consciousness, and trigger social and political actions (Mannheim 1952c). While intellectual activities 
revolve around abstract ideas and concepts, the mental world of intellectuals is structured by historical 
events that are significant to them and vivid personal memories. In other words, what divides the 
intellectuals is often neither the present nor the future, but the past. In the Chinese intelligentsia, two 
concrete historical events have profoundly shaped the political orientation of the intellectuals: the Cultural 
Revolution from 1966 to 1976 and the Tiananmen Square protests of 1989 (June Fourth). While every 
individual who experienced these historical events had his or her own memory (Ding 2006:156), the 
memories and interpretations display striking similarities on each side of the intellectual spectrum and 
differences between the liberals and the New Left. 
As Barry Schwartz (2012:529) notes, “understandings of the past … are not randomly distributed 
through society; different groupings, organizations, and institutions have elective affinities for different 
remembrances.” Past events are not an objective world that is out there to be discovered or unearthed; 
rather, history is constructed through collective memory that is filled with human experience and emotions. 
Remembering is a process of meaning making and negotiation; memory is not a thing that is recalled, but 
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an act of understanding and identification. Michael Oakeshott (2015:74) puts it subtly, “The mind can 
entertain only that which has a meaning, that which belongs to a world.” Memory is a negotiation between 
remembering and forgetting; people tend to unconsciously prioritize certain things to remember while 
leaving other things behind (Ricoeur 2004). 
 
Cultural Revolution: When it comes to the Cultural Revolution and Maoist China in general, four 
discourses are associated with the New Left: equality, reasonable elements, different voices, institutional 
innovation, and alternative modernity. Xuding Zhang, professor of comparative literature at New York 
University, described Maoist China as one in which the national wealth “[belonged] to all Chinese people” 
and contrasted it with present-day China in which the wealth was “allotted through the scrambling of the 
privileged” (Zhang 2008a:135). The Cultural Revolution was not only perceived as a period of economic 
equality, but also viewed as an attempt to achieve “genuine popular sovereignty” (Wang Hui [2006] 
2009:9). Cui Zhiyuan (1994b, 1995c, 1996b), political scientist at Tsinghua University, called on the 
exploitation of the “reasonable elements” (heli yinsu) of the Cultural Revolution, and in particular the mass 
participation of political life. Gao Mobo (2008), professor of Chinese Studies at the University of Adelaide 
in Australia, argues that the narrative of the Cultural Revolution has been monopolized by a small number 
of political and intellectual elites, and the majority of the Chinese, especially the rural poor, actually 
benefited from Mao’s policies, and therefore their voices deserve to be heard. Many of Mao’s policies are 
viewed by the New Left as seeds of institutional innovation, such as post-Fordism and economic 
democracy (Cui Zhiyuan 1996a). Liu Kang (2000:x), professor of Chinese at Duke University, regarded 
the Cultural Revolution as a Marxist project of “critiquing capitalist modernity and constructing an 
alternative modernity.” While not many leftists whole-heartedly praised the Cultural Revolution with any 
reservation, most of them have been largely silent about the disasters during the Cultural Revolution in 
specific and Maoist China in general. Furthermore, they are unwilling to break free of the revolutionary 
past, but instead want to reclaim the “real” revolutionary spirit of Mao (Wang Hui 2015). 
The liberals appear to have radically different interpretations of the Cultural Revolution. The 
dominant liberal narrative has been “catastrophe” (haojie).186 For the liberals, the decade from 1966 to 
                                                          
186 Ironically, on the surface, the liberal narrative of the Cultural Revolution has been in accordance with the official 
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1976, and even the three decades under the rule of Mao, was ten years of great calamity with disastrous 
consequences. The whole society was in chaos, countless people were persecuted or even killed, the 
economy was on the brink of collapse, the traditional culture was attacked, and the masses were fooled 
by Mao. Some liberals who hold more radical views even go further and denounce Mao as an evil, power-
hungry, and mass-murdering monster. In short, the Cultural Revolution was a past that was unbearable to 
recall and the revolutionary past it represented must be completely broken free. While the New Left and 
the liberals both call for critical reflections of the Cultural Revolution, the liberals insist on the necessity of 
confession (Xu Youyu [2000] 2002), whereas the New Left practically transformed Mao into a “should be” 
hero by “projecting their own vision … into a charismatic personality” (Xiao Yanzhong 2010:284). 
The attitude toward the Cultural Revolution is a defining boundary that demarcates the liberals 
from the left. Although the Cultural Revolution has remained a “forbidden zone” in China,187 it is very easy 
to detect the disfavor of the history in the liberal discourse. Take Li Yinhe for example. While repeatedly 
asserting herself as a liberal, she almost always followed the assertion with a caveat that she indeed 
agreed with many of the proposals from the New Left. The statement below is a perfect illustration: 
 
Without a doubt, I’m a liberal. However, I feel ambivalent about the Chongqing 
Model188 implemented by Bo Xilai, which represents leftist policies. I don’t think it’s 
entirely wrong. Of course, I disagree with the extreme leftists, such as those associated 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
narrative of the CCP, who has openly acknowledged that the Cultural Revolution “led to domestic turmoil and brought 
catastrophe to the Party, the state and the whole people” (Sixth Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee 
of the Communist Party of China, 1981), although the CCP has not allowed any large-scale open discussion of the 
Cultural Revolution. 
 
187 For example, when liberal philosopher Xu Youyu edited a special issue of a magazine that was dedicated to 
critical reflections of the 30th anniversary of the launch of the Cultural Revolution, it was immediately banned by the 
government (Béja 2011:2). The ban on public discussions has applied to the leftist discourse as well. For example, in 
2001, the influential intellectual magazine Reading published an essay by Gao Mobo, in which Gao used his 
hometown as a case to argue for the “bright side” of the Cultural Revolution. Reading intended to continue the public 
conversation, but then received an order from a relevant authority not to continue publishing any article about the 
Cultural Revolution (Gan Dan 2007). 
 
188 While the CCP has repeatedly denied its existence, the widely-discussed “Chongqing Model” refers to a series of 
economic, political, social, and cultural policies adopted by Bo Xilai, the now-disgraced former member of the Central 
Politburo of the CCP and leader of Chongqing, a direct-controlled municipality, although some policies were put in 
place by Bo’s predecessors and some have remained in place after the purge of Bo. Economically, Bo actively sought 
foreign investment, and implemented large-scale public works programs and subsidized housing projects for the poor. 
Politically, Bo ordered the municipal officials to visit rural areas and to eat, live, and labor with peasants. Socially, Bo 
initiated a sweeping and often extrajudicial campaign against corruption and organized crime, and significantly 
increased the security and police presence in the city. Culturally, Bo launched a “red culture” movement, featured by 
the massive promotion of “red songs,” revolutionary television programming, and the traditional revolutionary thought. 
The model was praised by many leftist intellectuals and widely perceived as representing leftist ideology. For an 
extensive discussion of the Chongqing Model, see Cheng (2015). 
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with Wuyou zhi xiang (the Utopia), such as the saying that we need another Cultural 
Revolution. But I very much agree with some of leftist proposals, such as reducing 
economic inequality exemplified by the Chongqing Model. … Wholesale Westernization 
isn’t the only option … . After all, China has a set of distinct national conditions and 
situations, and it has been under the rule of the CCP for more than 60 years. It has a 
number of its own characteristics, which are not necessarily all negative. From the 
perspective of classic liberalism, they have no merits at all, but … for thousands of years 
China has been a dictatorial society, and such machinery has been running this way. … 
So I think the left makes certain sense. 
 
It is interesting to note that while Li identified herself with liberalism at the outset, almost the entire 
paragraph is to highlight the merits of the New Left. However, the picture will be much clearer once we 
look at what she is against: 
 
What I’m firmly opposed is the deification of Mao Zedong. Of course Mao was a 
human being. The deification of Mao will lead to the defeat of China. … The Cultural 
Revolution was about persecuting intellectuals, and the intellectuals were miserable. Not 
again! … How crazy are those Utopia people, who can’t even figure out whether Mao is a 
god or was a human being! Why would you live in today’s China? You should go to hell! 
How sick is that! … Speaking of the chaos during the Cultural Revolution, do they know 
about cannibalism in Guangxi? … And these people want another Cultural Revolution? 
This is terrible. I think these people are terrorists. 
 
From the very emotional remarks above, we can say that while Li’s head is with the left, her hear 
is with the liberals. Despite her sympathy of, and agreement with, many economic and social policies 
advocated by the left, the disgust with Mao and the Cultural Revolution marks the fundamental division 
between her and the left. He Weifang acknowledged that his position was partially driven by his strong 
distaste for the Cultural Revolution: 
 
I’m very, very disgusted with the praise of the Cultural Revolution by the New Left. 
I have to admit that my view is a little extreme. I especially can’t understand why 
someone would praise Mao Zedong and the Cultural Revolution, would say that the 
Cultural Revolution was about equality, and would say that the Cultural Revolution was 
about democracy. They’re unashamedly distorting the truth. … Some people say that the 
Cultural Revolution was a period of democracy. I say it’s simply—what kind of democracy 
was it? Democracy means that decisions are made by the people, not that the highest 
leader can purge all the other officials. Who could question the decision of the only leader? 
Nobody. How can this be called democracy? 
 
To be sure, the distaste for the Maoist era is a matter of degree. Not many liberals expressed the 
animosity toward Mao as bluntly as the art historian Zhang Yaojie: “I have hated Mao Zedong since [first 
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grade]. I’m full of hatred of Mao. … I have hated the CCP and Mao Zedong since childhood.” But the 
general difference in attitude toward Mao, and in particular toward the Cultural Revolution, between the 
liberals and the New Left is obvious. Take Zhang Boshu, for example. Zhang has repeatedly criticized the 
simplistic view of Mao as nothing but an evil man, but after all, he aligns himself with liberalism because 
he acknowledges that “Mao has been the biggest dictator in contemporary China” (Zhang Boshu 2010:5). 
 
June Fourth: The difference between the New Left and liberals with respect to their view of June 
Fourth is more subtle. While the CCP has not been completely successful in quelling the discussion of the 
Cultural Revolution, it has been much more successful in erasing the 1989 protests from the collective 
memory.189 As popular demonstrations led by college students and with broad civic support, at least in 
urban areas, the protests eventually met with forcible suppression by the CCP that led to a large number 
of civilian deaths in Beijing. Since then and up to the present, the tragic event has been an absolute taboo 
in China. For the New Left, while many were active participants of the protests themselves, the protests 
and the suppression have been an “elephant in the room,” and the leftists have appeared to be very 
careful not to get into any explicit discussion of the event. Wang Hui ([2001] 2008) has been one of very 
few intellectuals, among both liberals and New Left, who have systematically reflected on the protests. 
While briefly acknowledging the historical significance of the protests as a pro-democracy movement, 
Wang downplays the claims of democracy and political rights of the movement, but rather regards it as a 
reactive social movement that originated from the society’s attempt to defend itself from the penetration of 
market forces that were colliding with the monopolizing state power. In other words, the 1989 movement 
was part of worldwide anti-neoliberal movements that culminated in the 1999 Seattle WTO protests. While 
never explicitly defending the authoritarian political system, Wang took pain to reveal the real “bad guy”—
global capitalism.  
In 2000, when an audience asked about his view of the 1989 tragedy in a conference in Belgium, 
Cui Zhiyuan gave a reply revealing enough to be quoted here in an extended form: 
 
                                                          
189 It is a fact that the majority of younger-generation Chinese do not know what happened in 1989; many of them are 
not even aware of such an incident. See Lim (2014). 
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To answer the sensitive question about June Fourth, let me tell you my personal 
feeling about the Tiananmen Incident. I was working on my PhD at the University of 
Chicago back then and was very sympathetic to the students in Tiananmen Square. One 
evening, when watching a TV debate about the Tiananmen students on an American TV 
station, I was surprised to hear Henry Kissinger, one of the guests, say that no 
government should tolerate students or other activists to occupy a central square for 
more than a month. He also mentioned an incident in 1932 when World War I veterans 
massed at the U.S. Capitol. … While General Eisenhower was sympathetic to the 
veterans and their families, General MacArthur insisted that the veterans were cat's-paws 
for the Republican Party and therefore ordered the army and tanks to crack down. … I 
was then very angry at Kissinger and searched everywhere for information in order to 
know what on earth happened. … I lived in America for 17 years. Aside from specialist 
historians, I never heard any American mention it. I’m not dredging up the past 20 years 
[after 1989] to justify the Tiananmen Incident. I just want to honestly tell everybody my 
personal ambivalence and struggle back then. 
I then became very interested in the constitutional history of the West and delved 
deeper into it. One case particularly drew my attention. In 1836, U.S. Congress passed a 
billed called “gag rule” … that set aside any anti-slavery petition. Even then 
Congressman Lincoln [sic], who advocated the abolition of slavery, voted in favor of the 
bill. … Under the circumstances back then, Lincoln believed that the wisest approach to a 
sensitive issue was to temporarily set aside until the time was right. 20 years later, 
Lincoln became the president that abolished slavery. This means that his earlier decision 
was totally justifiable.190 
… In On the Use and Abuse of History for Life, the German philosopher 
Nietzsche says that sometimes for an individual or a nation, the wisest approach may be 
to forget, or “active forgetfulness” in Nietzsche’s words, as it may not do you any good if 
you keep opening past wounds.191 
This has nothing to do with the freedom of speech. What I’m emphasizing here is 
that Western media’s reports on this incident have often been tendentious. For them, if 
the Chinese government or the Chinese media does not mention June Fourth, that 
indicates the lack of the freedom of speech in China. But I think this is a simplified view of 
the freedom of speech. We should distinguish between “gag rules” and the freedom of 
speech. 
 
This statement deserves special attention because it reveals the ways in which many of the New 
Left intellectuals approach the tragedy of 1989. First, similar tragedies have happened in the West, 
including the United States. Second, the similar tragedies have not been the subject of everyday 
conversations. Third, dwelling on the past may not be wise; rather, we should look ahead. By diverting the 
attention away from the massacre (a term that has never been used by the left) and the authoritarian 
                                                          
190 Cui’s seemed to have misunderstood both the historical events and the gag rule. I thank Andrew Nathan for 
pointing this out to me. 
 
191 On another occasion Cui stated that this argument came from the political philosopher Stephen Holmes 
(http://www.cui-
zy.com/Recommended/%E5%AE%AA%E6%94%BF%E4%B8%8E%E6%B0%91%E4%B8%BB/Cui%E7%A7%AF%
E6%9E%81%E5%81%A5%E5%BF%98.asp). Based on my comparison, both the historical case of “gag rule” and the 
citation of Nietzsche come from Holmes (1988). 
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regime, Cui implicitly defended the military action of the CCP in 1989, albeit his denial of such an 
intention. 
Instead of advocating “active forgetfulness”, June Fourth is deeply ingrained in the mind of the 
liberals, and they have tried hard to keep the memory of 1989 alive, both for themselves and for the 
public. Indeed, June Fourth has occupied such a prominent role in the memory and identity of the liberals 
that it is difficult to find a single self-identified liberal who does not holds a favorable, or at least 
sympathetic, view of the protests and who tries to justify the crackdown. While those write about June 
Fourth only belong to the minority, and the writings only appear in overseas outlets, 192 my interviews 
confirm the universal support of the protests and disapproval of the military action of the CCP. 
It is indeed the strong anti-authoritarian sentiment—exemplified by the aversion to the Cultural 
Revolution (and Maoist China in general) and the crackdown of the CCP on Tiananmen Square protests 
of 1989—that unifies those otherwise heterogonous intellectuals whom we call liberals. In other words, 
those intellectuals are liberals not in the sense of what they are for, but in the sense of what they are 
against—the authoritarian regime, the elephant in the room in contemporary China. As Charles Tilly 
(2008:ix) observes, blame often carries more weight than credit in collective memory in that blame 
demarcates sharper moral boundaries “between a worthy us and an unworthy them” than does credit. 
The antithesis to the authoritarian political system is indeed a strong force that renders all the other 
disagreements irrelevant and constructs a de facto community of liberal discourse. In a nutshell, conflict 
generates knowledge and identity. 
The following example nicely showcases the starkly different attitudes toward the authoritarian 
regime of the liberals and the New Left. In December 2009, after Liu Xiaobo, who won a Nobel Peace 
Prize a year later, was charged “inciting subversion of state power” and sentenced to eleven years’ 
imprisonment for his leading role in the Charter 08, Cui Weiping called 160 well-known intellectuals 
without prior notice and recorded their responses to the sentence. The liberals nearly universally 
condemned the sentence, or at least expressed disapproval of it. Cheng Yizhong denounced the 
sentence as “a barbaric abuse of human conscience and civilization” and “shameless and stupid.” Xu 
                                                          
192 See, for example, Liu Xiaobo (2009), Yu Jie (2005), and Zhang Boshu (2008). It should also be noted that some 
liberals have openly commemorated June Fourth through small-scale meetings, although with the consequences of 
police harassments, questioning, detentions, or even sentencing. See Tatlow (2014). 
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Youyu viewed it as “an act of defiance to all Chinese and human conscience.” Hu Xingdou even 
compared China to Hitler’s Germany and Stalin’s Soviet Union. On the contrary, the responses from 
those on the left were quite measured and restrained.193 Liu Xiaofeng indicated that he was unaware of 
the sentence and had to learn what happened before making a comment. Zhang Yiwu said that his 
“attention was on other matters” and “[did] not have any response.” Wang Yichuan said that he did not 
know Liu Xiaobo well and did not want to make a comment. Han Shaogong responded that it was not a 
good time to comment on the sentence and he would write an article about it one or two years later. 
Without commenting on the sentence itself, Wang Hui expressed his general disapproval of punishment 
for speech in an email, “I don’t agree with many of Liu Xiaobo’s opinions, but am opposed to punishing 
someone for speech. I will pay follow up this incident and expresses my view after learning more facts.”194 
Among all the leftists who received the call from Cui, the only explicit oppositions to the sentence came 
from Mo Luo and Huang Jisu. Mo Luo said, “[The sentence] was unfortunate. There is nothing else I want 
to say.” The most elaborate comments, although preceded by a disclaimer, were made by Huang Jisu, “I 
agree with few of Liu Xiaobo’s political views, and we have had no nice things to say to each other. But 
punishing a person for speech is not a good thing—it is neither just nor wise, and should not continue.” 
(Cui Weiping 2010) 
 
Liberalism as Generational Phenomenon 
 
In the preface of a collection of his essays, dissident and one of China’s most prominent liberals 
Hu Ping, whose 1979 article “On Freedom of Speech” (Lun yanlun ziyou) is widely considered one of first 
manifestos of liberalism in communist China, describes how he became a liberal: 
 
I did not acquire the idea of freedom of speech from an abstract theory of natural 
law or of human rights. On the contrary, I only discovered the abstract theories of natural 
law and human rights after acquiring the idea of freedom of speech. There is not 
surprising: cultural traditions such as the natural law had been absent in China, and as a 
result of the ideological monopoly of the Communist Party we were unable to acquire 
                                                          
193 It should be noted that the majority of the intellectuals whom Cui Weiping called are more or less associated with 
liberalism. 
 
194 To the best of my knowledge, Wang Hui has not made any public comment with respect to the sentence since.  
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those spiritual resources from the West. Therefore, our liberal ideas could only originate 
from our own experience, from our reflections on our own experiences. In my view, this is 
likely a shared experience of all liberals in contemporary China (Hu Ping 1992). 
 
This is indeed a typical experience for Chinese liberals, and it brings us to a general point: what 
we call Chinese liberalism is largely a generational phenomenon. As some scholars note, the term 
“generation” has multiple meanings in the social sciences and may generate confusion. It is often used as 
a kinship term that indicates “stages of linear descent in a family” (Shanahan and Macmillan 2008:120; 
see also Gold 1991). However, since Karl Mannheim’s widely-cited essay “The Problem of Generations,” 
the term has also been adopted to describe the formative role of similar historical backgrounds and 
personal experiences on the later development of people’s lives and views. The term is used in the 
second sense throughout this dissertation. However, the term is need of further refinement here, as those 
in the Mannheimian tradition often simply assume generation to be those “born at roughly the same time 
in history” (Shanahan and Macmillan 2008:120–21). Therefore, it is necessary to make a distinction 
between a birth cohort and a generation. An age cohort (or simply “cohort”) is “a group of people who 
have shared some critical experience during the same interval of time” (Alwin and McCammon 2004:26). 
The common experience, however, is not necessarily imprinted in the human brain and transformed into 
shared meanings, understandings, or identities of the cohort members. A generation is a cohort that 
internalizes the shared experience and historical contexts, which give rise to a distinctive and conscious 
collective culture or shared identity, or “with a special mission even if it goes unachieved,” to borrow 
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(1979:470–71, see also Li Zehou and Schwarcz 1983) classified twentieth-century Chinese intellectuals 
into six generations: the generation of the Xinhai Revolution, the generation of the May Fourth Movement, 
the generation of the Great Revolution, the generation of 1938, the generation of liberation, and the 
generation of Red Guards. Similarly, Xu Jilin (2003:79–87) distinguishes six generations of intellectuals in 
twentieth-century China. “Generation” has also entered China’s political vocabulary, as historians and 
political observers have referred to five generations of Chinese leadership, with the fifth generation, 
represented by Xi Jinping, came to power in 2012 and the next generation set to come to the fore in 2022. 
The concept of generation is even much more widely spread in daily conversations as it is common for 
the Chinese to be divided into different age groups such as the “1970s generation” (70 hou, meaning 
those born in the 1970s) and the “1980s generation” (80 hou, meaning those born in the 1980s). The 
notion of generation in China is by no means arbitrary grouping based on birth years. Instead, it reflects 
the profound impact of social structure and historical context on the individual orientation. For example, 
the 1980s generation is the first generation born during the enforcement of China’s one-child policy and 
therefore grew up in a family and social environment that was drastically different from the previous 
generation. 
A glance at the birth years of the liberals reveals a general pattern: the majority of them were 
born in the year between 1950 and 1979. Out of the 55 self-identified liberals whom I interviewed, 16 
belong to the birth cohort of 1950–1959, 17 belong to the birth cohort of 1960–1969, and 11 belong to the 
birth cohort of 1970–1979, particularly the first half of the 1970s. Upon closer look and including the 
cohort of 1940–1949, we can divide the liberals into two generations—the generation of Mao and the 
generation of Tiananmen—with the former roughly consisting of the liberals born from the 1940s to the 
early 1960s and the latter born in the late 1960s and the 1970s. Indeed, the two generations have 
received quite some academic attention, and are often referred to as the “Mao generation” and the “Deng 
generation,”195 or the “lost generation” and the “reform generation” (Cherrington 1997:3). I do not use the 
terms in any substantively different way, but imply want to emphasize the importance of the two historical 
events, which I argue played a formative role in the development of the political views and attitudes of the 
liberals. A cautionary note is in order here: the division between these two generation is only an exercise 
                                                          
195 As China was under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping in the 1980s, the label “Deng generation” conveys a sense 
of political succession between the Mao and Deng administrations. 
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of ideal type categorization, as the memory of June Fourth is also essential to the generation of Mao, and 
the Cultural Revolution was decisive in the formative stage of those born in the late 1960s and had an 
impact on those born in the 1970s in various ways. Furthermore, my focus is not on the difference 
between these two generations; rather, I argue that the two generations are united by their share memory 
and view of some of the major historical events in the second half of 20th-century China. Each generation 
is not merely a loose collectivity composed of individuals who happened to be born in roughly the same 
historical period, or occupy the same “generation location,” but rather a “generation as an actuality” with a 
concrete inner link uniting its members (Mannheim 1952c:303–304). 
Different from the previous and the subsequent generations, the generation of Mao grew up in the 
shadow of Maoism. Their individual life trajectories were closely linked with Mao’s political decisions, and 
they breathed in and out of Maoism. As a consequence, Maoism and the Cultural Revolution occupied 
the central place of the collective memory of this generation. For example, Wu Si’s childhood training was 
occupied by reciting the entire Little Red Book, which contains more than 200 pages, and all of the Five 
Old Articles (lao wupian),196 and he read Marx and Engel’s The Communist Manifesto line by line for 
more than ten times. They had similar patterns of life trajectory in childhood and adolescence, and are 
bonded by the similar fate and shared memories. As Ding Dong summarized: 
 
I was in middle school when the Cultural Revolution erupted. The Cultural 
Revolution sparked my life-long interest in Chinese politics. Unlike your generation and 
the other generations, we encountered the Cultural Revolution when we were teenagers. 
As a consequence, we were much more precocious and began to care about grand 
issues such as our state, nation, and people at a very early age. … The questions of the 
future of our country and the fate of the human being seem to be remote for today’s 
[teenagers] in Beijing. … From the beginning to the end of the Cultural Revolution, 
“whither China” was always an appealing question to me. 
 
Growing up in the 1980s, the Tiananmen generation was not burdened by the Maoist ideology 
and was largely free of the endless political campaigns. Instead, as Chapter 2 shows, it was heavily 
influenced by the New Enlightenment movement that dominated Chinese intelligentsia in the second half 
of the 1980s (Xu Jilin 2011a:3–16). The New Enlightenment movement had two features. First, it was a 
                                                          
196 Five constantly read articles by Mao that were written before the CCP came into power in 1949, including “The 
Foolish Old Man Who Moved the Mountain” (Yugong yishan), “In Memory of Norman Bethune” (Jinian bai Qiuen), 
“Serve the People” (Wei renmin fuwu), “On Correcting Mistaken Ideas in the Party” (Guanyu jiuzheng dangnei de 
cuowu sixiang), and “Combat Liberalism” (Fandui ziyouzhuyi). 
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heterogonous, and in a sense all-embracing, cultural movement. “Reevaluating all values” was the de 
facto guiding principle (Xu Jilin 2011a:12). Second, it had a teleological understanding of Western 
modernity. It avoided the ideological labels of “capitalism” and “socialism,” and resorted instead to the 
theory of modernization, and in particular that of cultural modernization. The West became a vague ideal 
to be emulated. Under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping, China in much of the 1980s was marked by the 
overarching themes of economic reform and opening up, despite repeated small-scale political crackdown. 
This generation was characterized by a strong desire to embrace reforms and learn from the West. Unlike 
the previous generation that was “tempered in the revolutionary furnace” (Pan 2009) and the later 
generation that was nurtured by popular culture, occupied by the desire of economic betterment, and 
characterized by political apathy, the Tiananmen generation was largely free of the heavy baggage of 
Maoism and cultural tradition while still being occupied by big questions such as the fate of China. More 
important, the authoritarian state as the “generalized other” permeated the consciousness of the 
generation, as Li Lu (1990:98, cited in Cherrington 1997:5), one of the leaders of June Fourth describes, 
“[A] central characteristic of my generation [is] the concept of the individual standing up against an 
autocratic system that sought to eliminate individuality. Many did not know how to develop as individuals 
but had a strong desire to rebel against convention and society: they did not want to be slaves like their 
fathers.” After decades of isolation from the outside world, the generation was eager to learn from the 
West and was interested in a dizzying array of different, and indeed often opposing, Western thoughts. 
Different Western thoughts were hastily swallowed, and the generation had a romanticized image of the 
West. 
As Chapter 2 suggests, the rise and dominance of reformist discourse in the 1980s was initially 
facilitated by, and to a degree even a result of, power struggle within the CCP. The new leaders, and in 
particular Deng Xiaoping, were purged by Mao during the Cultural Revolution. Therefore, once back in 
power, they became the decisive force of de-Maoization,197 and “reform” was a powerful rhetorical tool for 
crushing their enemies within the CCP.198 In the first half of the 1980s, to consolidate their power, the 
                                                          
197 The effort of de-Maoization was limited as Deng realized that a radical approach similar to Khrushchev’s de-
Stalinization might ultimately bring down the CCP rule. 
 
198 This is why it is misleading to describe any CCP leader in the 1980s as “liberal” or even “reformist,” as their 
position was often out of consideration of political expediency. For example, the widely perceived “ultra-leftist” Deng 
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center of power formed a de facto alliance with the reformist intellectuals. Although Deng’s reformist 
policies were instrumental and he never intended a political reform that would end his or the CCP’s rule, 
the Tiananmen generation was in general optimistic about China’s future and viewed the CCP positively. 
However, the hopeful 1980s ended in bloodshed. In the spring of 1989, college students in 
Beijing gathered in Tiananmen Square, the symbolic center of the nation, to mourn the death of the 
deposed former reformist leader Hu Yaobang. It quick escalated into a nationwide movement against 
government corruption and authoritarian rule.199 At its height more than 100,000 college students on the 
square, making it the largest student revolt in human history (Zhao 2001). After sidelining Zhao Ziyang,200 
the party leader who was sympathetic to the student protesters, Deng ordered military tanks into the 
square on the night of June 3–4. While the exact death toll remains unknown, civilian deaths have been 
estimated at between hundreds and thousands (Faison 1999). June Fourth has been the most significant 
historical and political event in post-Mao China, and has haunted China to this day. They profoundly 
changed the life trajectory and worldview of the Tiananmen generation. After three years of tight political, 
social, and economic control, Deng’s southern tour in 1992 signaled the shift of the political legitimacy of 
the CCP from socialist ideology to economic performance. On the fast track to neoliberalism, he CCP 
gave up its ideological orthodoxy, and Deng’s maxim, “It doesn’t matter whether a cat is white or black, as 
long as it catches mice,” became the guiding principle of both the regime and its citizens. Despite 
significant improvement in material life, the ideological alliance between the Tiananmen generation and 
the CCP no longer exists. “It was remarkable, and remarkably depressing,” sighs Maurice Meisner 
(1999:511), “how rapidly the intense political and moral passions that had gone into the making of the 
Democracy Movement faded and dissipated—submerged under government-promoted waves of 
consumerism and nationalism.” 
In the early morning on June 4, 1989, Pu Zhiqiang, then a graduate student at the China 
University of Political Science and Law, told his fellow student protestors, “The Monument [to the People’s 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Liqun was one of the most radical reformists in the late-1970s and early 1980s, and Hu Sheng, who was today seen 
as a reformist, belonged to the left-wing whateverists, or doctrinaire Maoists in the early 1980s. 
 
199 As mentioned earlier, some of the New Left intellectuals, and in particular Wang Hui, have different interpretations 
of the protests, especially the origin of the prevalent corruption. 
 
200 Zhao was since under house arrest until his death in 2005. 
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Heroes] will witness our death. But if we can leave [the square] alive, I’ll come back on every anniversary 
to pay respect to all the innocent lives lost.” (Pu Zhiqiang 2006) And he did, until a restriction from the 
CCP since 2007.201 While those publicly commemorating June Fourth belong to the minority, it is safe to 
say that most liberals who experienced June Fourth in any way have a “June Fourth complex.” To a large 
degree, the generation is defined by June Fourth. 
 
Self-Taught Liberals: The Generation of Mao 
 
Born in 1939, Qian Liqun, retired literature professor at Peking University, remarks that his 
generation has had a complicated and entangled relationship with the revolution led by Mao: “Our 
generation had flesh-and-blood ties with historical campaigns, which directly influenced our lives, bodies, 
emotions, spirits. Our little I’s (xiao wo) have been intertwined with history’s great I’s (da wo) … . [For my 
students,] history is external to their bodies and is something to be understood. But for us, history is 
ourselves.” (Qian Liqun 2012a:11) With a wide popular support for the Communist Party, the first several 
years after the founding of the People’s Republic in 1949 were marked by nationwide optimism. Qian had 
a free and happy childhood, despite the permanent separation from his father, a high-ranking official of 
the Nationalist Party who fled to Taiwan. Growing up under the influence of CCP-formulated Marxism, 
and with the eruption of the Korean War and the ensuing comprehensive containment from the Western 
world led by the United States, Mao was a heroic and even god-like figure that defended the 
independence, unification, and dignity of the nation of China. When Mao launched the Cultural Revolution 
in 1966, Qian was a faithful Maoist and active participant. Qian was not blind to the disaster brought by 
Mao and began to reevaluate Mao after the Cultural Revolution. However, this process of self-purging, 
self-criticism, and self-salvation turned out to be long and torturous, and even to this day Qian feels 
ambivalent about Mao and his legacy. As Qian (2012:13) describes it, it is a feeling of “both ‘cursing’ and 
‘blessing,’ both ‘farewell’ and ‘nostalgia,’ and both ‘revenge’ and ‘fondness’.” 
The generation of Mao had a rather different experience. The joy of the successful revolution 
soon gave way to dismay as the harsh reality unfolded. Personally impacted by economic hardship, and 
                                                          
201 Pu was arrested in 2014 and received a suspended prison sentence in 2015 for his criticism of the CCP. 
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in particular the 1959–1961 famine, and by frequent political turbulence, they did not experience the 
“golden childhood” described by Qian. What is more, the ten years of Cultural Revolution from 1966 to 
1976 completely changed the life trajectories and world views of the whole generation. First, the entire 
system of formal education, from elementary schools to higher education, was halted once the Cultural 
Revolution began. While Mao ordered all students to “return to class to make revolution” (fuke naogeming) 
in 1967, the educational system was not restored as the schools became the battlefields for the Red 
Guards. In 1968, Mao ordered workers propaganda teams (gongxuandui) to “permanently occupy 
schools.” As school teachers were all condemned as members of the capitalist class and therefore 
deprived of the right to teach, all systems of school at all levels were paralyzed for several years. As a 
result of urban disruption, more than ten million high school graduates floated in the society with no 
school to enroll and no job to take (Li Honglin 2010:247–48). In 1968, Mao declared that the educated 
urban youth would be sent to mountainous areas or farming villages to receive reeducation from workers 
and peasants. From 1968 to 1979, the “send-down” policies forced more than 17 million urban youth to 
work in rural areas (Zhou 2004:38).202 In addition, admission into colleges and universities was halted. 
When some colleges readmitted students in 1970, political recommendation based on political allegiance 
and performance replaced entrance examinations, which was not reinstated until 1977. In short, the ten 
years of Cultural Revolution caused the disruption of education of the entire generation. The early 
memory of the generation of Mao was characterized by marches and gatherings, the Little Red Book,203 
big-character posters (dazibao), Two Newspapers and One Journal,204 picture book of sequential 
drawings(lianhuanhua), revolutionary songs, war films, model operas (yangbanxi), and poems by Mao 
(Zhu Dongli [2005] 2010). 
This social turmoil certainly had deep impact on the fate of liberalism. Indeed, the supply of liberal 
ideas was cut off during the entire Maoist era. With the CCP took over mainland China in 1949, many 
celebrated liberal intellectuals, Hu Shi being the most prominent one, fled to Taiwan. For three decades, 
                                                          
202 The best study of the Up to the Mountains and Down to the Countryside Movement to date is still Bernstein 
(1977). 
 
203 Quotations from Chairman Mao, a book of selected statements from speeches and writings by Mao Zedong. 
 
204 A common reference to the three mouthpieces of the CCP: the newspapers the People’s Daily (Renmin ribao) and 
the People's Liberation Army Daily (Jiefangjun bao), and the magazine the Red Flag (Hong qi), which was later 
replaced by Seeking Truth (Qiushi). 
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and in particular after the 1957 Anti-Rightist Campaign, liberalism was denounced as a dangerous heresy 
that represented Western bourgeois ideology and American imperialism. The CCP not only accused 
liberalism of leading to moral decay, but also treated as a subversive ideological enemy. With very few 
exceptions, books containing liberal ideas were banned, and liberalism disappeared from public 
discussion. What is more, Mao classified intellectuals into the class of petty bourgeois that was in need of 
thought remolding (sixiang gaizao) (Hu Ping 2012), and targeted intellectuals through wave after wave of 
political campaigns or even physical torture in order to nip the seeds of opposition in the bud (Li Honglin 
2010). As a result, liberalism as a systematic political or philosophical doctrine appeared moribund. 
The lack of formal education in liberalism as a philosophy or the absence of liberalism as a 
political culture, however, does not mean the lack of people’s longing for freedom and consciousness of 
the suppression, for the life experience of being sent down to the countryside turned out to be the best 
real-life textbook. Unlike the previous generation, such as Qian Liqun, that was almost universally and 
immediately drawn to Mao’s utopian and revolutionary ideal, the initial reaction of the generation of the 
Mao was divided, largely contingent on family background. 
A number of liberals grew up in the countryside and experienced the turbulence of the Cultural 
Revolution from the outset. Even during the heyday, they never had the taste for the Cultural Revolution. 
As He Weifang said, “As time goes by, my experience during the Cultural Revolution, including my 
family’s experience and what I personally witnessed, had had an increasingly significant impact on my 
estimate of Chinese society. For example, my disgust of today’s ‘singing red songs’ and campaign-style 
law enforcement all had much to do with my childhood experience.” In 1970, when He was a 10-year-old 
boy, his father, a CCP veteran who participated in the Chinese Civil War and the Korean War, committed 
suicide because of the torture and humiliation from the struggle sessions (pidou dahui). He never saw a 
future for himself because of his family background. Zhang Yaojie’s memory of the Cultural Revolution 
centers on hunger: “My liberal thought originated in my childhood experience—I never had enough food 
and was always starving—and that made me think a lot.” At the age of 16, Zhang went to college with 
weight of only 38 kilograms. From childhood throughout his adult life, Zhang has always refused to sing 
“red songs” and felt angry whenever hearing those songs. While growing up in the city, Gu Su witnessed 
his parents paraded through the streets and severely persecuted when he was only twelve years old. 
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Xu Youyu’s father grew up in poverty and had been resentful of the rich since childhood. An early 
member of the CCP, he worked for the Nationalist Party during the Second Sino-Japanese War and 
therefore belonged to those with “problematic” historical record. However, this experience radicalized his 
political beliefs, and as a consequence, the revolutionary ideology and education that Xu received as a 
child probably “greatly exceeded those received by the children of the real revolutionary families” (Xu 
1999:5). When the Cultural Revolution erupted in 1966, Xu, who just graduated from high school, 
immediately participated in the rebellious movements with “10 times of enthusiasm and 100 times of 
craze” (Xu 1999:5). He was obsessed with the idea of “line struggles” (luxian douzheng) and busied 
himself every day with outcry, fighting, overthrowing, and defending to the death (Xu 2002:130). As Xu 
(1999:7) recalled, “I celebrated [the Cultural Revolution], because it declared the advent of a new era: the 
Chinese will assume the mission of liberating all human beings. I desired it, because I yearned for the 
phoenix’s nirvana in the flames of revolution.” Similarly, Lei Yi described, “Our generation grew up in a 
closed environment. We always felt that China was the best country, the Soviet Union was revisionist, 
and the other two thirds of the world population lived in deep water and scorching fire. We felt that the 
Maoist era was the best in history and aspired to liberate the entire world and the whole human being. 
We … were initially fanatic followers of Mao.” 
As the Cultural Revolution proceeded, its negative and even ugly elements began to be gradually 
exposed, and the enthusiasm of many young participants began to fade, but the discontent was only 
directed at the specific policies or their executions. Lei considered the chaos as temporary, and even 
necessary, for the construction of a better world, “just like there have been bloodshed and all sorts of 
extreme phenomena during the great revolutions.” When the chaos appeared increasingly like normality, 
more and more people began to question the Cultural Revolution itself. 
 
Up to the Mountains and Down to the Countryside: For many liberals, however, the first turning 
point did not come until they were sent down to the countryside. Ironically, the send-down policy was 
designed to have the privileged urban youth plug into the socialist movement in the countryside to counter 
the perceived bourgeois thinking, but ironically, once the youth had a first-hand experience with what the 
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Cultural Revolution really had brought about, the former Red Guards felt that they had been deluded fools, 
and the urban youth began to question Mao and the nature of the political system itself. 
Xu went to the country with euphoria and alacrity. As he recalled his first days in the countryside: 
 
We received the “remembering the bitter and considering the sweet” (yiku sitian) 
education immediately after we arrived in the countryside. We were quite familiar with the 
procedure: older workers and peasants vividly narrated their miserable histories and 
described the past days of hunger and cold, so the youngsters who took everything for 
granted would know that “the days in the old society was bitterer than goldthread root and 
the days in the new society was sweater than honey.” But before the meeting, we saw 
that the cadres nervously reminded the soon-to-speak old peasants, “You’re only asked 
to recall the bitterness before 1949. Never recall the bitterness of 1962!” Without an 
exception, these guileless old people, however, made accusations against the public 
mess halls (gonggong shitang) in tears. As embarrassed as they were, the cadres said 
the same thing after the meeting. When it was time for the “remembering the bitter” meal, 
we were psychologically ready for the solemnity and misery, but it turned out to be a 
joyful and jolly occasion as our young peasants were fighting for food and wolfed down all 
the meal … . The “remembering the bitter” meeting provided a chance for a free meal! If 
previously I did not haste for a conclusion about the direction and “great achievements” of 
the Cultural Revolution, I knew perfectly well now. … But what I now remember most 
vividly is not the cold, hunger, or overwork, but the moral decadence of the people 
around me and the spirit of hopelessness of an entire generation (Xu Youyu 1999a:8). 
 
The reeducation was a complete surprise to Xu, who was exposed to many things of which he 
had never heard. The previous myths of a world of difference between the old and the new society and of 
the deliverance and liberation of the poverty-stricken peasants quickly fell apart once he reached the 
countryside, especially when he learned that almost one third of the members of his production team 
(shengchan dui) died from starvation during the 1959–1961 famine (Xu Youyu 1999b:92–93). In addition, 
witnessing the stealing and even robbing behavior of his fellow sent-down youth forced Xu to question the 
justification of Mao’s decision to deprive the intelligent and studious young students the opportunity to 
continue their education and force them into the barren countryside, and seeing a dead body with a big 
hole on his head made him realize the senselessness of the slaughtering between different factions (Xu 
Youyu 1999b:94–95, 96–97). 
Lei Yi had experiences of both “down to the villages” and joining the military during the Cultural 
Revolution, and of being a factory worker after. He was first “enlightened,” in his own terminology, by his 
experience in the countryside. Lei was sent down to rural Henan in 1973, without finishing high school. 
Growing up with the propaganda about the “Three Red Banners”—the general line for socialist 
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construction, the Great Leap Forward, and the people’s communes—Lei was stunned to find out that the 
peasants were almost complaining about the people’s communes, because criticisms of the “Three Red 
Banners” were supposed to come only from the “four bad elements”—landlords, rich peasants, 
counterrevolutionaries, and the other bad elements such as thieves and bandits—and those who 
criticized them might well be arrested as counterrevolutionaries in the cities. Realizing that the 
complainers were poor and lower-middle peasants, Lei further learned of the dire situation of death from 
starvation during the three years of the Great Leap Forward, which had been completely unknown to him. 
Similar, Zhi Xiaomin was surprised to find out that the peasants did not welcome the Red Guards and the 
Cultural Revolution, as he put it, “The half-educated are most vulnerable to brainwash; on the contrary, 
the illiterate are not prone to brainwash.” 
After getting to know the situation in the countryside, many liberals felt that they had been duped 
and misled by Mao. “If you participate in something but aren’t totally committed, and later find out that 
you’ve been lied to, it won’t be that big a deal.” Remarked Xu Youyu, “But if you devote your entire energy, 
ideal and hope to a cause that you regard as lofty, holy and great, and see it as the meaning of your 
whole life, but later realize that it’s not what you thought, it’ll be an ultimate blow.” For Li Yinhe, the 
significance of resettlement in the countryside was the exposure of the truth: “It let you know the real 
grass-roots life, the real life situation of the peasants, … and how corrupt it really was.” 
“Going up” to a mountainous village in 1976 as an “ultra-leftist” and staying there for two and a 
half years, Wu Si was among the last “sent down” youth. While the experience in the countryside did not 
make him to fundamentally question Maoism, his faith in its feasibility shattered. As the leader of a 
production team, Wu failed his efforts in both voluntary labor and combating private plots (ziliudi) as the 
peasants were reluctant to volunteer and universally worked harder for their private plots than the 
collectively-owned land. He therefore realized that Mao’s effort to transform people’s worldviews that are 
based on self-interest with morality, propaganda, and political pressure was likely to fail. 
In brief, many liberals began to have doubt about the Maoist political system after personally 
experiencing the Up to the Mountains and Down to the Countryside Movement. Furthermore, the Cultural 
Revolution gave the liberals a real-life experience of the authoritarian nature Maoism and the communist 
rule, and in turn fed their anti-authoritarian sentiment. It is in this sense that a number of liberals claim to 
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be “self-taught liberals.” As Zhang Ming put it, “I lived through the Cultural Revolution, therefore I know 
what it is like to be in a society of each person persecutes one another and what it is like to disregard 
human dignity. All this experience has become the root of my thought.” 
 
Lin Biao Incident: The next, and indeed more significant, event was the Lin Biao Incident of 1971. 
The Lin Biao Incident has been an unsolved mystery even to this day.205 According to the official 
account of the CCP, on September 13, 1971, having fallen out of Mao’s favor and failed to assassinate 
Mao, Lin Biao, Mao’s officially recognized closest comrade-in-arms, chosen successor, and a chief 
architect of the Cultural Revolution and the personality cult of Mao, boarded a plane and was killed in a 
mysterious plane crash in Mongolia. While the CCP did not immediately issue an announcement of the 
incident, it became known to the general public a year later. This event has been widely viewed as 
marking the failure of the Cultural Revolution, both in theory and practice, and as a turning point from 
upsurge to decline of the Mao-initiated mass revolution (He 2001:249). The incident was a huge shock to 
the generation of Mao, as it for the first time revealed to the public the internal strife and ugly side of the 
CCP. 
More damaging was the disclosure of the “Outline of Project 571,” the alleged drafted plan for 
a coup d’etat to kill Mao. The outline revealed an economy that was on the brink of bankruptcy and a 
ruling group that was full of internal strife, harshly criticized Mao, and laid out eight plans of assassination, 
such as by train bombing, by a flamethrower, and by a gun. “All the things that no one even dared think 
about suddenly were all told now,” said Zhang Ming. The release of the outline turned to be devastating to 
the image of Mao and the CCP. If the Up to the Mountains and Down to the Countryside Movement for 
the first time shattered the faith of the liberals in Mao’s policies, the Lin Biao Incident initiated the disbelief 
of the liberals in the communist rule. It was a watershed event that marked the awakening of the 
generation of Mao. Their revolutionary pursuit and Maoist ideology began to fade because of the Lin Biao 
Incident. Some even go further in claiming that it marks the end of the revolution in twentieth-century 
China; or more precisely, while the revolutionary institution and ideology remained, the revolutionary 
passion and imagination was gone (Zhu Dongli [2005] 2010). Once the threshold was crossed, the 
                                                          
205 The most detailed account of the Lin Biao Incident in English is Jin (1999). 
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questions became why the CCP defeated the Nationalists, what the communist victory had brought, and 
what communism meant. The formative influence of the Cultural Revolution on the political orientation of 
the liberals was long-lasting and profound, as Xu Youyu commented, “Those who suffered the most and 
had the deepest reflections tend to think that the biggest evil for China is what has descended from the 
communist revolution and Stalinism, and they would not that the market economy is the root of all evils.” It 
was the critical reflection on the Cultural Revolution that heralded the reformist intellectual movement in 
the 1980s. 
In short, without the supply of liberal ideas, the generation of Mao acquired their firm anti-
authoritarian attitude and vague liberal ideas from their traumatic experiences in living under Maoism, 
which supplied enough raw materials for the distaste for repression and longing for freedom. 1979, Xu 
Bangtai, then an undergraduate student at Fudan University, conducted the first independent survey in 
communist China. Among hundreds of respondents, all students at Fudan University with direct 
experience of the Cultural Revolution, two thirds expressed disbelief in communism (Chen Li and Lu Wei 
1993). In 1980, Chinese college students had no election experience at all—not only did they have not 
experienced elections in real life, but they had not even seen elections on TV. However, the election 
campaign in universities in Beijing that year turned out to be the most competitive and successful form of 
direct democracy in contemporary China. Different from the liberals in early-twentieth century China, who 
were under the influence of Western enlightenment ideas, the liberalism of the generation of Mao mainly 
came from their experience during the Cultural Revolution. It is in this sense that Hu Ping (2011) claims 
that he “independently rediscovered liberalism.” 
 
From “Our Party” to “Their Party”: The Generation of Tiananmen 
 
June Fourth was a watershed event in the development of the anti-authoritarian mentality of the 
generations of both the Cultural Revolution and Tiananmen. It is June Fourth that permanently broke the 
emotional bond between the liberals and the CCP. As discussed earlier, Maoism as an ideology largely 
bankrupted after the Lin Biao Incident, and in particular after the release of the “Outline of Project 571,” 
but in much of the 1980s, because of the introduction of market principles and the relative loosening of 
192 
 
political control (Meisner 1996; Vogel 2011), despite the frequent oscillation between liberation and 
repression (Baum 1994, 2011), and because of the popular reformist leaders Hu Yaobang and Zhao 
Ziyang, the liberals in general viewed the CCP favorably and were optimistic about China’s political future. 
What is more, there are various formal and informal channels of communication between the reformist 
CCP leaders and the reformist intellectuals (Goldman 1994). 
The tanks and gunshots in Tiananmen Square on June 3–4 dramatically changed the relationship 
between the liberals and the CCP. Emotionally, the tragedy left indelible marks on the consciousness of 
the liberals and became part of their collective memory. Hu Xingdou was a young professor at Beijing 
Institute of Technology in 1989. As he recalled, “On the morning of June 4, someone set up a mourning 
hall at my university, because some students from my university were killed [in Tiananmen Square]. Not 
only did I go to the mourning hall and pay respect, but also I lost control and cries out loud in front of 
everybody. That was probably the only time I cried my heart out, and it was in public.” Then a doctoral 
student at CASS and a participant of June Fourth, Zhang Boshu did not support the hunger strikes of the 
students that began on May 13, fearing that they would increase the tension between the students and 
the government. The gunshots, however, completely changed the situation and his perception of the CCP. 
After June Fourth, the emotional bond and strategic alliance of the liberals with the CCP was 
broken, as an interviewee succinctly and plainly put it, “Before the gunshots, I felt that the Communist 
Party was our party, and we were the successors. After the gunshots, I felt that the Communist Party was 
their party. There was a breach now—they were them, and we were us. My emotional attachment to the 
Party was immediately broken, and I stopped relying on Marxism. I felt that what Marx said did not 
matter—didn’t [the CCP] open fire at its will?” 
June Fourth also changed life trajectories of many liberals. Zhang Boshu was a promising young 
philosopher in 1989. A doctoral student at CASS, Zhang was already a prolific scholar with a number of 
important publications, including a book in Chinese, a forthcoming book in English, and a series of articles 
in important Chinese-language and English-language journals. He was among the first to introduce 
Habermas to the Chinese world and his 1989 translation of Communication and the Evolution of 
Society was the first book-length translation of Habermas. Zhang received his PhD in 1991 and became a 
junior fellow at CASS. However, because of June Fourth, Zhang chose the path of self-marginalization. 
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First, Zhang stopped publishing in mainstream Chinese outlets. Since 1989, aside from one minor 
publication, Zhang has not published any article or book in any mainstream Chinese outlet, and instead 
chose to publish solely in overseas outlets, which have all been banned in China. As Zhang explained his 
decision, “In at least one or two years after June Fourth, … many of us felt that it was a shame to publish 
in any official outlet, for we didn’t want to bootlick. … While for many people this feeling was gradually 
worn down because they had to sustain themselves as scholars, I have insisted not to have anything to 
do with state-run journals and publishers.” Second, Zhang has since changed his life-long research 
commitment. Before June Fourth, Zhang was engaged in a philosophical inquiry into the self-interest of 
human behavior, or establishing a “general study of man” (zongti renxue) in his own terminology. He 
radically changed his research focus and has since worked on an ambitious six-volume project entitled 
“From May Fourth to June Fourth,” trying to understand how and why the CCP evolved from a 
progressive party with popular appeal to a dictatorial party that killed its own people. Third, Zhang has 
since refused to engage in self-censorship: “If the rule of the Communist Party last 50 more years, this 
book series will not be able to be published in China, which means most Chinese will not read my read 
my books. In this sense, From May Fourth to June Fourth is not written for the contemporaries, but rather 
written for the future Chinese. If it’s for the future generations, you cannot be engaged in any deliberate 
digression. You have to be straightforward.” Fourth, by choosing to conduct a sweeping philosophical 
study of authoritarianism in 20th-century China without any self-censorship, Zhang has become a 
dissident with huge personal cost. Not only did he receive innumerable police visits and harassments, he 
was also denied any chance of promotion at CASS—he held the title of “Assistant Fellow” for 18 years.206 
In 2009, he was officially dismissed by CASS and has since migrated to the United States under asylum.  
While the 1980s was a period of extraordinary intellectual curiosity and openness, as mentioned 
earlier, the liberals were interested in many conflicting schools of thought or sets of ideas, including 
various branches and brands of Marxism. Many believed that Maoism was simply a wrong version of 
Marxism and they could restore the original and authentic intention of Marx. After June Fourth, not only 
did most of them stop being self-confessed Marxists, but also they developed conscious aversion to 
Marxism all together. Many liberals explicitly regarded June Fourth as the watershed in the development 
                                                          




of their thought. As Ding Dong put it, “Before June Fourth, my thought was not particularly clear. I used to 
believe in Maoism, Marxism, and even communism … . I was not completely out of Mao’s shadow in the 
1980s, or you can say I was gradually purging the influence of Mao back then. June Fourth was a crucial 
juncture. Before June Fourth, when analyzing certain problems, I still used some basic ideas or 
theoretical tools of Marxism—or Sinicized Marxism. But after June Fourth, sorry, I no longer relied on 
such conceptions of history and no longer used such theoretical tools. … Lenin said that Marx had two 
discoveries, one was the theory of surplus value, and the other was the materialistic conception of history. 
Sorry, I no longer wanted those. … Because of June Fourth, Marxism, Leninism, and Maoism—I have 
rejected them all.” 
June Fourth heralded the division of the Chinese intelligentsia. While the 1980s was marked by 
market-oriented economic reforms and opening up to the outside world, political reforms were also on the 
agenda, albeit at a much slower pace. Accordingly, the intellectuals were largely united under the banner 
of reform. After June Fourth, the nature and desirability of reform itself were under attack within the CCP 
(Fewsmith 2011). The unrest in 1989, many conservative Party leaders believed, was the inevitable 
denouement of the reform program. After a few years of stalemate, Deng Xiaoping reasserted his 
economic agenda in 1992, but at the same time put the agenda of political reform on an indefinite hold. 
Since then, China has been on the route of “socialism with Chinese characteristics,” melting economic 
deregulation with political authoritarianism. With its sustained growth in GDP, by the end of the twentieth 
century, China had emerged as a global economic powerhouse. As a consequence, the CCP appeared to 
have reclaimed its political legitimacy and has grown to be more and more assertive politically. At the 
same time, official corruption has become rampant, and the link between business and politics has 
produced a large number of crony capitalists. Different from the 1980s when almost everybody shared 
and celebrated the reform, without the company of political liberation, the benefits of the market reform 
since the 1990s haven not been equally shared by everybody; indeed, the rights and benefits of the 
working class have often been impaired in the name of reform. It is under this background that the 
intelligentsia began to divide in the late 1990s. While almost all intellectuals acknowledged and criticized 
the negative consequences of the economic reform, two starkly different perspectives have emerged. 
Some intellectuals attribute the negative consequences to the lack of political reform and viewed the CCP 
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as the root of social injustice, and some others accuse the corrosive power of capitalism. The former has 
been called liberals, and the latter are labeled New Left. The reformist consensus has dissipated. 
Even for many from young generations with no direct involvement, June Fourth was a life-
changing historical event. Yu Jie, who was only 16 years old in 1989, called himself a “son of Tiananmen”: 
 
In the evening of June 3, 1989, my adolescence abruptly ended, and I had my 
coming of age ritual overnight. That night, in tears, I saw through what on earth good and 
evil were, what on earth freedom and serfdom were, and what earth darkness and 
brightness were. Since that night, nothing could cheat on or fool me any longer—the 
place built on lies collapsed like a paper house. … My life has since changed. In this 
sense, I am a son of both my mother and June Fourth. There is an umbilical cord soaked 
with blood. Without June Fourth, I would not be who I am today. Without June Fourth, I 
may have been like a pig in a dirty pig pen, knowing nothing about my long imprisonment 
and soon-to-come slaughter (Yu Jie 2003). 
 








We divide every subject in the world into two, take side, and then we pretend we know 
who we are. 
—A. A. Gill, cited in Cartledge (2002:200) 
 
 
Chapter 3 leaves a question unanswered: why did Chinese intellectuals divide into two opposing 
groups? In other words, how were the intellectual positions of New Left and liberalism formed? After all, 
they are about the same age group and have similar life experiences. More important, to a large extent, 
as the Cultural Revolution erased class differences, Marxist economist determinism dimply does not pass 
the empirical verification. As Karl Mannheim (1956) points out, “[a] common social habitat does not 
necessarily create like interests” (p. 106), it is therefore important to look into group dynamics. This 
chapter aims to address this issue. While the debates between the New Left and the liberals have 
received abundant academic attention from China observers, little has been done to address this 
question. Most studies follow the path of intellectual history by either classifying elite intellectuals into the 
two camps of New Left and liberalism, and then expound their different positions on a series of important 
issues, or identifying a fixed set of intellectual positions, and then proceed to fit intellectuals into these 
positions (Li 2015; Ma Licheng 2012; Zhang Boshu 2015). I see intellectual ideas as historical 
contingencies, rather than fixed properties, that are shaped by polemical oppositions. I make two 
arguments in this chapter. First, the labels “liberalism” and “New Left” created group opposition, which in 
turn crystallized intellectual identities. Second, once the “groups” were established, the New Leftists and 
the liberals became the reference group of each other, and each group took subsequent intellectual 
position in accordance with its grouping. 
 




In what sense is the New Left new? Relative to what is it new? To the left side of what? What is 
the Old Left? These questions have never been clearly answered, but they were hidden in the intellectual 
debates in the second half of the 1990s, and shaped how the New Leftists saw themselves and were 
perceived by others. To understand the meaning of the term, we need to first trace the changing 
meanings of the labels of “left” and “right” in the context of Chinese politics in the twentieth century. 
 
The Historical Context of the Ideological Designators 
 
As ideological designators, “left” and “right” have been widely used since the French Revolution, 
but are seldom clearly defined. The terms are even more confusing in the Chinese context, not only 
because of the translingual practice of applying universal terms to very different historical and cultural 
contexts (Liu 1995), but also because they have been frequently deployed, and therefore distorted, as 
weapons against opponents in real-life politics. 
The left/right distinction was first widely used by the Communists in reference to the 
Nationalists,207 their political opponents, in the 1920s. While the Nationalists themselves rarely referred to 
themselves as either left or right,208 the Communists classified the Nationalists into the camps of left and 
right. In 1924, the First National Congress of Kuomintang affirmed the controversial policy of alliance with 
the CCP in order to end warlordism. Thereafter, the Communists regarded the Nationalists who 
supported the policy as Left-wing Nationalists—such as Wang Jingwei, Liao Zhongkai, and He 
Xiangning—and those who opposed it as Right-wing Nationalists—such as Hu Hanmin and Dai Jitao, and 
even Chiang Kai-shek.209 The classification was not widely accepted by the Nationalists themselves—
many even believed that it was a tactic of the Communists to divide the KMT. 
On the Communist side, from its founding in 1921 to the victory of its revolution in 1949, it 
consistently positioned itself as a left-wing party. For example, Mao Zedong was influenced by Marx’s and 
                                                          
207 The Chinese Nationalist Party is also called Kuomintang and often abridged as KMT. 
 
208 Chiang Kai-shek, head of the KMT, more often made a distinction between revolutionaries and counter-
revolutionaries, with the former being friends (comrades) and the latter being enemies (Wang Hongsong 2006:156). 
 
209 There were other definitions. For example, Chen Duxiu (1924, 1925) considered the Nationalists who favored 
revolutionary and military means as left-wing, such as Sun Yat-sen, and those who preferred moderate and peaceful 
means as right-wing, such as Chen Jiongming. Such definitions, however, were not widely used. 
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Stalin’s view that human history progressed through a series of stages, from slave society through 
feudalism to capitalism, and eventually to communism by way of socialism. The left, therefore, meant for 
Mao those standing on the side of progress (Nathan and Shi 1996:526–27). Accordingly, labeling an 
opponent as “right-wing” was an effective political tactic. The party leadership identified three right-wing 
thought: right-wing opportunism (youqing jihuizhuyi), right-wing capitulationism (youqing touxiangzhuyi), 
and right-wing flightists (youqing taopaozhuyi). These labels were not really ideological terms, but were 
used to describe and attack a particular political opponent’s political or military strategy, and in particular 
in relation to the KMT. For example, when the Communist and the KMT openly split in 1927, Chen Duxiu, 
who favored continued cooperation with the KMT, was attacked as a right-wing opportunist and 
capitulationist who gave up the leadership of the revolutionary movement to the KMT and as a 
consequence lost all his formal power within the party that he founded. Coming from an ideological 
perspective, however, Chen, who espoused Trotskyism, refused the labels and still considered himself as 
a leftist. In 1929, Chen founded the Proletarian Society (Wuchanzhe she), a Trotskyist organization. After 
his expulsion from the CCP, he became associated with the International Left Opposition, headed by 
Leon Trotsky. In 1931, the Proletarian Society merged with three other Trotskyist organizations into a new 
umbrella organization, the Left Opposition of the Chinese Communist Party, and Chen was elected its 
general secretary. 
Beginning in 1927, the CCP began to criticize certain leaders within the party as “leftists.” Since 
the party was on paper a leftist party on behalf of the disadvantaged peasants and workers, it had to use 
quotation marks to indicate that those criticized blundered into “wrong” kinds of leftism. They were 
criticized not because of their political ideology, but rather because of their military and political 
strategies—how the communist revolution should be carried out. In 1927, Qu Qiubai, the de facto leader 
of the party, was criticized for his “‘left-wing’ putschism” (“zuo”-qing mangdongzhuyi) for being reckless in 
staging uprisings nationwide, and as a consequence was replaced by Li Lisan. Li, however, lost his grip 
on the party to Qu again when his strategy of armed uprising in major cities nationwide led to military 
defeats. This strategy was condemned as “‘left-wing’ adventurism”(“zuo”-qing maoxianzhuyi). As a 
moderate, Qu refused to push the attack on Li to an extreme, which gave Wang Ming the opportunity to 
push him out against by attaching him to “‘left-wing’ dogmatism” (“zuo”-qing jiaotiaozhuyi). Wang, a loyal 
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adherent of the policies of the Communist International and Moscow, did not survive the spell of ism 
either, and was eventually ousted from the power center by Mao Zedong, who attacked Wang first of 
“‘left-wing’ dogmatism” in the early 1930s, and then of “‘right-wing’ capitulationism” in the late 1930s. 
From the CCP’s military victory over the KMT in 1949 to Mao’s death in 1976, “left” and “right” 
were used exclusively as ideological designators, although “left” as an ideological label was rarely used. 
After all, it was almost inconceivable to attack someone of leftism in the red China infused by Mao’s 
revolutionary fervor. In addition, as China was isolated from the rest of the world, the various leftist 
thoughts in the West had no influence in China. In the three decades under Mao, labelling someone as 
“rightist” continued to be an effective way to bring him or her down. The distinction between left and right, 
however, became ambiguous in 1957. Before the CCP took over China in 1949, it embraced and 
advocated ideas such as democracy, elections, freedom of speech and press, and fairness. After 1949, 
with its hegemony of political power, however, the party threw away all its previous political promises. 
Moreover, during the Anti-Rightist Campaign of 1957, the exact same ideas were condemned as right-
wing ideology. Meanwhile, in Maoist China, “left” designated the ideological orthodoxy of Maoism—
although as a consequence of its “political correctness,” the term “left” was rarely used. It should be noted 
that Mao did more than once warn the danger of out-of-control “leftism,” and in particular after the 
disastrous consequences of the Great Leap Forward became evident. However, the warnings were more 
or less friendly criticisms of attempts to realize communism overnight, and were quickly replaced by harsh 
campaigns against the “rightists,” whom Mao deemed real enemies.  
After the death of Mao and the end of the Cultural Revolution in 1976, the CCP, under the 
leadership of Deng Xiaoping, abandoned the Maoist revolutionary ideology and launched a market-based 
economic reform. As the party officially defined the Cultural Revolution as a “mistake of ultraleftism,” and 
as the new leaders were themselves victims of Mao’s ideology of perpetual revolution, “left” was no 
longer a politically correct designator, although the party was still theoretically a left-wing party guided by 
Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought. More important, in post-Mao China, “left” has almost 
entirely lost its ideological appeal because of its association with Maoism. In stunning contrast with the 
Mao-era, labelling someone a “leftist” has now become an effective an attacking tactic. In the 1980s and 
the early 1990s, an ideological label that was more widely-used in the intellectual circles—although it was 
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never part of the official discourse—was “conservative,” which essentially meant the same thing as “left.” 
The leftists were called conservatives because they were supposedly attempting to conserve Mao’s 
policies and legacies. While the party only criticized ultraleftism—not leftism in its entirety—“ultraleftism,” 
“leftism,” “radicalism,” and “conservatism” became synonymous derogatory term in both the intellectual 
circles and people’s everyday life. In a strikingly way, as two ostensibly opposite ideological designators, 
“radicalism” and “conservatism” converged naturally in the Chinese context. Meanwhile, while still a 
vague term that remained to be politically sensitive, with which most people were afraid to be associated, 
“right” was no longer a cause of contempt. Indeed, as the large number of people denounced as “rightists” 
were officially rehabilitated, “rightists” simply meant for most average people the victims—and often 
educated victims—of Mao’s dictatorship and even for this reason subjects of respect.  
 
How New were the New Leftist? 
 
The sobriquet “New Left” did not come from those labeled “New Leftists” themselves. As 
mentioned in Chapter 2, it first appeared in a commentary in the Beijing qingnianbao (Beijing Youth Daily), 
written by a journalist. In 1994, the newspaper reprinted Cui Zhiyuan’s article “Institutional Innovation and 
a Second Liberation of Thought,” which first appeared in the Hong Kong-based intellectual journal, 
Twentieth-First Century. In his introductory essay, Yang Ping noted that as various problems emerged in 
the course of wealth distribution and redistribution, the New Left theory provided many new insights by 
criticizing the unjust global order from the angle of Third World. Therefore, when it first appeared in China, 
“New Left” was meant to connect the Chinese intellectuals with the New Left movement that swept the 
Western intellectual circles in the 1960s and 1970s, and it was given a positive connotation.210 
A difficult ambiguity, however, quickly arouse: what was the relationship between the New Left 
and the now defamed older-generation left, meaning the Maoists? For the New Leftists themselves, the 
answer was simple—they had nothing to do with the Maoists. Rather, the New Leftists were happy, and 
indeed wanted, to be associated Western New Left, which was surely a well-reputed school of thought in 
                                                          
210 Therefore, the claim made by some observers, many have been identified as New Leftists themselves, that “[the] 
‘New Left’ was invented as a label to stigmatize the group’s alleged ideological complicity with the state” (Yue Gang 
2005:429) was not empirically grounded. 
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the West. What is more, as the Western New Left thought was still a cluster of foreign, and esoteric to 
some degree, theories to the Chinese audience, it was seen by many as theoretical “cutting edge” and 
therefore looked upon with a great deal of awe in the Chinese intellectual circles in the 1990s. Moreover, 
the debate between the New Left was preceded by a closely intertwined debate: the debate between the 
postmodernists and their opponents. Indeed, until Wang Hui ([1997] 2008:82–84), a noted New Leftist, 
criticized the postmodernists in his famous essay “The State of Contemporary Chinese Thought and the 
Question of Modernity,” New Left, postmodernism, and postcolonialism—the latter two were even given a 
derogatory term “post-ism” by their critics (Zhang Longxi 1996)—were seen as essentially synonymous 
terms by their opponents. Indeed, upon a close look, we can find that Chinese postmodernists and New 
Leftists were the subject of the same criticism: mechanically applying Western theories—which were in 
general critical of the free market and, in many cases, democracy—to China—which were exactly what 
communist China urgently needed in the eyes of many liberals. This is why before the appearance of the 
term “New Left,” liberal philosopher Liu Dong (2001) lumped together postmodernists and New Leftists, 
and criticized their “designer pidgin scholarship.” With the exception of a small number of intellectuals,211 
most critics of postmodernism in the early 1990s were also critics of New Left in the second half of the 
1990s. As most critics of postmodernism were literary theorists and critics, some, such as Zhao Yiheng 
and Zhang Longxi, were not actively engaged in the debate with the New Leftists, but they generally 
supported the liberal stance and were seen by the liberals as allies. Even two decades later, during 
interviews, many liberals who participated in the debates still lumped together postmodernists and New 
Leftists. On the other side of the ideological spectrum, with the notable exception of Wang Hui, most 
postmodernists and New Leftists regarded their critics—liberals as they later came to be called—as their 
audiences and opponents, they rarely debated each other.212 Moreover, some postmodernists, such as 
Liu Kang and Zhang Xudong, did become prominent New Leftists by means of their positive views of 
Maoism. 
                                                          
211 It should be noted that Wang Hui did not directly participate in the debate surrounding postmodernism in the early 
1990s. 
 
212 Wang Hui ([1997] 2008:82–84) only objected to a specific version of postmodernism: the embrace of commercial 
culture in the cynical spirit of deconstruction. Wang’s main targets were Zhang Yiwu, Zhang Fa, and Wang Yichuan. 
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The New Leftists, however, quickly found themselves in a difficult position when the general 
public began to wonder what they had to do with the much-discredited Maoism. As Huang Jisu, a noted 
New Leftist, recalled: 
 
The Cultural Revolution completely stunk up leftism—anyone who smelled it was 
disgusted. As the 1990s proceeded, some people began to hold [leftist] views, which 
could be seen as history repeating itself. As new questions appeared in China, [the New 
Leftists] tried to answer these questions. In comparison with the [Mao] era, some of their 
opinions sounded similar. A question immediately came up: how to define those 
people. … Yang Ping first used the word ‘New Left,’ probably in 1994. … Since then, 
whenever the others mentioned [the word], it was like some out-of-the way thing 
happened: on, my, how come there is New Left? Who are the New Leftists? It reminded 
me of a tale I heard in my childhood: a chimpanzee in a zoo mutated into a human being. 
 
The New Left came as a surprise to most Chinese. After all, after the Cultural Revolution and the 
Tiananmen uprising, despite its enshrined place in the official rhetoric, leftism, including Maoism, 
communism, socialism, conservatism, Mao, the Communist Party, and the Cultural Revolution, was much 
discredited in the popular discourse. Against the backdrop of the binary opposition between “good” right 
and “bad” left, the emergence of the New Left caused much confusion and anger: How can anyone be a 
leftist? Where did they come from? What do they want? Are they going to abolish the reform and go back 
to planned economy, or even the Mao era? Why would they choose dictatorship instead of freedom? 
Indeed, not long after the appearance, journalists and other commentators began to rename Maoists “Old 
Left,” which hinted that the New Left was somehow born out of Maoism, or at least was associated with it. 
Juxtaposed with the Old Left, the New Left would be perceived as a new, more educated generation of 
Maoists who used Western jargons and fashionable theories to defend the dictatorship of the CCP, or 
even wanted to relaunch the Cultural Revolution. For example, in a book on elite politics in post-Mao 
China, the famous journalist Yang Jisheng (2004:539–57) regard the debate between the liberals and the 
New Leftists as part of the power struggle in China’s elite politics, and treated the New Leftists as heirs of 
the political conservatives who wanted to continue Mao’s policies, were opposed to reform and opening 
up in the 1980s, and were responsible for the 1989 Tiananmen massacre. 
Moreover, attaching the New Left to the Old Left became an effective polemical tactic for the 
liberals, the adversaries of the New Leftists. In a scathing essay, entitled “The New Left: Corpses 
Reanimated,” liberal commentator Wu Jiaxiang (2000) claimed that “compared with the Old Left, the 
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newness of the New Left lies only in its wording and quotations.” The title suggested that the New Left 
was nothing but a repackaged Old Left. Wu even made a sweeping statement that “in China, ‘leftism’ 
cannot be touched rashly, be it new or old. Once on the left turn, one becomes ruthless; once on the left 
turn, one becomes shameless; and once on the left turn, one becomes untrustworthy … .” 
As the epithet “New Left” did not come from those attached with the label, many New Leftists 
resisted the name. As liberal philosopher Xu Youyu acknowledged during interview: 
 
[The New Leftists] did not like the label [“New Left”]. Almost none of them were 
willing to say “I’m a New Leftist.” When debating with us, they kept saying that we pinned 
the label on them. I want to be honest—we did pin the label—but it was an appropriate 
label. … I don’t think that the label “New Left” was a mistake or being unfair to them. I 
think the label was perfectly fine. They had some concern, which I can understand, for 
“left” is a derogatory term in China. In the West, “left” is not a derogatory term—it may be 
even mildly flattering. 
 
Some New Leftists tried to add some qualification by branding the Chinese New Left as a part of 
broader global leftist thought—it was “new” because it grew out of New West thought in the West. Gan 
Yang ([2000] 2003:111) insisted that a more accurate name for the New Leftists, including himself, was 
left-wing liberals (ziyou zuopai), because their ideology was very close to liberals in today’s contemporary; 
for the same reason, the so-called liberals should be called “right-wing liberals” (ziyou youpai), for they 
would be conservatives if placed in the American ideological spectrum.213 Similarly, Wang Shaoguang 
(2012b) argued that he belonged to left-wing liberalism, while China’s liberals were actually right-wing 
liberals. However, the way he characterized left-wing and right-wing liberalism was open to contention—
right-wing liberalism focused on human rights and political liberty, such as the freedom of speech, press, 
and association, Wang pointed out, whereas left-wing liberalism cared more about economic liberty and 
social liberty, that is, the basic material demand for human existence. Cui Zhiyuan (2010) also 
emphasized the connection between his thought and Wester New Left: 
 
The word “New Left” has been used more and more often. Since so many people 
use it, I have not tried to reject it. However, I want to give the “Left” a specific definition—I 
                                                          
213 Gan’s position quickly changed in a couple of years when he began to identify himself with American 




want to define “Left” in the Western sense. Before [sic]214 the French Revolution, [France] 
had a three-estate National Constituent Assembly. Those sitting to the right of the king—
the representatives of aristocrats, monks, and priests—were relatively conservative, 
whereas those sitting to the left of the king leaned toward the position of the average 
people. The “Left” was the class that sat on the left side of the king during the French 
Revolution. … If you define the “Left” as the representation of the interest and pursuit of 
the average people—those sitting on the left side of the king during the French 
Revolution—I accept it. But if you understand the New Left as conservative and anti-
reform, I don’t think it’s appropriate. 
 
Wang Hui ([2000] 2003:62) tried to distance himself from Maoist: 
 
[People] like me have always been reluctant to accept this label [of “New Left”], 
pinned on us by our adversaries. Partly this is because we have no wish to be so 
ridiculously associated with the Cultural Revolution, or for that matter with the “Old Left” 
of the Reform-era CCP.215 
 
However, while insisting that the “historical context [of the New Left] is Chinese, not Western” 
([2000] 2003:62), Wang Hui (2004:15) also added that “if the concept of ‘New Left’ is to be used, I prefer 
to place it in its opposition with the New Right, or neoliberalism, or neoconservatism.” By positioning the 
New Left as the opposite of neoliberalism or neoconservatism, Wang effectively justified the New Left as 
the Chinese counterpart of the Western New Left. 
In positioning themselves as spiritual descents of the New Left movement in the West, the New 
Leftists hoped to highlight their critical stance. Wang Hui ([2000] 2003:62), for example, repeatedly 
expressed the wish to be called “critical intellectuals” (pipan zhishifenzi). The problem is that rooted in a 
capitalist society, the Western New Left directed their criticisms against capitalism, whereas criticizing 
capitalism in an authoritarian state ruled by a communist party can be a tricky business. “Speaking of 
being critical, whom do you criticize? America or what?” liberal philosopher Gao Quanxi questioned 
Wang’s critical credential. 
Indeed, the battle over which side should be counted as critical intellectuals constituted an 
important polemic between the New Leftist and the liberals. Taking inspiration from the Western New Left, 
China’s New Leftists mounted fierce attacks against capitalism and Western hegemony, although their 
attack on liberal democracy was not a consensus among Western New Leftists. Wang Hui ([1997] 2008), 
                                                          
214 It appears to be a mistake for “during.” 
 
215 I have slightly modified the translation based on the original Chinese text. 
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for example, criticized the liberals for losing much of their critical spirit by blindly embracing free market 
economy while ignoring the damage global capital had done to Chinese society in the 1990s. A liberal, on 
the contrary, maintained that criticizing capitalism—and the West in general—in China did not reflect a 
critical spirit at all: 
 
As of now, [the New Leftists] rarely criticize China’s politics and economy. I’m not 
talking about specific policies, for the Leftists have confused politics and policies in the 
West, or chose to ignore [their differences] intentionally. In terms of China, in general, 
they are not critical on the level of politics. They have criticized some highly abstract 
things—that was before, and they don’t even criticize those things nowadays. What do 
they criticize? The line from Deng to Jiang—and they dare not speak out. But with 
respect to Mao and present-day [politics], they don’t have any critique. When they 
criticize, they criticize America and the West. Such a criticism is not the essence of 
critique! By its definition, [critique] means that you should criticize the world you live in. 
What criticism does the New Leftists have on the world they live in? What have they 
criticized? 
 
Moreover, by questioning the critical credential of the New Leftist, their adversaries cast a doubt 
on the New Left’s authenticity—an irony considering that it was the adversaries who pinned the label. 
Ding Xueliang, a liberal sociologist at the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, dismissed 
the New Left outright: 
 
There is no New Left in China at all. The chief claim of the New Left is the priority 
of human rights over sovereignty. Are there such New Leftists in China? … There are 
only not-so-old Old Leftists. … Does any of [the New Leftists] dare to say “human rights 
above sovereignty” when domestic conflicts arise? The Western New Leftists criticize at 
once their own government and their own big companies, and thus fall between two 
stools. Although the path they envision may not be realistic, they at least have the 
courage. China’s New Leftists, however, ride the government’s coattails. How can they 
be called “New Left”?! (Li Zongtao 2010:77) 
 
In an article that discussed the differences between ideological designators  in China and 
those in the West, Qin Hui (2000c), a self-claimed liberal who leaned toward social democracy, 
wrote that “the New Left popular in European and American discourse in recent years is the same as 
‘social liberalism’ that was popular in the Socialist International in the 1990s” (83). After juxtaposing 
Western New Left with the vision of Third Way proposed by Tony Blair, then Prime Minister of the 
United Kingdom, Qin noted that Chinese New Left was indeed a mixture of Stalinism and Western 
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Marxism in the West. Chinese New Left, Qin (83) asserted, was “closer to Stalinism than socialist 
democracy.” 
 
How Liberal were the Liberals? 
 
As discussed in Chapter 3, “liberalism” has been a sensitive term since the founding of the CCP 
in 1921. In the era of Mao, the term was often interpreted as a lack of principles or disciplines. Mao even 
wrote a famous essay “Combat Liberalism” in 1937 (Mao Tse-tung 1965). In a sense, the term has 
become even more sensitive in the post-Mao era official discourse, as it has become a symbol of Western 
hostile political forces that want to subvert China’s communist rule. However, it is a completely different 
story outside the political circles. As a reactionary intellectual movement, in the second half of the 1990s, 
liberalism regained most of its moral and ideological legitimacy in the intellectual circles and popular 
discourse. “During [the 1990s] one could say that there had been a thoroughgoing victory of liberalism in 
the realm of popular ideas.” Intellectual historian Xu Jilin (2000:184) observed. “The word ‘liberalism’ itself 
had achieved a cultural cachet previously enjoyed by such terms as democracy and science, even a 
certain inviolability.” As a consequence, when the term “liberalism” reentered public discussions in the 
mid-1990s, after its more than four decades’ forced disappearance in the political, ideological, and 
popular lexicons, both sides of the intellectual opposition—the liberals and the New Leftists—wanted to 
claim their right to it. 
In the 1990s, when the liberals emerged as heirs of the New Enlightenment movement of the 
1980s, the New Leftist fought back by insisting that they were the proponents of real liberalism. Gan Yang, 
a leader of the New Enlightenment movement who carried forward the banner of “liberty and order” in his 
influential 1989 essay “The Idea of Liberty,”216 refused to let the liberals exalt themselves as the inheritors 
of the New Enlightenment legacy and monopolize the notion of liberalism. In Gan’s ([2000] 2003:111) 
view, the rift between New Leftists and liberals was a result of the division of liberal-oriented intellectuals 
in the mid-1990s; the left-wing liberals had come to be called “New Leftists,” whereas the right-wing 
liberals took the name of “liberals.” Moreover, Gan pointed out, the labels were inaccurate because the 
                                                          
216 Xu Jilin (2000:184) thus even considered Gan Yang “[the] first public proponent of liberalism” in post-Mao China. 
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view of the New Leftists was close to that of liberals in America, whereas the liberals would have been 
called “conservatives” in the United States. However, as the New Leftists made no effort to monopolize 
liberalism, Gan (113) added, they were willing to share the label “liberal” with the liberals by calling 
themselves “left-wing liberals”—accordingly the liberals would be “right-wing liberals.” 
Despite the efforts, the term “liberalism” had been widely used without any qualification—and 
used as a designator for the liberals, the adversaries of the New Leftists—by the end of the 1990s. 
Notably, while branding their opponents with the accusatory term “New Left,” the liberals were in general 
happy with their label “liberalism”—rather than “New Right.” Although they lost the battle for the name, the 
New Leftists have insisted that the liberals are not liberal at all, but extreme ideologues under the disguise 
of liberalism. 
 
Liberalism as Conservatism: In the mid-1990s, conservatism as a Western ideology had not been 
widely known in the Chinese intelligentsia, and the word “conservative” carried a strongly negative 
connotation because of its linkage to Maoism and anti-democratic political elite. As a consequence, one 
of the discursive tactics the New Left employed against the liberals was branding them as conservatives. 
As Chapter 2 indicates, before their turn against democracy altogether in the 2000s, the New Leftists 
were passionate proponents of democracy. The nuance here is that they espoused only one specific form 
of democracy—direct democracy or mass democracy. Because most liberals were supporters of 
representative democracy, including division of power and rule of law, they were attacked by the New 
Leftists as anti-democratic and conservative. In his essay “Antidemocratic Liberalism or Democratic 
Liberalism,”217 Gan Yang (2001) criticized the liberals for “[pretending] to advocate liberalism by 
emphasizing negative freedom at the cost of democracy” (79). In his view, the liberals wrongly made a 
distinction between the English model and the French model, with the former standing for worthy gradual 
reform and the latter representing detrimental radicalism manifested by revolution; they blindly accepted 
Isaiah Berlin’s distinction between negative freedom and positive freedom, and thus rejected 
democracy—meaning direct democracy—in the name of freedom; and they advocated laissez-faire 
economics at the cost of social justice (79–81). Calling the liberals “ultraconservatives,” Gan (87–88) 
                                                          
217 The essay was translated and included in an English-language anthology edited by Zhang Xudong, but its title 
was changed to “Debating Liberalism and Democracy in China in the 1990s.” See Gan Yang (2001). 
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blasted them as political and intellectual reactionaries who embraced “political philistinism,” characterized 
by “pseudoelitism,” in politics, and “conservative mind-set” that avoided real problems faced by today’s 
China. Gan (83–84) positioned himself as a political and intellectual progressive, “We must reject the 
exclusion of democracy in the name of liberalism, reject the repudiation of the French Revolution in favor 
of the English Revolution, reject the disavowal of Rousseau and the endorsement of Burke, and reject, 
especially, the negation of modernity (in the form of the European Enlightenment and the Chinese May 
Fourth Movement) under the pretext of resorting to Chinese tradition.” In his response, liberal historian Lei 
Yi (1997b) argued that the conservative/radical distinction should be made in the context of national 
politics, rather than as one of political philosophy isolated from real-life politics, and that the democracy 
envisioned by the New Left was in essence akin to the dictatorship manifested by the Cultural Revolution. 
 
Liberalism as Neoliberalism: Against the backdrop of a powerful authoritarian state and decades 
of planned economy, most liberals welcomed the market-oriented economic reform. As Chapter 3 shows, 
in today’s China, liberalism encompasses a wide range of views. Some liberals, most of whom 
economists, embraced the free market without any reservation, and therefore can indeed be described as 
neoliberals. However, neoliberals only account for a small proportion of Chinese liberals. Most liberals 
simply believe that the party-state should be responsible for much of the social injustice occurred in 
China’s neoliberal reform. But this has not been how the New Leftists characterize the liberals. Zhang 
Xudong (2008b:41), for example, denounced Chinese liberalism in the 1990s as a radical degradation 
“from a traditional liberalism (freedom, equality, social justice, etc.) to a neoliberal discourse 
corresponding to the conservative revolution of the Reagan-Thatcher period, and to the demise of the 
Soviet Bloc between 1989 and 1991.” Chinese liberals were really neoliberals, according to Zhang, 
because they demanded “a wholesale, systematic adoption of the ideologies and policies of the market 
revolution that has swept the World since the 1980s.” 
The most systematic and influential attack of Chinese liberals as neoliberals has come from 
Wang Hui. In his long essay “The 1989 Social Movement and the Historical Roots of China’s 
Neoliberalism,” Wang (2003) mounted a full-fledged attack on the entire liberal intelligentsia. The article 
was a follow-up to his previous critique of the Chinese intelligentsia in “Contemporary Chinese Thought 
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and the Question of Modernity” (Wang Hui [1998] 2003), in which he criticized Chinese intellectuals of the 
1990s for being trapped in the teleology of modernization, which began with Mao’s utopian vision, at the 
cost of ignoring the penetration of global capital on Chinese society and state. In the new essay, which 
first appeared in 2001, Wang began to refer to the liberal intellectuals “neoliberals.” In his narrative, after 
the 1989 Tiananmen uprising, the Communist launched a program of radical marketization. Because the 
liberals were passionate supporters of market economy, they were de facto collaborators with the state. 
In other words, the discursive hegemony of neoliberalism was a result of the imbrication of state policy 
and neoliberal ideology promoted by the liberal intellectuals, with the facilitation of the media penetrated 




How did the intellectual come to what they believe, or what they presented as their views? In 
Chapter 3, I show that the political attitudes and views of the liberals have been profoundly shaped by 
their life experiences. In particular, two significant historical events—the Cultural Revolution and the 
Tiananmen Square crackdown—changed the way they viewed the political authorities. That knowledge 
and thought are the products of their social existence and historical context is a traditional insight of the 
sociology of knowledge (Mannheim 1936), and it is indeed useful in helping us to navigate the range of 
intellectual positions that appear to be all over the place on the surface.  However, an important question 
remains: what led to the division between the New Leftists and the liberals? After all, both liberals and 
New Leftists were reformist in orientation in the 1980s—New Leftists such as Gan Yang was even more 
radical than the liberals in terms of their anti-authoritarian stance. The importance of the changing social 
and political environment described in Chapters 2 and 3, such as the emergence of China as a significant 
global power and the increasing autonomous—yet at the same time deeply penetrated by state power—
intellectual field that rewards intellectual innovation but punishes ideological nonconformity, is without a 
doubt. What is more, through the prism of knowledge production, as a universal phenomenon in cultural 
sphere, the process of self-similarity tends to produce fractal distinctions (Abbott 2001). In other words, 
the left/right distinction is a perennial social phenomenon not confined in contemporary China. The 
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problem is that the internalist account does not really explain anything, and we still do not know how the 
division happens. If knowledge generation is a social process, we need to develop a process-oriented 
analytic (Glaeser 2011). Instead of laying out an abstract theory, I try to be focused and modest in this 
section. I argue that the positions of both New Left and liberal intellectuals were defined by their polar 
opposition to each other. Both New Left and liberal intellectuals were defined not by what they were for, 
but by what they were against; and their self-definitions did not take shape until the combative interaction 
began, and such definitions did not crystalize until the combative interaction operated along the New 
Left/liberal line. 
To begin with, many prominent participants in the debate between liberalism and the New Left 
were friends, or at least acquaintances. For example, Xu Youyu and Gan Yang both belonged to the 
editorial board of Culture: China and the World and met frequently; Liu Junning, Gao Quanxi, and Wang 
Hui were literally next-door neighbors in an apartment building of CASS; and Lei Yi and Cui Zhiyuan were 
colleagues at CASS and were in the same English training camp sponsored. The debate began as 
serious and polite intellectual discussions. The tone was quite gentle in general, and the exchanges 
revolved around issues, rather than rhetoric. In addition, those first carried the banner of liberalism and 
those who first engaged in the debate with the New Leftists—despite most of them were all called 
“liberals” and formed an alliance against the New Leftists—were not the same people. 
The debate began with the liberals criticizing the New Leftists—without the labels. In February 
1994, in an article in Twentieth-first Century, Wang Shaoguang and Hu Angang warned that 
decentralization had led to the steady decline of state capacity, and a weakening central government 
would result in serious crises, including income inequality and social unrest. The first responses came 
from Yang Dali, Rao Yuqing, Xiao Geng, and Cui Zhiyuan, none of whom claimed or were later identified 
as liberals—Cui was even the first to be attached with the New Left. The criticisms were all technical, 
mainly resolving around the definition and measurement of state capacity. While the article received more 
criticisms from liberals in the following months (Li Qiang 1998; Wang Dingding 1994b; Zhang Shuguang 
1995), the exchanges were largely academic ones without personal insults. Indeed, it was not until the 
late 1990s when Wang was widely listed as one of the “big four” New Leftists did he begin to receive 
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more critical scrutiny. Furthermore, the real combative interaction between Wang and the liberals only 
began in the 2000s when he initiated a wave of attacks against election-based democracy. 
The situation subtly changed for Cui Zhiyuan. In 1994, Cui published “Institutional Innovation and 
a Second Liberation of Thought” in the August issue of Twentieth-first Century. The article criticized the 
pursuit of Western-style liberal democracy as “institutional fetishism,” praised many practices in the Mao 
era—particularly those during the Great Leap Forward—as ones of institutional innovation that 
exemplified economic democracy, and called for bringing back the “reasonable elements” of the Cultural 
Revolution. As one of the very first—if not the first—academic papers in post-Mao China that explicitly 
cast the Mao era in a positive light, Cui’s piece offended a great number of liberal intellectuals, many of 
whom regarded the 10 years of Cultural Revolution as the darkest moment in their lives and modern 
Chinese history, and viewed capitalism and liberal democracy as the only viable or desirable path forward, 
and critiques poured in over the following months. 
The most notable critic of Cui was Qin Hui, a historian at Tsinghua University. In the early 1990s, 
Qin published a large number of articles that revealed and criticized the egregious corruption in the 
course of China’s economic reform and the grave social injustice as a result of crony capitalism.218 As a 
result, in the first few years, Qin was a target of social free-market economists, and some New Leftists 
viewed Qin as an ally (Wang Hui [2001] 2008:144). However, offended by Cui’s positive view of Mao and 
the Cultural Revolution, Qin sided with the liberals and chose the New Left as his target. In a long 
response essay in February 1996, he ridiculed Cui as a “New Leftist with Chinese characteristics” who 
faulted capitalism but not political authorities, and praised dictatorship with Western jargons. It was after 
this essay that the intellectual debate began to operate the New Left/liberal line. 
If thus far the New Left had been on the defense, a round of full-fledged attacks on liberalism was 
launched in 1997. Wang Binbin, a Nanjing-based literary critic published an essay in the magazine Tianya 
(Frontiers). The essay began with the critique of liberalism from Max Horkheimer and Herbert Marcuse, 
two theorists of the Frankfurt School, who argued for the intrinsic connection between liberalism and 
dictatorship, including totalitarianism and fascism. In particular, as Marcuse argued, despite its 
prioritization of rationality, liberalism remained an attitude of “irrationalistic naturalism” when it came to 
                                                          
218 Many of the articles are reprinted in Qin Hui (1998b). 
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reconciling the conflicting interests of different classes, thus it effectively defended the status quo. It then 
moved on to liberal intellectuals in modern Chinese history. As Wang saw it, because of their preference 
of order over chaos and reform over revolution, those liberal intellectuals, such as Yan Fu, Hu Shi, and 
Zhou Zuoren, ended up siding with dictatorship. In a nutshell, Wang saw liberals as political conservatives. 
Because of his attack on liberalism, Wang was immediately regarded as a member of the New Left. 
However, despite his appropriation of the Frankfurt School, Wang Binbin never praised the New Left 
either. Ironically, more than ten years later, when Wang Binbin accused Wang Hui for alleged plagiarism, 
the New Leftists furiously called the accusation a smear campaign, while the liberals suddenly had a 
favorable view on him. In his response, Xu Youyu used John Locke as an example to show that liberalism 
provided theoretical rationales for revolts against dictatorship and laid the foundation for the American 
and French revolutions, and therefore denied the connection between liberalism and status quo. 
A year later, Han Yuhai (1998), a young literature professor at Peking University, published a 
critical essay on Chinese liberals in Frontiers. Han attacked the liberals for ignoring urgent social 
problems, such as official corruption, popular participation, and the penetration of the capital into society, 
and instead resorting to empty rhetoric such as rights and freedom. In Han’s view, because of the liberals’ 
rejection of direct democracy, they are by nature illiberal, elitist, and aristocratic. Han (17) also attached 
Chinese liberalism to neoliberalism that gave rise to the Thatcher and Reagan governments, which he 
described as “right-wing capitalist hegemonism” and the most militant regimes in human history. The 
sharpest and most controversial critique of Chinese liberalism, however, came from Wang Hui’s 1997 
article “The State of Contemporary Chinese Thought and the Question of Modernity.” One of its 
remarkable accusations of the liberal intellectuals was that because of their advocacy for market-oriented 
economic reform, regardless of their intention, they formed a de facto alliance with the neoliberal state 
against the backdrop of state-driven capitalism. This long essay challenged much conventional wisdom 
about the New Enlightenment movement in the 1980s and liberalism in the 1990s. Despite its difficult 
prose style, it was widely read and immediately stirred up intense opposition from the liberal camp. It has 
been hailed by both sides as a “manifesto of the Chinese New Left” (Wang 2003:29). Because of this 
article, Wang became the de facto leader of the Chinese New Left. Moreover, Wang’s article changed the 
Chinese intelligentsia in three ways. First, it ignited an unprecedented level of anger from the liberal, who 
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began to group Wang Hui, Cui Zhiyuan, Gan Yang, Wang Shaoguang, and some others together as 
leading New Leftists. With the employment of labels, the initial serious intellectual discussions quickly 
dissolved into a “war of words.” Second, with the labels in place, both sides began to not only adopt or 
accept them, but also define themselves as the opposite of, or at least in reference to, the rival camp. 
Those who did not engage with the other side as a discursive enemy lost influence and became 
marginalized, no matter how serious their intellectual pursuit was. Third, both camps sought to occupy the 
moral high ground, and began to question the motives of the rival, thus the criteria for argument became 
incommensurable for both sides. 
 
The Rival Camp as Reference Group 
 
As the two ideological labels took shape, the self-definition and self-identity of the intellectuals 
began to crystalize. Here we notice the important role of group rivalry in shaping the identities of the 
intellectuals and even their intellectual positions. As one of the most essential wisdom of sociology, 
individual identities are never formed in isolation, but are always constructed through repeated 
interactions with other human beings in group settings. In other words, individual identities are shaped by 
group identities (Smith 1998:90–91). Moreover, group identities are formed by processes of contrast and 
opposition (Horowitz 2001:179; Smith 1998:91–92). It is too vague, however, to say identification is a 
social process. The case of Chinese intellectuals tells us two things. First, through repeated labeling and 
interaction, social categorization can be internalized as self-identities. Second, social identities, and even 
social knowledge and attitudes, are shaped by symbolic boundaries. Furthermore, symbolic boundaries 
are constructed against a reference group, defined as a set of individuals who act as a frame of 
comparison relative to which individuals compare themselves. 
In our case here, the liberals and the New Leftists served as each other’s negative reference 
group, and the polar opposition not only formed their group- and self-identities, but also shaped their own 
views. As Lei Yi recalled, “It exactly began from the dispute [over the Cultural Revolution] that the 
differences between liberalism and the New Left became gradually accentuated. … In the course of 
debate, both sides sorted out their own views, and sorted out what they agreed on and disagreed on. In a 
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sense, the camps that we now call liberalism and the New Left were formed in such debates.” To respond 
to the attacks from the New Left, the liberals had to define themselves against both the accusations and 
the New Left positions. In an influential essay “1998: A Philosophical Discourse of Liberalism,” liberal 
historian Zhu Xueqin ([1998] 1999) attempted to the first comprehensive definition of Chinese liberalism. 
Zhu (380), however, began by noting that Chinese liberalism had been subjected to frequent 
misunderstandings and distortions. He emphasized, “In China’s specific linguistic context, to ask what 
[liberalism] is, the first thing to know is what it is not.” Zhu (2003:105) defined Chinese liberalism as the 
following: 
 
Philosophically it stands for empiricism, in contrast to transcendentalism. Its 
historical ideas are based on a fallibilistic evolutionary theory, and reject any kind of 
historical determinism. Its concepts of evolution involve gradual improvement and 
progress, and a refusal of the voluntarism that is characteristic of radicalism. Its economic 
theory requires a market system, and rejection of a planned economy. Its political theory 
requires a representative democracy, a constitutional government and a legal system, 
proof not only against an individual tyranny or an oligarchy, but also against a mass 
dictatorship in the name of the ‘general will’ exercised by a majority. Its ethical code 
requires the protection of differing values and includes the belief that no individual must 
be sacrificed as a means to any abstract end. 
 
Zhu’s definition clearly was an attempt to refute the accusation. Indeed, in the second half of his 
essay, Zhu made it clear that his Anglo-Saxton conservative version of liberalism was an attempt to 
differentiate Chinese liberalism from radical mass participation exemplified by the French Revolution, as 
confused by Han Yuhai. The emergence of liberalism, as he saw it, was a response to two dangerous 
trends: the continuous authoritarianism since 1989, which led to rampant structural corruption and social 
injustice; and the “left turn” of the intelligentsia, which directed its critique to the global economic system, 
and thus put China’s market-oriented economic reform in peril and concealed the real roots of China’s 
social instability. Therefore, the liberals were fighting two wars at the same time. Twenty years of 
economic reform without political liberation was responsible for China’s social injustice, the solution to 
which could only be constitutional democracy through political reform, not returning to mass movements 
of the Mao era. 
Similar to Zhu’s response to Han, Xu Youyu tried to define liberalism against Wang Hui’s 
accusations. In Xu’s (1999c) view, the opposition between the Left and liberalism was “fundamental,” and 
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the Left’s hostility toward liberalism had always been greater than that toward totalitarianism. In late-
1990s China, “when [many intellectuals] were discussing political reform, the sole target of attacks of the 
New Left was liberalism” (44–45). Thus, to respond to the criticisms, claimed Xu (45–46), it was 
necessary to clearly state the core component of liberalism, which was the priority of individual liberty. 
Such a claim was a direct refutation of Wang Hui’s (2009:94) statement that “[if] someone truly supports 
individual rights and acknowledges that these are social rights, then he must abandon the atomistic 
conception of individuals and necessarily embrace the tendency toward socialism,” which Xu (46) mocked 
as “what a profound logic.” Taking individual liberty as the point of departure, Xu (45–46) identified three 
derivative elements of liberalism: the protection of individual properties, separation of powers, and cultural 
pluralism. Xu (46–48) then placed liberalism in the context of China’s market transition, rejecting Han 
Yuhai’s assertion that free market economy only catered the special interests of the privileged class. 
Those who consistently called for social justice, Xu insisted, were the liberals, not the New Leftists. Finally, 
in reference to Wang Hui’s charge of liberalism’s lack of critique of capitalism, Xu (49–51) pointed out that 
by its nature, today’s China was a continuation of Mao’s China and that in the 1980s. Therefore, for the 
liberals, the most important reality of China was an authoritarian regime led by a communist party, not a 
market society that was part of global capitalism. It is indeed remarkable to see how much the positions of 
both camps were defined by the polar opposition. As Xu (2012a:45–46) recalled, “In the mid-1990s, … 
when I tried to clarified my own overarching intellectual and cultural position, I came up with the term 
‘liberalism,’ which was born out of the comparisons and debates with several popular thoughts back 
then. … In the debate between [liberalism and the New Left], I chose liberalism rather than the New Left.” 
In short, the existence of a rival camp helped to shape the view of both liberal and New Left 
intellectuals. As the labels of “New Left” and “liberalism” came to be widely used, the fierce exchange 
between the two camps galvanized them to define their views as the opposite of the other camp. Liberal 
philosopher Gu Su provided a vivid account such a process: 
 
[My debates with the New Leftists] helped to solidify my beliefs and basic 
conclusions—they even helped me to develop my own thoughts. Take equality for 
example. Should it be mass democracy or representative democracy, cultural democracy 
or political democracy, … , direct democracy or indirect democracy? The debates were 
helpful. They at least forced me to clarify my positions, and even shaped some of my 
views—because I had to respond to them. For example, initially I didn’t quite understand 
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the difference between mass democracy and representative democracy. Through the 
debates, I realized that mass democracy was only an empty slogan, or at least unrealistic 
for today’s China. … So I later said that … democracy based on the rule of law would be 
a good option; when possible, we could even combine indirect elections at lower levels 
and direct elections for state leaders. In order to debate [the New Leftists], I began to 
read relevant literature, and my views became increasingly clear along the way. … All 
these views were formed in the course of debate. … The debates were crucial. 
 
Going to Extremes 
 
In the process of debate, the internal differences with each camp were suppressed, whereas the 
mutual disagreements were augmented. The employment of ideological labels and verbal squabbles not 
only shaped the self-identity of each side, but also pushed the intellectual positions of each side further 
apart from its opponent. On the liberal side, as the critique of capitalism was seen as a typical New Left 
position, the liberal intellectuals were unwilling to critically reflect on the negative consequences of 
economic rationality on the society. While only a small portion of the liberals—mainly free market 
economists—denied such consequences outright, most liberals simply dismissed such discussions as out 
of place with China’s current stage of development. On the New Left side, while the New Leftists initially 
criticized the Communist Party for colluding with transnational capital in implementing neoliberal policies 
and supported direct democracy, in the course of countering the liberal arguments for constitutional 
democracy, they quickly lost their critical edge by giving up the democracy rhetoric all together and 
justifying the communist rule as a viable alternative to Western modernity. 
As Table 4.1 indicates, the debate between the New Left and liberalism started out in a quite 
moderate manner in which both sides focused on specific issues. When both sides began to resort to 
ideological labels in the mid-1990s, however, not only did their relationship deteriorated from intellectual 
rivals to real enemies, but also their intellectual positions were substantially polarized in the process of 








Table 4.1 Major Debates between the New Left and Liberalism in the 1990s 
 
Year Issue New Left Liberalism 
1993 Western 
Sinology 
Western Sinology had a cold-war mentality 
for ignoring the aesthetic value of Chinese 
literature in the Mao era 
Revolutionary literature in modern China 
served political purposes and therefore 
lacked aesthetic value 
1993 Rural 
industrialization 
Rural industrialization as an alternative to 
Western modernity 
Peasants were forced to stay in the 
countryside and treated as secondary 
citizens 
1994 State capacity The state capacity must be strengthened in 
order to bring stable fiscal revenues for the 
central government 
Decentralization should be the direction of 
reform, and a strong central government 
was more worrisome than beneficial 
1994 Cultural 
Revolution 
Bringing “Reasonable Elements” of the 
Cultural Revolution Back to China 
The Cultural Revolution did not manifest 
democracy, but only brought disasters; the 
New Left turned blind to the atrocity of 
Maoism (1996) 
1995 Designer pidgin 
scholarship 
Studying Maoist and today’s China in light 
of postmodernism was a blind application 
of Western intellectual fads 
The notion that only those living in China 




Chinese liberals were political 
conservatives who rejected democracy in 
the name of negative liberty 
Chinese liberals were not conservatives 
because conservatism should be defined in 
its social context; mass democracy is not 
real democracy and only led to 
totalitarianism 
1997 Modernization Chinese liberals had given up critical 
analysis by embracing capitalism; the 
ideology of modernization was reactionary 
because it did not allow for an alternative 
modernity 
The real enemy was the authoritarian rule, 
not capitalism. A real critical intellectual 
should criticize its government, not the 
easy target of capitalism 
1998 Autocratic 
liberalism 
Chinese liberals were autocratic because 
they rejected mass participation 
Chinese liberals supported market 
economy, negative liberty, and 
representative democracy 
1999 Neoliberalism Chinese liberals were neoliberals who 
colluded with the state in the development 
of a neoliberal ideology, and were blind to 
the movements for social self-protection 
since the 1980s, including the 1989 
Tiananmen uprising 
Only further market reform would weaken 
the power of the state and bring social 
justice; the 1989 Tiananmen uprising was a 
pro-democracy movement and had nothing 
to do with neoliberalism 
 
During interview, a well-known New Leftist criticized his fellow leftists for being pushed to the 
extreme in the course of debate: 
 
I often tell my New Left friends: you can’t scold everything that’s American. That’s not 
right. We support everything that our enemies oppose, and we oppose everything that our 
enemies support—I don’t think that’s the right way to go. Americans say we China doesn’t have 
democracy, then I say you don’t have democracy either; you talk about ancient Rome, I say 
Song China was democratic. Some New Leftists like to argue this way. … The liberals say we 
need universal values and democracy, and then we say democracy is bad. … The boundary 
between two camps has become more and more clear-cut. They have defined themselves in 
the process of bashing each other and insulting each other. A situation has ensued: if you say 
something, I would go for the opposite; and if you accuse me of something, I would take pride in 
such a thing. … We are not supposed to be defined by our rivals. But the reality is this: when 
my opponent say I’m far-left, I would argue that it’s good to be far-left; when my opponent say 
you’re a remnant of the Cultural Revolution, I would do everything I can to prove that the 
Cultural Revolution was good; when my opponent supported, I would argue in various ways that 
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democracy is a bad thing; … and when my opponent say “you bastard,” I would say “it’s good to 
be a bastard.” … I have found that my [intellectual] friends used to be moderate and fair, but are 




The intellectual field and the academic field have had a complex relationship in China. For the 
purpose of the discussion here, it helps to recall that while the state began to loosen its control over the 
intellectual and academic fields in the 1990s, it remained its strong presence in the areas most relevant to 
public discussions, such as political science. As a consequence, the issues that received most attention 
in the intellectual debates—such as the nature of China’s party-state, the definition of democracy, and the 
relationship between democracy and liberty—lacked discipline-specific basic research, both theoretical 
and empirical. For those big issues, the academic field did not prepare necessary knowledge 
accumulation for the intellectual field (Liu Qing 2006:295). On the other hand, in the 1980s, there was not 
an autonomic academic field, and the intellectual field was largely a subfield within the political field. In 
the 1990s, as an intellectual field was trying to gain autonomy by breaking from the political field, it had to 
converge with the academic field in order to “safely” intervene in the public sphere. As we can easily see, 
the debates between the New Left and liberalism were often conducted in abstract and sweeping 
theoretical language. Even when the issues at hand were important policy ones, names of Western 
theorists—such as Weber, Tocqueville, Locke, Hayek, Gramsci, Wallerstein, Giddens, and Habermas—
and aphorism-style assertions that are grand in style but short of substance—such as “support a 
government that can be opposed and oppose a government that can only be supported” (cited in Liu Qing 
2006:300)—flew around. Aside from the purpose on the part of the intellectuals to appropriate the classic 
thinkers for the sake of their own arguments, there are two reasons behind the phenomenon. First, 
because of the insufficiency in the development of the academic field, the exchanges in the intellectual 
field had to be conducted as theoretical exchanges in academic languages (Liu Qing 2006:295–96). 
Second, because of the strong presence of state power, the intellectual debates could not be conducted 
in a straightforward fashion. As a consequence, appropriating classic theories and communicating one’s 
thoughts “between the lines” were important discursive tactics for the intellectuals. When we look at the 
debates in the 1990s, we find that the intellectual exchanges rarely led to any fruitful conclusions, let 
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alone any consensus, shared by the New Leftists and the liberals. For example, both sides labeled the 
other as “conservatives,” but the term clearly meant different things to them: for the liberals, the New 
Leftists were conservative because they supported the communist rule; for the New Leftists, the liberals 
were conservative because they dismissed mass participation, as manifested by the Cultural Revolution, 
and because they uncritically embraced capitalism. Take another example, both sides noticed and 
criticized social injustice brought about by crony capitalism, but without analyzing the mechanism behind 
the superficial phenomenon—the sensitive nature of the topic certainly cannot be neglected—the liberals 
and New Leftists simply blamed either communism or capitalism without the willingness of finding a 
common ground. 
In addition, once the intellectuals were named, defined, and generalized under the rubrics of New 
Left and liberalism, both sides began to attack the opponents with stereotypes and stigmatization, often 
out of sincerity. Aside from the previously discussed labels, such as neoliberalism, conservatism, 
neoconservatism, post-ism, and New Left, both sides tried to occupy the moral high ground and question 
the motives of the rival camp. Both sides saw themselves as victimized critical intellectuals and accused 
the other side of colluding with the government or transnational capitalists. The liberals branded the New 
leftists as “hack writers” for the CCP, while the New Leftists denounced the liberals as “compradors” of big 
transnational corporations and American imperialists. For example, when criticizing the liberals’ blind 
belief in the free market, Gan Yang (1999:85) described liberalism as a symptom of “collective moral 
decadence”—for the liberals “have lost the most basic sense of morality and justice”—and a symptom of 
“collective mental retardation”—for the liberals “have no capacity of grasping the basic problematics and 
hidden assumptions of academic inquiry.” The liberals also repeatedly resorted to personal insults, 
accusing the New Leftists of “dishonest,” unworthy of “serious academic discussions,” “evoking the spirit 
of ultraleftism that has wrecked China” (Xu Youyu 2000a), and even “choosing to side with terrorism” 
(Xiao Shu [2001] 2003). 
 For example, after Zhu Xueqin claimed in 1998 that liberalism “emerged from the water” (fuchu 
shuimian)—a metaphor for the previously suppressed state of liberalism and the hostile political 
environment faced by the liberals—instead of engaging in a serious discussion, Wang Hui (2000b:x) 




1998 was a year of disasters219 and crises, …. For a Shanghai celebrity, however, 
it was a year of the so-called liberalism emerging from the water, whereas the “New Left” 
was nothing but duckweed that crusted on the hero’s clothes in order to emerge from the 
water, whose smell of the Seine was still lingering. I kind of suspect that this “New Leftist” 
was a strawman who was knitted and pinned on the on the upper part of the jacket by our 
hero—otherwise he would have long been in the raging flood and flooded into the sea to 
feed fish, along with mud, sandbags, and all sorts of pollutants. What a great 1998! 
Millions of gallons of water did not awaken this hero to think about the disaster, but only 
arouse his fervor to emerge from the water in a mad rush. What a great swimmer is this 
gentleman! 
 
With such rhetoric, the initial serious discussions of China’s past and future quickly degraded into 
a “spitting war” (Wu 2014:185–222). Both sides stopped criticizing those in their own camps, and focused 
only on attacking and ridiculing the rivals. The line-drawing and ideological alignment affected the 
ideological makeup of the Chines intelligentsia. An interesting case is Wang Xiaodong, a famous 
nationalist who has been seen as a New Leftist. During interview, however, Wang emphasized that other 
than nationalism, his views were similar to those of the liberals. As he put it: 
 
When I entered the intellectual debate, the liberals had so much resentment 
against me and tried to force me out [of the intellectual circles]. Indeed I had never 
spoken against their democratic view and the market economy. I was only opposed to 
reverse racism. … In this situation, the Left gave me some space and allowed me to 
speak. … Therefore I had to make some concessions, to be honest with you. For 
example, I’m against the Cultural Revolution. No question about it—and it has something 
to do with my personal experience. But for a long time, I avoided this issue in my 
publications … . Why? Because the people who gave me the platform to speak would not 
tolerate any criticism of the Cultural Revolution … . 
 
During interviews, many intellectuals faulted those on the other side simply for being “liberals” or 
“New Leftists” without even any familiarity with their writings. On the liberal side, many easily dismissed 
anyone who has any positive view on the CCP as a “New Leftist.” On the New Left side, during interview, 
an intellectual made an assertion without any qualification or explanation, “The Enlightenment is bad. 
What China does not need now is exactly the Enlightenment.” As a result of this polar opposition, many 
intellectual positions that had not necessarily been compatible melted into the two mutually exclusive and 
far-apart blocs, with virtually no overlap with each other. The moderate voices of both camps have been 
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drowned out.220 The excessive attacks even affected the reputation of relevant intellectual journals and 
media outlets (Wang 2003:30). For example, the Southern Weekly became most important platform for 
the liberals, and it has played an important role in many intellectual debates. Reading and the Frontiers, 
however, were quite arbitrarily attacked by the liberals as New Left journals. In the case of the latter, the 
association merely came from the fact that some controversial articles by New Leftists, such as a few by 
Wang Hui, were first published in the Frontiers. The case for the former is more complicated. Reading 
was generally seen as a reformist-leaning intellectual journal, although it was not associated with any 
“faction.” In 1996, the journal invited Wang Hui to take charge. Wang invited Huang Ping, a sociologist at 
the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences with a doctoral degree from the London School of Economics 
and Political Science, to be the coeditor a few months later. As the humanities and social sciences were 
on the quick path of professionalization and specialization, Wang and Huang tried to make the journal 
more academically rigorous by transforming it from accessible magazine of Enlightenment ideals to a 
more serious journal of critical inquiry. However, the journal still published a number of essays associated 
with liberalism, including those criticizing the New Left. Therefore, the accusation was a result more of 
ideological division than of New Left taking over the journals. During interviews, numerous liberals called 
Reading a “New Left propaganda machine.” One of them even said that he suspected, despite the lack of 
any evidence, Dong Xiuyu, former publisher of the journal who invited Wang Hui to be its editor, to be an 
agent of the CCP to monitor the journal’s liberal then-editor. 
By the beginning of the twenty-first century, as the polar opposition became so deeply entrenched 
and intellectual exchanges no longer productive, both sides stopped engaging with the other, both 
intellectually and socially. Intellectually, while sporadic debates can still be seen, they have been more 
theatrical than substantive. As Lei Yi said, “The debates only target the general public now.” Socially, the 
liberals and the New Left became two increasingly closed circles with no social interaction with each other. 
In the 1990s, the liberal and New Left intellectuals often attended conferences together. Since the early 
2000s, such an interaction has become increasingly rare as both camps avoid direct engagements. 
Commenting on the liberals, Wang Hui said, “They simplified many of your sophisticated thoughts and 
                                                          
220 Since the late 2000s and early 2010s, some intellectuals, including Xu Jilin, Liu Qinghave, and Chow Po Chung, 
have tried to differentiate themselves with the mainstream New Left and position themselves as left-wing liberalism 
(ziyouzhuyi zuoyi). The influence so fa has been limited. 
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studies as New Left and nationalism, then [your research] lost any significance. What a discussion was 
that?! … Honestly, speaking of taking sides, a taxi driver would do a better job than [the liberals]. Anyone 
can take sides and does it better than [the liberals], then why [discuss]?” The liberals are no less angry, 
as Lei Yi said, “The leftists completely defend today’s Communist Party, and some even think that the 
suppression is not enough. You can read Pan Wei’s articles. Sima Nan said that those who dared go 
against the will of the CCP should be consequence. Tell me, how can the two sides get together?” 
 
The Intellectual Politics of Academic Awards 
 
In 1999, the charitable foundation of Li Ka-sheng, a Hong Kong business magnate and 
chairperson of the Cheung Kong Group, donated RMB 999,000 to launch the annual Cheung Kong-
Reading Awards, jointly administrated by the Li Ka Shing Foundation, the Reading, and the SDX Joint 
Publishing Company (Shenghuo dushu xinzhi sanlian shudian), Reading’s publisher. Richest academic 
awards in any field, the annual Cheung Kong-Reading Awards promised to be China’s most prestigious 
academic awards. To make the awards as rigorous and convincing as possible, the nomination and 
selection process imitated that of the Nobel Prizes. 
With much publicity and anticipation, however, when the inaugural award winners were 
announced in June 2000, a nation debate erupted, which was quickly morphed into a virtual war between 
the New Leftists and the liberals. The awards comprised of three categories: a special award for lifetime 
achievements, which carried no monetary value; three book awards, each of which carried RMB 300,000; 
and three article awards, each of which carried RMB 30,000. Many liberals found the result of the article 
awards troubling, for two of the four winners (Chien Sechin Y. S. and Zhu Suli shared an award) were 
noted New Leftists.221 More troubling was the selection of the Collected Works of Fei Xiaotong for the 
special award for lifetime achievements and Qian Liqun’s article for an article award, for Fei Xiaotong, 
China’s most esteemed sociologist and former vice chairperson of the Standing Committee of the NPC, 
was Honorary Chair of the awards’ advisory committee, whereas Qian Liqun was a member of the awards’ 
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selection committee.222 The title of a newspaper article “Grand Prizes of 999,000 Awarded to ‘Readingers’” 
(99 wan yuan dajiang bangei “dushu” ren) conveyed the widely-held concern over corruption in the 
selection process (Zhong Xiaoyong 2000), as the expression “‘dushu’ ren”—along with the quotation 
mark—is an intentionally ambiguous double-edged remark that could mean scholars in general or those 
associated with the journal Reading. 
The most controversial of all, however, was the selection of Wang Hui’s collected essays for one 
of the three book awards. Some noted the inappropriateness of collected essays, Fei Xiaotong’s multi-
volume collections included, for the book awards (Ge Jianxiong 2000:2; Xu Youyu 2000b:6). More 
important, not only was Wang a coeditor of Reading, a cosponsor and co-administrator of the awards, but 
also his name appeared on the list of three conveners of the academic committee of the awards. Even 
though Wang was overseas for the entire duration of the selection process, his nominal status and close 
association with the selection committee made him a target of cataclysmic criticisms of nepotism. Many 
critics resorted to the principle procedural justice by pointing out that as a universal rule, those with direct 
working relationship with the hosts of an award should not be considered for the award. As coeditor of 
Reading, Wang should not have been nominated, let alone selected, at all (Ge Jianxiong 2000; He 
Weifang 2000; Lei Yi 2000; Qin Hui 2000a; Xu Youyu 2000b, Zhu Xueqin 2000). While not a member of 
the selection committee, Xu Youyu was on the nomination committee. He recalled his concern when 
receiving the invitation as Reading was no longer a fair and nonpartisan journal, and described how 
shocking it was for him to learn about the results: “I could not believe it. Not only did my previous concern 
turn out to be true, but also it was much worse.” (Xu Youyu 2000b:5) In addition, some liberals criticized 
Wang’s selection in the context of the debate between the New Leftists and the liberals. Lei Yi (2000:11) 
observed that many of the 15 selection committee members were associated with the New Left, and two 
were Wang’s colleagues at CASS’s Institute of Literature. 
In its assertive official response, however, the awards’ selection committee denied any wrong 
doing and threatened to sue the rumor mongers. It also denied that Wang was a convener of the awards’ 
academic committee, despite the fact that Wang’s name appeared on the committee’s list in the initial 
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award was an ad hoc arrangement and carried no cash prize, while Qian resigned from the selection committee after 
his article advanced to the next round in the four-round selection process (Zhong Xiaoyong 2000:445–46). 
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announcement of the awards and no announcement regarding the change of committee makeup was 
made in the process (Xu Youyu 2004). 
More important, as a large number of intellectuals took sides, the controversy quickly spiraled out 
of control and became a war between the New Left and the liberals. Shao Jian reiterated his critique of 
the Reading as degrading into a left-wing journal by “opposing hegemony without opposing totalitarianism” 
(fan baquan bufan jiquan). Zhu Xuqein scoffed Wang Hui for intellectual hypocrisy, “Since [Wang Hui] 
made his name as a critic of market economy and transnational capital, why would he seek money from 
market economy and transnational capital, and award himself?”223 While almost all the liberals active in 
the polemics against the New Left criticized Wang’s award in the name of procedural justice, the New 
Leftists universally came out in Wang’s defense. Wang Shaoguang (2000) lashed out the critics for 
intending to “completely integrate the ‘New Left,’ dismantle the editorial team of the Reading, and purge 
and discredit Wang Hui.” Kuang Xinnian (2000:55–60), a literature professor at Tsinghua University, gave 
the following account: 
 
I was … told that Wang Hui originally belonged to the “liberal intelligentsia,” but 
because of his article “The State of Contemporary Chinese Thought and the Question of 
Modernity,” this “intelligentsia” felt betrayed, and the Chinese hate traitors the most. … [In] 
recent years the hatred of Wang Hui and the Reading has seen no end. … [What] a 
sinister intelligentsia! As a popular saying goes, “The rising wind forebodes the coming 
storm.” Being a “public enemy” and “traitor” was exactly the reason Wang Hui was the 
subject of concerted nationwide attacks from the media this time … . … What surprises 
me is that so many self-claimed liberals like to enforce their “good will” on the others by 
giving instructions: what Dong Xiuyu should do, what Wang Hui should do, and what the 
“Cheung Kong-Reading Awards” should do. How come we never tell ourselves: how the 
SDX Joint Publishing Company is doing, how the Reading is doing, that’s Dong Xiuyu 
and Wang Hui’s business, what the fuck does it have to do with us? … In particular, 
liberalism advocates the freedom of speech, but when the Reading speaks in a different 
tiny voice, or becomes so-called “inaccessible,” or becomes the so-called “New Leftist,” 
[the liberals] would uphold justice by suppressing and eliminating [the voice]. … [The] 
mobilization of the media in the “Cheung Kong-Reading Awards” controversy and the 
fabrication of Wang Hui’s wrongdoings conjure up the Cultural Revolution. 
 
As usual, Wang Hui did not respond to the criticisms immediately in a direct manner, but 
rather posted a previously published article “Dead Ashes Rekindled” (Sihuo chongwen) on the 
Internet without any explanation. The article was a preface for an anthology of the debates between 
Lu Xun and his rivals in early-twentieth century China. A towering intellectual figure in modern China, 
                                                          
223 http://blog.boxun.com/sixiang/000625/10.htm (retrieved May 25, 2016). See also Qin Hui (2000a). 
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Lu Xun was noted for his fearless engagement in political and cultural debates. Revered as China’s 
most esteemed man of letters and the nation’s conscience, Lu was hated by his intellectual rivals, 
portrayed in the official discourse as “reactionary literati” (fandong wenren) who would do anything to 
bring down Lu. By quietly posting this old article, Wang was indeed drawing analogies between him 
and Lu Xun, between his liberal critics and the “dark forces” surrounding him, and between the 
criticisms on his award and those mounted against Lu Xun. Ten days later, Wang (2000a) issued a 
formal response. After stating that he was not involved in the rule-making and award-selection 
processes at all, Wang sharply placed the controversy in the context of the feud between the New 
Left and liberalism, questioned the motives and integrity of the critics, and called the criticisms 
“morbid attacks and calumnies” (13). As Barmé and Davies (2004:97) remarked, “Wang availed 
himself of the same diction of moral high dudgeon, the rich and ready-made vocabulary of 
categorical assertion, the colourful prose of denunciation as well as the biting satire of excoriation 
previously employed by Xu Youyu.” Wang (2000a:19) ended his clarifications with a one-sentence 
paragraph, whose combative tone was reminiscent of big-character posters in revolutionary China: 
“The attempts to tarnish our intellectual inquiry with calumnies and slanders are doomed to fail.” 
With fiery rhetoric and intense media attention, the controversy became a full-blown Internet 
brawl between New Leftists and liberals, with the participation of all high-profile intellectuals and 
previously nonaligned scholars.224 Some exchanges, such as those between Gan Yang and Yi Yuan (a 
pseudonym) and between Gan Yang and Dai Qing, became so nasty that they were filled with verbal 
abuses and curses. Exhausted and overwhelmed, the Cheung Kong Group and the SDX Joint Publishing 
Company put the awards to an end. The controversy became a signature event in the intellectual history 
of post-Mao China. It was obvious at this point that the cleavage between the two camps was so deep 
that it was beyond repair. 
 
Which Side is Habermas on? 
 
                                                          
224 See Zhonghua dushu wang (2008) for the relevant exchanges. 
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This section uses the “Habermas incident” as a case to illustrate the intensity and unfruitfulness 
of the polar opposition of the Chinese intelligentsia. As mentioned earlier, the intellectual debates in the 
1990s and early 2000s were characterized by abstract and sweeping theoretical assertions and 
appropriations of famous Western thinkers. The German philosopher and sociologist Jürgen Habermas 
was one of the classic thinkers whose names frequently appeared in the debates (Davies 2007a). The 
New Leftists regarded Habermas a theoretical authority. Their reading of Habermas, however, was highly 
selective: The New Leftists were not interested in his defense of modernity, his analysis of the public 
sphere, or his theory of communicative rationality, but only focused on his critical analysis of advanced 
capitalistic societies. A closer look at the polemical texts revealed a slightly different picture. The tribute 
was more of a gesture than an actual intellectual lineage. For example, an influential essay by Li Tuo 
(1997), a New Leftist literary critic, claimed that the Frankfurt School, and it particular its critique of the 
Enlightenment and modern technology, could shed great light on the discussion of contemporary China. 
But other than name dropping and abstract statements, as well as accusations of the liberals for 
unwillingness to engage critical social theory, this essay did not address the Frankfurt School in any 
substantive way. Indeed, the New Leftists frequently cited Habermas mainly because of his fame as a 
leader of the Frankfurt School, which seemed to offer a convenient theoretical tool to criticize capitalism. 
When Habermas defended the NATO’s military action in Kosovo in 1999, he suddenly fell out of favor 
with the New left. On the other side, while much less passionate about Habermas, the liberals avoided 
attacking Habermas himself—because of his undisputable intellectual reputation—but rather insisted on 
the inapplicability of the Frankfurt School and critical theory on a communist country that just began to 
develop capitalism. In the same issue of Reading, in which Li’s essay appeared, Lei Yi (1997) ridiculed 
the popularity of the Frankfurt School in Chin by saying “today is very Frankfurt.” As Lei saw it, it was 
wrong to mechanically applying critical theory, which was born in and criticized advanced capitalistic 
societies, to contemporary China that was in need of Enlightenment and more capitalism. 
The Chinese intelligentsia had been interested in Habermas since the early 1980s. In 1980, 
during their visit to West Germany, a delegation from CASS and Peking University visited Habermas and 
invited him to visit China. Aside from a quiet visit to Hong Kong, however, Habermas’s China trip had 
never materialized, despite the numerous invitations from many academic institutions. In April 1999, 
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Habermas finally decided to visit China. The trip, however, was cancelled at the last moment because of 
his health issues, despite the speculation in China that it had something to do with his support of the 
Kosovo War. In April 2001, with much anticipation, Habermas finally visited Beijing and Shanghai. The 
trip attracted tremendous attention from the media and the intelligentsia. Some even compared it to the 
high-profile China trips of Bertrand Russell, John Dewey, and Jean-Paul Sartre in the twentieth century, 
which all hailed as among the most significant cultural events in modern Chinese history (Feng Zhi 
2001:112). During the trip, Habermas gave seven speeches at CASS, the Party School of the CCP’s 
Central Committee, and some of China’s top universities, all drawing large crowds and wide media 
coverage. 
On April 17, Reading organized a colloquium, attended by Habermas and more than a dozen of 
well-known scholars and intellectuals. While some liberals, such as Xu Youyu, attended the colloquium, 
more attendees were associated with the New left. Aside from several “sensitive” questions, such as 
religion in contemporary China and the reception of Falun Gong, a quasi-religious group suppressed by 
the Chinese government, with no substantive answers from the Chinese intellectuals, Habermas 
expressed a strong interest in the debate between the New Leftists and the liberals and kept asking for 
details about the debate. The Chinese intellectuals, however, were more interested in theoretical 
questions, such as Habermas’s debates with Foucault and Rawls. Huang Ping briefly introduced the 
intellectual debate, but his answer appeared to be “cautious and reserved”—in Habermas’s words—and 
added more confusion rather than clarification (Feng Zhi 2001:117). Four days later, at the apartment of 
Markus Wernhard, director of Beijing’s Goethe-Institut, Habermas had dinner with a small number of 
Chinese intellectuals, including liberals Li Shenzhi, Xu Youyu, Qin Hui, and Lei Yi. Shortly after the dinner, 
both Xu Youyu (2001) and Lei Yi ([2001] 2008) published an essay describing the dinner. 
Xu’s essay began with Cao Weidong’s (2001) essay that appeared immediately before 
Habermas’s visit. Cao, a young literature researcher at CASS who was associated with the New Left, was 
an acquaintance of Habermas as a result of his experience as a visiting scholar at the Goethe University 
Frankfurt. From the late 1990s to early 2000s, Cao emerged as an authority on Habermas by translating 
and editing a number of Habermas’s books and writing introductory essays. In this essay, Cao 
commented Habermas’s view on the Kosovo War, and criticized it as inconsistent with his own theoretical 
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work. Toward the conclusion, in a triumphant tone, Cao described how his questioning made Habermas 
struggling and embarrassed. The liberals did not believe Cao’s narration. As Xu put it in the essay, “a 
serious scholar … was so easily admonished by a Chinese youngster … . Was it real?” Lei Yi brought the 
article to the dinner and asked Habermas about its accuracy. In Xu’s description, “Habermas reacted with 
agitation,” and “flatly and completely denied the description in [Cao’s] essay.” By citing Habermas’s 
reaction, Xu effectively accused Cao of lying. Xu also accused Zhang Rulun, a philosopher pinned by the 
liberals as a New Leftist, of misquoting Habermas. In approvingly discussing Habermas’s defense of the 
Kosovo War, Xu argued Habermas was indeed on the liberal side because of his advocacy for universal 
values and insistence on the supremacy of human rights over national sovereignty. As a response, Cao 
([2001] 2006) recounted his conversation with Habermas toward the end of his China trip. According to 
Cao, he had more than criticized Habermas during their private conversations, and Habermas had always 
responded graciously; therefore, it was Xu who was lying. Cao went on and derided Xu for lying about his 
personal relationship with Michael Dummett, a leading British philosopher, “[A] scholar claimed to be a 
dear friend of Michael Dummett when he was in Britain, and frequently bragged about such a relationship. 
Unfortunately, Dummett doesn’t even remember such a person. This has become a laughing stock in the 
academic circles … .” 
Lei Yi’s account of the dinner stirred even more controversy. According to his account: 
 
When talking about the state of today’s Chinese intelligentsia, Habermas 
suddenly said, “I have always had two impressions, but am not sure whether they are 
correct, … . First, I have read English-language translations of some of Reading’s editor 
Wang Hui’s articles as well as some of his interviews, and I have talked with him in 
person. I have also read in English some articles by Huang Ping, Reading’s coeditor. … I 
feel that their views have the tendency of serving totalitarianism and dictatorship as well 
as defending the Cultural Revolution. … Second, they seem to have often applied the 
theory of the Frankfurt School, but it doesn’t feel right, for they should use other theories, 
and not the theory of the Frankfurt School, to criticize China’s reform and opening up. 
There are theories that defend the Cultural Revolution in both Europe and America which 
they can directly take … .” 
 
This passaged excited the liberals, because it appeared to corroborate their long-held view that 
the New Liberals were “fake”—unlike “real” Western New Leftists such as Habermas, they did not support 
human rights; even worse, they supported the communist regime. And it came from Habermas! The 
liberals had never thought so highly of Habermas. As Xu Youyu (2012b:58) said, “Habermas almost 
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became the dean of [Chinese] liberalism.” Lei concluded his essay with the following compliment: 
“Habermas may not know China well, but he was able to describe so pungently the essence of the 
Chinese New Leftists, who flatter his theory. You have to deeply admire his insights as a thinker.” 
Commenting on this essay, Wu Jiaxiang put the widely-held view among the liberals in a blunt way: “As I 
have said, some New and Old Leftists in China are either bastards or idiots. If they cannot understand 
complex things and always mechanically apply simplified concepts to things as intense as galloping 
horses, take measures without considering changes in circumstances, and like to go to extremes, then 
how are they not idiots? If they do understand [complex things] but hold their views on purpose, they have 
an ulterior motive that is either power or money, then how are they not bastards? Now it appears, as 
expected, that real Western leftists are different from our natural-born leftists. If you don’t believe it, 
please read [Lei’s] essay.”225 
Unsurprisingly, the New Leftists responded with anger. Cao Weidong ([2001] 2003) recounted a 
complexly different comment Habermas made to him about the dinner, “My impression is that if the 
attendees of the colloquium organized by Reading are Chinese New Leftists, then those discussed with 
me at the apartment of the Goethe-Institut’s director would be China’s Old Leftists.” Cao also emphasized 
the status of Habermas as an outsider with limited knowledge of China, and therefore his critique, even if 
they were real, must be taken with a grain of salt—a quite ironical comment considering that such an 
argument had been mostly made by the liberals. Huang Ping ([2001] 2003) clarified that Habermas had 
never met with Wang Hui in person, and Habermas had told him twice unequivocally that he had never 
read anything by the Chinese New Leftists, except for Wang Hui’s interview in the New Left Review. 
Huang also quoted Habermas as making the following comments on Hayek during the colloquium: 
“Nothing original. It is empty.” The implication was clear: there is no way that Hayek would be on the 
liberal side. 
Wang Hui, a key figure in the controversy, did not attend the meetings as he was in Germany. He 
was no less angry, however. A year later, in the May issue of Reading, Wang Hui (2002:158–59) 
addressed the event in the monthly editorial note: “Inconceivably, while I was out of country, a ‘historian’ 
could concoct my meetings [with Habermas] out of thin air, and recount with certainty Habermas’s 
                                                          
225 http://www.chinavalue.net/General/Blog/2008-7-14/75742.aspx (retrieved May 23, 2016). 
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criticisms of me.” The quotation mark on the word “historian” was a clear indication of contempt. As Wang 
met with Habermas a few months after the latter’s China trip, he also quoted Habermas’s private 
conversation with him, which mostly supported the New Left position, such as the praise of China’s 
development and the need for Europe and China to work together to challenge the American hegemony. 
According to Wang, Habermas was surprised to learn that the liberals used him to attack Wang, and said, 
“As I know so little about China, how could I have made baseless accusations?” Wang’s editorial note 
sparked a new wave of criticisms from the liberals, who accused Wang of abusing his power as a journal 
coeditor by retaliating against the liberals in the form of an editorial note.226 Looking back at the 
“Habermas incident,” it is striking to note that the liberals and the New Leftists could not even reach 
agreements on facts as both sides used their version of facts to accuse the other of dishonesty. It is more 
interesting how both sides worked hard to take “ownership” of Habermas by using him to justify their own 
positions and bashing the rival camp, instead of seriously engaging his thought. 
  
                                                          
226 See, for example, the following exchanges on the Internet: http://bbs.tianya.cn/post-no01-66977-1.shtml; 







In an essay published in 2008, British political scientist and essayist Mark Leonard described his 
first visit to CASS in 2003. When told by the vice president, a high-ranking cadre within the Communist 
Party’s apparatus, that the academy had 50 research centers covering 260 disciplines in the humanities 
and social sciences with 4,000 full-time researchers, Leonard was shocked. Previously unfamiliar with the 
Chinese intelligentsia, he was fascinated by the seemingly booming intellectual life in China. This study 
hopes to make the complex ecology of the Chinese intelligentsia less confusing. 
While there is no shortage of media coverage or academic attention to today’s Chinese 
intellectuals, two misperceptions can be easily identified. On the one hand, those with no affinity for the 
CCP often equate Chinese intellectuals with political dissidents who are subjects of ruthless persecution 
from the ruling party. Such a characterization contains some truth. Liu Xiaobo, the 2010 Nobel Peace 
Prize winner, has been incarcerated as a political prisoner since late 2008. Ding Zilin, a “Tiananmen 
Mother” whose teenage son was shot to death on the night on June 3, 1989, has been under house 
arrest for decades. The problem is that they belong to the group of dissidents, the most politically 
sensitive members of the liberal camp. While they are the intellectuals most familiar to Western observers, 
the majority of Chinese intellectuals are not dissidents—indeed many liberal intellectuals have led quite 
comfortable lives, with a respectable university job, a nice house, and a car. Indeed, even some of the 
most famous dissidents in Beijing are quite well-off in terms of material well-being. It is also worth noting 
that as a result of the party-state’s information control, at least within China, the dissidents are not as 
influential as Westerners tend to think. Before winning the Nobel Prize, Liu Xiaobo was indeed an 
unknown figure for most average Chinese, including educated youth. 
On the other hand, Western observers who are critical of capitalism often see the Chinese New 
Left as intellectual heroes who forcefully challenge American hegemony and convincingly show the 
possibility of an alternative modernity. These observers may have not been confronted with a puzzle: the 
notion of human rights have never entered China’s New Left discourse, but is instead welcomed by the 
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liberals, who are on the right side of China’s ideological spectrum. In Leonard’s book, What Does China 
Think? (2008b), for example, Chinese liberals are portrayed as market fundamentalists who have 
benefited greatly from crony capitalism, while the new Leftists are cast as critical and pro-democracy 
intellectuals who fearlessly challenge such a corrupt system. My study hopes to provide a more balanced 
and nuanced picture. 
 
Analyses and Findings 
 
The central question of this study is how the liberal intellectuals became liberals. It differs from 
previous studies by taking a sociological perspective. Unlike existing studies, which have been mostly 
carried out by intellectual historians and political theorists, this study consciously casts itself against the 
literature of sociology, and in particular the sociology of intellectuals and knowledge. Instead of purely 
textual analysis or historical contextualism, I conducted extensive fieldwork, interviewed a large number 
of intellectuals, and talked with many others. Rather than treating the ideological classification as given, 
this study sees classification as a process of alignment and differentiation. Rather than beginning from 
the classification and then proceeding with the internal differentiation, this study looks at how Chinese 
intellectual have been categorized into different camps and how group dynamics have shaped their 
thoughts. 
Through a historical narrative of post-Mao Chinese intelligentsia, Chapter 2 looks at the structural 
transformation that has contributed to the intellectual division. After the death of Mao Zedong and the end 
of the Cultural Revolution in 1976, the political and intellectual elites were divided into reformers and 
whateverists. In order to defeat the whateverists who claimed ideological orthodoxy, Deng Xiaoping 
positioned himself as a reformer and aligned himself with the reformist establishment intellectuals. To 
claim ideological legitimacy, Deng even initially tolerated the pro-democracy movement launched by the 
nonestablishment intellectuals. But once Deng consolidated his power, he suppressed the movement. 
Nevertheless, due to the relative liberal policies, the CCP enjoyed the support of reformist intellectuals in 
most of the 1980s. The ideological battles during this period were mainly between the conservatives and 
the reformers. As the overwhelming majority of the intellectuals were reformist in orientation, the 
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intellectual rivalry was part of elite politics. In the second half of the 1980s, an intellectual field outside 
elite politics was beginning to develop. Against the backdrop of the culture craze, some young 
intellectuals became prominent figure by introducing Western thought. They initiated a New 
Enlightenment movement.  
After the Tiananmen Square crackdown in 1989, the reformist intellectual elites were purged and 
lost their influence. As a result of the expansion of higher education, the intellectual field grew 
dramatically in the second half of the 1990s, and the younger, more educated intellectuals who were 
members of the New Enlightenment movement and with no direct ties to the political establishment 
emerged as the key players in the intellectual field. However, as the CCP embarked on a path of 
neoliberalism, with a combination of market economy and political authoritarianism, these intellectuals 
began to divide into two rival camps: the liberals and the New Left. In the 1990s, a series of debates 
broke out with regard to how to interpret China’s crony capitalism. 
With the continuing penetration of the political field, the intellectual field has been further divided 
and fragmented in the 2000s and up to this day. On the left side, in line with China’s global rise, the New 
Leftists began to converge with Maoists and nationalists. On the liberal side, the intellectual movement 
has converged with the civil rights movement. 
Chapter 3 tackles a puzzle in the study of Chinese intellectuals: who are the liberals? It begins 
with an observation that from various ideological perspectives, people have starkly different 
characterizations of Chinese liberals. It also notes a perennial theme in China studies: the inauthenticity 
of Chinese liberalism—the view that Chinese liberals throughout the twentieth century tended to 
subordinated individual liberty to national salvation. This chapter argues that the confusion stems from an 
attempt to define the social category of Chinese liberals on a substantive level that regards liberalism as a 
pre-defined ideology imported from the West, and that this approach is ultimately misleading because it 
generalizes on the basis of some hypothetical existential condition. It takes the opposite approach by 
identifying the commonalities of the self-identified liberals. Based on my sample of 56 self-identified 
liberals, I argue that “liberal” is used to describe the political orientation of a wide array of intellectuals 
who are themselves scholars, social and cultural critics, journalists, human rights lawyers, social activists, 
political activists, and Christian liberals. Moreover, liberalism in post-Tiananmen China is not a coherent 
234 
 
ideology, but a relational concept that is socially embedded and historically contingent. As a community of 
discourse, Chinese liberalism contains different, and often conflicting, strands of thought. Chinese 
liberalism is more about what they are against, rather than what they are for. What the liberals share and 
what set them apart from the leftists, ultimately, is their anti-authoritarian sentiment. Such a sentiment is a 
result of shared life experiences in communist China, and has been solidified by two historical events: the 
Cultural Revolution and the Tiananmen Square crackdown. 
After examining structural factors and life histories, Chapter 4 moves to the transformative impact 
of the binary opposition between liberalism and the New Left. When the intellectual debates broke out in 
the mid-1990s, names became one of the contested sites. On the one hand, because of Maoism as 
reference, “left” was widely perceived to be a derogatory term; on the other hand, as a result of popular 
aversion to authoritarianism, “liberalism” as an ideological designator achieved a wide currency in the 
popular discourse, despite the hostility from the political authorities. Therefore, both camps fought for right 
to “liberalism.” The liberals won the battle for the term for two reasons. First, the label “New Left” was 
successfully attached to the opposing camp. Second, the liberals had a much border popular base, 
including a liberal journalistic field. Nevertheless, labelling became an effective tactic for both sides, as 
the liberals successfully attached the New Leftists with Maoism, which was seen as the Old Left, whereas 
the New Leftists characterized the liberals as neoliberals and neoconservatives who did not care about 
social justice. In the course of verbal squabbles, the positions of both sides were pushed further and 
further apart. Such a binary opposition not only shaped the self-definition of the intellectuals, but also has 




What does the future hold for the liberal intellectuals? It largely hinges on the future of China, 
which in turn has much to do with the action of the liberal intellectuals. While I will not venture into 
predicting the future, the past certainly provides some clues. 
First, with respect to China’s political future, the most important fact is the marked slowdown of 
Chinese economy. The stability of China’s political system during the past 25 years is certainly impressive, 
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but it should be noted that such stability was, to a large degree, a result of China’s steady and rapid 
economic growth. The economic gain has successfully minimized the legitimacy crisis caused by the 
1989 Tiananmen crackdown. The New Leftists are right to point out that the CCP has enjoyed a high level 
popular support. Such a support, however, should not be over-interpreted, for communism, or to some 
extent socialism, as an official ideology has greatly faded. With sufficient but limited economic security—
which explains why China has had high saving rates—the Chinese people have refused to envision a 
political alternative. Once the economic becomes a lingering problem, the regime’s legitimacy problem will 
resurface. In 2015, China recorded its slowest economic growth in 25 years. To be sure, the growth rate 
of 6.9 percent is still considerably higher than most major economies, but half-way through 2016, there 
has been no sign of improving. What is more, likely because of the concern of political stability, the top 
leaders did not take a decisive step in changing China’s economic structure, it is almost certain that the 
double-digit growth only belongs to the glorious past. On the one hand, a continuous limited economic 
growth is still more likely than economic collapse; on the other hand, an economy largely built on the 
exploitation of debt bubbles will only create long-term risks. With the economic slowdown, the party-state 
will have fewer resources to maintain the political stability, thus renders the future highly unpredictable. In 
particular, once the problem of inflation becomes out of control, China will face a real crisis. However, 
even with such a crisis, a Tiananmen-style radical uprising will be highly unlikely. More important, as the 
cases on Bo Xilai and Zhou Yongkang tell us, the party is not a monolithic bloc, and the Communist Party 
has not solved the problem of power succession. Therefore, it is reasonable to expect that as social 
pressure mounts, a liberal faction within the party may seize power by positioning itself as liberal and 
aligning with liberal intellectuals. In other words, another Gorbachev may be unlikely, but it is not 
unreasonable to expect another Deng Xiaoping. 
Second, intellectual will continue to be a significant social force in China. As this study suggests, 
the political trajectory in post-Mao China has been deeply shaped by the ideological struggles, as part of 
both elite politics and the civil rights movement. The intellectual debates per se, however, will have less 
influence on national politics. With the development of the intellectual field, the difference between 
academics and intellectuals have become increasingly salient since the 2010s, which means that 
intellectuals will no longer be able to intervene in public affairs with abstract Western theories. Rather, 
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they will play their role as organic intellectuals by acting as spokespersons for different social groups. 
More particular, liberal intellectuals will speak for various civil rights movements, whereas various leftist 
intellectuals will continue engage in the interpreters of China’s national rejuvenation. 
Third, the party-state is likely to continue its tight ideological control. As detailed in Chapter 2, the 
party-state has initiated a sustained crackdown on liberal intellectuals since 2009. In April 2016, however, 
Xi Jinping delivered a speech to intellectuals nationwide, in which he praised the constructive role of 
Chinese intellectuals and called for a tolerance of dissent. How are we to interpret such a message? 
Ironically, this speech was met with deep suspicion from the liberal intellectuals, as it had so much 
resemblance with the Hundred Flowers Campaign of 1956 during which Mao encourage the intellectuals 
to openly express their opinions of the party-state, only followed by the massive purge of those who 
responded to Mao’s invitation during the following year’s Anti-rightist Campaign. A closer reading of Xi’s 
speech reveals some clues. While encourage intellectuals to speak out, Xi also warned that “[under] no 
circumstances should [intellectuals] damage national dignity or violate their conscience.”227 In line with the 
party’s initiative to “cultivate” elite think tanks that serve national interests, Xi was encouraging 
intellectuals to serve the country by offering policy advice. He will not, however, tolerate ideological 
challenges.  
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Name Year of Birth Profession 
Cao Siyuan 曹思源 1946 Legal scholar 
Cui Weiping 崔卫平* 1956 Literature professor 
Chen Yongmiao 陈永苗 1975 Political commentator 
Chen Ziming 陈子明 1952 Political commentator 
Cong Riyun 从日云 1956 Political theorist 
Dang Guoying 党国英 1957 Economist 
Ding Dong 丁东 1951 Historian 
Feng Xingyuan 冯兴元 1965 Economist 
Gao Quanxi 高全喜 1962 Political philosopher 
Gu Su 顾肃 1955 Political philosopher 
Guo Yukuan 郭宇宽 1977 Journalist 
Guo Yushan 郭玉闪 1977 Human rights activist 
He Guanghu 何光沪 1950 Religious studies scholar 
He Weifang 贺卫方 1960 Legal scholar 
Hu Xingdou 胡星斗 1962 Economist 
Jiang Qisheng 江棋生 1948 Political commentator 
Jiao Guobiao 焦国标 1963 Cultural critic 
Lei Yi 雷颐 1956 Historian 
Li Yinhe 李银河 1952 Sociologist 
Li Ziyang 李子旸 1973 Economist 
Liu Haibo 刘海波 1969 Legal scholar 
Liu Junning 刘军宁 1961 Political theorist 
Liu Suli 刘苏里 1960 Businessperson 
Liu Yejin 刘业进 1974 Economist 
Liu Yu 刘瑜 1975 Political scientist 
Ma Licheng 马立诚 1946 Journalist 
Mao Yushi 茅于轼 1929 Economist 
Pan Wei 潘维 1960 Political scientist 
Shao Jian 邵建 1956 Cultural critic 
Sheng Hong 盛洪 1954 Economist 
Wang Jianxun 王建勋 1972 Legal scholar 
Wang Lixiong 王力雄 1953 Writer 
Wu Zuolai 吴祚来 1963 Cultural critic 
Xia Yeliang 夏业良 1960 Economist 
Xiao Gongqin 萧功秦 1946 Historian 
Xiao Shu 笑蜀 1962 Journalist 
Wu Si 吴思 1957 Cultural critic 
Xu Xiaonian 许小年 1953 Economist 
Xu Youyu 徐友渔 1947 Political philosopher 
Xu Zhiyong 许志永 1973 Human rights activist 
Yang Hengjun 杨恒均 1965 Political commentator 
Yang Zhizhu 杨支柱 1966 Legal scholar 
Yao Zhongqiu (Qiu Feng) 姚中秋（秋风） 1966 Historian 
Yu Haocheng 于浩成 1925 Legal scholar 
Yu Jie 余杰 1973 Political commentator 
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Yu Shicun 余世存 1969 Cultural critic 
Yuan Weishi 袁伟时 1931 Historian 
Zhang Boshu 张博树 1955 Political philosopher 
Zhang Dajun 张大军 1973 Political commentator 
Zhang Ming 张鸣 1957 Historian 
Zhang Qianfan 张千帆 1964 Legal scholar 
Zhang Shuguang 张曙光 1939 Economist 
Zhang Weiying 张维迎 1959 Economist 
Zhang Wen 章文 1974 Journalist 
Zhi Xiaomin 智效民 1946 Cultural critic 
Zhou Kecheng 周克成 1981 Journalist 
Zhang Yaojie 张耀杰 1964 Historian 




Name Year of Birth Profession 
Han Deqiang 韩德强 1967 Economist 
Huang Jisu 黄纪苏 1955 Playwright 
Huang Ping 黄平 1958 Sociologist 
Pan Wei 潘维 1960 Political scientist 
Sima Nan 司马南 1956 Journalist 
Wang Hui 汪晖 1959 Literary critic 
Wang Xiaodong 王小东 1955 Political commentator 
Wu Fatian (Wu Danhong) 吴法天（吴丹红） 1978 Legal scholar 
Yao Yang 姚洋 1964 Economist 





Appendix B. Script for Interviews 
 
The following questions only served as an interview guide. While the questions were all asked, many 
more questions were added during the interviews. 
 
1. Do you view yourself as a liberal (or New Leftist/leftist)? 
2. How do you feel about your being labeled as a liberal (or New Leftist/leftist)? 
3. What is your view of the New Left (or liberalism)? 
4. What was your general position in the 1980s? Did you identify yourself with the reformers or 
conservatives back then? 
5. When did your thought take shape? 
6. How has your past experience shaped your thought? What were the major events that helped 
shape your ideas? 
7. Briefly describe your thought on the path of China’s reform, and in particular the market and 
political reforms, democracy, and individual liberty. 
8. In your opinion, what sets your though apart from that of the New Left (or liberalism)? 
9. Which thinkers have had the most profound impact on you? 
10. What contemporary Chinese intellectuals do you respect the most? 
11. What books have shaped your thought? 
12. Have you felt pressure? In what ways has the pressure shaped your thought? 
